



THE
COMMENTARIES
OF
C. JULIUS CÆSAR,

Of his Warres in GALLIA, and the *Civile* Warres
betwixt him and POMPEY,

Translated into English:

With

Many excellent and judicious

OBSERVATIONS

Thereupon:

As also The Art of our *Modern Training*, or, *Tactick Practise*;

By CLEMENT EDMONDS *Esquire*,

Remembrancer of the City of LONDON.

Whereunto is adjoyned

The EIGHTH COMMENTARY


of the Warres in GALLIA;

With some short Observations upon it.

Together with

The LIFE of CÆSAR, and an Account of
his MEDALLS.

Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged.



L O N D O N,

Printed by R. DANIEL, and are to be sold by *Henry Tivyford*
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Cops 10. 16



TO THE
P R I N C E.

S I R :



Having ended this task of Observations, and according to your gracious pleasure and command, supplied such parts as were wanting to make up the Totall of these Commentaries: it doth return again, by the lowest steps of humbleness, to implore the high patronage of your Princely favour; emboldened specially because it carrieth Cæsar and his Fortunes, as they come related from the same Author: which, in the deep Judgement of his most excellent Majesty, is preferred above all other profane histories; and so commended, by his sacred Authority, to your reading, as a chief pattern and Master-piece of the Art of war. And herein your admired wisdom may happily the rather deem it capable of freer passage, in that it is not altogether unproper for these happy daies; as knowing, that War is never so well handled, as when it

ΒΑΣΙ-
ΛΙΚΟΝ
ΔΩΡΟΝ.

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is

*is made an Argument of discourse in times of sweet and
plenteous peace. The blessings whereof may ever crown
your years ; as the sovereign good of this temporarie life,
and the chiefeſt Ornaments of Princely condition.*

The humbleſt

of your Highneſſe ſervants,

CLEMENT EDMONDS.



In
CLEMENTIS EDMONDI
De re militari ad
JUL. CÆSARIS *Commentarios Observationes.*

Cur creperos motus, & aperto prælia Marte
Edmondus nobis pace vigente rejert ?
Cur sensus mentesque Ducem rimatur, & effert ?
Diserteque Anglos bellica multa docet ?
*Scilicet, ut media meditetur prælia pace
Anglia belli potens, nec moriatur honos.
Providus hæc certe patriæ depromit in usus ;
Ut patriæ pacem qui cupit, arma parat.*

Guil. Camdenus, *Cl.*

To my friend, Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

Who thus extracts, with more then Chymick Art ;
The spirit of Books, shews the true way to find
Th' Elxer that our leaden Parts convert
Into the golden Metall of the Mind.
Who thus observes in such materiall kind
The certain Motions of his Practises,
Knows on what Center th' Actions of Mankind
Turn in their course, and sees their fatalness.
And he that can make these observances;
Must be above his Book, more then his Pen.
For, we may be assur'd, he men can guesse,
That thus doth CÆSAR know, the Man of men.
Whose Work, improv'd here to our greater gain,
Makes CÆSAR more then CÆSAR to contain.

Sam. Daniel.

To his worthy friend, Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

Observing well what Thou hast well Observ'd
In CÆSAR'S Works, his Warres, and Discipline ;
Whether His Pen hath earn'd more Praise, or Thine,
My shallow Censure doubtfully hath swerv'd.
If strange it were, if wonder it deserv'd,
That what He wrought so fair, He wrote so fine ;
Me thinks, it's stranger, that Thy leained Line
Should our best Leaders lead, not having serv'd.
But hereby (Clement) hast Thou made thee known
Able to counsell, aptest to record
The Conquests of a CÆSAR of our own ;
HENRY, thy Patron, and my Princely Lord ;
Whom (O!) Heav'n prosper, and protect from harms,
In glorious Peace, and in victorious Arms.

JOSUAH SILVESTER.
(44)

TO MY FRIEND,
MASTER
CLEMENT EDMONDS.

Epigramme.

NOt *Cæsar's* deeds, nor all his honours wonne
In these West-parts; nor, when that warre was done,
The name of *Pompey* for an Enemy;
Cato to boot; *Rome*, and her libertie;
All yielding to his fortune: nor, the while,
To have ingrav'd these Acts with his own stile;
And that so strong, and deep, as might be thought
He wrote with the same spirit that he fought;
Nor that his Work liv'd, in the hands of foes,
Un-argu'd then; and (yet) hath fame from those:
Not a'l these, *Edmonds*, or what else put to,
Can so speak *Cæsar*, as thy Labours do.
For, where his person liv'd scarce one just age,
And that 'midst envy' and Parts; then, fell by rage;
His deeds too dying, save in books: (whose good
How few have read! how fewer understood!)
Thy learned hand, and true Promethean Art,
As by a new creation, part by part,
In every counsell, stratageme, desighe,
Action, or Engine, worth a note of thine,
T' all future time not only doth restore
His Life, but makes that he can dye no more.

Ben. Johnson.

Another, of the same.

WHo, *Edmonds*, reads thy book, and doth not see
What th' antique Souldiers were, the modern be?
Wherein thou shew'st, how much the later are
Beholden to this Master of the Warre:
And that in Action there is nothing new,
More then to varie what our Elders knew.
Which all but ignorant Captains will confesse:
Not to give *Cæsar* this, makes ours the lesse.
Yet thou, perhaps, shalt meet some tongues will grutch
That to the world thou shouldst reveal so much;
And thence deprave thee, and thy Work. To those
Cæsar stands up, as from his urne late rose
By thy great Art; and doth proclaim by me,
They murder him again, that envie thee.

Ben. Johnson.



CAIUS IULIUS CÆSAR DICTATOR
PERPETUUS
ÆTATIS SUÆ LVI.



CÆSARIS ELOGIUM.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR.

*Lucii Cæsaris F. Lux Cæsarum & Pater,
Romanus Alexander, Terræ Mars:
Omnibus tam metuendus, quam mitis;
Pretium fecit servituti.*

*Victo orbe Urbem victricem orbis vicit.
Defuere illi hostes, hostem habuit Patriam,
Ne deesset unquam quod vinceret.*

*Ingratam Patriam patriis armis punit.
Eam vicit invitus, quâ vixit invitâ.*

*Qui Romæ propugnator non regnavit, regnavit expugnator:
Pro Româ triumpharat, de Româ triumphavit:*

Amavit tamen inimicam, nolenti profuit.

*Sæpe à fulmine lauro servatus regiâ,
Quem inermem timuerunt arma, armata necavit toga.*

Cessit Civibus Cæsar Cæsus:

Sero cognitum luxit Patria;

Viventem hostem, mortuum vocavit Patrem,

Parricidium confessa cum patrem dixit.

Disce lector:

Melius sæpe quæ non habes vides, quam quæ habes.



THE LIFE
OF
C. JULIUS CÆSAR;
with certain Historicall Observations upon
his Medalls.



THE excessive Lustre of a million of gallant atchievements successfully performed by *Cæsar* (the most illustrious and celebrated Favourite of Fortune) hath through all ages so dazzled the greatest part of Mankind, especially those, both ancient and modern, who made it their business to describe the great transactions either of their own, or former ages; that they have not onely parallell'd him with the greatest Heroes of the first ages, but have ballanc'd him with *Alexander*, the most generous and the most glorious of all Monarchs. Nay in their account *Cæsar* farre outweighs him, since that all that may be call'd great or illustrious, either as to *Vertue*, *Valour*, true *Magnanimity*, or *Clemency*, is more conspicuous in him then in all the *Roman* Emperours, who after him sate at the helm of that Monarchy. Those who made difficulty to assign him the first place among the *Roman* Emperours, considered not certainly that the designation of a building is the Master-piece of the Architect, and that superstruction may require no eminency of perfection. For having consummated those innumerable Trophies he had erected among the *Galls* by those about *Pharsalia*, he laid the foundation of that eternall fame the world hath deservedly honoured him with since: nay, to that height of adoration had he rais'd the minds of Posterity, that his very Successours thought it their greatest glory to wear the livery of his Name, and after him to be called *Cæsars*.

To offer at a perfect anatomy of this great man's actions, were to quote most Authours and writers that have been, and consequently a work of too long a breath. It shall therefore suffice to trace him out in those great designs whereby he laid the foundations of the *Roman* greatnesse.

The first thing worthy, not onely notice, but admiration, is the strange judgement of *Sylla* of him: who reflecting on the great perfections of *Cæsar* when yet a youth, and the strange vivacity and conduct of his first actions,

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made that inhumane proposition that he might be killed, as he had caus'd divers of the Kinred and party of *Marius*, who had married *Julia* an Aunt of *Caesar's* by the mother side. Nor doth Envy want pre-
tences, since as he conjectur'd, one *Caesar* contain'd many *Marius's*, and should, if suffer'd to live; prove the *Viper* of the *Common-wealth*. But this may be easily pass'd by, since that they are indeed the greatest actions that must expect Censure. But it must in the mean time denote a strange transcendency of courage and confidence, to think to conquer that people who had conquer'd the *Universe*, it must be the effect of an ambition more then humane, for this is commonly fetter'd to probabilities. The Emperour *Iulian*, though he hath made it his business to satyrize against his predecessors, yet having to do with *Caesar*, he by a strange fiction discovers the greatness of his designations. *Caesar*, sayes he, a person of a gallant and gracefull presence, being entered the place, where *Romulus* was to entertain the *Gods*, and *Roman* Emperours at the *Saturnalian* feasts, came in with such an insolent deportment, that the *Gods* were of opinion, he was not come thither unlesse it were to manage some ambitious plots against the Majesty of Heaven, whereof *Jupiter* being very jealous, he was thrust by, till at last *Mars* and *Venus* made him place. The ingenuity of this *Satyrist* amounts onely to thus much, to paint ever that great *Vertue*, that great indulgence of *Nature*, and *Fortune* in the colours of an insatiable ambition, which had not this Censor been excessively guilty of, might have prov'd somewhat.

But the endowments of *Nature*, the constant presence of *Fortune*, and the surprizing *Glory* consequentall to his Actions, were the Genius's that rais'd him to such high adventures, as the sudden change of the *Democrat-icall* State of *Rome* into a *Monarchicall*, to pretend a title to the great acquets of a valorous people for 700. yeares, and to assume to himself an Empire far greater then the *Assyrian*, *Persian*, or *Macedonian*, both in extent of time greatness and power. For not to descend to the acquisitions of the later Emperours, we shall onely take a view of the *Roman* Empire as it stood, before *Caesar* seiz'd the raines of Government. In *Europe* they were Masters of all *Italy* and *Gallia Cisalphina*, or *Lombardy*, *Austria*, and *Illyricum* now call'd *Slavonia*, reaching as farre as *Danubius*; They had reduc'd all *Greece*, the States of *Athens*, *Lacedemonia*, *Thebes*, *Corinth*, and all *Peloponessus* now call'd *Morea*; *Macedon*, and *Epire* now call'd *Albania*, and *Thrace*. They had the Islands of *Sicily*, *Sardynia*, *Creta*, *Candia*, *Cypres*, *Rhodes*, and *Negrepont*, and divers others in the *Mediterranean* Sea. They had taken in all *Spain*, and (which was *Caesar's* own work) all *France* that part of *Germany* lying on the *Rhine*, call'd *Gallia Belgica*, and great *Britain*. They were Masters of all *Africk*, (the third part of the world then) even to pull down the pride of *Carthage*. The best Provinces of *Asia* were Tributaries, as *Syria*, *Phoenicia*, *Palestina*, *Iudaea*, *Phrygia*, *Caria*, *Cilicia* and *Bithynia*. *Egypt* and *Cappadocia* were confederates. In *Armenia* and *Colchos* they had forces. *Albania*, *Iberia* and some other Coun-
tries paid Contributions and did homage. In fine they were so great that they
were

The life of Iulius Caesar.

were unconquerable unlesse by their own strength, that so they might have this satisfaction and glory in their conquest, that they triumph'd over them-
selves.

It is easy to attribute to ambition and discord what is the design of Fate. Greatness must expect a period, and to be successfull presumes a happy conjuncture of men and affaires. Some differences there were between *Caesar* and *Pompey* (the most eminent and the most powerfull in *Rome*) rak'd up in the embers of the civile warre between *Sylla* and *Marius*, wherein the later being slain, the other made himself *Dictator*, and seiz'd *Rome*, but quitted both before his death. *Pompey* had sided with *Sylla*, *Caesar* with *Marius*, as being his Kinsman. But to ascend a little higher in these Broiles, we are to note that *Sylla* having dispower'd himself, *Pompey* and *Crassus* came into repute. The later was the more recommended by his wisdom, eloquence, Nobility and excessive riches; the other had gain'd the popular esteem by his Victories and great actions in warre, even in *Sylla's* time. While the differences of these two encreas'd with their greatness, *Caesar* returns to *Rome* from his Pratorship in *Spain*, bringing that reputation with him, that swell'd the greatness and ambition of his thoughts. He had gone through most charges Civile and Military; he had been *Quaestor*, *Tribune* of the Souldiers, *Edile*, *High-priest* and *Prator*. All which, with other accomplishments he was furnish'd with, which we shall mention elsewhere, though they brought him into much esteem, yet was he not yet arriv'd to near the Authority and reputation of either *Crassus* or *Pompey*.

Caesar, though he were come to *Rome*, yet stifled all thoughts of aspiring for a while: so that both *Crassus* and *Pompey* apply'd themselves to him, hoping by his accession to ruine one the other. But *Caesar* declin'd both, and carried himself with circumspection, that he endeavour'd to reconcile them, so hoping by his newtrality to undermine them both, which was, as *Plutarch* sayes, observ'd onely by *Cato*. At length he so order'd things, that he made an agreement between them, and so oblig'd both; which caus'd that, retaining some jealousies of each other, they equally courted *Caesar's* friendship, by which means he became equall to either: so that the power which before was between two, became now tripartite. Things being thus appeas'd, *Caesar* demands the Consulship: which obtain'd, he carried himself in it with that reputation, that his Co-Consul *Bibulus* left all to his managery. To maintain the authority he had got, he himself took to wife *Calpurnia* the daughter of *Lucius Piso*, who was to succeed him in the Consulate, and bestowes his own Daughter *Julia* on *Pompey*; and so taking in *Crassus*, they make a League, and being equally ambitious conspire to invade the Common-wealth. *Caesar* chuses for his Province the *Galls*, or *France*; *Crassus*, *Asia*; *Pompey*, *Spain*; whither they went with three puissant Armies, as if the world had been to be trichotomiz'd among these three. What *Caesar* did in his Province, what Battels he fought, what people he subdued, what
valour,

valour, policy, success follow'd him every where, may be seen in his own *Commentaries* of that war, approv'd by his very enemies as modest and impartiall, and attested by *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Suetonius*, *Appianus Alexandrinus*, *Lucan*, *Paulus Orosius*, *Florus*, *Eutropius*; too great a testimony against one censorious *Asinius Pollio*. By this war Cæsar got the reputation of the greatest Captain that ever was, subduing all France from the Pyrenean hills to the Alps, and so to the Rhene. But to forbear particular instances, as that he conquer'd the *Suiffers* and *Tigurins* (who were according to *Plutarch* 300000. men, whereof 19000. were well disciplin'd) this is most worth our remark, that during these so great warres, he omitted not, both by intelligence and presents, to endear his friends both at Rome and elsewhere, doing many things without the Senate's leave, upon the score of the League with Pompey and Crassus. Nay, his courting of all sorts of people, both Souldier and Citizen, was none of his least master-pieces, by which means he had supplanted Pompey in matter of esteem, before he perceiv'd it. To this purpose hath *Pliny* observed, *Lib. 33. cap. 3.* that in the time of his *Aedility*, that is to say his *Shrievedome*, he was so prodigall, that all the *Vienfills* and armes that he made use of at publick sports and combats, were all of silver, which yet afterwards were bestow'd among the people; and that he was the first that ever brought forth the beasts in chariots and cages of silver. This it was made some suspect him guilty of rapine, and that he plunder'd Temples and Cities *sepius ob predam quam ob delictum*.

But this reputation of Cæsar begat jealousy in Pompey, which (the tie of their correspondence being loos'd by the death of *Julia*) was easily seen to break forth into a flame, especially now that Crassus, the third man, was together with divers stout Roman Legions buried with infamy in *Parthia*. Thus the foundations of Friendship and Alliance in great ones being once taken away, the superstructures fall down immediately. Nothing could decide the emulation of two so great persons, as Pompey and Cæsar, (the one desying superiority, the other equality) but as great a war. It could not but be universall, when Senate, Armies, Kingdomes, Cities, Allies, all were some way or other imbarqu'd in the quarrell. There was on one side 11. Legions, on the other 18. The seat of the warre was *Italy*, *France*, *Epirus*, *Thessaly*, *Aegypt*, *Asia* and *Africk*; through all which after it had ravag'd 5. yeares, the controversy was decided in *Spain*. That Ambition (the imperfection onely of the greatest minds) might have been the occasion of so inveterate a warre, hath been the opinion of divers others, who charge not Pompey with so great discoveries of it as Cæsar, to whom they assign a greater then the Empire; as if their mutuall distrust and jealousy of one another, should be able to cause so many tragedies through so many Countries. Besides Cæsar had his Enemies at Rome, and among others *Cato*, who threatned to impeach him when he was once out of command. What bandying there was against him, we find somewhat in the later end of the eighth Commentary, to this purpose. *Lentulus* and *Marcellus*, both of Pompey's Faction, being Consuls, it is mov'd in the Senate, that Cæsar might be call'd home, and another sent to supply his command of the Army then

then in *Gallia*; since that he, having written for the Consulship, should according to Law have been personally in Rome. Cæsar demands to be continued in Commillion and Government, and that he might demand the Consulship absent. This Pompey opposes, though he himself as much contrary to Law, had had the Consulship and other dignities before he was at full Age.

This deny'd, Cæsar proposes, that he would come to Rome as a private man, and give over his command, so that Pompey quitted his employment in *Spain*. About this the Senate was much divided. Cicero proposes a mediation: but Pompey's party prevailing, it was decreed that Cæsar should by a certain time quit his command, and should not passe his Army over the River Rubicon, which bounded his Province; declaring him an enemy to the Roman State in case of refusal. C. Curio and M. Antonius the Tribunes of the people, out of their affection to Cæsar, endeavouring to oppose this decree, were thrust disgracefully out of the Senate, which occasion'd them to repair to Cæsar; whereby they endear'd the affections of the Souldiery to him, the office of the Tribunes being ever held sacred and unviolable.

Cæsar understanding how things stood at Rome, marches with 5000. foot and 300. Horse to *Ravenna*, having commanded the Legions to follow. Coming to the fatall passage of *Rubicon*, he entered into a deep deliberation, considering the importance, and miseries that might ensue that passage. At last in the midst of his anxiety, he was animated to a prosecution of his designs, by the apparition of a man of an extraordinary stature and shape, sitting near unto his army, piping upon a reed. The Souldiers went down to the River side to heare him, and approach'd so near, that he caught one of their trumpets, and leaping into the River, began with a mighty blast to sound, and so went to the bank of the other side. This resolves Cæsar, who cry'd out, Let us go whither the Gods, and the injurious dealings of our enemies call us. With which he set spurs to his horse, and past the River, the army following. Who would be more particularly inform'd, may be satisfi'd out of *Appianus Alexandrinus*, *Suetonius*, *Plutarch*, in the lives of Cæsar, *Cato*, and *Cicero*, *St. Augustine l. 3. de c. d.* Cæsar himself in his *Commentaries*, *Florus*, *Livy*, *Paulus Orosius*, *Eutropius*, *Lucan*, *Pliny de viris illustribus*, *Valerius Ataximus*, &c.

Having pass'd the River, and drawn the Army together, the Tribunes came to him in those dishonourable garments wherein they had fled from Rome. Whereupon he made an excellent oration to the Souldiery, opening to them his cause: which was answer'd with generall acclamations, and promises of duty and obedience to all commands.

This done he seizes *Ariminum*, and divers other Towns and Castles as he past, till he came to *Corfinium*: where *Domitius*, who was to succeed him in his command, was garrison'd with 30. Cohorts.

Cæsar's advance and intentions astonish'd Rome, Senate and people; nay, so surpriz'd Pompey, that he could not believe Cæsar would thrust himself into so much danger, or that his forces were so considerable. But though Pompey was empower'd by the Senate to levy forces, recall the Le-

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gions, and provide for the defence of *Italy*, yet all could make nothing against *Caesar*. The rumour of his advance spreading, *Pompey* and the Senate leave *Rome*, and repair to *Capua*, from thence to *Brundisium*; from whence the Consuls were dispatch'd to *Dyrrachium*, to unite what forces they could, since they despair'd of resisting *Caesar* in *Italy*: who hearing the Consuls and *Pompey* were at *Brundisium*, march'd thither, and having invested the Town, *Pompey* in the night time embarks for *Dyrrachium*, where the Consul expected him: so that *Caesar* became absolute Master of *Italy*. Having not shipping to pursue him, he resolv'd for *Spain*, which held for *Pompey*, where his best Legions were, and two Captains, *Petereius* and *Afranius*.

Returning from *Brundisium*, he in 60. dayes master'd all *Italy* without any bloodshed, and coming to *Rome*, the memory of the devastations of *Sylla's* dayes frightned the people extreamly. But *Caesar's* clemency, and his attributing the cause of all the distractions to *Pompey*, quieted all things. He so far justifi'd his own Cause, that he mov'd that Ambassadors might be sent to *Pompey* for peace, and causing himself to be chosen Consul, he opened the *Roman* Treasury, and made a dividend of it among the Souldiery. This done, he provides for *Spain*, having taken care for the civile as well as military government. *Brundisium*, *Otranto*, and other maritime places he fortifies against *Pompey's* entring into *Italy*, in case he should attempt it. *Hortensius* and *Dolabella* were to provide shipping for him at *Brundisium* against his return. *Quintus Valerius* he sends with a Legion into *Sardinia* against *Marcus Cotta*, who held it for *Pompey*. To *Sicily* he sends *Curius* against *Marcus Cato*: which when he had taken in, he was to march into *Africk*. He leaves *Leptidus* to govern at *Rome*, and *Antonius* for all *Italy*. Thus intending to leave *Licinius Crassus* in *France* he with his wonted celerity went on his journey, meeting with no resistance, but at *Marseilles*; which leaving *D. Brutus*, and *C. Trebonius* with sufficient forces to besiege, he went forward towards *Spain*, where he was expected by *Petereius* and *Afranius*: with whom, though he met with the inconveniences of the Winter and high Rivers, he had divers skirmishes; yet at length he carried his business so, that the enemies were forc'd by hunger to a composition, the Legions and Captains, such as would not remaine with *Caesar*, having leave to depart whither they pleas'd.

The spring now coming on, (to leave nothing unsubdu'd) he marches into *Betica*, now called *Andalusia*, where quarter'd *Marcus Varro*, with one Legion of Souldiers, as *Pompey's* Lieutenant; who, conceiving himself unable to make opposition, resign'd both the Country and Legion to *Caesar*, whereby all was quieted.

Thence he march'd to *Cordova*, where assembling the estates of the Provinces, he acknowledg'd their affection and devours, and so went to *Cales*; where he took such ships and Gallies as *Marcus Varro* had there, with what others he could get, and embarked. Having left *Q. Cassius* with

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which four Legions in that Province he marches to *Narbona* and so to *Marseilles*, which having suffer'd great miseries during the siege, at length, surrendred, yet he protect'd it from any violence, preferring the consideration of the antiquity of the place, before the affronts he had receiv'd from it, and so having sufficiently garrison'd it, he marches into *Italy* and so to *Rome*, all things succeeding Prosperously to him, though not so to his Captains. For *Antonius* (who was joint Generall at sea with *Dolabella*) was over thrown and taken Prisoner by *Octavius*, *Pompey's* Lieutenant, in the gulfe *Venice* and that by a strange stratagem. *Antonius* being forc'd for want of ships to put his men into long boates, the *Pompeians* ty'd ropes under the water, by which means one of them which carried a thousand *Opitergins*, stout young men, was surpriz'd and assaulted by the whole Army, yet making resistance from morning till night, they at last seeing all their forts ineffectuall did by the instigation of their Commander *Vulturnus*, kill one another. *Dolabella* was also overcome, as also *Curius*, who was ordered to go into *Africa*, was overthrown by *Pompey's* friend *Iuba*, King of *Mauritania*.

While *Caesar* was at *Rome* busy in causing himself to be made Dictator, and then putting off that Consull, that so he might send Prætors into the Provinces, as *Marcus Lepidus* into *Spain*, *A. Albinus* into *Sicily*, *Sextus Peduceius* into *Sardinia*, and *Decius Brutus* into *France*, and taking such further order as he thought fit; *Pompey* was as busy in *Macedonia*, raising of men and money and providing ships in order to his return into *Italy*. What his forces might amount unto, may be judg'd from the almost infinite assistances came in to him from divers Kingdomes and Provinces of *Asia* and *Greece*, from *Syria*, *Pontus*, *Bithynia*, *Cilicia*, *Phœnicia*, *Cappadocia*, *Pamphilia*, *Armenia* the lesse, *Aegypt*, *Greece*, *Thessaly*, *Beotia*, *Achaia*, *Epire*, *Athens*, *Lacedæmonia*, the Isles of *Creta* and *Rhodes* and divers other places, there coming to his assistance in person the Kings *Deiotarus* and *Ariobarzanes*. These certainly, with those he had brought with him out of *Italy*, must needs make up a vast Army by land, nor could the number of ships and Gallies but be proportionable. However *Caesar* knowing all this, leaves *Rome* in *December*, and so marches to *Brundisium*, whence he was to embark for *Macedonia*, out of this consideration, that his Victory consisted in expedition, though *Pompey* in the mean time upon intelligence of *Caesar's* being at *Rome*, had scattered his people into *Macedonia* and *Thessaly*, conceiving the inconveniences of the winter would have defer'd him from crossing the Seas. But *Caesar* being come to *Brundisium*, (now call'd *Brindis*), he embarks seven Legions of his choicest men in the beginning of *January*, leaving order to those that were coming to make hast and joine with those which remained behind, all whom he would speedily send for.

Three dayes after he arrives upon the coast of *Macedonia*, before *Pompey* had so much as heard of his embarking, and lands in Spite of *Pompey's* Captains, and presently commands the ships to returne for the remainder of his Army, which done he takes it by storm

Apol-

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Apollonia, (now call'd *Bellona*) and *Oricum*, two Cities kept by *L. Torquatus* and *L. Straberius*, for *Pompey*; who alarm'd by this, sends for such troupes as were nearest, and marches to *Dyrrachium*, where all his Ammunition and Provision lay, to secure it from being surpriz'd by *Caesar*: which indeed he had attempted, but, by reason of the naturall strength of the place, to no purpose.

Pompey being come, both Armies lodg'd not many furlongs from one another, onely they were divided by a River. Which post as it gave occasion of divers skirmishes, so it begat many overtures of Peace from *Caesar*; which *Pompey*, presuming upon his strength, would not hear of. This proposition of *Caesar's*, though it proceeded from his meeknesse, which was not the least of his vertues; yet argu'd some conscience of his own weaknesse at this time. For he was extremely perplex'd, that the other part of his Army was not come, in so much that he embark'd in a *Brigandine* disguised to fetch them. Having pass'd down the River, the sea was so tempestuous, that the master of the vessell would not adventure out: whereupon, as it is said, *Caesar* discovered himself, and said to him, *Friend, thou carriest Caesar and his fortune*. Whereat the master being encourag'd, ventur'd out into the sea, but the Tempest was so violent, that it brought *Caesar* back again. This action of his was like to have rais'd a mutiny in his Army, as a thing which though it spoke courage, yet was a stranger to discretion: which it may be is the reason that *Caesar* hath made no mention of it in his Commentaries.

But some few dayes after *Antonius* arrives with four Legions of the remaining part of the Army, and sends back the ships for the rest. These joyning with *Caesar*, there pass divers skirmishes and pickerings (being so nearly lodg'd) between both Armies: but that which was most remarkable was near the City of *Dyrrachium*, wherein *Caesar's* Troupes were so routed, that no threats or entreaties could stay them from running to their Camp; which though fortifi'd, yet was abandon'd by some. *Pompey* in the mean time, either out of fear that the slight might be feigned, and in order to some ambush, or that he thought *Caesar* sufficiently conquer'd, doth not prosecute the victory. Which weaknesse in him *Caesar* dissembled not, when afterwards he said to his men, that *that day had ended the war, if the enemy had had a Captain that knew how to overcome*. But *Caesar*, as no Prosperity disorder'd him, so in Adversity he had a courage and such a confidence of Fortune that he was nothing cast down. He lost in that engagement, besides the Common-Souldiery, 400 *Roman* Knights, 10 Tribunes, and 32 Centurions, with as many Colours. This successe obtained, *Pompey* sends the news of it into all parts of the world, so advantageously to himself, as if *Caesar* were utterly routed; who though he did not decline fighting, yet thought it not policy to engage his men lately worsted (though indeed exasperated with shame and indignation at their losse) with those that were animated and flesh'd with a victory. He therefore disposes his maimed men into *Apollonia*, and in the night takes his way towards *Thessaly*: both to hearten and refresh his Army, as also to draw the enemy further from the Sea-

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Sea-coast, where his main force and all his provisions lay; or at least to meet with *Scipio*, who, he had intelligence, was to join with *Pompey*.

This unexpected departure of *Caesar's* brought *Pompey* almost to a Resolution to return into *Italy*, to recover that, with *France* and *Spain*, and afterwards to meet with *Caesar*. But the *Roman* Lords that were about him (a sort of proud, insolent, indisciplineable people, who indeed prov'd his ruine) dissuaded him, and caused him to alter his design: and so he fell upon the hot pursuit of *Caesar*, who, making a stay in the fields of *Pharsalia* till that his men had reassumed their courage and resolution, was now willing and eager to fight. But *Pompey* perceiving this readinesse of *Caesar* to proceed from want of Provision, and a fear his Army should diminish, purposely avoided fighting, and would have prolong'd the warre, and so have defeated his enemy without hazarding his own Army. But the murmurings, mutinies, and importunity of those that were about him had such a prevailing influence over him (as *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Caesar* himself acknowledgeth) that they forced him contrary to his intentions and policy, to give Battell; which was such, that all the flower and force of *Rome* was engaged in it. *Caesar's* Army (according to the computation of most writers) amounted to half *Pompey's*: but in compensation, his men were more active, and versed in warre, and knew their advantages; whereas the other's was a tumultuary sort of people raked together, (besides what *Romans* he had.) The exact number of both these Armies is not agreed on by Authors: some raise them to 300000. of which opinion was *Florus*; others bring them down to 70000. But if we agree with *Appianus*, we must conceive, that so many countries and nations having sent in their assistances on either side, there must needs be vast Armies on both sides: and therefore those who pitched upon the lesser number, meant onely the number of *Romans*, who were the maine force and hope of both Generalls. But here we may make a strange remark upon the uncertain events of warre. We have two of the greatest Captains that ever were, the stoutest Armies that ever met, such as experience, force, and valour was equally divided between, and, to be short, the most exasperated parties that could be, and yet it proved but a very short fight: so weak is the confidence and assurance that is onely placed in number. We may further note the strange influence of Religion upon Mankind in general, in that it enforces man in the greatest exigencies to consultation: for *Pompey* met with divers things that might somewhat have informed him of the successe of that famous Battel; The running away of the beasts destined for Sacrifice, the swarming of bees, the sky darkned, and his own fatal dream of being in mourning in the Theatre, seconded by his appearance in the head of his main Battel the next day in a black robe, which might signifie he mourned for the liberty of *Rome* beforehand.

Being both resolved to give Battel, they put their Armies in such order as they thought fit, and harangued their Souldiers according to their severall pretences. In the beginning, *Pompey's* horse, consisting most of the *Roman* Gentry and Nobility, prevailed over *Caesar's*, and made them give ground: which he perceiving, causes a Battalion, set apart for that purpose, to charge them;

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with order to aime altogether at the face: which *Pompey's* horse not able, or not willing to endure, began to retreat, and so made way for the tall overthrow; by which means the foot being discourag'd, and seeing *Cæsar's* horse falling on, the Victory was soon decided on *Cæsar's* side, *Pompey* flying to his camp, and leaving the field to his adversary. Here was the greatest misfortune of *Pompey*, to out-live the Liberty of his Country (which he pretended so much to fight for) and his own glory in this Battell, being forc'd to a dishonourable flight, and to deliberate whither he should retire, whether into *Parthia*, *Africk*, or *Egypt*.

Cæsar being thus Master of the field, and meeting with no opposition, falls upon *Pompey's* camp, which, without any great difficulty, he entered. Whereupon *Pompey* disguizing himself, takes up the first horse he met, and with four more (his own Son *Sextus Pompeius*, the two *Lentuli*, and *Favonius*) makes his escape, and staves not till he came to *Larissa*: where meeting with some of his own horse, who were in the same condition of running away, he continued his flight till he came to the shore of the *Ægean* Sea; where meeting accidentally with a certain Merchants ship of *Rome*, he embarks himself in her, and sailes to *Attylene*, where his wife and family were. Having taken them with him, and got together what men and ships a shatter'd fortune could furnish him with, he departed thence in very great doubt and perplexity, not able to resolve whither to dispose of himself. He was advis'd by some to march into *Africa*, and shelter himself with *Iuba*, whose friendship and affection towards him he had receiv'd testimony of but very lately; others were of opinion, his best course was to retire among the *Parthians*; but at last, by his own wilfulness, it was voted he should go into *Egypt*; which he was the more inclin'd to, out of a consideration of the friendship and correspondence which he had had with King *Ptolemey*, father to him who then reign'd; and so touching at *Cyprus*, he sailes towards *Egypt*, and arrives at *Alexandria*.

Thus was the controversy for no less than the known world decided in one day, *Cæsar* being Master of the field and Victory. Of *Pompey's* side there were slain fifteen thousand, if you will take it upon *Cæsar's* credit, and of his own not two thousand. *Cæsar* having intelligence of *Pompey's* flight, pursues him without any stay with the swiftest and lightest of his Army, so to give him as little breath as he could afford, that he might not meet with any means or opportunity to recover or repair himself. Reducing all Cities as he passed, he comes to the Sea side, and taking up all the ships and gallies he could meet with, and such as *Cassius* (who was receiv'd into his favour) could furnish him with, he embarks such troupes as he could, and passed into *Asia* the lesse: where understanding that *Pompey* had been at *Cyprus*, he easily presumed that he was gone for *Egypt*. He thereupon resolves to take the same course, and taking with him only two Legions of his old Souldiers, he safely arrives at *Alexandria*: where he soon understood that *Pompey* was arrived, upon a confidence (as was said before) there might have remain'd some sense and memory in young *Ptolemey*, of the entertainment and favours he had done his Father. But he was as much mistaken in this, as he had been eluded by Fortune

in the warre: for he finds that the friendship of great men and Princes seldom outlives their prosperity, and that adversity makes them the greatest strangers that may be. Being by this King *Ptolemey* invited into Protection, and upon that confidence coming towards the shore in a small Boat, he was, ere he could reach the land, murdered, by the same Kings commandment, by *Septimius* and *Achillas*, who thought by that means to purchase *Cæsar's* favour. This was done by the contrivance of *Photinus* an Eunuch, whose authority both with King and Court was very great. *Cæsar* receives also news, that *Cornelia*, *Pompey's* wife, and his Son *Sextus Pompeius*, were fled from that port in the same vessell wherein they came. Being landed and received into the City, he was soon presented with the head of the great *Pompey*; which out of a consideration of the horridness of the fact, he would not by any means see. His Ring also and his Seal, with his Coat of Armes upon it, were presented to him: which causing him to reflect on the great successes, adventures and prosperities of that great and glorious man (besides that he was to look on him as his Son in Law) it drew teares from him, to compare them with his unfortunate end. Thus is he who had three times triumph'd, been so many times Consul, been the most eminent and the most concerned person that *Rome* had for so many yeares together, one who had been acquainted with all the dignities so great a Common-wealth could conferre upon a deserving Citizen, most inhumanely and perfidiously assassinated, to the greatest regret of him who was look'd on as most desirous of it. This in the mean time concludes that opinion erroneous, that *Cæsar* was so extremely over-joy'd at the newes of *Pompey's* death, that he caus'd upon that very place where he had ordered his head to be interr'd, a Temple to be built to the Goddess *Nemesis*; which some interpret a most unnaturall revengefulness, a horrid insultation over a calamitous vertue, and a prophanation of divine worship, to abuse the name of a Goddess for to immortalize the memory of his vengeance, and to authorize the injustice of it. But it is as easy to give the title of barbarisme and cruelty to magnanimity and height of courage, as to say the contrary: and therefore *Cæsar* certainly could not be guilty of so great an Hypocrisy, as to shed teares over his enemy's head, when he was inwardly surpriz'd with joy.

Cæsar upon his arrivall into *Egypt* findes it embroil'd in civile warres, arising from some differences between young *Ptolemey* and his sister *Cleopatra*, about the division and inheritance of the Kingdome, wherein *Cæsar* (as Consul of *Rome*) thought fit to be a mediator. *Photinus* and *Achillas*, the plotters and practicers of *Pompey's* death, fearing from *Cæsar* a reward of vengeance proportion'd to so horrid a crime, and perceiving his inclination to favour *Cleopatra*, take such order, by their great influence over King and Court, that they brought what Army the King had near the City, which consisted of about 20000. able men: and this they did out of a design to entrap *Cæsar*; and act the same perfidious butchery upon him, as they had done upon *Pompey*. By this means there began between what forces *Cæsar* had brought with him, and those of the *Egyptians* within and about the City, as also between the ships and gallies in harbour, the hottest disputes and sharpest encounters he ever met with: which we shall not particularize here,

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because it is the proper work of a compleat history. One thing our observation cannot balk in these hot and occasionall engagements, that *Cesar* himself was personally engag'd in most disputes, both within the City, and among the ships, and that to the great hazard of his person; as may appear by that one adventure, when he was forc'd to leap out of the Boat wherein he was, into the Sea, and by swimming to recover one of his galleys: and being in this great extremity (if you will believe *Suetonius*,) he carried his *Commentaries* in one hand above the water, and his robe in his teeth, that it might not fall into the enemies hands. In these conflicts were there nine months spent: at which time *Cesar* receiving his forces out of *Asia*, made an end of the controversy, with the same attendance of *Fortune* and *Victory* which had waited on him every where else. Had *Cesar* been acquainted with no warre but this, he might justly challenge the title of the greatest Captain in the world, so much personall valour, wisdom, conduct, circumspection and policy did he expresse in all passages thereof, though encompassed with all the inconveniences and disadvantages imaginable.

Aegypt being thus quieted, the murderers of *Pompey* punish'd, and *Cleopatra* (by whom *Cesar* had a Son call'd *Cesarion*) establish'd Queen, *Cesar* takes his march towards *Asia* through *Syria*, having receiv'd intelligence, that, while he was engag'd in the warres of *Aegypt*, King *Pharnaces*, the Son of the mighty *Mithridates*, taking his advantage of the dissensions among the *Romans*, entertained some hopes of recovering what his Father had lost; having in order thereto overthrown *Domitius*, whom *Cesar* had left Governour in those parts, and taken in by force the Provinces of *Bithynia* and *Cappadocia*, expelling thence *Ariobarzanes*, a friend and subject to *Rome*. The like he intended to have done with *Armenia* the lesse, which King *Dejotarus* had made subject to the *Romans*. But *Cesar* coming upon *Pharnaces* before he expected him, they in a few dayes came to a Battell, which in a few hours was dispatched, to the overthrow of the King, and the infinite slaughter of his people, which he himself escaped by flight. This Victory gave *Cesar* more satisfaction then any of his former, because of the great desire he had to return to *Rome*, where, he was informed, many scandalls were spread, and insolencies committed by the encouragement of his absence. He had also understood that *Pompey's* eldest Son had seiz'd a great part of *Spain*, and, out of those that *M. Varro* had left there, and some gleanings of his Father's troupes, had gotten together some considerable force. He also knew that most of the principall *Romans* who had escaped the Battell at *Pharsalia*, were gathered together in *Africk*, and headed by *M. Cato*, (surnamed *Uticensis*, for having kill'd himself at *Utica*) and *Scipio Pompey's* Father-in-Law; that they had a great part of *Pompey's* navy; that with the assistance of *Iuba* King of *Mauritania*, they had subdu'd all that Country, and had a great Army in readinesse against *Cesar*, having chosen *Scipio* for their General, because that name had been fortunate in *Africk*. *Cesar*, upon intelligence of all these transactions, with his wonted celerity and diligence recovers all that *Pharnaces* had usurped, & chasing him from *Pontus* regained all those Countries, which he recommended to the government of *Calpurnius Minucius*, with two Legions; where having reconciled

differences,

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differences, decided all controversies, and settled all things, by rewarding and gratifying those Kings and Tetrarchs who had continued firm to the Common-wealth and interest of *Rome*, he made no longer aboad in *Asia*, but passing with all expedition into *Italy*, he came to *Rome* within a little more then a year after he had departed thence: wherewith if we compare his great expeditions and adventures, it would prove matter of faith and astonishment, to consider how such vast Armies should passe through so many countries in so short a time.

Some few dayes after his coming to *Rome* he is created the third time Consul, and, as farre as time and the exigencies of his affairs permitted, studied the reformation of what disorders there then were. For that his Enemies before-mentioned should be Masters of *Africk*, was a thing he could not easily digest. Therefore with his ordinary expedition he marches thitherward, and commands his forces to follow. He took shipping in *Sicily*, and so passed into *Africk*, having no great force with him: however, such was his confidence of his Fortune, that he staid not the arrivall of either his Army or navy. Being landed with his small forces near unto the City of *Adrumetum*, he marches unto another called *Leptis*; where he was received, and where he took occasion by some conflicts, to keep the enemy in action, so to divert them from augmenting their forces. In fine, his Legions being arrived, he very earnestly set himself to the prosecution of the war: in which, though it lasted but four Months, (from the beginning of *January* to the end of *Aprill*) there happened many encounters and Battels. For having dispatched what work *Petreus* and *Labienus* found him, he came to deal with *Scipio* and King *Iuba*, who had brought an assistance of 8000. men, whereof one half were Cavalry, *Africa* at that time being very abundant in horse, as may appear partly in that *Cesar's* enemies had, among them, raised in that Country, besides eight Legions of foot, 20000. horse. *Hirtius*, *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Florus* have written at large of this warre, and tell you that *Cesar* was many times in very great danger as to his own person, yet at last, by the assistance of his forces and the compliance of his great Fortune, he put a period to that warre by one signall Battel, wherein there being slain of the Enemies side 10000. they were utterly defeated; *Cesar* remained Master of the field, and shortly after of all the Country. The principall Captains of the adverse party, though they escaped death at the fight, died most of them miserably and unfortunately. King *Iuba* himself being for want of refuge brought to that despair, that fighting with *Afranius*, and killing him, he commanded one of his own slaves to dispatch himself. *Marcus Cato*, being in *Utica*, hearing of *Cesar's* approach, though confident not onely of his pardon, but his particular favour, yet either out of an indignation to be oblig'd by his enemy, or an extravagant zeal to Liberty, laid violent hands on himself. *Cicero* wrote a book in commendation of *Cato*, to justify that action, which *Cesar* answer'd with another, which he called *Anti-Cato*, both which are lost. The Ceremony of his death was very remarkable; for upon hearing of the miscarriage of most of his partners, he embraces his Son and Friends, and bids them good night, pretending to go to bed. Resting upon his bed, he took into his hand *Plato's* book of the immortality of the Soul: wherein ha-

*Lucan saith
Petrarch
Lib 7. 55. pa*

Scipio's
Bag
of Hippo.

ving satisfied himself, he, about the relieving of the watch, with a *Roman* resolution drew his sword, and ran himself into the Body. Being not quite dispatch'd, Physicians came in and apply'd something to the wound, which he suffer'd while they staid with him, but as soon as they were departed, he pull'd all off, and thrust his dying hand into the wound. *Scipio*, the Generall in this war, having escaped, and shipp'd himself in certain Gallies, was met by *Cæsar's* navy; but to avoid being taken by them, he gave himself some wounds, and leapt over-board, and so was drown'd.

Cæsar being by this means absolute Victor, spends some time in ordering the Provinces of *Africk*: which done, and reducing *Iuba's* Kingdome into a Province, he comes to *Ticca*, whence he embarked the third of June for *Sardinia*, where having staid some few dayes, he arrives at *Rome* July 25. whither as soon as he was come, there were granted unto him four Triumphs. The first was for his conquest and Victories in *France*, wherein were set forth the Rivers of *Rhodanus* and the *Rhene* wrought in gold. In the second, which was for *Egypt* and King *Ptolemy*, were represented the River *Nile*, and the *Pharos* of *Alexandria* burning. The third was for his Victory over King *Pharnaces*, wherein a certain writing represented the celerity he used in the prosecution of that Victory, which onely contain'd three words, *Veni, Vidi, Vici*; I came, I saw, I overcame. The fourth was for his reduction of *Africk*; wherein was placed *Iuba's* Son as a captive. As for the Battel against *Pompey*, *Cæsar* would not triumph for it, because it was against *Roman* Citizens.

These triumphs ended, and great rewards scatter'd among the Souldiery, who had been assistant in so great Transactions, the People being also entertained with feasts, sports, and presents. *Cæsar* is chosen the fourth time Consul. But there yet remain'd some sword-work to do, for *Gneius Pompeius*, Great *Pompey's* Son, had got together most of the remainder of the *African* Army, and was gone into *Spain* to joyn with his Brother *Sextus*, who (as was hinted before) was there, and had possess'd himself of a great part of *Spain*, with the Cities of *Sevill* and *Cordova*, the *Spaniards* being ready enough to come in to their assistance. *Cæsar* takes with him his most experienc'd veterane Souldiers, and with extraordinary speed arrives in *Spain* within a few dayes, being accompany'd with his Nephew *Octavius*, who was about sixteen yeares of Age.

Being come into *Betica* (now *Andaluzia*) where the two *Pompeys* were with such Legions as they had got together, he soon began a hot and bloody war; whereof to be short the issue was this. *Cæsar* and *Gneius* (*Sextus* being in *Cordova*) near *Munda*, join battell, which proves the sharpest and most obstinate that ever was. It lasted almost a whole day, and that with such indifference as to point of Victory, that it was adjudg'd sometimes to one side sometimes to another. *Suetonius* and *Entropius* tell us that *Cæsar* one time, upon his mens giving ground, was in such a plunge, that he was almost resolv'd to have kill'd himself, so to have avoided the shame and dishonour of being conquer'd; and that in that heat of indignation and despair he snatched a Target from one of his Souldiers, saying with a loud voice (as *Plutarch* relates) *If you are not asham'd, leave me, or deliver me into the hands of these Boyes, for this shall be the last day of my life, and your honour.* With which words the Souldiers being animated

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and heighten'd by his example, regain their lost ground, turn, by degrees, the scales of the Battell; and, towards the evening, the enemy fainting and flying, become apparent Victors. The Enemy lost in this field 30000. men: *Cæsar*, beside the common Souldiery, 1000. all persons of quality. This did *Cæsar* account the most glorious of all his Victories, (the commemoration of hazzards and suffering being to some the greatest satisfaction conceivable,) for he would often say afterwards, that at other times he fought for *Fame* and *Victory*, but that that day he fought for his *Life*, which he had never fought for before. *Pompey*, who had performed all that a wife and stout captain could, persecuted by a malicious fortune, and seeing there was no other remedy, escap'd by flight: but being hopelesse and refugelesse, he was at last surpriz'd by some of *Cæsar's* friends, kill'd, and his head brought to him; which was also the fate of *Labienuus*. *Sextus* upon this quits *Cordova*, and shortly after *Spain*, leaving all to *Cæsar*, who in a short time reduc'd and settled the whole Country. Which done, he returns to *Rome*, and triumphs for the warres of *Spain*; which was his fifth and last triumph.

Having thus conquer'd the greatest part of the world, and by consequence gain'd the reputation of the most famous and most powerfull man in it, it was at least a pardonable ambition, if he thought no title, name, or dignity too great for him. It requires some faith to believe that such vast bodies as *Roman* Armies, consisting of many Legions, could at an ordinary rate, march through so many Countries, and crosse so many Seas, had they had no enemy to engage: but to conquer them transcends it, and must be attributed to Miracle; for within lesse then five yeares, through infinite conquests and Victories, he consummated the *Roman* Monarchy, making himself perpetuall Dictator, Sovereign Lord or Emperour. Which later title though it had not that height of signification which his Successors have rais'd it to, yet was it the greatest attribution of honour which that, or after-Ages have acknowledged.

But if his thoughts were so high, and his ambition so exorbitant as to deserve a severe Censure, certainly it may prove so much the more excuseable, by how much it was enflam'd by the generall acclamations and acknowledgments. For both the Senate and people of *Rome*, some out of feare, some out of affection, some out of dissimulation, were forward enough to invent those appellations of honour and preeminence, and afterwards to elevate them to the height of his ambitious mind. Hence was he call'd *Emperour*, *Father*, *Restorer*, and *Preserver* of his Country; hence created perpetuall Dictator, and Consul for ten yeares, and perpetuall Censor of their Customes; his Statue erected among the *Kings* of *Rome*; hence he had his thrones and chaires of state in the Theatre and Temples, which, as also all publick places, were filled with his pictures and images. Nay, their adoration ascended to that point, that from these humane honours they attributed to him divine; finding marble little enough for Temples and Statues for him, (which were dedicated to him with the same veneration as to their Gods) and metall little enough to represent his high and almost incredible adventures.

But all the power and command of so many nations as he had conquer'd, was

was inconsiderable as to the extent of his mind: whereby we may see what small acquaintance there is between Ambition and Acquiescence. It was not sufficient to have been personally engag'd in fifty signall Battels, and to have lay'd with their Bellies to the Sun a million ninety and odd thousand men, (abating all those that fell in the Civile warres) but there yet remains something to do greater then all this. The fierce *Parthians* break his sleep, they are yet unconquer'd, which once done, 'twere easy, like lightning, to passe through *Hyrcania* and other Countries to the *Caspian* Sea, and so scoure the Provinces of *Scythia Asiatia*, and so passing over the River *Tanais*, to come into *Europe*, and bring in *Germany* and the bordering Provinces under the wings of the *Roman* Eagle. In order to this expedition had he in sundry places rais'd 10000. horse and 16. Legions of choice foot: but another greater power thought fit he should leave some work for his successors.

Nay some things he aim'd at beyond Man's attempt, correcting even nature it self. As that design of making *Peloponnesus* an Island, by cutting off that neck of Land which is between the *Aegean* and *Ionian* Seas. He thought to have altered the courses of the Rivers *Tiber* and *Senon*, and made them navigable for ships of the greatest burthen. He had begun to level divers hills and mountains in *Italy*, and to dry up Lakes and Fens. He re-edified and re-peopled the once famous *Carthage* and *Corinth*. These and many other things he had done without doubt, had not an unexpected and barbarous death surpriz'd him in the midst of his designations. Which because it is the tragick part of this Relation, we shall referre to the last place, while in the mean time we shall divert our thoughts, with a short entertainment of his personall excellencies and endowments, his extraction, birth, Deification, and names; as we have already satisfi'd our selves with the consideration of his Actions: and so passe to that part of our undertaking, wherein we presume to promise the curious and criticall reader no lesse content then he hath found in what he hath already reflected on, that is to say, the description and dilucidation of what MEDALLS have been snatch'd out of the jaws of hungry Time, that have had any relation to the great name of CÆSAR.

Caesar was of a full & handsome composure of body, of a graceful carriage and deportment, of a whitish complexion, his eyes were somewhat big, black, quick and piercing, his nose straight and large enough, but his mouth was more then ordinary wide, his cheeks lean. In his later dayes he became bald towards the fore-part of his head, and, through his continual hazzards and hardships, much wrinkled in the forehead. These last imperfections are easily discernable in his Medalls, as also in some graven stones and Marbles: and this made him seem somewhat older then he was, his baldness, wrinkles, and wide mouth taking away much of the gracefulness of his countenance, and causing him to have a rustick Physiognomy. This gave occasion to *Silvius* the oldest among the *Satyrs*, very pleasantly (in the CÆSARS of the Emperour *Julian*) to boast that, besides other similitudes between them, he had a head like *Julius Caesar's*. But as to the bald-

baldness, it is no more to be objected to him as indecent, then to diverse other great personages of Antiquity, as may be frequently seen in Medalls and Marbles, *Hercules* himself being one of the Tribe. They are the highest and sublimest things, nay the more divine, as approaching the sky, that are freed from all superfluities. The highest mountains are bald on their tops, though in other parts they are perqu'd with woods, and have fertile descents. Caesar was much troubled at the losse of his haire, inso much as, having effected his designs, he alwayes wore a Crown of Lawrell, the better to cover the nakedness, thrusting up the haire he had towards the hinder part of his head as much as he could, as may be remarked out of his effigies in the Medalls. He had a strong and vigorous body, able to endure any thing of labour or hardship; an active and lively mind, capable of any undertaking; his judgement and common sense most exquisite. He was furnished with a strange fore-sight and vigilance, a dexterity and presence of mind above ordinary, and an incredible resolution and courage in all exigences and emergencies. In the warres of *Asia*, under the Prator *Marcus Terminus* he obtained a Civill Crown. He was admirable for his Eloquence and incomparable Memory. He was well versed in *Astrology*, and by the assistance thereof knew many things. It was by that that he was jealous of the *Ides* of the months, as being fatal to him. Nay, he writ books of the motion of the starres, regulated the year, and reduc'd it to the course of the Sun; which science he learned from the *Egyptians*. From his skill in that science he rais'd himself to attempt that great change and alteration which he brought about, from the strange prodigies which had happened not long before, as you have them elegantly described by *Petronius* and *Lucan*; the heavens, earth, sea, nay the very mountaines and rivers intimating that great vicissitude.

But in the whole constellation of his virtues and perfections, none shines brighter then his Clemency and Generosity. His propensity to pardon his enemies, when conquered, whether Barbarians or Citizens, was exemplary: and it is much to be questioned whether his Lenity rais'd him more friends or enemies. When he had passed the *Rubicon*, he takes the City *Corfinium*, and in it *Domitius*, whom the Senate had designed to succeed him in his Command in *France*: yet though all were at his mercy, he dismissed *Domitius*, with what part of the Legions would go with him, to repair to *Pompey*. Nor was his Clemency and Liberality lesse remarkable at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, where he not onely pardoned his enemies, but received some of the most inveterate into favour and familiarity, and engaged them into the government of Provinces and Countries: not to mention the confidence in him of *Cato Uticensis*, and his severe punishing of the Murderers of *Pompey*. Much more might be said of him, but since it is not our business to write any *Panegyrics* on him, we come to his extraction.

As for his extraction, we find that those of the *Julian* family boasted that they were originally descended from *Iulus*, the Son of *Aeneas*, the Son of *Anchises* and *Venus*, which was a common and yet no criminall ambition in those times. The Poets, above all other, those that lived in the times of

The life of Iulius Cæsar.

Cæsar and *Augustus*, strove who should most celebrate this Genealogie, and that by very remarkable casts of their inherent flattery. To omit what may be gathered out of *Lucan*, *Petronius*, and others, we shall content our selves with what we have from *Manilius*, *Astron. lib. 1.*

———*Tenerisque ab origine proles
Iulia descendit cælo, cælumque replevit.*

and *Propertius*, lib. 4. Eleg. 1.

*Tunc animi venere Decii, Brutique secures,
Iexit & ipsa sui Cæsaris arma Venus,
Armæ resurgens portans victricia Trojæ:
Felix terræ tuos cepit, Iule, deos.*

But that which *Cæsar* suffers in this businesse, is, that it was objected to him as a great vanity, to derive himself from this Goddesse, as being so far guilty of it, that he recommended to her the successe and conduct of his most signall enterprises, trusting her with all his good fortune. We mention not his dalliances with *Cleopatra*, because the temptation on her side was more then ordinary; not onely that of her beauty, but her strange prostitution of her self, even to that point, that before she had seen *Cæsar*, she caused her self to be put up into a Basket, and, as if it had been some present, to be brought to him, fearing, if she had come without this surprise, she might not have access. But if it be a vanity, 'tis easily discover'd in his Coins, being furnish'd with severall shapes of this *Venus Genitrix*, this Goddesse of Generation, sometimes sitting on the prow of a ship, sometimes standing, bearing a Victory in her right hand, to represent a *Venus Victrix*, such as whereof *Hypermetra* dedicated a figure in the City of *Argos*, calling it *Nixophoros* bearing a Victory, which was the word *Cæsar* gave at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, where in he was afterwards imitated by *Augustus* at the fight of *Actium*. The same reason may be given for his placing a *Venus Victrix* upon the other side of his own effigies in his Medalls, with a globe, as conceiving she ought him the conquest of the Universe. Besides at the battel of *Pharsalia*, he made a vow to build her a Temple (as *Appianus* records l. 2.) and afterwards caused his statue to be plac'd next to that of this Goddesse of Generation. To which Monuments seem to relate those antique Inscriptions which *Gruterus* mentions, forasmuch as concerns the worship of this *Venus*, observed by the *Romans* out of their Veneration of her and the *Iulian* family.

<p style="text-align: center;">DIVO JULIO LIB. JULIA EBORA OB ILLIUS IMMUN. ET MUN. LIBERALITATEM QUO IUS DEDICATIONE VENERI GENETRICI CESTUM MATRONÆ DOMUM TULERUNT.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">VENERI GENETRICI D....JULI IN MEMORIAM GENT. JULIÆ STATUAM CUM... JUNIUS VIRBIUS ATTICUS FLAM. DIVI JULI D.S.P.D.</p>
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The life of Iulius Cæsar.

But we shall have more to say of this Goddesse when we come to the *Medalls*, we therefore proceed to his *Nativity*.

Cæsar was born under *Sagittary*, that is to say, upon the twelfth day of *July*, which denoted to him great Victories, and many famous triumphs in his own Country, according to *Manilius*, lib. 4. in these verses.

*Nec non arcitenens prima cum veste resurgit,
Pectora clara dabit bello, magnisque triumphis
Conspicuum patrias Victorem ducet in arces;
Sed nimium indulgens rebus Fortuna secundis
Invidet in facie, servitque asperrima fronti, &c.*

but the end should be dismall and unfortunate: as indeed it happen'd. But *Apollinaris Sidonius* in his Panegyrick of *Anthemius*, vers. 120. makes another observation, wherein of all Authours he is singular, saying that *Cæsar* was born at the same time when a crown of Lawrell was burning.

Julius in lucem venit dum Laureæ flagrat.

What presage could arise hence to signify his innumerable Victories, we have onely this Authour to inform us. But indeed there is one other discovers this mystery, but another way: for when they would presage the fertility or sterility of the ensuing year, they were wont to cast a crown of Lawrell into the fire, and according to the crackling of the leaves they gave their judgement. This is *Tibullus*. l. 2. Eleg. 5.

*Ut succensa sacris crepitet bene laurea flammis,
Omne quo felix & sacer annus eat.
At Laurus bona signa dedit, gaudete coloni,
Discedet spicis aurea plena Ceres.*

Therefore at *Cæsar's* birth it may be thought some one out of superstition be-thought him of this ceremony, or it happened by chance. But in fine, those that were assistant at the birth, were by that accident raised to a certain confidence that the child then born should prove a most fortunate man, and should arrive to great fame and wealth.

As concerning his *Deification*, there is not much to be said. In the first place, we suppose it a thing not so miraculous, that the *Romans* should believe that one who had done such great and transcendent actions, as *Cæsar* did, might be thought somewhat more then a man, and had in him something divine; besides that he was one acknowledg'd to have descended from *Venus Genetrix*, the mother of the Universe. Other nations had that custome of adoring and invoking their Kings, as Gods, after their death; as the *Ægyptians*, *Persians*, and the *Moor*s, who in *Cæsar's* time put *Tuba* into the number of the Gods. In the second place, we meet with two censorious remarks upon this *Deification*. First, how that Genius of Vertue and generosity which was wont to animate the *Roman* people, was so metamorphos'd into that of flattery and vanity, as to deify one who, by the greatest, if not the most, was look'd on as the greatest oppressor of the *Roman Liberty*, and

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onely the most fortunate Malesfactor that ever was, when they had not vouchsafed that honour to *Numa Pompilius*, who had been the *Moses*, the Law-giver, the most just and the most pious among the *Roman* Princes. Secondly, whether, if he had miscarried at the battell of *Pharsalia*, he had not been the most infamous person among the *Romans* that ever was, and more abominable then *Catiline*; and on the contrary, whether rocks, mountains, seas, and the cabinets of conquered Kings and Citizens had furnished marble, porphyry, jasper and precious stones enough to erect pillars, statues, and Temples to celebrate the glory of the great *Pompey*, who was so zealous for the Liberty of *Rome*. But *Divine Providence* was pleased to use *Cæsar* as an Instrument to change that *Common-wealth* into a *Monarchy*, that the *Prince of Peace* and *Saviour* of the world should be born under the peaceable reign of one sole *Monarch*.

As for the name of *Julius*; since, as is before noted, the *Julian Gens* derived it self from *Iulus* the Son of *Æneas*, the Son of *Anchises*, by a prodigious coition with *Venus*, it must be granted *Iulus* was the Authour of this Family.

Julius à magno deductum nomen Iulo.
as *Virgil* sayes. This *Iulus* was also called *Ilus*, and more frequently *Ascanius*, from a place in *Phrygia* called *Ascanium*, or from a River named *Ascanius*. That of *Ilus* was in memory of *Ilus* the most renowned King of the *Trojans*; from whom *Troy* was called *Ilium*. But to be yet more critical, the name *Iulus* or *Iulus* was given him, because of his hairiness about the cheeks sooner then his age required, according to the same *Virgil*,

*At puer Ascanius, cui nunc cognomen Iulo
Additur, Ilus erat dum res stetis Iliæ regno.*

Upon which place *Servius* tells us, that that name was given after the battell that *Ascanius* gain'd against *Mezentius*, *ob barba lanuginem (quam ἰσλὸι Græci dicunt) quæ ei tempore victoriæ nascebatur.* So that ἰσλὸς signifies τὸ ἰσχυρὸν ἢ γυνεῶν, the soft haire which first appears upon the cheeks.

The name *Cæsar* seems to have some relation to the other, for that *Καισαρία*, in *Hesychius*, signifies *περικεφαλαία*, that is to say, a certain thick and clotted hairiness, such as women's, when they plait and twist their haire about their heads; and he that either naturally or artificially had such a one, had first the honour of that name, which likely was some one of the posterity of *Iulus*, the Son of *Æneas*; unless we would rather trust *Spartianus*, who would have the first of this family to be so called, *Quod cum magnis crinibus sit utero parentis effusus*, because he was born with abundance of haire. In fine, however it came, it was so venerable during the long reign of *Augustus*, that of *Tiberius*, and three more of the family, that it alone design'd the Emperour, and became a name of invocation upon any accident of halt, surpris, or admiration.

We might here bring in what *Suetonius* delivers in the life of *Augustus*,
that

that the first Letter of the name *Cæsar*, which is *C.* being dash'd out by a thunderbolt, it was predicted that he should dy within a hundred dayes, because that Letter stands for that number: and that after his decease he should be received into the number of the Gods, because *ÆSAR* signified in the *Hetruscan* tongue *GOD*. This gave occasion to all that have commented on that Authour, to criticize and puzzle themselves about the signification of the word *CÆSAR*: but all being triviall, and imaginary, we forbear further disquisition, and passe to our observations upon his *MEDALLS*.

Observations upon CÆSAR'S MEDALLS.

Upon the first Medall.

THE effigies of *Venus Genitrix* with a globe or world before her, without any inscription; though *Occo* and *Vrsinus* mention one inscrib'd with *L. BUCA*, the other side hath *Venus* giving *Anchises* a meeting near Mount *Ida*: this it should seem *Cæsar* caus'd to be done out of flattery to himself, in that it serv'd, both to make his originall more illustrious, and as a monument of that happinesse and good fortune which this Goddess had procured him in all his enterprises. For it was his ambition, to have descended in a right line from *Anchises* and *Venus*, by whose indulgence he had conquered the Universe, as being his directrix in all his designs, as is represented by the globe, or world; whereof this Goddess was thought to be in some sort the Protectresse, as being esteem'd the Sovereign *Genius* of Generation according to *Solinus*,

*Tu futibus auges
Cuncta suis, totus pariter tibi parturit orbis.*

And her worship was questionlesse very ancient: For it was the head of *Venus Genitrix* that the *Saracens* and *Ishmaelites* worshipp'd, alledging that *Abraham* had by the means of it enjoy'd *Hagar*, from whom proceeded a great generation, as *Enthymius Zigabenus*, in his table of the opinions of that Nation, and the anonymous *Greek* Authour of the *Saracen* History, have observed. So have we here the same Goddess accosting that great Heros to have issue by him. The *Genius* destin'd to further the establishment of the *Roman* greatness, hath a Scepter in his hand, to signify the future Majesty of that Monarchy.

The second Medall.

L SEPULIUS MACER. *Venus* standing with a Victory in her right hand, and a pike in the other, being the other side of that which bore the effigies of *Cæsar* and the starre of this Goddess. *Servius* quoting an observation of *Varro*, says upon the first of the *Æneids*, that when this Heros left *Troy*, looking up into the sky he presently perceives *Venus* in the day-time, she shining then purposely to direct him to *Laurentum*, the place for which the Destinies had design'd him. The *Egyptians* represented this starre by the figure of a most beautifull woman, it being thought the brightest in the firmament, whence it was called *Καλλιων* *pulcherrima*, being nam'd in the morning *Phosphorus* or *Lucifer*, in the evening *Vesper*. This starre therefore, that was *Æneas's* conductresse, was no other then that midwife of the Light, *Venus*, being the same which the *Saracens* call *Cubar* or *Kabar*, which word signifies, great; being also otherwise called *Astarte*, *Frania* or *Celestis*: by all which names is meant no other but this *Genetrix*, under which epithet the *Lacedemonians* ador'd and invoc'd her as an advancer of Generation. The *Romans* in the *Circensian* games brought forth the statue of *Cæsar* in pompe, having the Planet *Venus* on his head. Now this *Frania* (because of her procreative influence) was held in particular devotion by the women, as divers Medalls of the Emperres discover, being commonly inscrib'd *Veneri celesti*, and having that Starre. *Quatrenus* furnishes us with an inscription of a certain priestesse of hers, out of the ancient monuments of *Sicily*.

ΔΙΟΔΩΤΟΣ ΤΙΤΙΕΛΟΥ ΑΠΠΕΙΡΑΙΟΣ
ΤΑΝ ΑΔΕΛΦΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΤΑΝ
ΜΙΝΥΡΑΝ ΑΡΤΕΜΟΝΟΣ ΙΕΡΑΤΕΟΥΣΑΝ
ΑΦΡΟΔΙΤΑΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΙΑΙ.

Diodorus Titieli filius Appeiræus sororem suam Minyram Artemonis filiam Sacerdotem Veneris Cælestis.

She was also inscrib'd *Venus Cælestis Augusta*, (possibly in favour of some Emperresse) as also, *Invicta Cælestis*.

The third Medall.

CÆSAR DICT. PERP. *Cæsar* perpetuall Dictator. A *Venus Victrix* naked, holding an Helmet and a Buckler. There is before her a Pillar, upon which is plac'd an Eagle, and behind a military Ensign. The meaning is this. We have *Venus* here naked with a Helmet in her hand, to signify her victorious over *Mars* by her charming attractions,

attractions, as if that God had quite lost all courage, delivering up his Armes, and rendring himself her Prisoner. Thus *Menelaus* casts away his pike, sword and buckler, having had but a glimpse of the delicate breast of the fair *Hellen*. But in this Medall *Venus* denotes, that she had so fortunately assisted *Cæsar* (the minion of all her progeny) in all his warlike enterprises, that he had obtained absolute Victory over all his enemies; whereof the Helmet, Buckler and military Ensign being the marks, *Cæsar* had consecrated them to her in acknowledgement of her favours. The Eagle pitched upon a pillar, signifies, that his Victories have assured him the *Roman* Empire, which should be his eternally. The Eagle denotes Empire and Royalty, and presages and signifies absolute Victory. It signifies also that the Empire shall be assur'd to him, maugre all the force and opposition of the *Galles* and *Germans*, or any other whatsoever, whom he should despise, as this bird doth thunder; for that of all creatures it can ascend above the clouds, where it can suffer no injury.

The fourth Medall.

GERMAN. INDUT. III. A River lying by a mountain side pours out his water, having a boat or bark near him. This Medall seems to have been stamp'd purposely to exercise our divinations. We conceive it should be read GERMANA INDUTIA, and that the number three stands for nothing else but the year, taking the word INDUTIA to signify a Colony of *Germans* disposed into that place by *Cæsar's* order. This name indeed is not found among the Geographers, onely *Pliny* mentions a Town called INDUSTRIA, situated along the *Apennine*, upon the famous River of *Po*. Now there is a great conformity between the situation of this Town and this Medall, and possibly it may be an *erratum* in *Pliny*, and that it should be read INDUTIA instead of INDUSTRIA, which is not so likely to be the name of a City. For the three points III. they may signify the year of the establishment of that Colony, or of the foundation of the City. There is another Medall hath four IIII. denoting the fourth year; but it hath withall the devise of an Ox with his head stooping, and his knee bent, which posture implies the establishment and foundation of a City. In this posture doth *Nonnus* describe the Ox of *Cadmus*. Upon both these Medalls there is a *Venus Victrix* on one side, and what is before recited on the other: whence it is infer'd, that the planting of this Colony happened after *Cæsar's* most remarkable Victories against the *Germans*.

The fifth and sixth Medalls.

WE have these two Medalls from *Goltzius*: whereof one in *Greek*, hath a Tripod and two starres, the inscription of the head & the other side is ΚΑΙΣΑΡ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΑΡΧΙΕΡ. ΜΕΓ. ΟΙΟΝΙΣΤΗΣ. *Cæsar Imperator, Pontifex maximus, Augur.* This Tripod of *Apollo* hath something in it more particular. *Apollo, Augur*, or Φοῖβος, who is here design'd by one of the starres which accompanies that of *Venus Genetrix* or *Cælestis*, shewes that *Cæsar* was assisted in his charge of *Augur*, and his study of *Astrologie*, and presaging (whereof the *Lituis* and the Tripod were the marks) by these two divinities. For *Phæbus* or Φοῖβος hath two significations, which relate much to his starre and Tripod, that is to say, splendid and luminous, so that he is both foreteller and *Augur*. But to return to the starre of *Venus*, or *Phosphorus*, or (as *Philolæus* calls it) *Eosphorus*, and to this Sun or starre of *Phæbus Apollo*. It may be conjectured they are placed above this Tripod, to give us to understand, that these Gods should promise the *Roman Augur Cæsar*, by a continuall successe in all his enterprises, the absolute conquest of both East and West.

The seventh Medall.

CÆSAR. An Elephant with a Serpent betwixt his legges. On the other side, the utensils and instruments that belong'd to sacrificing, with the head-ornament of the High-priest. Divers Antiquaries have so commented upon this Medall, as to make the word *Cæsar* signifie an Elephant. But in my opinion, this devise signifies altogether as much as if it had this inscription about it, I M P. CÆSAR, or CÆSAR DICTATOR PER P. on one side, and PONTIF. MAX. on the other. For as the one shewes forth the Royall quality, the other supposes the Pontificall to have been in those times joyned with it in the person of *Cæsar*. An Elephant in *Italy* (according to *Artemidorus*) signifies a Royall, imperiall or supreme Power. But *Achmet* in his *Oneirocriticks* ch. 271. tells us that this creature had the same signification in the *Indies* and *Egypt*; therefore *Artemidorus* hath not done well to restrain it to *Italy*. But it may be the *Moors*, imitating other nations herein, took an Elephant to signify a Monarch; and because *Cæsar* was the most famous man that ever was, one that commanded Kings and Monarchs, would make his name stand for an Elephant, for this word is little lesse then *African*. The same *Artemidorus* sayes, that a Dragon seen in a dream signifies a King and a supreme Magistrate; which agreeing with what he sayes of the Elephant, and both these creatures being on the other side, I conceive my interpretation the more receivable.

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The eighth Medall.

CÆSAR DICTATOR. *Cæsar* with the augurall stick. In the reverse there is L. LIVINEIUS REGULUS. a Bull furiously running with his head stouping. It is conceiv'd this was stamp'd by *Regulus*, in *Cæsar's* favour, when *Cæsar* was created Dictator, or shortly after. This Bull is brought in as an emblem of Principality, as *Dion Chrysostome* sayes, who hath made an excellent parallel between this creature, and a King and his Kingdome. But before him *S. Denys* in the 15. ch. of his *Hierarchy*, said that the strength of a Bull represents the force necessary for a Prince, and that his horns signify *Servatricem atque invictam vim*. *Stephanus* observes upon the word ταύρος, that the Ancients called ταύρους all things that were excessive for greatness or strength. The intention therefore of *Regulus* was to let *Cæsar* understand, that, having overthrown *Pompey*, and become perpetuall Dictator, he was in effect the most powerfull and most redoubted Monarch that ever was, and was in a condition to pursue and accomplish the utter ruine of his enemies, and protect his friends.

There is a reverse among the Medalls of *Augustus*, where there is also a Bull in a different figure and posture from this, bending his knee, to represent (as is conceived) the *Taurus Cælestis*, which is under the dominion of *Venus*, which signified the invincibility of *Augustus*. It may be also considered, that this Bull may signify *Italy* subdued and subject to the Laws of *Augustus*, as being, now the civile warres were over, ready to receive the yoke. For that Province took its name from a Bull, which the *Tyrrhenians* called Ἰταλὸν; so that *Italy* submitted its neck to receive the yoke of the new government, as the Bull ———— *Summittit aratris*

Colla, jugumque suis poscit cervicibus ipse.

The ninth Medall.

DIVO JULIO. the effigies of *Cæsar* deif'd, the Starre of *Venus* before him, or if you will, *Cæsar's* own. On the other side *Mars* upon an Altar, or rather *Cæsar* representing *Mars*, before whom sits a figure, which hath a *Cornucopia*, or horn of abundance under the left arme, in the right, holds a Victory, which presents a Crown to him. This Medall seems to have been made shortly after *Cæsar's* death, to keep his memory in veneration, and nourish that belief of the people, that he was, while living, a God transformed into a man. It was indeed an excellent artifice of *Augustus* and his party, to make the superstitious vulgar believe, that *Julius Cæsar* was become a fellow-Commoner among the Gods, to make his succession the more plausible. For being already persuaded that no other then a demy-God, could have arrived to that glory which *Cæsar* had

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Observations upon

had, having baffled the Universe; it was not very hard to persuade them that the Comet which appeared in the North after his death, was his deif'd soul. But the cheat was, that this soul must appear there to render *Augustus* more illustrious; who to retribute the glory, and make the business more authentick, must erect *Cæsar's* statue in the Capitoll, representing upon the head of it that Starre in Gold, and giving it this bold inscription; ΚΑΙΣΑΡΙ ΗΜΙΘΕΩ, to *Cæsar the Demi-god*. To make any long discourse upon Comets from hence, were superfluous, since all that can be said is, that they signify changes and revolutions of States and Empires, and sometimes favourably. This signified, in all likelyhood, the warre then kindling against *Augustus*: after which, a generall peace ensuing, the Prince of Peace should be born; the Comet at whose birth denoted the universall change of Religion that afterward happened. To be short, all that the *Poets*, those fine Cooks of fictions and inventions, could dresse that would be any way digestible with the credulous vulgar, was serv'd up at this time to raise the memory of *Julius Cæsar* to the greatest reputation that might be: but it will be to no purpose to repeat their adulations in this place.

On the reverse of this Medall, we find *Mars*, who receives the Crown which *Victory* presents him with, represented with a dart. The *Victory* is *Venus Victrix*, or the Victorious City of *Rome*, and the *Mars*, *Julius Cæsar* himself, in the posture of that God. The statue is conceived to be the same with that of *Mars* erected by the *Romans* in the Temple of *Quirinus*, with this magnificent title, ΘΕΩ ΑΝΙΚΗΤΩ, *Deo invicto*. This supposition is confirmed by the dart, for *Mars* was ordinarily represented with a spear, as divers Medalls discover. But in this statue he hath a dart, which is that piece of Armes which is capable of furthest casting, and that indeed which the *Romans* most used, and at the sight of *Pharsalia* was one main cause of the Victory, *Cæsar* having given his men order that they should aime at the faces of the raw *Roman* Nobility they had to deale with, as divers Historians have delivered. Yet this argues not but that *Cæsar* sometimes made use of a lavelin or Pike as well as *Mars*; but it is to be conceived this was more for the convenience of his travelling, which was afoot, (and that many times in the winter haply over the *Alpes*) according to the custome of most of the great Captains and Generalls of *Rome*, as *Livy* and *Plutarch* abundantly attest.

The tenth Medall.

ΓΙΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΚΑΙΣΑΡΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΔΟΥΚΤΑΤΟΡΟΣ. *Cai Julii Cæsaris Imperatoris Dictatoris*. The effigies of

Cæsar's Medalls.

of *Cæsar* crowned with a thick crown of Laurell, which closed before, the better to cover his baldness, the hair being thrust forward to help it. The reverse hath ΙΑΙΩΝ ΒΙΖ ΝΕΩΚΟΡΩΝ *Iliensium his Neocorum*; *Aeneas* carrying his Father and the *Palladium* at their quitting of *Troy*, the little *Julius* going before with his hat in his hand. That which in this falls under question, is, First, to know the situation of this *Ilium*; wherein *Strabo* hath spent more sweat then all the Geographers; affirming it was not the *Ilium* of his time, a town well known, nor any thing built upon the ruins of the old one so ill-entreated by the *Greeks*, as being distant from this thirty *stadia*; that in that place there was only a small village bearing up the name; that it was built up by *Alexander*, from a small town that it was before, having a little Temple of *Minerva* much ruin'd, and received from him divers priviledges and immunities, with a promise after his Victory over *Darius*, of a magnificent Temple, and the toleration and setting up of Games and exercises. This was partly executed after his death by *Lyfimachus*, who enlarged the City by a wall of forty *stadia*, disposing thither many out of the neighbouring Cities that were ruin'd. After which it was ruined and restored diverse times; but lastly it received great favours from *Sylla*, which is conceived to be the reason that it declared against *Cæsar* in the Civile warres: whence it may be inferred, that those of that City knew not at that time that *Cæsar* pretended to be of the race of *Venus* and *Anchises*, which was only found out after his Victory. But at length *Cæsar* receives them into favour, restores and confirms their ancient priviledges and immunities, and imitating *Alexander*, did them many courtesies.

In the second place, the understanding of these words ΙΑΙΩΝ, or ΙΑΙΩΝ ΝΕΩΚΟΡΩΝ *Iliensium Neocorum*. The word *Neocorum* is translated commonly *Aedituorum*; which we cannot render properly in English, but by *Overseers*, *Supervisors*, and those that are entrusted with the charge of the Temples, and dispose of all things sacred, or in some sort, they were such as we call *Church-wardens* in our Churches. But they are not those *Neocori* of the Temples that this Medall and divers others represent unto us, but the word was analogically applyed to whole Nations, as also to Cities and Bodies corporate, to whom the Kings, and afterwards the Emperours gave Commissions, to make Panegyricks and Encomiastick Orations upon their Statues, Poms, religious worships, publick recreations and exercises, to the honour of their Gods and Princes; which was done out of the publick stock, or by the contribution of the Corporations. As therefore the *Neocori* that belonged to the Temples, were disposers and guardians of the things sacred, that were in their Sanctuaries, nay haply entertained the people or strangers, with the rarities and antiquities of their worships and mysteries; so these Nationall *Neocori* had the superintendency over the Poms and Solemnities, panegyricall celebrations, exercises, sacrifices, and ceremonies which were to be observed upon the more festivall dayes, whereof they had the absolute disposal. This

I build upon the conjecture of the Great and Learned SELDEN, who was the first cut this Gordian knot, upon a passage of the *Acts* of the Apostles *chap. 19*. There we have *Demetrius* and those of his profession raising a Tumult, and accusing *St. Paul* and others for preaching that the Statues made with the hands of men were not Gods. The *Town-Clark*, or the *Church-warden* having appeased the Tumult, tells them that it was well known that the City of *Ephesus* was then *Neocore* (in the English Translation *worshipper*) of the great Goddess *Diana*, and of the Image fallen from *Jupiter*, and that therefore there being no contradiction in that, they ought not to do any thing rashly. For these men, saith he, are neither sacrilegious, nor blasphemous persons, and therefore have done nothing against the Majesty of *Diana*. But if they had any matter against any man, the Law was open: but in case it were something else relating to their Goddess, whether by Blasphemy, impiety, or sacrilege, (the cognizance whereof did of right belong to the *Ephesians* in body, as being then *Neocori*) they should have satisfaction in a full assembly convoked for things of that nature. Now those silver shrines which *Demetrius* is said to make, are conceived to have been Modells of that magnificent Temple, which the *Ephesians* being *Neocori*, caused out of magnificence to be made of that rich Metall. Had this controversy between the Apostles and the Goldsmiths come to a decision, they had proceeded thus; They would have had some to make publick panegyrics of their Goddess in the first place; then, if *Paul* and his companions should not rest satisfied, this *Neocorean* people would have punished them according to their manner. Now that the *Neocori* of the Temples were used to commend to all comers (especially Travellers) the greatness and power of their Gods, and that the *Neocori* of Cities imitated them, but did it with great Pomp, employing persons eminent for Learning and Eloquence, as Poets and Orators, for the honour of their Gods, as also their Kings, Monarchs, Emperours, Founders, and that upon dayes in stituted and ordained for that purpose, may be learn'd from *Horace*, who *lib. 2. Ep. 1.* writing to *Augustus*, call's those Poets *Aiditnos*, who should immortalize the Vertue of that Emperour, or rather those who were charg'd to chose such as should do it, in these verses:

*Sed tamen est operæ pretium cognoscere quales
Aiditnos habeat, belli spectata domique
Virtus, indigno non committenda Poetæ.*

But besides *Selden* hath well observed, that there were none of these Medalls in the time of the Common-wealth, for that the Cities of *Greece* were not yet arrived to that esteem of the *Roman* greatness by the sabrick of their monies and other signes of veneration, which they have come to since it became a Monarchy. This is the opinion of that great judicious man, which yet is not absolutely true; for there were found the marks of this magnificence, under the title of *Neocori*, abundantly among the Medalls of *Alexander* the Great, whereof *Goltzius* reckons above 20. with this inscription: KOINON MAKE-
ΔONON NEOKOPON. Whence may be observ'd, that the people

of *Macedonia* being generally *Neocori*, had caused these Coins to be stamp'd in the honour of *Alexander*, having upon the reverse, the figures of statues, chariots, temples, columns, &c. Nay, the *Maroneans* in *Philip's* time, though but the people of a particular City, were honour'd with the charge of *Neocori*, there being a Medall, which hath on the one side, the effigies of *Bacchus*, crown'd with Vine-branches, inscrib'd, ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ; on the reverse, that of *Philip*, thus, ΜΑΡΩΝΕΙΤΩΝ ΝΕΟΚΟΡΩΝ. In fine, the inhabitants of *Ilium* obtained leave of *Cesar*, to make some magnificence, under the title of *Neocori*, to honour him and the *Julian* Family, having erected, in memory of his extraction from *Anchises*, *Aeneas* and *Iulus*, some Colossus representing the posture of *Aeneas* when he left *Troy*, doing a signall act of Piety both toward the Gods and men, having the *Palladium* in his hand, and carrying the old man his Father in his right arme, as women carry children, the little *Iulus* marching before, having his hat in one hand, and asking his father the way with the other. The word ΒΙΣ, signifies that this was the second time they had been honour'd with the quality and commission of being *Neocori*, and that they had celebrated the solemn dayes with Panegyrics, Poms, exercises, and other magnificences besitting the grandeur of *Cesar*.

The Wives of Cesar.

His first wife was COSSUTIA, whom he married in his youth, but divorc'd her at the seventeenth year of his Age, before he had lived with her, though she was rich, and descended of a family of the *Roman* Knights.

The second was CORNELIA, the daughter of *Cornelius Cinna*, one who had been four times Consul; by whom he had onely one daughter, named *Julia*, afterwards first wife to *Pompey*. He took her death very heavily, and publicly commended her, in a most elegant funerall Oration.

The third was POMPEIA, the daughter of *Q. Pompeius*, who had gotten that evill report, as if *Publius Claudius* had been somewhat too familiar with her, which was the reason that *Cesar* divorc'd her.

The fourth and last was CALPHURNIA, who out-lived him, and was the daughter of *Lucius Piso*: a woman of a generous spirit and well spoken, and had that honour and affection for *Cesar*, that after his death she herself made a most elegant funerall Oration to his honour, and afterward retir'd to *Mark Antony*.

The Medall of the

T R I U M V I R I.

THIS Medall is of Copper, small, of the *Greek* fashion; It represents the three effigies of *Cæsar*, *Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, done sideways, one upon another on the same side, without Inscription. On the reverse it represents an *Hermathena*; before which image there is an altar, out of which issues a serpent that lifts it self above it; behind there is a Legionary eagle: time hath worn out the inscription to this half word APXIEP. This figure represents *Mercury* and *Minerva* join'd in one statue; that is to say, the upper part is of that Goddess, arm'd with a Helmet, Buckler and Laveline; the Lower part is a *Terminus* or *Hermes*. For the interpretation of this device; This *Hermathena*, comprehending in it the God *Terminus*, with *Minerva* and *Mercury*, denotes an excellent union, as to affection, interest and good understanding, among the *Triumviri*, as well for the management and conduct of civile affairs, as military. Which being so, the invention must needs be ingenious, denoting that, though their employments were severall, yet there was such a concurrence between their Counsels and intentions, as that they jump'd into the same resolution for to carry on the interest of the Common-wealth. As for the Altar and Serpent, they signify certain sacrifices performed by that people, for the welfare, union and concord of those three powers; as also either to obtain some Victory, or to give thanks to the Gods for one received. For a Serpent issuing from under a table was taken by *Sylla* to presage Victory, as the Historian *Sisenna* observes upon *Cicero*, lib. 1. de *Divinatione*. See also, *Val. Maximus*, lib. 1. ch. 6. and *Plutarch* in his *Life*. 'Tis therefore the Symbole of Health, Victory and Felicity. Of which opinion is also *Theophrastus*, who giving the marks of a Superstitious man, says, that if he surprize a Serpent in any place, he presently raises a chappell or an altar in that place, as it were to thank the Gods for so good an adventure. There may this further reason be given of this juncture in the *Hermathena*, that as *Minerva* hath a dominion over wrestling, as well as *Mercury*, so were they also both equally patrons of *Traffick* and *Merchandise*.

We shall divert a little to speak of another kind of statues, called *Hermheracles*, consisting, the lower part of *Hermes*, the upper of *Hercules*. Both these and the *Hermathenas*, were placed in the places of publick exercises, *Mercury* and *Hercules*, implying strength and sleight. The reason why *Mercury* was so often joyn'd with the other Gods, was, that he could conform to any, and was one with all; as *Iamblichus* affirms, *Isque* (says he) *de Diis vere scientie præsidium*

Cæsar's Medalls.

scilicet ac tutelam tenens, unus extat idem in universis: for which reason, the Ancients dedicated all their works under his onely name. *Hercules* was held in such veneration for the God and Genius of all Gymnick engagements, that they came to be called (*angustiori vocabulo*) *Herculeæ certamina*. He was the institour of the *Olympick Games*, wherein having had the honour to wrestle with *Jupiter*, he was thought fit to be the patron of them: whence *Lycophron* call's him *παλαστής*, the *Wrestler*.

The second Medall.

M. ANTONIUS IMP. AUG. III VIR. R.P.C. *Marcus Antonius Imperator Augur Triumvir Reipublicæ constituendæ*. A sacrificing vessel called *præfericulum*, and the augurall stick called *Lituus*. On the reverse there is L. PLANCUS IMP. COS. An urne between a thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*. It is to be noted first, that there is a vessel on either side of this Medall, and therefore it is not enough to say, that that on one side with the *Lituus*, is the mark of an augurall dignity, which *Antonius* obtained from his favourite *L. Plancus* being Consul; but something must be said of this urne, so honourably plac'd between a thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*, on the other. *Appianus Alexandrinus* in his book of the warres against the *Parthians*, speaking of the design which *Mark Antony* had, being at *Athens*, to undertake the warre against them, and to partake of the glory might follow the ruining of so great and powerfull a nation, says, that, to satisfy the admonition of a certain Oracle, he carried with him a vessel full of water, taken out of the sacred fountain which was in that City, called *Clepsydra*. *Et ut oraculo cui-dam scitis faceret, etiam è Clepsydra fonte vas repletum aqua secum asportavit*. This fountain *Hesychius* says was within the Cittadell of *Athens*. Now this is the representation of that vessel, and a monument of the transportation of that water by *Mark Antony*, which must needs be of great concernment to him, since he was advi'd to do it by the Oracle, and specified the fountain. As for the thunderbolt and *Caduceus*, they signify that *Mark Antony* should in that expedition make a thundring and dismall warre against the *Parthians*, with a great number of old experienced Legions, who should tread under foot the *Parthian* greatness, elevated against the *Romans* by the miscarriage of *Cæssus* and his flourishing Legions; or those Barbarians should buy their peace very deare, which the Heralds of *Mark Antony* should offer them with the *Caduceus* in their hands, that being the embleme of an assured reconciliation.

Observations upon

ATILIUS CIMBER.

WE should have no more to say of this *Cimber*, then we have of *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and the other Massacrers of *Cæsar*, were it not that his Medall serves to correct divers passages in History (which it hath been the main designe of these our observations to clear up) wherein his name is corrupted.

All who have mentioned this man, have been mistaken in his name, except *Appianus Alexandrinus*, and that in one place only, for in some others he calls him Τύλλιος. Others call him *Tillius*, others *Tullius*, or *Annius*. *Seneca* Epist. 3. *Cai Cæsaris cæde (illius dico qui, superato Pompeio, Rempublicam tenuit) tam creditum est Tillio Cimbro quam Cassio: Cassius tota vita aquam bibit, Tillius Cimber & nimius erat in vino & scordalus. In hanc rem jocosus est ipse, Ego, inquit, quenquam feram, qui vinum ferre non possum?* Upon which passage (which gives a strange intimation of the vicious qualities of this man) *Pintianus* says, it ought to be read *Tullius Cimber*, as the same *Seneca* elsewhere calls him, and as he is called in *Plutarch* and *Suetonius*. But it is doubtlesse he should be called *Atilius Cimber*, and that *Suetonius*, *Quintilian*, and the other later Authors should be corrected, as having trusted the corrupt Manuscripts, and not seen this Medall.

But to come to the Device on the reverse first. The Cap signifies (as is obvious to any one) the Liberty obtained by the means of the ponyard wherewith *Cæsar*, who oppressed the Commonwealth, was dispatched. The wings, or Talaries of *Mercury*, with the serpents, and the rod, which was ceremonious at the manumission of slaves, or rather the wand which *Mercury* made use of to conduct the souls delivered out of the miseries of this life to their expected rest, signify that the diligence, dexterity, and prudence which *Atilius Cimber* had used in this execution, had restored the Universe to its Liberty, the *Romans* from the Tyranny of *Cæsar*, and had established peace and tranquillity in all families. The conduct and assistance of *Mercury* to the departed souls with this wand, is expressed by *Statius* in these Verses.

*Summa pedum propere plantaribus illigat alis,
Obnubique comas, & temperat astra galero;
Tum dextra virgam inseruit qua pelleret dulces,
Aut suadere iterum somnos, quam nigra subire
Tartara, & exsangues animare adsueverat umbras.*

There is yet another thing whence it may be inferred that *Mercury* was a God very anciently esteemed well-affected to Liberty; which is, that in the Isle of *Creet*, (now *Candia*) they celebrated an anniversary, with they called Εἰμασίον, to the honour of this God, wherein, after the manner of the *Saturnalls* at *Rome*, Slaves and servants had all manner of Liberty, and were magnificently waited on at table by their Masters, as *Athenæus* affirms l. 14.

On the other side we have this inscription, *ATILIUS CIMBER*,
a man

The death of *Julius Cæsar*.

a man beyond middle-aged, with a great beard, and a rustick countenance, with a long ponyard before him. That which may be more particularly deduced hence is, that he was more then ordinarily desirous that the conspiracy should prosper, though before he had been a great creature of *Cæsar's* (as *Seneca* affirms in his Book *de Ira*.) Nay, under pretence of presenting a Petition to him, he was so importunate with him, and held him in discourse with such eagerness till he came into the Senate, that he had not the time to read a note which was presented to him, wherein the whole conspiracy was discovered. This ponyard therefore stands to signify the great Zeal he had to this execution, wherein he thought the Liberty of his Country was concerned; to vindicate which, as it was his ambition to appear the most eager and the most resolute of all the gang, so he thought it his glory to give *Cæsar* the first wound. Which consideration leads us by the hand to what we had designed for the last part of this discourse, namely the tragicall Catastrophe of this miraculous person.

For motives to the conspiracy, we may lay down partly the irreconcilable hatred that some bare, in others, the aversion they had from Tyranny, in others, a kind of zeal to publick Liberty: the encouragements, *Cæsar's* own carelesness of himself, according to that *Apophthegme* of his, when advised to take a guard about his person, *That it was better to dye once then live in continuall fear*; his not humouring that people who, if courted with *Majesty* (as they had been wont in the time of the Commonwealth) had suffered any thing; his derisory expressions of the Commonwealth, saying that it was a shadow, and an imaginary notion; *Antonius* his proffering him a Crown, which though (seeing the acclamations of the people backward) he accepted not, yet was his designe easily discovered; the report that he was to be declared *King*, and would translate the Seat of the Empire to *Troy*, whence he pretended to descend, or to *Alexandria*, to spend his dayes with *Cleopatra*; the Tribunes shewing a certain law to a friend of his, in writing, whereby it was lawfull to take as many wives as one would, the better to people the Commonwealth. These and such like passages gave occasion to Libels and placards, which were set up at every Corner, whereof divers particularly addressed to *Brutus*, who by his influence over the chiefest Citizens got together above 60. who under the conduct of *Brutus* (whose very name they thought to be fatal to Tyrants) would preferre the Liberty of their Country before Lives, Fortunes, or Relations. Some time before his death, so many signes and prodigies happened, that it was become the generall belief that *Cæsar's* death was near at hand. Among other things, his soothsayer *Spurina* bid him beware of the Ides of *March*. All which put together, somewhat startled him, inso much that he was once resolved to deferre the Senate for that day, had not *Brutus* advised him in no case to betray so much fear; whereupon he went.

Going therefore in his litter towards the Senate the fifteenth day of *March*, it could not be but diverse would be presenting petitions, and discoursing with him; but the Conspiratours kept some of them so close to him, that he had not the leisure to peruse any thing he had taken, which if he had, he had in an epistle given him by *Artemidorus*, or some other, discovered the whole plot. Meeting by the way with *Spurina*, he told
A him

The death of Iulius Caesar.

him the *Ides of March* were come: to which he answered, 'tis true, but they are not past. Being come to the Temple, where the Senate was to sit that day, and sacrifice done according to the custome, he took his chair in the Senate. The first came up to him was one *Celer*, who while he was entreating him to release a Brother of his that was in captivity, the rest came up to him: whereat he suspecting some violence, cryed out, what force is this? To which the above-mentioned *Atilius Cimber* answered him with a wound in the throat, which the rest of the Conspiratours seconded with others. But that which amazed him above all, was to see *Brutus* among them, one whose authority was great, and one whom he had obliged beyond all expression of gratitude, when a conquered enemy; upon which he could not but break forth into these words, *And thou, son Brutus, art thou one?* Whereupon seeing there was no possibility of escaping, he remembered to keep the honour of his person, covering his head with part of his robe, and with his left hand settling his cloaths about him; and so having received 23. wounds, he fell to the ground a sacrifice to the publick Liberty, near the base of *Pompey's* statue, which was noted as a judgement of the Gods.

Caesar having neither Son nor Daughter legitimate, at his death, had by his will before, adopted his Nephew *Octavius Caesar*, who was afterwards called *Octavianus Augustus*, who studied in *Apollonia* at the time of this murder of *Caesar*, and expected to go with him to the war against the *Parthians*, being then about 17. yeares of age.

This death (as all extraordinary accidents) must needs beget tumult and confusion in the City; All Offices ceased, the Temples, and Courts of Justice were shut up; *Caesar's* friends were afraid of the Conspiratours, & they reciprocally of them. This Tumult somewhat startled the Conspiratours, who seeing the design took not with the people as they expected, to secure themselves, seized the Capitoll, crying as they went, *Liberty, Liberty, Liberty*. Whereupon, *Antonius* and *Lepidus* being all this while in Armes, divers treaties of accommodation passed between them, whereby it was at last agreed the Senate should sit, whither *Brutus* and *Cassius* came, *Antonius's* Sons being hostages for their return. The Senate approves the fact, the people dissemble their satisfaction: for, as the Authority of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, with the name of *Liberty*, was very charming on one side; so the horror of the fact, and the love some bare *Caesar*, exasperated them against the Murtherers. But *Mark Antony*, endeavouring to trouble the waters as much as he could, among other things got *Caesar's* testament to be opened, wherein he had bequeath'd to the people of *Rome* certain gardens and heritages near the River *Tiber*, and to every Citizen of *Rome* a certain summe of money: which being known, it re-enslamed their old affection to *Caesar*, and raised a compassion and a regret for his death. The day appointed for his funerall (the ceremony whereof was to burn his body in the field of *Mars*) *Antonius* being to make the Oration, brought with him the robe wherein *Caesar* was assassinated, which being all bloudy he shewed to the people, using some expressions which raised in them both indignation and pity; insomuch as before the solemnity of the funerall was ended, they all departed in great fury with the brands of the same fire,

to

The death of Iulius Caesar.

to set afire the houses of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and the rest of the Conspiratours, whom they sought running up & down the streets. In which fury they killed *Elivs Cinna*, mistaking him for *Cornelius Cinna*, who indeed was one of them. This Tumult forced *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and all who conceived themselves guilty of *Caesar's* death, to depart from *Rome*: whereupon *Antonius* took occasion to dispense with the decree of the Senate, and assuming *Caesar's* power and authority persecuted them all he could. *Brutus* and *Cassius* went into *Greece*, to govern those Provinces which *Caesar* (whom they had murdered) had conferred on them, which were *Macedonia* and *Syria*; and in like manner were all the rest dispersed, and that so unfortunately, that within the space of three yeares they all came to violent deaths.

He was slain in the 56. year of his age, somewhat above four yeares after the death of *Pompey*, 700. yeares after the foundation of *Rome*, 3010. yeares after the Creation, but according to the 70. Interp. 5157. in the 184. Olympiad, and 42. yeares before the birth of *Christ*. Having made himself perpetuall Dictator, he enjoyed it 3. yeares, 4. months, and 6. dayes.

Thus have we traced this transcendent Personage through all his great and incomparable actions and achievements, we have viewed him in his distresses and extremities, and we have also seen him in his victories & triumphs, expressing the same greatness, that is, the same equality of mind in both; we have surveyed him in all his excellencies and abilities both of mind and body; we have considered the invincibility of his spirit, his incomparable courage, his clemency & magnanimity, his policy, vigilance, prudence, conduct; we have, as near as we can, enumerated the many battels he fought, the many victories obtained, the many people and provinces reduced, the many Kings and Countries subdued, so to figure a person imitable in all things, that may be called great or vertuous, not exceedable in any; we have described and dilucidated his *Medalls*, wherein if we have committed any offence, it hath been in studying brevity, purposely omitting many things that might have been said, and forbearing the multitude and particularity of citations, least it might be thought a vanity: lastly, we have accompanied him to his funerall pile, the fire whereof consumed his murtherers and enemies, while he himself is carried up by the same element, to shine eternally a starre of the first magnitude, in the firmament of famous and heroick spirits. And there we leave him, recommending the Reader to see and find him haply fare greater then our commendations, in his own everlasting COMMENTARIES.

FINIS.

With some littrell faults, and ill pointing.

CÆSAR





Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a souldier
perfect in the Art militarie, how great soever his
knowledge may be, which long
experience and much practice
of Arms hath gained.

When I consider the weaknesse of mans judgement in censuring things best known unto it self, and the disability of his discourse in discovering the nature of unacquainted objects; choosing rather to hold any sensible impression, which custome hath by long practice inured, then to hearken to some other more reasonable perswasion: I do not marvell that such souldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience, & consisteth in the rules of their own practice, are hardly perswaded that history and speculative learning are of any use in perfecting of their Art, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the use of Armes and achievements of war seem to have their chiefest being. But those purer spirits embellished with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other mens fortunes, wherein variety of accidents affordeth variety of instructions, & the mutuall conference of things happened, begeth both similitudes and differences, contrary natures, but yet joyntly concurring to season our judgement with discretion, and to enstall wisdom in the government of the mind: These men I say, mounting aloft with the wings of contemplation, do easily discover the ignorance of such Martialists, as are only trained up in the school of practice, and taught their rudiments under a few yeares experience, which serveth to interpret no other authour but it self, nor can approve his maxims, but by his own authority; and are rather moved to pity their hard fortune, having learned only to be ignorant, then to envy their skill in matter of war, when they oppose themselves against so manifest a truth as this, that a meer practicall knowledge cannot make a perfect souldier. Which proposition that I may the better confirme, give me leave to reason a litle of the grounds of learning, and dispute from the habitude of Arts and sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the variety of that indivi-

duality, the intellectuall power frameth generall notions and maxims of rule, uniting terms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diversities by differences of properties, aptly dividing the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his descriptions, duties, cautions and exceptions. For unless the understanding be in this sort qualified, and able by logicalall discourse, to ascend by way of composition, from singularity to catholicke conceptions, and return again the same way to the lowest order of his partitions, the mind cannot be said to have the perfection of that Art, nor instructed in the true use of that knowledge: but guiding her self by some broken precepts, feelth more want by that she hath not, then benefit by that she hath. Whereby it followeth that a science divided into many branches, and consisting in the multiplicity of divers members, being all so interested in the Bulk, that a maim of the smallest part causeth either debility or deformity in the body, cannot be said to be thoroughly attained, nor conceived with such a profiting apprehension as feelth the mind with true judgement, and maketh the scholar master in his Art, unless the nature of these particularities be first had and obtained.

And for as much as no one science or faculty whatsoever, in multitude and plurality of parts, may any way be comparable to the Art military, wherein every small and unrespected circumstance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth such disparity and difference, that the resemblance of their equall participating properties is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing parts; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the variety of chances in the course of war, must needs be thought a more perfect souldier, and deserveth a title of greater dignity in the profession of Armes, then such as content themselves with a few common precepts and over-worn rules: without which as they cannot be said at all to be souldiers; so with them and no more, they no way deserve

serve the name of skilfull and perfect men of war. Now whether meer experience, or experience joyned with reading and discourse, do feate the mind with more variety and choice of matters, or entertain knowledge with greater plenty of novelties, incident to expeditions and use of Armes, I will use no other reason to determine of this question, then that which Franciscus Patricius alleadeeth in his parallels, where he handleth this Argument which I intreat of.

He that followeth a war (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part only. If his knowledge extend no farther then a part, he hath learned lesse then he that saw the whole: but admit he hath seen and learned the instructions of one whole war, he hath notwithstanding learned lesse then he that hath seen the proceeding of two such wars: and he again hath not seen so much as another that hath served in three severall wars: and so by degrees, a souldier that hath served ten years, must needs know more then one that hath not served so long. And to conclude, he that hath received 22. years stipend (which was the full time of service amongst the Romans before a souldier could be dismissed) hath greater meares of experience then another, that hath not so long a time followed the camp, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custome. And hence it consequently followeth, that in one or more of all these wars, there have happened few or no actions of service, which might teach a souldier the practice of Armes; that then his learning doth not countervail his labour. And if the war through the negligence, or ignorance of the chief commanders have been ill carried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of military discipline; if the part which he followed were defeated and overthrowen, he knoweth by experience how to loose, but not how to gain. And therefore it is not only experience and practice which maketh a souldier worthy of his name, but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise from the variety of humane actions; wherein reason & error, like merchants in traffick, enterchange contrary events of fortune, giving sometime copper for silver, and balme for poyson, and repaying again the like commodity as time and circumstances do answer their directions. And this knowledge is onely to be learned in the registers of antiquity and in histories, recording the motions of former ages.

Caius Julius Caesar (whose actions are the subject of these discourses) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the provinces of Spain, broken the strength of the Roman Empire at Pharfallas was held a souldier summenting cravy and all her exceptions; and yet notwithstanding all this he battell he had

with Pharnaces king of Pontus, was like to have buried the glory of his former conquests, in the dishonourable memory of a willfull overthrow. For having possessed himself of a hill of great advantage, he began to encamp himself in the top thereof: which Pharnaces perceiving, (being lodged likewise with his camp upon a mountain confronting the Romans) inbattelled his men, marched down from his camp into the valley, and mounted his forces up the hill, where the Romans were busied about their intrenchments, to give them battell. All which Caesar took but for a bravado: and maintaining the enemy by himself, could not be perswaded that any such fool hardiness could carry men headlong into so dangerous an adventure, until they were constrained to say that he had leave any time to call the legions from their work, and to give order for the battell: which to amazed the Romans, that unlike as Caesar himself saith, the advantage of the place and the benignity of the gods had greatly favoured them; Pharnaces had at that time reversed the overthrow of Penney and the Senate, and restored the Roman Empire to liberty. Which may learn us how necessary it is (besides experience, which in Caesar was infinite) to perfect our knowledge with variety of chances: and to meditate upon the effects of other mens adventures, that their harms may be our warnings, and their happy proceedings our fortunate directions.

And all this amongst so many decads of History, which pregnant wits have presented to these later ages, we seldom or never meet with any one accident which jumpeth in all points with another of the like nature, that shall happen to fall out in managing a war, or setting forth of an army; and so do seem to reap little benefit by that we read, and make small use of our great travell: yet we must understand that in the Audic of Reason, there are many (slices, which through the sovereign power of the discursive faculty, receive great commodities by whatsoever falleth under their jurisdiction, and suffer no action to passe without due triall of his nature, and examination of his state; that so the judgement may not be defrauded of her revenues, nor the mind of her learning: For notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of forms, which seem to cut off the privilege of imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we have obtained by reading; the intellectuall faculty hath authority to examine the use, and look into the inconveniences of these wants and diversities, and by the help of reason to turn it to her advantage; or so to counterpoise the defect, that in triall and execution it shall not appear any disadvantage. For as in all other sciences, and namely in Geometry, of certain bare elements, and common sentences, which sense admitteth to the apprehension, the powers of the

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soul frame admirable Theorems and Problems of infinite use, proceeding with certainty of demonstration, from proposition to proposition, and from conclusion to conclusion, and still make new wonders as they go, besides the strangeness of their Architecture, that upon such plain and easy foundations, they should erect such curious and beautifull buildings: so in the Art Military, these examples which are taken from histories, are but plain kind of principles, on which the mind worketh to her best advantage, and useth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities she concludeth an equality, and of dissimilitudes most sweet resemblances; and so she worketh out her own perfection by discourse, and in time groweth to absolute knowledge, that her sufficiency needeth no further directions. But as Lomazzo the Milanese, in that excellent work which he writ of picturing, saith of a skilfull painter, that being to draw a portraiture of gracefull lineaments, he will never stand to take the symmetry by scale, nor mark it out according to rule; but having his judgement habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the variety of shapes and proportions, his knowledge guideth his eye, and his eye directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with such facility of cunning, that each of them serves for a rule whereby the true measures of nature are exactly expressed: The like may I say of a skilfull Souldier, or any Artizan in his faculty, when knowledge hath once purified his judgement, and turned into the key of true apprehension.

And although there are many that will easily admit a reconciliation of this disagreement, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well-tempered spirit; yet they will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous and inimitable examples of valour and magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigal, and spendeth as though time should never want such treasure) can any way avail the manners of these dayes, which if they were as they ought to be, would appear but counterfeits to the lustre of a golden age, nor yet comparable to silver or brasse, or the strength of iron, but deserve no better title then earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is between the customs of our times, and the actions of those antient Heroes? They observed equity as well in war as in peace; for virtue rather flourished by the naturall disposition of men, then by law and authority; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deeds of armes which they had achieved for their country, adorning the temples of their gods with piety, and their private houses with glory, pardoning rather then persecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing injury: But the

course of our times hath another bias, for covetousness hath subverted both faith and equity, and our valour affecteth nothing but ambition, pride, and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughts, and subtilty teacheth us to carry rather a fair countenance, then a good nature; our meanes of getting are by fraud and extortion, and our manner of spending is by wast and prodigality, not esteeming what we have of our own, but coveting that which is not ours; men effeminated and women impudent, using riches as servants to wickedness, and preventing natures appetite with wanton luxury; supplanting vertue with treachery, and using victory with such impiety, as though *injuriarum facere*, were *imperio uti*: and therefore the exemplary patterns of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serve to be gazed upon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtle to deal with honesty, and wanting courage to encounter valour. I must needs confesse, that he that compareth the history of Livie with that of Guichardine, shall find great difference in the subjects which they handle; for Livie triumpheth in the conquests of vertue, and in every page erecteth trophies unto valour, making his discourse like Cleanthes table, wherein vertue is described in her entire majesty; and so sweetened with the presence and service of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellency, and charmed with the love of her perfection: but Guichardine hath more then Theseus task to perform, being to wind through the labyrinth of subtilty, and discover the quaint practices of politicians, wherein publicke and open designs are oftentimes but shadows of more secret projects, and these again serve as foiles to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so intangled in the sleights of subtilty, that when you look for war, you shall find peace; and expecting peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissensions and wars: So crabbed and crooked is his argument in respect of Livies fortune, and such art is required to unfold the truth of those mysteries.

But to answer this objection in a word, and so to proceed to that which followeth; I say those immortal memories of vertue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be known, then any stratagems of subtler ages: for equity and valour being truly apprehended, so season the motions of the soul, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peradventure stir up imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practices, and devilish devices, when evil is reprovved by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steps which the present course of the world hath traced, and play the Cretian with the Cretian; this objection hindreth nothing, but that history, especially these of

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later times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a souldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore any man despise the sound instructions which learning affordeth, nor refuse the helps that history doth offer to perfect the weaknesse of a shoit experience, especially when no youth can countervail the weight of so great a businesse: for I take the office of a chief commander, to be a subject capable of the greatest wisdom that may be apprehended by naturall meanes, being to manage a multitude of disagreeing minds, as a fit instrument to execute a designe of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualify both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidents which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true judgement which he ought to have of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our providence cannot have enough either from learning or experience, to prevent disadvantages, or to take hold of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our judgements, so it serveth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as behold the achievements of vertues, commended to a perpetuall posterity, having themselves the like meanes to consecrate their memory to succeeding ages, wherein they may serve for examples of valour, and reap the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our own fortunes, and long to foresee the end of that race which we have taken, which is the chiefest matter of consequence in the use of Arms; what better conjecture can be made, then to look into the course of former times, which have proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like meanes, and therefore not unlikely to fort unto like ends?

And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice have the first place in this Art, & serveth as a foundation to the rest of the buildings; let Marius answer this question, who envying at the nobility of Rome, saith thus, *Qui postquam consules facti sunt, alii Majorum & Græcorum militaria precepta legere ceperunt: homines præposteris, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius esse*; Whereas (saith he) reading ought to go before practice (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no reading, but of something practised before) these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helm of government, begin to read, when they should practice that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiency of knowledge by using out of time that, which in time is most necessary. This testimony gave Marius of reading and book-learning, being himself an enemy to the same, for as much as all his knowledge came by meer experience. But howsoever his judgement was good in this point: for

since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soul, and cannot well be produced, untill the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the minds, according to which pattern the outward being, and sensible resemblance is duly fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expressed, when the mind is not directed by knowledge to dispose it in that sort, as shall best agree with the occurrences of such natures, as are necessarily interested both in the means and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the course of all practice is first to be respected.

But that I may not seem partiall in this controversy, but carry an equall hand between two so necessary yoke-fellowes, give me leave to conclude in a word the benefit of practice, and define the good which cometh from experience; that so nothing that hath been spoken may seem to come from affection, or proceed from the forge of unjust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practice giveth boldnesse and assurance in action, and maketh men expert in such things as they take in hand: for no man can rest upon such certainty, through the theorick of knowledge, as he that hath seen his learning verified by practice, and acknowledged by the testimony of assured proofs. Besides, there are many other accomplishments gotten only by practice, which grace the presence of knowledge, and give credit to that which we have read: as first to learn the use and advantage of the armes which we bear: secondly, by frequent aspect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terror, to learn to fear nothing but dishonour, to make no difference between heat and cold, summer and winter, to sleep in all places as on a bed, and at the same time to take pains and suffer penury, with many other difficulties which custome maketh easy, and cannot be gotten but by use and practice.

And thus at length, I have brought a shallow discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater zeal of affection then I am able with manifest proofs of reason, to demonstrate the necessity, that both these parts were by our souldiers so regarded, that neither practice might march in obstinate blindness without learned knowledge; nor this again be entertained with an idle apprehension without practice: but that both of them may be respected, as necessary parts to make a compleat nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectuall part giveth life and spirit to the action, and practice as the materiall substance maketh it of a sensible being, and like a skilfull workman expresseth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore-conceived: wishing no man to despair of effecting that by practice which the Theorick of knowledge commendeth. For *Cur desperes nunc posse fieri, quod jam toties factum est?*

Salust. de bello Jugur.



The summe of the first book of Cæsars commentaries; with observations upon the same, discovering the excellency of Cæsars Militia.

The Argument.

IN this first book are contained the specialities of two great wars, begun and ended both in a summer: the first, between Cæsar and the Helvetii: the second, between him and Ariovistus, king of the Germans. The history of the Helvetians may be reduced to three principall heads: under the first, are the reasons that moved the Helvetians to entertain so desperate an expedition, and the preparation which they made for the same. The second containeth their defeat by Cæsar: and the third their return into their Country. That of Ariovistus divideth it self into two parts: the first giveth the causes that induced Cæsar to undertake that war: the second intreateth of the war it self, and particularly describeth Ariovistus overthrow.

Chap. I.

Gallia described: the Helvetians dislike their native seat, and propound to themselves larger territories in the Continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth this humour, for his own advantage.

Gallia is all divided into three parts; whereof the Belges do inhabit one, the Aquitanes another, and those which they call Celtes, and we Galles, a third: all these do differ each from others in manners, language, and in laws. The river Garon doth separate the Galles from the Aquitans, and Maine and Seine do bound them from the Belges. Of these the Belges are most warlike; as fittest off the civility and politure of the Province, and lesse frequented with Merchants, or acquainted with such things as are by them imported to effeminate mens minds; as likewise being situate next to the Germans beyond the Rhene, with whom they have continual wars. For which cause also the Helvetians do excell the rest of the Galles in deeds of Arms,

being in daily conflicts with the Germans, for defence of their own territories, or by invading theirs. The part inhabited by the Galles, beginneth at the river Rhone, and is bounded with Garon, the Ocean, and the confines of the Belges; and reaching also to the Rhene, as a Limit from the Sequans and Helvetians, it stretched northward. The Belges take their beginning at the extreme confines of Gallia, and inhabit the Connry which lieth along the lower part of the Rhene, trindling to the North, and to the East. Aquitania spreadeth it self between the river Garon and the Pyrenean hills, and butteth upon the Spanish Ocean, between the West and the North.

Amongst the Helvetians, Orgetorix did far exceed all others, both for noble descent and store of treasure: and when M. Mettala and M. Piso were Consuls, being stirred up with the desire of a kingdom, he moved the Nobility to a commotion; persuading the State to go out of their confines with their whole power: as an easy

Suitzers.

Metron's Sequana.

matter for them, that excelled all other in valour and prowess, to seize upon the Empire of all Gallia. To which he did the rather persuade them, for that the Helvetians were on every side shut up, by the strength and nature of the place wherein they dwelt; on the one side, with the depth and breadth of the river Rhene, which divideth their Country from the Germans; on the other side, with the high ridge of the hill Jura, which runneth between them and the Sequans; and on the third part they were flanked with the lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, parting their territories from our Province.

Hence it happened, that being thus straitened, they could not easily enlarge themselves, or make war upon the bordering Countreys: and thereupon, being men wholly bent to Arms and war, were much grieved, as having too little elbow-room for their multitude of people, and the renown they had got of their Valour; their whole country containing but 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth. Spurred on with these inducements, and moved specially with the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to make provision of such things as were requisite for their expedition, bought great numbers of Carriages, and horses, for carriages; sowed much tilage, that they might have plenty of Corn in their journey; made peace and amity with the adjoining Countreys. For the perfecting and supply of which things, they took two yeares to be sufficient; and in the third, enacted their setting forward by a solemn Law, assigning Orgetorix to give order for that which remained.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

HE that will examine this expedition of the Helvetians, by the transigrations and flittings of other Nations, shall find some unexamined particularities in the course of their proceeding: for, first it hath never been heard, that any people utterly abandoned that Country which Nature or providence had allotted them, unless they were driven thereunto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty and oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Suevians, who thought it great honour to suffer no man to border upon their confines; or some other universall, which made the place inhabitable, and the people willing to undertake a voluntary exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a Country were so multiplied, that the place was over-charged with multitudes of off-spring, and like a poor father, had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new fortunes in

foraine Countreys, and to possesse themselves of a resting seat; which might recompense the wants of their native Country, with a plenteous revenue of necessary supplements. And in this sort we read that Rome sent out many Colonies into divers parts of her Empire. And in this manner the ancient Gallies disburdened themselves of their superfluity, and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the Islands of the Baltick sea, and in Sulla his time swarmed over Germany: besides many other Nations, whose transigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsook their Country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same; from whence, as from a fountain, succeeding ages might derive the stream of that over-flowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moved them unto it. For their manner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to divide themselves into two or three parts, equall both in equality and number: for after they had parted their common people into even companies, they divided their Nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions: and then casting lots, that part which went out to seek new adventures, left their lands and possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industry they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawn upon them. And this was the means, which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the flood, to people the uninhabited places, and to keep off the inconveniences of scarcitie and famine.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

HE that would prognosticate by the course of these severall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better success, hath greater reason to foretell happiness to these which I last spake of, then to the Helvetians; unless their valour were the greater, and quitted all difficulties which hatred and envy would cast upon them: for an action which savoureth of necessity (which was alwayes understood in sending out a Colony) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntary motion. For, as men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concern not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gain to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

ORgetorix, thirsting after princely dignity, discovereth the humour of vain glory. For, not contented with the substance of honour, being already of greatest power amongst the Helvetians; and ordering the affaires of the State by his

his own direction, thought it nothing without the marks and title of dignity, unto which the inconveniences of Majesty are annexed: not considering that the best honour fitteth not alwayes in imperiall thrones, nor wear the Diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it self in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles.

For proof whereof, to omit antiquity, take the family of the Medices in Florence, and particularly Cosmo and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferior to the greatest Potentates of their time; being themselves but private Gentlemen in that State, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoever, the opportunity of changing their soil was well observed by Orgetorix, as the fittest means to attempt an innovation: but the success depended much upon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition.

For, as a multitude of that nature can be content to attribute a great part of their happiness, wherein every man thinketh himself particularly interested, to an eminent Leader; and in that universall extasy of joy, will easily admit an alteration of their State; so, if the issue be in any respect unfortunate, no man will acknowledge himself faulty. But, every one desiring to discharge his passion upon some object, a chief director is likeliest to be the mark, at which the darts of their discontent will be thrown; and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.

Chap. II.

Orgetorix practices are discovered: his death. The Helvetians continue the resolution of their expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.

CaDr.

ORgetorix thereupon undertook employment to the adjoining States; and first persuaded Calpurnius, the sonne of Catamantelides a Sequan (whose father had for many yeares reigned in that place, and was by the Senate and people of Rome styled with the title of a Friend) to possesse himself of the Signiory of that State which his Father formerly enjoyed; and in like manner dealt with Dumnorix the Heduan, Divitiacus brother (who at that time was the only man of that Province, and very well beloved of the Commons) to endeavour the like there; and with all, gave him his daughter in marriage. Shewing them by lively reasons, that it was an easy matter to effect their designs; for that he being sure of the sovereignty of his State, there was no doubt but the Helvetians would do much throughout all Gallia, and so made no question to settle them in those kingdoms, with his power

and forces. Drawn on with these inducements, they gave faith and oath each to other, hoping with the support of the sovereignty of three mighty Nations, to possesse themselves of all Gallia.

This thing being discovered, the Helvetians (according to their customes) caused Orgetorix to answer the matter in durance: whose punishment upon the Ataint, was to be burned alive. Against the day of triall, Orgetorix had got together all his Family, to the number of ten thousand men, besides divers followers, and others far indubied, which were many; by whose means he escaped a judicall hearing. The people thereupon being much incensed, agreed the Magistrate should execute their lawes with force of Armes, and to that end should raise the Countrey: but in the mean time Orgetorix was found dead, not without suspicion (as was conceived) that he himself was guilty thereof.

Notwithstanding his death, the Helvetians did pursue their former designe of leaving their Countrey: and when they thought themselves ready prepared, they set fire on all their Townes (which were in number twelve) together with four hundred Villages, besides private houses, and burnt likewise all the Corn, save that they carried with them; that all hope of return being taken away, they might be the readier to undergo all hazards. And commanded that every man should carry so much Meale with him, as would serve for three Months.

Moreover also they persuaded the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and Latobrigi, their neighbour borderers, that putting on the same resolution, they would set fire on all their habitations, and go along with them. And likewise took unto them the Boii, which had dwelt beyond the Rhene, but were now seated in the Territories of the Norici, and had taken the Capitall town of that Countrey. There were only two wayes which gave them passage out of their Countrey: the one through the Sequans, very narrow and difficult, between the hill Jura, and the River Rhone, by which a single Cart could scarce pass; and had a high hill hanging over, that a small force might easily hinder them. The other was through our Province, far easier and readier; forasmuch as the river Rhone, running between the Helvetians and the Allobroges (who were lately brought in obedience to the people of Rome) did give passage in divers places by Fords.

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The utmost towne belonging to the Allobroges, that bordereth upon the Helvetians is Geneva; whereunto adjoineth a bridge leading to the Helvetians; who doubted not but to persuade the Allobroges (that seemed as yet to carry a great affection to the people of Rome) or at least to give them to give them passage. Things being now ready for their journey, they assigned a day when all should meet together upon the banks of Rhone: which day was the first of the Calends of April, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinius.

OBSERVATION.

AS these provisions were all requisite; so one thing was omitted, which might have furthered their good fortune more than anything thought of: which was, to have concealed by all means the time of their departure. For all the beasts of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such Lions roused themselves out of their dens; and be then very watchfull of their safety, when they knew the instant of time, when some of their spoils must needs be offered to appease their fury. Or at the least it behooved them to have dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to croffe their designs might have been no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two wayes out of their Country by which they might go; the one narrow and difficult, between the hill Jura and the river Rhone, by the Country of the Sequani; the other through Provence, far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoever, their error was, that after two yeares provision to go, and having made an exterminating decree which injoynd them to go, when they came to the point, they knew not what way to go.

Chap. III.

Cæsar denieth the Helvetians passage through the Roman Province: he fortifieth the passage between the hill Jura, and the lake of Geneva.

Cæsar.

Rom.

AS soon as Cæsar was advertised that their purpose was to passe through our Province, he haisted to leave the City, and posting by great journeyes into the further Gallia, he came to Geneva. And inrolling great forces throughout all the Province, for that there was but one legion in those parts, he brake down the bridge at Geneva.

The Helvetians having intelligence of Cæsar's arrivall, sent divers of the best of their Nobility Embassadors unto him, whereof Numicius and Veredoctius were the chief, to give him

notice, that they had a purpose to passe peaceably through the Province, having no other way to go: and therein to pray his sufferance and permission.

Cæsar, well remembring how Lu. Cassius the Consul was slain, his Army beaten, & the souldiers put under the yoke, did not hold it convenient to grant their request. Neither did he think that men so ill-affected could so bear to offer wrongs and insolencies, if leave were given them as was required. Howbeit, for the better gaining of time, and getting such forces together as were caused to be inrolled, he answered the Commissioners that he would take a time of deliberation; and to that end willed them to return again by the Ides of April. And in the mean time with that legion he had ready, and the souldiers that came out of the Province, he made a ditch, and a wall of sixteen foot in height, from the lake Lemanus, which runneth into the Rhone, to the hill Jura, that divideth the Sequans from the Helvetians, being in length nineteen miles; and disposed garrisons and fortresses along the work, the better to impeach them, if happily they went about to break out by force.

At the day appointed, when the Embassadors returned for a resolution, he utterly denied to give any leave to passe through the Province; having neither custome nor precedent from the people of Rome to warrant him in that kind. And if they should endeavour it by force of Arms, he would oppugne them.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THIS manner of prolonging of time to reinforce the troupes or get some other advantage, as it was then of great use to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes been practiced to good purpose; so doth it discover to a circumspect enemy, by the directions in the mean time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inviteth him with greater courage to take the opportunity of that present advantage; especially if tract of time may strengthen the one, and not further the other: which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the Action.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE request of the Helvetians seemed to deserve a facile answer; being in effect no more then Nature had given to the river Rhone: which was to passe through the Province, with as much speed and as little hurt as they could. But Cæsar looking further into the matter, and comparing

paring things already past with occurrences that were to follow after, found the majesty of the Roman Empire to be intercelled in the answer; being either to maintain her greatness by resisting her enemies, or to degenerate from ancient vertue by gratifying such as fought her ruine: which in matter of State are things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an unsafe course to suffer an enemy to have means of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is always prone to load him with further wrongs whom he hath once injured: not but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarrell upon that advantage; but fearing the other whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunity of revenge, he gets what advantage he can beforehand, and to cease not until he have added a bloody end to an injurious beginning.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING this marvellous fortification between the hill and the lake, how serviceable such works were unto him in all his wars, in what sort, and in how small a time they were made; I will deferre the treatise of them until I come to the height of *Alesia*, where he gave some ground of that hyperbolical speech, *An mediocriter non animadvertet, ut decem habere legiones quidem legiones populum Romanum, que non solum vobis obistere, sed etiam caelum diruere possent?*

Chap. III.

The Helvetians failing to passe the Rhone, take the way through the Country of the Sequani, Cæsar haisteth into Italy, and there inrolleth more legions: and returning, overthroweth part of them at the river Aar.

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THE Helvetians frustrated of their former hope, went about, some with boats coupled together, others with Flats (whereof they made great store) the rest by foords and places where the River was shallow, sometimes in the day, and oftentimes in the night to break out: but being beaten back by the help of the fortification, and the concourse of souldiers, and multitude of weapons, they desisted from that attempt.

There was only another way left through the Sequans, which they could not take by reason of the narrowness thereof, but by the favour of the Country. And so much as of themselves they were able to prevail little therein, they sent Messengers to Dumnorix the Heduan, that by his mediation they might obtain so much of the Sequans. Dumnorix, what through favour and booties carriage, was of great power in

his Country, much affecting the Helvetians, by reason of his marriage with Orgetorix daughter; and drawn on with a desire of a kingdom, gave his mind to new projects; labouring to gratify many States, to tie them the rather to favour his courses. And thereupon undertaking the business, got the Sequans to give the Helvetians leave to passe through their Confiner; giving each other Pledges, that the Sequans should not interrupt the Helvetians in their journey, nor they offer any injury to the Country.

It was told Cæsar that the Helvetians were determined to passe through the territories of the Sequans and Hedunians, on the confines of the Santons, who are not far from the borders of the Tholosans, a people of the Province: which if they did, he foresaw how dangerous it would be to have a warlike Nation, and such as were enemies to the people of Rome to come so near them, and to have the advantage of an open and plentiful Country.

For which causes he left T. Labienus a Legate to command those works, and he himself made great journeyes to get into Italy; where he inrolled two legions, and took three more out of their wintering Camps near about Aquileia; and with these five legions went the next way over the Alps into the further Gallia. Where by the way the Centrons, Garoceli, and Caturiges taking advantage of the open ground, did seek to keep the Army from passage; but being beaten and put off by many skirmishes, they came in seven days from Ocellum, a town in the furthest parts of the nearer Province, into the confines of the Vocontii, a people of the further Province: from whence he led them into the territories of the Allobroges, and so unto the Saburians, that are the first beyond the Rhone, bordering upon the Province.

By that time the Helvetians had carried their forces through the straights and frontiers of the Sequans, into the Dominions of the Hedunians, and began to forrage and pillage their Country. Who finding themselves unable to make resistance, sent Messengers to Cæsar to require aid; shewing their desires to be such from time to time of the people of Rome, that might challenge a greater respect then to have their Country spoiled, their children led into captivity, their townes assaulted and taken, as it were in the sight of the Roman Army. At the same instant likewise the Ambarri, that had dependency and alliance with the Hedunians, advised Cæsar that their Country was utterly wasted

wasted, and they scarce able to keep the Enemy from entering their townes. In like manner also the Allobroges that had farmes and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled directly to Cæsar, complaining that there was nothing left them but the soil of their Country.

With which advertisements Cæsar was so moved, that he thought it not convenient to linger further, or expect untill the fortunes of their Allies were all wasted, and that the Helvetians were come unto the Santones. The river *A-rar*, that runneth through the confines of the Helvians and Sequans into the Rhone, passeth away with such a stillnesse, that by view of the eye it can hardly be discerned which way the water taketh. In this river did the Helvetians passe over by Flotes and bridges of boats. When Cæsar was advertised by his Discoverers that three parts of their forces were already past the water, and that the fourth was left behind on this side the river; about the third watch of the night he went out of the Camp with three legions, and surprising that part which was not as yet got over the river, slew a great part of them: the rest fled into the next woods.

This part was the Tigurine Canton: and the Helvetians being all parted into four divisions, this Canton alone in the memory of our fathers slew L. Cassius the Consul, and put his Army under the Yoke. So whether it were by chance, or the providence of the Gods, that part of the Helvetian State which gave so great a blow to the Roman people, was the first that did penance for the same. Wherein Cæsar took revenge not only of the publick, but of his particular losse too; forasmuch as the Tigurines had in that battel with Cassius slain L. Piso, the Grandfather of L. Piso, his father in law.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THIS defeat being chiefly a service of execution upon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which men call unawares, containeth these two advices. First, not to neglect that advantage which *Sertorius* by the hairs of his horse's tail had proved to be very important; that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to overcome the whole. Secondly, it may serve for a caveat, to transport an Army over a water, where the enemy is within a reasonable march; that no part may be so severed from the body of the Army, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off altogether, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most honourable way to transport an Army over a river,

is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troupes of horse and foot, to defend the Army from suddain assaults as they passe over the water. And thus went Cæsar over the Rhene into Germanie two severall times.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the circumstance of time, when Cæsar went out of his Camp, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must understand that the Romans divided the whole night into four watches; every watch containing three houres; and these watches were distinguished by severall notes and sounds of Cornets or Trumpets; that by the distinction and diversity thereof it might easily be known what watch was founded. The charge and office of founding the watches belonged to the chiefest Centurion of a legion, whom they called *Præpeditus*, or *Primus Centurio*; at whose pavilion the Trumpeters attended, to be directed by his houres-glasse.

The first watch began alwaies at sunne-setting, and continued three houres (I understand such houres as the night contained, being divided into twelve: for the Romans divided their night as well as their day into twelve equall spaces, which they called houres:) the second watch continued untill midnight; and then the third watch began, and contained likewise three houres: the fourth was equall to the rest, and continued untill sunne-rising. So that by this phrase *de tertio vigiliis*, we understand that Cæsar went out of his Camp in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceive of the rest of the watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in historie.

Chap. V.

Cæsar passeth over the river *Arar*: his horsemen encounter with the Helvetians, and are put to the worke.

AFter this overthrow he caused a bridge to be made over the river *Arar*, and carried over his Army to pursue the rest of the Helvetian forces. The Helvetians much daunted at his suddain coming, that had got over the river in one day, which they could scarce do in twenty. sent Embassadors unto him, of whom *Divico* was chief, that commanded the Helvetians in the warre against Cassius: who dealt with Cæsar to this effect; I but if the people of Rome would make peace with the Helvetians, they would go into any part which Cæsar should appoint them: but if otherwise he would prosecute warre, that he should remember the overthrow which the people of Rome received by their valour; and not

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to attribute it to their own worth, that they had surprized an unawares a part of their Army, when such as had passed the river could not come to succour them. They had learned of their forefathers, to contend rather by valour, then by craft and devices; and therefore let him beware that the place where they now were did not get a Name, or carie the marke to all future ages of an eminent calamity to the people of Rome, and of the utter destruction of his Army.

To this Cæsar answered; that he made the lesse doubt of the successe of these businesses, in that he well remembered and knew those things which the Helvetian Commissioners had related: and was so much the rather grieved thereat, because it happened without any cause or desert of the people of Rome; who if he were guilty of any wrong done unto them, it were a matter of no difficulty to beware of their practices: but therein was his error, that he could think of nothing which he had committed, that might cause him to fear; neither could he fear without occasion. And if he would let passe former insolencies, could he forget those late and fresh injuries? for, that they had attempted to pass through the Province by force of Armes: sacked and pillaged the Heduians, Ambians, and Allobrogiens that did so insolently vaunt of their victorie, admiring that these injuries were suffered so long time to rest unrevenged, came all in the end to one passe. For the immortal Gods were wont sometimes to give happinesse and long impunity to men, that by the greater alteration of things, the punishment should be the more grievous for their offences. Howbeit if they would give Hostages for the performance of these things which were to be agreed upon, and sursse the Heduians and Allobrogiens, together with their Allies, for the injuries they had done unto them, he would be content to make peace with them.

Divico replied, that they were taught by their Ancestors to take Hostages rather then to give them, whereof the people of Rome were witnesses: and thereupon departed. The next day they removed the Camp, and the like did Cæsar, sending all his horse before, to the number of four thousand (which he had raised in the Province, and drawn from the Heduians and their Associates) to understand which way the Enemy took: who prosecuting the reuerward overboldly, were forced to undertake the Helvetian Cavalry in a place of disadvantage; and thereby lost some few of their Company.

The enemy made proud with that encounter,

having with five hundred horse beaten so great a multitude, did afterwards make head with more assurance; and sometimes stuck not to fall out of the Reuerward and assault our Partie. Cæsar kept back his men from fighting; and held it enough for the present, to keep the Enemy from spoiling and harrying the Country: and went on for fifteen daies together in such manner, as there were but five or six miles between the first troupes of our Army, and the Reuerward of theirs.

OBSERVATION.

THIS example of the Helvetians may lesson a Cominaunder, not to wax insolent upon every overthrow which the enemy taketh; but duly to weigh the true causes of a victorie gotten; or an overthrow taken; that apprehending the right current of the action, he may neither vaunt of a blind victorie, nor be dismayed at a casual mishap.

And herein let a heedfull warinesse so moderate the sequels of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and jealousie to keep still that sweet-founding fame on foot, may as farre surpass the industrie which he first used to obtain it, as the continuance of happinesse doth exceed the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soul, that although from her instancie even to the manhood of her age she never should want of that which she lusteth after; yet when she meeteth with a counterbuffet to check her appetites, and restrain her affections from their satisfaction, she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had never received any contentment at all: for our will to everie object which it seeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a former quittance, but either seeketh present payment, or returneth discontentment unto the mind.

And as our soul is of an everlasting being, and cannot think of an end to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetuall continuance of such things as she lusteth after: which he that meaneth to hold Fortune his friend, will endeavour to maintain.

Chap. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the advantage of a hill, and so to give the Helvetians battell: but is put off by false intelligence. The opportunitie being lost, he intendeth provision of Corn.

IN the mean time Cæsar pressed the Heduians from day to day to bring in Corn, according to their promise: for by reason of the cold temperance of Gallia, which lieth to the Northward, it happened

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pened not only that the Corn was farre from being ripe, but also that there was scarce forrage for the horses. And the provisions which were brought along the river Arar stood him in small stead at that time, forasmuch as the Helvetians had taken their journey clean from the River, and he would by no means forsake them.

The Heduians putting it off from one day to another, gave out still it was upon coming. But when Cæsar found the matter so long delayed, and that the day of meeting out Corn to the souldiers was at hand, calling before him the chiefest Princes of the Heduians, of whom he had great numbers in his Camp, and amongst them Divitiacus and Lilius, who for that time were the sovereign Magistrates (which they call Vergobret, being yearly created, and having power of life and death) he did greatly blame them, that he was not supplied with Corn from them, the Enemy being so near, and inforced full a time, that it could neither be bought for money, nor had out of the fields: especially when for their sake, and at their request he had undertook that warre. Whereat he was the rather grieved, because he found himself forsaken of them.

At length Lilius moved with Cæsars speech, discovered (which before he had kept secret) that there were some of great authority amongst the Commons, and could do more being private persons, than they could do being Magistrates. These, by seditious and bad speeches, did defer the people from bringing Corn: shewing it better for them, first they could not attain to the Empire of Gallia, to undergo the sovereignty of the Galles, then the Romans: for they were not to doubt but if the Romans vanquished the Helvetians, they would bereave the Heduians of their libertie with the rest of all Gallia. By these men are our deliberations and counsels, or whatsoever else is done in the Camp, made known to the Enemy. That they were not able to keep them in obedience. That he knew well withall what danger he fell into by acquainting Cæsar with these things; which was the cause he had kept them from him so long.

Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix (Divitiacus brother) was shot at by this speech of Lilius: but forasmuch as he would not have those things handled in the presence of so many, he speedily brake off the Councell. & retaining Lilius, asked privately after those things which he had delivered in the Assembly; whereunto he spake more

freely and boldly then before. And inquiring secretly of others, he found it to be true, that Dumnorix was of great courage, & singularly favoured for his liberality of the Common people. desirous of novelties and changes, and for many years had kept at a low rate the Taxes and Impositions of the Heduians, forasmuch as no man durst contradict what he would have done. By which courses he had increased his private estate, and got great means to be liberall: for a great number of horsemen did only live upon his entertainment, and were continually about him, being not only powerfull at home, but abroad also amongst divers of the neighbour States; and for this cause had married his Mother to a great Rich man, and of a Noble house, in the Countrey of the Bituriges, himself had too: a wife of the Helvetians, had married his sister by his Mother, and others of his kin, into other States. For that affinity he favoured and wished well to the Helvetians: and on the other side hated the Romans, and specially Cæsar of all others; for that by their coming into Gallia his power was weakened, and Divitiacus his brother restored to his ancient honour and dignity. If any misfortune happened to the Romans, his hope was to obtain the Principalltie by the favour of the Helvetians: whereas the sovereignty of the Romans made him not only despair of the kingdom, but also of the favour, or what other thing soever he now enjoyed. And Cæsar had found out by inquiry, that the beginning of the flight, when the Cavallrie was routed, came from Dumnorix and his horsemen; for he commanded those troupes which the Heduians had sent to aide Cæsar; and out of that disorder the rest of the Cavallrie took a flight.

Which things being discovered, forasmuch as these suspicions were seconded with matters of certainty, in that he had brought the Helvetians through the confines of the Sequans, had caused hostages to be given on either side, and done all those things not only without warrant from the State, but without acquainting them therewith, and lastly, in that he was accused by the Magistrate of the Heduians, he thought it cause sufficient for him to punish him, or to command the State to do justice upon him. One thing there was which might seem to approprie all this; the singular affection of Divitiacus his brother to the people of Rome; the great love he bare particularly to Cæsar, his loyalty, justice and temperance; and therefore he feared least his punishment might any way alienate or offend Divitiacus sincere affection. And therefore before he did

any thing, he called Divitiacus, and putting aside the ordinarie Interpreters, he spake to him by M. Valerius Proculus, one of the principall men of the Province of Gallia, his familiar friend, & whom he specially trusted in matters of importance, and tooke notice what Dumnorix had uttered in his presence, at a Councell of the Galles, shewing also what informations he had privately received concerning him: and therefore by way of advice desired, that without any offence to him, either he himself might call him in question, or the State take some course in the same.

Divitiacus embracing Cæsar with many tears besought him not to take any severe course with his brother; he knew well that all those things were true, neither was there any man more grieved thereat then himself. For whereas he had credit and reputation, both at home and amongst other States of Gallia, and his brother being of small power by reason of his youth, was by his aide and assistance grown into favour and authority, he used those meanes as an advantage not only to weaken his authority, but to bring him to ruine: And yet nevertheless he found himself overruled through brotherly affection, and the opinion of the common people. And if Cæsar should take any strict account of these offences, there was no man but would think it was done with his privitie, considering the place he held in his favour; whereupon would consequently follow on his behalf, a generall alienation and distaste of all Gallia.

As he uttered these things, with many other words accompanied with tears, Cæsar taking his right hand, comforted him, and desired him to intreat no further: for such was the respect he had unto him, that for his sake, and at his request he forgave both the injurie done to the Commonwealth, and the displeasure which he had justly conceived for the same. And thereupon called Dumnorix before him, and in the presence of his brother shewed him wherein he had deserved much blame and reproof; told him what he had understood, and what the State complained on; advised him to avoid all occasions of dislike for the future; that which was past he had forgiven him, as Divitiacus his brothers intreaty. However he set espials upon him, to observe his courses, that he might be informed what he did, and with whom he conversed.

The same day, understanding by the Discoverers that the Enemy was lodged under a Hill, about eight miles from his Camp, he sent some to take a view of the Hill, and of the ascent from

about the same. Which was found, & accordingly reported unto him to be very easie. In the third watch of the night he sent away T. Labienus the Legat with two legions, and those Guides that knew the way; commanding him to possess himself of the top of that Hill. Himself, about the fourth watch, marched on after the Enemy, the same way they had gone, sending all his horsemen before.

P. Causidius, that was held for a great souldier: first in the Army of L. Sylla, and afterwards with M. Crassus, was sent before with the Discoverers. At the breaking of the day, when Labienus had got the top of the Hill, and himself was come within a mile and a half of the Helvetian Camp, without any notice to the Enemy either of his or Labienus approach (as was afterwards found by the Captives) Causidius came running as fast as his horse could drive, and told him that the Hill which Labienus should have taken, was held by the Galles; which he perceived plainly by the Armes and Ensignes of the Helvetians. Whereupon Cæsar drew his forces to the next Hill, and imbatelled the Army.

Labienus (according to the directions he had from Cæsar, not to fight, unless he saw his forces near the Enemies Camp that they might both at the same time assault them from divers parts at once) when he had took the Hill, kept his men from battel, expecting our Army.

At length when it was farre in the day, Cæsar understood by the Discoverers that the Hill was possessed by his Party; as also that the enemy was dislodged, and that Causidius was so astonished with fear, that he reported to have seen that which he saw not. The same day he followed the Enemy at the distance he had formerly used, and incamped himself three miles from them. The day following, forasmuch as the Army was to be paid in Corn within two days next after, and that he was but eighteen miles distant from Bibract, a great and opulent City of the Heduians, he turned aside from the Helvetians, and made towards Bibract.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE getting of this hill as a place of advantage, was marvellous important to the happy success of the battel: for the advantage of the place is not only noted as an especiall cause of easy victory throughout this history, but in all their wars, from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremities soever they were put. The first reason may

be in regard of their Darts and Slings, and especially their Piles; which being a heavy deadly weapon, could not any way be so available being cast countermount, or in a plain levell, as when the declivity and downfall of a swelling bank did naturally second their violent impression. Neither can the shock at handy-blows be any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battels) when the souldiers spent their strength in franchising the injury of a rising Mountain, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their course.

And to conclude, if the battel succeeded not according to their desire, the favour of the place afforded them means of a strong retreat in the highest part whereof they had commonly their Camps well fenced, and fortified against all chaunces. If it be demanded, whether the upper ground be of like use in regard of our weapons; I answer, that in a skirmish of shot I take the advantage to ly in the lower ground rather than on the hill; for the peece being hastily charged has commonly they are after the first volley, if the bullet chance to ly loose, when the noise of the peece is lower than the breech, it must needs fly at random; and be altogether uneffectual: but when the noise shall be raised upward to the side of a hill, the bullet being rammed in with his own weight, shall fly with greater certainty and fury: considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is stoppt and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his room, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury.

Concerning other weapons, I take the upper ground in the shock and encounter to be advantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserve as great respect, if the controversy were decided by these weapons, as seldome times it is.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BY *Cassius* his demeanour we see that verified which Physicians ascribe, That nothing will sooner carry our judgement out of her proper seat, then the passion of fear; and that amongst souldiers themselves, whom custome hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turn a flock of Sheep into a squadron of Contes, and a few Canes or Oars into Pikes and Lancers. Which may serve to advise a discreet Generall not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation is perfect in discipline, and so experienced in the service of three famous Chiefs, was so surpris'd with fear, that he could not discern his friends from his enemies. But I will speak more of this passion in the war with *Arminius*.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

In every relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first words are commonly these, *Re frumentaria comparatur*, as the foundation and strength of every expedition, without which no man can manage a war according to the true maxims and rules of the Art Military, but must be forced to relieve that inconvenience with the losse of many other advantages of great consequence. Which gave occasion to *Galpar de Coligny* that famous Admirall of France, amongst other Oracles of truth wherewith his mind was marvellously enriched, often to use this saying, *Tha che that will shape that beatt* (meaning war) must beginne with the belly. And this rule was diligently observed by *Cæsar*, who best knew how to express the true portraiture of that beatt in due proportion and lively resemblance.

The order of the *Romans* was, at the day of measuring, to give corn to every particular souldier for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: and by the measure which was given them they knew the day of the next payment; for every footman received after the rate of a bushell a week, which was thought sufficient for him and his servant. For if they had payed them their whole spend in money, it might have been wasted in unnesseary expenses: but by this means they were sure of provision for the time determined; and the sequell of the war was providently cared for by the Generall.

The Corn being delivered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-mills, which they carried alwayes with them, and made into hasty cakes, dainty enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their servants. Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for *Salust* reckoneth this up amongst other dishonours of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their corn which was given them by the Treasurer, and bought their bread by the day. And this manner of provision had many speciall commodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualling: for it is impossible that victuallers should follow an Armie upon a service in the Enemies Countrey, twenty or thirty dayes together, with sufficient provision for an Armie: And by that means the Generall cannot attend advantages and fittell opportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole upon unequall termes, or to found an unwilling retreat.

And whereas the Victuallers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gain, and the souldiers on the other side carelesse of the morrow, and prodigall of the present; in that turbulent marre-markers, where the seller hath an eye onely to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publick good nor his private commoditie,

ditie, there is nothing to be looked for but famine and confusion. Whereas the *Romans*, by their manner of provision, imposed the generall care of the publick good upon the chief Commander, whole dutie it was to provide store of Corn for his Armie; and the particular care upon every private souldier, whom it especially concerned to see that the allowance which the Commonweale had in plentifull manner given him for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigality: which excellent order the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their Provinces, and the next confederate States furnished their Armies continually with Corn; as it appeareth by this place, that for provision of grain he depended altogether upon the *Hedui*; and when they were in the Enemies Countrey, in the time of harvest the souldiers went out to reap and gather Corn, and delivered it threshed and cleaned to the Treasurer, that it might be kept untill the day of payment.

But to leave this fugall and provident manner of provision, as unpensible to be imitated by this age, let us return to our historie, and see how the *Helvetians* were led, by a probable error, to their last overthrow.

Chap. VII.

The *Helvetians* follow after *Cæsar*, and overtake the *Rervard*. He imbatteled his legions upon the side of a hill; and giveth order for the battel.

Cæsar.

Whereof the Enemy being advertised by certain sagittiers of the troupe of horse commanded by *L. Emilius*, presently, whether it were that they thought the *Romans* did turn away for fear, (and the rather for that the day before, having the advantage of the upper ground, they refused to fight) or whether they thought to cut them off from provision of Corn, they altered their purpose, and turning back again began to attack our men in the *Rere*. Which *Cæsar* perceiving, drew his forces to the next hill, and sent the Cavalrie to sustain the charge of the Enemy: and in the meantime in the midst of the hill made a triple battell, of four legions of old souldiers; and upon the highest ridge thereof he placed the two legions which he had lately enrolled in the *hither Gallia*, together with the associate forces, filling the whole front of the hill with men, and showing the carriages in one place, which he commanded to be fenced and guarded by those that were in the uppermost battalions.

The *Helvetians* on the other side conveyed their carriages and impediments into one place; and having beaten back *Cæsar*'s horsemen with a thick thronged squadron, they put themselves into

a Phalanx, and so pressed under the first battell of the *Roman* legions.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Concerning the true sense of this triple battel, which *Cæsar* made upon the side of the hill, I understand it according to the ancient custome of the *Romans*, who in the infancy of their Military discipline divided their Army into three sorts of souldiers, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*; for I omit the *Velites*, as no part of their standing battels: and of these they made three severall battels, from front to back. In the first battel were the *Hastati*, and they possessed the whole front of the Army, and were called *Acies prima*. Behind these, in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes* in like sort and order, disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*. And lastly, in a like correspondent distance were the *Triarii* imbatteled, and made *Acies tertia*.

Their legion consisted of ten Companies, which they called Cohorts, and every Cohort consisted of three small Companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a manipule of the *Hastati*, a manipule of the *Principes*, and another of the *Triarii*, as I will more particularly set down in the second book. And as these three kinds of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to back: so was every battel divided into his manipules; and these were divided by little allies and wayes one from another, which were used to this purpose: The *Hastati* being in front, did ever begin the battel: and if they found themselves too weak to repel the enemy, or were happily forced to a retreat, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second battel, between the manipules of the *Principes*, into the space which was between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*; and there they rested themselves, whilst the *Principes* took their place and charged the Enemy. Or otherwise, if the Commanders found it needfull, they filld up those distances of the *Principes*; and so united with them into one body, they charged the enemy all in gresse; and then if they prevailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarii*, and so they gave the last assault, all the three bodies being joyned into one.

Now if we examine by the current of the historie whether *Cæsar* observed the same order and division in his wars, we shall find little or no alteration at all: for first, this triple *Acies* here mentioned, was no other thing but the division of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dream of that ordinary division, which is likewise threefold, the two corners and the battels, and in that sense he might say to have made a triple *Acies*, let him understand that the circumstances of the division have no coherence

Observations upon Cæsars

rence with that division: for in that he faith of the *Helvetians*, *successerunt sub Acies primam*; they pressed near the first battel or Vanguard, he maketh it clear that the Army was divided into a triple battel from front to back: for otherwise he would have said, *successerunt sub dextrum aut sinistram cornu, aut medium Acies*; for so were the parts of that division termed. Again, in the retreat which the *Helvetians* made to the hill, when he faith that the first and second battel followed close upon the enemy, and the third opposed it felt against the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, and stood ready at the foot of the hill to charge the legions in the flank and on the back; it is manifest that no other division can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to back.

But that place in the first of the *Civill* wars taken away all scruple of controversy, where he useth the very same terms of *prima*, *secunda*, and *tertia Acies*: for being to encamp himself near unto *Afranius*, and fearing least his souldiers should be interrupted in their work, he caused the first and second battel to stand in Arms, and keep their distance, to the end they might shroud and cover the third battel (which was employed in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemy; and this kind of imbattelling *Cæsar* observed in most of his fights: by which it appeareth that he used the very same order and discipline for imbattelling, as was instituted by the old *Romans*.

Concerning the ancient names of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, which *Ramus* in his *Militia Julii Cæsaris* urgeth to be omitted throughout the whole history, I grant they are seldom used in these Commentaries in the sense of their first institution: for the *Hastati*, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest poorest of the legionary souldiers; and the *Principes* were the lusty and able-bodied men; and the *Triarii* the eldest and best experienced. But in *Cæsars* Camp there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares between the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*; which he nameth *Prima*, *Secunda*, and *Tertia Acies*; and therefore they were never termed by those names in respect of that difference.

Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that virtue might be rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the privilege of a more worthy place, the said distinctions and terms were religiously observed. For in the battel with *Petrenius* at *Ilerda* in *Spain*, he mentioned the death of *Q. Fulginius*, *ex primo Hastato legionis quartodecime*; and in the overthrow at *Dyrachium*, he faith that the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, commended the safety of his Ensigne to the horsemen, all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, *præter Principem priorem*.

And for the *Triarii*, there is no term more frequent in *Cæsar* then *Prinipilus*; which name, by the rules of the ancient discipline, was given to none but to the chiefeest Centurion of the first maniple of the *Triarii*; whereby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessary distinction, although peradventure the *Hastati* were as good souldiers as either the *Principes* or the *Triarii*.

As touching the spaces between the maniples, whereinto the first battel did retire it felt if occasion urged them, I never found any mention of them in *Cæsar*: excepting once here in *Englands*, where in a skirmish the *Britans* so urged the court of guard, which kept watch before the *Roman* Camp, that *Cæsar* sent out two other Cohorts to succour them; who making distance between them as they stood, the court of guard retired it felt in safety through that space into the Camp. Otherwise we never find that the first battel made any retreat into the allies, between the maniples of the second battel; but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them: as appeareth in the battel following with *Arminius*, and in divers others.

Concerning the use of this triple battel, what can be said more then *Lipinus* hath done? where he laith open the particular commodities thereof, as far forth as a speculative judgement can discern of things so far remote from the use of this age, which never imitate this triple battel but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a Vanguard, a Battel, and a Rereward: but in imbattelling they draw these three Companies all in front, making two cornets and the battel without any other troops to second them.

But let this suffice concerning *Cæsar* his manner of imbattelling, and his *triplex Acies*, until I come to the second book; where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battalions.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The *Macedonian Phalanx* is described by *Polybius* to be a square battel of Pikemen, consisting of sixteen in flank and five hundred in front; the souldiers standing so close together, that the pikes of the fifth rank were extended three foot beyond the front of the battel: the rest, whose pikes were not serviceable by reason of their distance from the front, couched them upon the shoulders of those that stood before them; and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward, to hold up the way or giving back of the former ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and irresistible.

The *Grecians* were very skilful in this part of the Art

Art Militarie, which containeth order and disposition in imbattelling: for they maintained publick professors, whom they called *Tactici*, to teach and instruct their youth the practise and Art of all formes convenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici* found by experience that sixteen in flank, so ordered as they were in a *Phalanx*, were able to bear any shock, how violent so ever it charged upon them. Which number of sixteen they made to consist of four doubles: as first unitie maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and pluralitie; but unitie doubled maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled again maketh the second order, of four souldiers in a file; which doubled the third time maketh eight; and this doubled maketh sixteen, which is the fourth doubling from a unitie; and in it they staid, as in an absolute number and square, whose root is four, the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes. For every one of these places the *Tactici* had severall names, by which they were distinctly known. But the particular description requireth a larger discourse then can be comprehended in these short observations. He that desireth further knowledge of them, may read *Ælianus*, that lived in the time of *Adrian* the Emperour; and *Arianus* in his historie of *Alexander* the great, with *Mauritius*, and *Leo* Imperator; where he shall have the divisions of *Tetraphalangia*, *Diphalangia*, *Phalangia* unto a unitie, with all the discipline of the *Grecians*. The chiefeest thing to be observed is, that the *Grecians* having such skill in imbattelling, preferred a *Phalanx* before all other formes whatsoever; either because the figure in it felt was very strong; or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether *Cæsar* termed the battell of the *Helvetians* a *Phalanx*, in regard of their thick manner of imbattelling onely, or otherwise so far as besides the form, they used the natural weapon of a *Phalanx*, which was the pike, it remaineth doubtfull. *Brancatio* in his discourses upon this place, maketh it no controversie but that every souldier carried a pike and a target. The target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same that their offensive weapons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that many of the legionary souldiers were wounded through the cart-wheels, with *trigule* and *matres*, which are commonly interpreted Speares and Javelins; and I take them to be weapons longer then common darts; but whether they were so long as the *Sarrissus* of the *Macedonians* I cannot tell. Howsoever this is certain, that the *Helvetians* have ever been reputed for the true *Phalangia*, next unto the *Macedonians*; and that in their thick and close imbattelling, they failed not at this time of the form of a *Phalanx*: for they rooted it to thick with targets, that *Cæsar* faith they were fore

troubled, because many of their targets were fastened and tied together with piles darts through them. Which argueth that their *Phalanx* was very thick thronged, whatsoever their weapon was.

Chap. VIII.

Cæsar sendeth away all the horses of ease; exhorteth his men; and beginneth the battell.

Cæsar to take away all hope of safety by flight, first caused his own, and then all the private horses of ease to be carried out of fight; and so using some motives of courage, began the battell. The souldiers casting their Piles, with the advantage of the hill, did easily break the *Helvetians Phalanx*, and then with their swords betook themselves to a furious close.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The ancient Sages found it necessary to a faithfull and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the minds of their men with words of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceits, either of the unlawfulness of the cause, or disadvantage against the Enemy: for if at any time that saying be true, that *Oratio plus potest quam pecunia*, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For a donative or liberanza can but procure a mercenary endeavour, ever yielding to a better offer; and do oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong, even amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slack to discharge their service with loyalty, yea oftentimes of friends to become enemies. But inasmuch as speech discovereth the secrets of the soul, and discovereth the intent and drift of every action, a few good words laying open the in iurie which is offered to innocence, how equity is controlled with wrongs, and justice controlled by iniquitie (for it is necessary that a Commander approve his Cause, and settle an opinion of right in the mind of his souldiers, as it is easie to make that seem probable which so many offer to defend with their blood; when indeed every man relieth upon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing lesse the right) a few good words I say, will so stirre up their minds in the ferventness of the cause, that every man will take himself particularly ingaged in the action by the title of Equite; and the rather, for that it jumpeth with the necessity of their condition. For men are willing to do well, when well-doing agreeth with that they would do: otherwise the Act may happily be effected, but the mind never approveth it by assent.

And this manner of exhortation or speech of encouragement was never omitted by *Cæsar* in any

Lib. 7. de
bello
Gallico.

any conflict mentioned in this historie: but he still used it as a necessary instrument to set vertue on foot, and the onely meanes to stir up alacritie. Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or crosse accident, as they were at *Gergobia*, and at the two overthrowes he had at *Dyrrachium*, he never would adventure to give battell until he had incouraged them again, and confirmed their minds in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humour, that it cannot hear a speech in this key, sound it never so gravely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side, discontinuance of so necessarie a part hath bred at length such an *inutilem pudorem* in our chief Commanders, that they had rather lose the gain of a great advantage, then buy it with words to be delivered in publick.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this Chapter we may further observe the violence of the *Roman* pile, which being a heavy deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectuell against a *Phalinx*, or any other thick and close battell, or wheresoever else the stroke was certain, or could hardly deceive the aime of the catter: for in such encounters it so galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keep their order, nor answer the assault with a resisting counter-buffe. By which it appeareth that the onely remedie against the Pile was to make the ranks thin; allowing to every souldier a large poudine or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of it self fall without hurt, or by fore-sight be prevented; as it shall plainly appear by the sequels of this historie, which I will not omit to note, as the places shall offer themselves to the examination of this discourse.

The Roman
Pile
described.

But as touching the Pile, which is so often mentioned in the *Roman* historie, *Polybius* describeth it in this manner; A Pile, saith he, is a casting weapon, the staffe whereof is almost three cubits long, and it hath *palmarum diametrum*, a hand-breadth in thickness. The staves were armed with a head of iron, equall in length to the staffe it self: But in that sort, that half the head was fastened up to the middle of the staffe, with plates of iron, like the head of a Halbert; and the other half stuck out at the end of the staffe like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thickness, and so decreasing lesse and lesse unto the point, which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the weight of the staffe would bend it as it stuck, as appeareth in this battell of the *Helvetians*. This weapon was peculiar to the *Romans*, and was called *Pilum*, as *Caesar* noteth, of *Pilum* a Pettell, quod hostes ferret ut pilum. *Lipsius* finding that *Palmarum diametrum* was too great a thickness to be managed

Lib. 3. de
militia
Romana.

by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be four inches in circuit, if the staffe were either round or square, for they had of both sorts, and so he maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description given by *Polybius*, either in forme or weight.

Patricius in his *Parallel* maketh the staffe to have *palmarum diametrum* in the butt end, but the rest of the staffe he maketh to decrease taper-wise, unto the head of iron, where it hath the thickness of a mans finger; and so it answereth both in form and weight to a Pettell, as may be seen by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of *Polybius*. *Patricius* in that place setteth down four discommodities of the Pile. First, a furious and hot-spirited enemy will easily prevent the darting of the Pile, with a nimble and speedy close. And so we read that in the battell which *Cæsar* had with *Ariovistus*, the *Germans* came so violently upon them, that the souldiers cast away their piles and betook them to their swords. And likewise in that worthy battell between *Caesar* and *Marcus Perreus*, they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommodity was, that the piles being so heavy could not be cast any distance, but were only serviceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aime, or as they say, point-blank. And lastly, the souldiers were to take advantage of ground backward when they threw them: which might easily disorder their troupes, if they were not very well experienced.

Lib. 5.

Salust.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THE last thing which I observe in this speciality is, that the legionary souldiers had no other offensive weapon but one pile or two at the most, and their swords. By which it may be gathered that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blows; for they came alwayes so near before they cast their pile, that they left themselves no more time then might conveniently serve them to draw their swords: neither would their Arms of defence, which was compleat, besides a large target which they carried on their left arm, suffer them to make any long pursuits or continued chase, whensoever a light-armed enemy did make any speedy retreat; as will more plainly appear by that which followeth.


Chap. IX.

The *Helvetians* fainting in the battell, retire to a Hill: the *Romans* follow after, and the battell is continued.




It was a great hinderance to the *Caesars* Gallies in their fight, that many of their Targets were struck through, and tied together with one fall of a Pile: for so it happened that it could neither be pul-

THE BATTEL WHICH CÆSAR HAD



WITH THE HELVETIANS. folio . 18



led out, by reason of the bowing of the Iron, nor could they use their left hand for the defence of themselves. Whereby it fell out that many of them (after a wearisome toil) did cast away their targets, and fought naked and unarmed. At length, fainting with wounds, they began to give place, and retreated to a Hill a mile off.

The Hill being taken, and the Legions following on to drive them from thence, the Boii and Tulingi, to the number of fifteen thousand, being in the Rere of the Enemy, to guard the lag of their Army, setting on our men as they were in pursuit of the rest, did charge them upon the open side, and began to inclose them about: which the Helvetians that had got the Hill perceiving began again to fall upon our men, and renewed the battle. The Romans dividing themselves, turned their Ensignes two ways; the first and second Army fought against the Helvetians that returned from the Hill; and the third battel took charge of them that stood ready to inclose them about. And here the fight was doubtfull and furious for a long time; untill at length they were no longer able to endure the violence of the legionary souldiers: and so one part betook themselves as at the first to the Hill; and the other to the place where their Carts and baggage were lodged.

And hitherto there was not one man seen to have turned his back in all this conflict; although the fight continued from the seventh hour untill the evening.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Ensignes of the Romans.

Concerning the Ensignes of the Romans, we are to understand that the chiefest Ensigne of every Legion was an Eagle, which alwayes attended upon the Primipile or chief Centurion of the said Legion. The Ensigne of a Maniple was either a Hand or a Dragon, a Wolf or a Sphinx; as it appeareth (besides the testimony of history) by the Column of Trajan in Rome, wherein the Ensignes are figured with such pourtraitures: so that these Ensignes resembling the proportions of living creatures, had their foreparts alwayes carried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight. And therefore in this history by the aspect and carrying of the Ensignes, the front of the Army was commonly noted: as in this place it is said, that the Ensignes of the first and second battel were carried towards the hill, whither the Helvetians had made their retreat; and the Ensignes of the third battel looked another way, towards the Boii and Tulingi, which stood on the foot of the hill,

By which is signified how the legions were divided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning the time of the day, we are to understand that the Romans used not the same division of the day as we commonly do: for they divided their artificiall (which is the space between sun-rising and setting) into twelve equall parts, which the Astronomers called unequall or planetary houres. The first heure of the day began alwayes at sun-rising; the sixth heure was alwayes high noon; and the twelfth heure was sun-setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, to these houres were either greater or lesse: neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, such as are now used, but only at the *Equinoctium*: so that by this manner of reckoning, *Ab hora septima ad vesperum* is meant, the battel began about one of the clock according to our Computation, and continued untill the evening. The like we must understand throughout this whole history, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

Chap. X.

The Helvetians continue their fight at the carriages: but at length they leave the field, and march towards Langres.

IN like manner the fight was kept on foot at the carriages, untill it was far in the night; the place being fortified with Carts in stead of a Rampier: and the Enemy casting their weapons from the upper ground, and with Darts and Javelins under the waggons, and from between the wheeles, did wound and kill many of our men. After a long conflict our souldiers took their carriages and their Camp, wherein Orgetorix daughter and one of his sons were taken. There were saved out of that battel about one hundred and thirty thousand persons; who marching continually all that night, and making no stay in any place, came the fourth day into the confines of the Lingones: for by reason of the souldiers hurts, and the buriall of the slain, wherein there was spent three dayes, there was no pursuit made after them.

OBSERVATION.

IF we consider the nature of the action, and look into the true cause of their overthrow, as far as the right sense of the history shall direct our judgement, we shall find valour not to be wanting in the Helvetians, but rather superlatively

tively abounding in the *Romans*. For that vehement opinion of their valiancy and manhood, which carried them out of the straits of the Country to seek larger fortunes in other kingdoms, was not so abated with the loss of the fourth part of their Host at the river *Avar*, nor with the terrible fury of those veterane legions; but it yielded this effect, which *Cæsar* in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for five houres space or more there was not one man seen to have turned his back. Their manner of imbattelling, had not the *Romans* been the enemy, was irresistible. For being cast into a *Phalanx*, which in the Plaines of *Asia* had made *Alexander* the great and the *Macedonians* famous, they did as far surpass any other form of imbattelling (supposing that the conveniency of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole is divided into many particulars, as the violence of a great body exceedeth the force and motion of his parts, when it is divided into smaller cantons. For as in a phalanx many particular souldiers are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire body; so their severall vertues are gathered into one head, and are as parts united into one generall force; which easily swalloweth up the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally divided.

The advantage of the place which they got by retreat, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the *Romans*, both in front and flank, was able in an indifferent conflict to have made Fortune fugitive, and bear arms on their side; or at the least so to have stemmed the swelling tide of victory, which carried the *Romans* so violently in the chase, that they might have been equall sharers in the honour of the day; had it not followed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, until it came to that height which true valour and unexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not so allay the heat of the *Helvetians* fury, but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when it came to the place where their carriages were laid, and cost much blood and many mens lives before they quitted the place: for they fought with that spirit and industry, as though they meant to make triall whether their fortune would prove no better in the night, then it had done in the day.

The overthrow of the *Tigerine* Cantons at the river *Avar* proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the least to be marvelled at, considering they had no chief Commander, as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the rules of Military government require especially care in passing over a water; for then especially an Army is in great danger, when it is disordered and divided. And therefore the *Romans* achiev'd this victory by the humble vigilancy

(as *Tully* calleth it) of their Commander, who alwayes watched *opportunitates rei bene gerendæ*, as necessary and speedy means to overcome in all his wars.

Chap. XI.

Cæsar, after three dayes respite, followeth after the *Helvetians*: he taketh them to mercy, and sendeth them back again to the Country.

Cæsar sent Letters and Messengers *extra* to the *Lingones*, forbidding to supply them either with Corn or any other thing; which if they did, he would esteem of them as of the *Helvetians*. Himself, after three dayes respite, followed after with all his forces. The *Helvetians*, pressed with the want of all necessary provisions, sent Commissioners unto him to treat of their rendition. Who meeting him on the way, cast themselves at his feet, and with humble words and tears desired Peace. Being commanded to attend in the place they then were, they accordingly obeyed. *Cæsar* being come up unto them, required hostages, together with their Arms and servants; as also the fugitives that were fled unto them.

While those things were sought out and brought, in the night time, six thousand men or thereabouts of the Canton called *Verbigene*, whether moved through fear of being executed after their Arms were given up, or induced with hope of escaping (as thinking that amongst such a multitude of people that were there to be rendered, their slight should not be missed, or at least would be concealed) did in the beginning of the night leave the *Helvetian* Camp, and made towards the *Rhene*, and the confines of the *Germanians*.

Cæsar understanding through whose territories they passed, commanded them to seek them out, and bring them back again, if they would be blamelesse in that behalfe: And being brought back, dealt with them as enemies. All the rest, after Hostages, Arms and fugitives were given in, he received to mercy; and commanded the *Helvetians*, *Tulinges*, and *Latobriges* to return into their Country from whence they came. And forasmuch as having lost all their provision of Corn, there remained nothing at home to satisfy hunger, he gave order to the *Allobroges* to supply them with Corn; and willed the *Helvetians* to reedify their Towns and Cities, that they had before destroyed and forsaken, which he did specially for this cause; that the *Germanians* inhabiting beyond the *Rhene* might not be invited with the richnesse of that soil, to seek themselves

so

so near neighbours to the Province of *Gallia*, and the *Allobroges*. The Boij, at the mediation of the *Hedunians*, as knowing them to be men of great valour, were permitted to dwell in their Country; to whom they gave lands and possessions, and received them into the same liberties and immunities as they themselves enjoyed.

In the *Helvetian* Camp was found a List, or Register, writ in Greek, and brought to *Cæsar*, containing by pole the whole number that left their Country, how many of them were able to bear Arms: and in like manner the boyes, old men and women were inrolled apart by themselves. The summary whereof was, that the whole number of the *Helvetians* amounted to two hundred sixty three thousand, the *Tulinges* to thirty six thousand, the *Latobriges* to fourteen, the *Rauracks* to twenty three, the *Boij* to thirty two. Of these there were that bare Arms, one hundred ninety two thousand. The total of all were three hundred sixty eight thousand. A view being taken by *Cæsar*s appointment of those that returned home, there were found one hundred and ten thousand.

OBSERVATION.

The directions concerning their rendry and return were very found, and of good consequence. For first, in that he commanded them to attend his coming in the place where they were, he took away all motions of new trouble, which often removes might have caused, by the opportunity of some accident which might have happened: assuring himself that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; considering that the *Lingones*, in whose territories they were, durst not for fear of *Cæsar*s displeasure furnish them with any necessities in that extremity. Touching the security which the *Romans* required of the loyalty of such people as they conquered, their manner was to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men-children of the chieftest men of that Nation; whose lives depended upon their Parents fidelity, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion. Which custom, besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age; when as those children by conversation and acquaintance should be so affected to the *Roman* Empire, that returning to their own country, their actions might rather tend to the advancement thereof, then any way be prejudiciall to the same. And least the love of liberty and freedom should prevail more with them, then that affection which Nature had injoynd them to bear to their children; he did what he could to

take away the means and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliver up such Arms and weapons as were there present: and so to become lutable to that petition of peace which they had made.

The summe of all is this; he corrected the insolency of a furious people, and reduced them to a feeling of their own madnesse. He kept them from sucking the possessions of many thousands in the continent of *Gallia*, and sent them back again to continue their name and Nation in the place where they first inhabited; which continueth unto this day. And thus we see that there is no humour so head-strong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meet with a remedy to qualify the insolency thereof, and make it subject to correction and controulment.

Chap. XII.

The States of *Gallia* congratulate *Cæsar*s victories: they call a counsell, and discover their inward grief concerning *Arminius* and his forces.

The *Helvetian* war being thus ended, *Cæsar*, the Princes and chief men of all the States of *Gallia* came to *Cæsar*, to congratulate the happiness of this victory; inasmuch as they well understood, that albeit the people of *Rome* had by the course of this war revenged the injuries which heretofore they had done unto them: yet nevertheless the issue thereof did redound no lesse profitable to the peace of *Gallia*, then to the *Roman* Empire; forasmuch as the *Helvetians* left their houses and Country abounding with all plenty and prosperity, for no other purpose but to invade the whole Country of *Gallia*, and to bring it in subjection to themselves; and choosing out of that large Continent some fit and fruitful place of habitation, to make the rest of the States their Tributaries. They required further, that with his good leave they might call a generall assembly at a day prefixed, of all the States of *Gallia*, forasmuch as they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired (with a common consent) to preffer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath not to reveal the causes of their assembly, but to such as should be designed by common counsel.

The Parliament being broken up, the same Princes returned to *Cæsar*, and desired that they might in secret treat with him of the safety of themselves, and all the rest: which being granted, they cast themselves in lamentable manner at his feet, contending with a great earnest-

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nestness, that those things which they delivered might not be revealed, as they did to have their petition granted: forasmuch as they saw that the discovery of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull upon them most grievous afflictions.

Divitiacus the Heduan, in the name of the rest, delivered, That Gallia was divided into two factions: the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Arverni of the other. These two States contending many years for the principality, the Arverni with the Sequans their Clients, hired the Germans to take their part; of whom at first there passed over the Rhene some fifteen thousand: but afterwards, these barbarous people having tasted the plenty and civility of the Galles, drew over many more, that now there were no less than one hundred and twenty thousand. With these the Hedui and their Clients had once or oftener fought; but the success sorted to their own calamity, and the utter overthrow of their Nobility and Senate: with which losses they were so broken and decayed, that whereas heretofore as well by their own credit, as by the favour of the people of Rome, they struck a great stroke throughout all Gallia; they were now driven to deliver the chieftest of their State as pledges to the Sequans, and to bind themselves by oath never to seek their release or freedom, nor to implore the aid of the people of Rome, nor to seek means to free themselves from their sovereignty; only himself of all the Heduians could not be brought to take that oath, or to give his children as hostages: for which cause he fled to Rome, and besought help of the Senate, being noway obliged to the contrary either by oath or hostages.

But so fell out, that the victory became more grievous to the Sequans than to the Heduians. For that Ariovistus king of the Germans was planted in their territories; and being already possessor of a third part of their Country, which was the best part of all Gallia, did now require the Sequans to forgo another third part, for that a few months before there were come unto him twenty four thousand Harudes, to whom lands and possessions were to be allotted. Whereby it would come to pass within a few years that all the Galles would be driven out of their dwellings, and all the Germans would come over the Rhene; for there was no comparison between Gallia and Germany, either in richness of soil or salubrity of life.

Concerning Ariovistus, after he had once de-

feated the Galles in a battel near Amagetobrig, he carried himself very cruelly and insolently, requiring the children of all the Nobility for hostages, and shewing strange examples of torture upon them. If any thing were done not according to his command or desire, he would easily shew himself to be a barbarous, fierce and hasty man, whose tyranny they could no longer endure: and unless there were help to be found in Cæsar and the people of Rome, all the Galles must, as the Helvetians did, forsake their Country, and seek new houses and seats of habitation, far remote from the Germans, and try their fortunes, whatever befell them. If these things should haply be discovered to Ariovistus, he would doubtless take a severe revenge of all the pledges in his custody. Cæsar might by his own authority, or the presence of his Army, or by the renown of his late victory, or by the countenance of the people of Rome, keep the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia, and defend it from the injuries of Ariovistus. This speech being delivered by Divitiacus, all that were present with much weeping besought Cæsar to give them relief.

Cæsar observed that only the Sequans of all the rest did no such matter, or were so affected at the others were; but with their heads hanging down, looked mournfully upon the ground: and wondering at it, asked them the cause thereof. To which they made no reply, but stood silent, with the same countenance of sorrow. And having oftentimes iterated his demand, without gaining any word of answer; Divitiacus the Heduan replied that the state of the Sequans was herein more miserable and grievous than the rest; that they of all others durst not complain, or implore aid, although it were in secret, as having before their eyes the cruelty of Ariovistus being absent, no less than if he were present. And the rather, for that other men had safe means of flying away; but the Sequans, having received Ariovistus into their Country, and made him Master of their townes, were necessarily to undergo all miseries.

These things being known, Cæsar encouraged the Galles with good words, and promised them to have a care of that matter, as having great hope, that by his means and power Ariovistus should be forced to offer no further injuries. And thereupon dismissed the Council.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN this relation there are divers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such as are willing

willing to be directed by other mens misadventures. As first, into what extremities ambition doth drive her thirty favourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soul, and setting such unbridled motions on foot, as carry men headlong into most desperate attempts. For as it had deserved commendation in either faction, so to have carried their emulation, that by their own means and strength applied to the rule of good government, their authority might wholly have wayed the inclination of the weaker states: so was it most odious in the Sequans to call in foreign forces, to satisfy the appetite of their untimpered humours; and in the end they were accordingly rewarded.

Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrel which civile dissension hath broached, when the party that called him in shall not be as able to refuse his assistance upon occasion, as he was willing to entertain it for advantage.

Lastly, the often discontents of these States shew the force of a present evil, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the soul, that any other calamity, either already past, or yet to come, how great soever, seemeth tolerable and easy, in regard of that smart which the present grief inflicteth.

So the Sequans chose rather to captivate their liberty to the Barbarisme of a savage Nation, then to endure the Hedui to take the hand of them. And again, to make themselves vassals to the Romans, rather then endure the usurping cruelty of the Germans. And finally (as the sequel of the history will discover) to hazard the losse of life and Country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans. So predominant is the present evil in mens affections, and so it prevaileth at the seat of our judgement.

Chap. XIII.

The reasons that moved Cæsar to undertake this war.

Cæsar.

Many were the inducements which moved him to take that business to heart. As first, that the Heduians, who were oftentimes stiled by the Senate with the title of Brethren, Cousins and Allies, were in the servitude and thraldome of the Germans, and that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequans: which in so great a sovereignty of the people of Rome, he tooke to be very dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. As also for that he saw it very dangerous for the Roman Empire, that the Germans should accustom by little and little to flock in such multitudes into Gallia. Neither did he think he could moderate or restrain such

fierce and barbarous people; but that having possessed all the Continent of Gallia, they would, as the Cimbri and Teutons had done before, break out into the Province, and so into Italy: especially the Sequans, being divided from the Province but with the river Rhene.

These things he thought fit with all speed to prevent: and the rather, for that Ariovistus was grown to that pride and arrogancy, as was not to be suffered. For which respect he thought it expedient to send Embassadors unto him, to appoint some indifferent place for parlee; for that he had to treat with him concerning publick affairs, and some matters that did much import both of them.

OBSERVATIONS.

I May here take an occasion to speak somewhat concerning the authority of the Roman Generals, which we see to be very large; considering that Cæsar of himself, without any further leave of the Senate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this history) did undertake a war of that consequence, and put in jeopardy the Legions, the Province, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia.

Wherein we are to understand, that when the State of Rome did allot the government of any Province to a Proconsul, they did likewise recommend unto him the careful managing of such accidents as might any way concern the good of that regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well-ordered government, are as well externall and foreign, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had been to small purpose to have given him only authority to maintain a course of wholesome government at home, and no means to take away such oppositions which forraign accident might set up against him. And so we see that Cæsar undertook the Helvetian war, in regard of the safety of the Province: and this again with Ariovistus, least the Germans should so multiply in Gallia, that the Province it self might at length be endangered. Neither had their Generals authority only to undertake these wars; but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what else they thought convenient for the advancement of the Commonwealth, did wholly rest upon their direction; republica bene gesta being the stile of the warrant for all their actions.

Neither may we think that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerfull in the course of business as that which absolutely commandeth without controulment, and proceedeth according to the opportunity of time and

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occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the Roman affairs were distressed, and driven to an exigent, they created a Dictator, that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute command, that whatsoever power rested either in the Consuls or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gave way to the greatness of that Magistrate; that there might be no lett or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish for the good of the Commonwealth. And yet notwithstanding this absolute government, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted upon dissolute and unfortunate Leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circumspect soever, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortunes, as far forth as his means and industry could achieve it. For old *M. Fabius* pleading for the life of his gallant son, and opposing the rigour of *Papirius* the Dictator with examples of antiquity, saith, *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem unquam atrocioram fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque insensu exercitus amississent, quam ut pecunia eos multaret: capite angustum ob rem misle gestum de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse.* The people, saith he, in whom the sovereign power of things consisted, never shewed greater displeasure against such as had lost an Army either by rashness or unskillfulness, then imposing a fine upon them: but to bring the life of a General in question for failing in his endeavours, was never heard of to that day.

The condition of the inferiour Officers of their Camp was far otherwise in regard of Military discipline: for prescription guided them in all their services, and the chiefest part of their duty was obedience; although they law evident reason to the contrary, and found their directions unperfect in that behalf: and therefore *Cæsar* saith upon that occasion, *Alia sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad prescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.* The office of a Legate or Licutenant differeth from that of a General: the one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoever may concern the cause. And this course the Romans held concerning the authority of their Generalls.

Chap. XIV.

Arivivillus his answer. A second Embassage, with the successe thereof.

Cæsar.



That Embassage *Arivivillus* answered; that if his occasions had required *Cæsar*'s assistance, he would have furthered them with his own

presence: and he thought it as reasonable, that if it were in his hand to pleasure the Romans, *Cæsar* ought not to think much of the like labour. For his own part, he durst not come into those parts of Gallia which *Cæsar* possessed, without an Army; nor could he draw an Army to a head without great trouble and expence. The thing that he most wondered at was, that the Romans or *Cæsar* had to do in that part of Gallia, which the law of Armes had made his inheritance.

Upon the return of this answer *Cæsar* framed a second Embassage, the purport whereof was; Forasmuch as he thus required the honour wherewith the people of Rome had beautified his best dignity (for in *Cæsar*'s Consulship the authority of their Empire had vouchsafed to esteem of him as a King in his dominions, and as a friend unto their State) and that he disdained to admit of a Parlee concerning the common good; let him know that these were the things that he required to be performed by him: First, that he should not suffer any more troops of Germans to be transported over the Rhene into Gallia. Secondly, that he should deliver up those Hostages which he had of the Heduns and Sequans, and should cease to molest them further with war or other injuries. These things if he did perform, *Cæsar* would assure him of a gratefull acceptance on the behalf of the people of Rome: otherwise, forasmuch as in the Consulships of *M. Messala* and *L. Pilo* the Senate had decreed, That he that should obtain the government of the Province, should as near as it would stand with the good of the Commonwealth endeavour the defence of their Associates and Friends, he would not neglect the injuries done unto the Heduns.

To these Mandates *Arivivillus* replied: The law of Armes kept this tenure amongst all Nations, That a Conquerour might govern a subdued people according as he thought best for his own safety. The people of Rome did not direct the course of their government by another mans precept, but by their own arbitrement: and as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to meddle with his proceedings.

The Heduns having tried the fortune of warre, were by right become his Stipendiaries; wherein *Cæsar* offered great wrong, for that his coming thither had made their tribute much lesse unto him then before. Touching their Hostages, his purpose was still to retain them. Neither would he make any unjust warre upon any of their Associates, if they observed the Articles of agreement, and paid their yearly tribute: but

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if they failed in that, the fraternity of the Romans would come too late to their succour. If *Cæsar* would needs undertake their quarrell, he was to let him know, that no man ever contended with *Arivivillus* but to his own destruction. Try when he would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germans, that for fourteen yeares space never were covered with other roof then the Heavens.

OBSERVATION.

AND thus fare proceeded *Cæsar* with *Arivivillus*, in debating the wrongs and grievances of the Heduns. Wherein appeared the difference between a matter handled according to moral civility, in terms of mildness and pleasing accent; and that which is rudely delivered, and dependeth rather upon the plannesse of the project, then fitted with words fit for persuasion. For that which *Arivivillus* alleged to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason as any thing to the contrary urged by *Cæsar*.

But as the Lacedemonian said of one, That he spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of *Arivivillus* his answer, that it wanted that sweetening humanity which giveth credit to verity it self, forasmuch as it proceeded from a well-tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controul the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true judgment; but rather seasoning her conceptions with humility, doth covertly complain of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing delivery. And therefore how great soever the controversy be, that party which exceedeth not the bounds of modesty, but maketh mildness his chiefest advocate, will so prevail in any auditory, that albeit equity doth disallow her title, yet the manner of his carriage will clear him from offering wrong, in that he utteth the sequels of innocency to prove his interest in that which he demanded. But to leave this circumstance, as onely to be noted, let us proceed to the war it self, which I made the second part of this history.

Chap. XV.

The Treveri bring news of one hundred townships of the Suevi that was come to the Rhene. *Cæsar* taketh in Belasum: his souldiers are surprised with an extreme fear of the Germans.

Cæsar.



T the same time that this answer was returned to *Cæsar*, there came likewise Embassadors from the Heduns and Treveri. The Heduns complained that the Haudes lately transported into Gallia, did depopulate and waste their borders,

and that they could not buy their peace of *Arivivillus* with giving of Hostages for their allegiance. The Treveri brought news of one hundred townships of the Suevi that were come to the river Rhene, to seek a passage into Gallia, conducted by *Naiua* and *Chimberius*, two brethren. Whereat *Cæsar* being exceedingly moved, thought his best means of prevention to consist in celerity, lest the difficulty of resisting should grow greater, when those new forces of the Suevi were joyned with the power which was already with *Arivivillus*. And therefore having provided Corn, he made hast to seek the Germans. And having gone three dayes journey on his way, he had intelligence that *Arivivillus* with all his forces was gone to take in Belasum, the greatest town of the Sequans; and that he was three dayes journey on his way already.

Cæsar knowing how much it imported him to prevent that disadvantage (forasmuch as the Town abounded with all necessary provisions for warre, and was so sited, that he that commanded it might prolong the warre at his own pleasure; being incircled with the river *Alduabis*, excepting a small space of six hundred foot, which was fortified with an exceeding high Hill, the foot whereof did at each end joyn unto the river, and the Hill strengthened with a wall, and so joyned to the town) made all the hast he could to take the town, and there left a garrison. And as he rested there a few dayes, to make provision of Corn and other necessities, the Romans enquiring of the Gallies and Merchants concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage invincible, and of great practice and experience in feats of Arms; wherof the Gallies had oftentimes made tryall: For when they encountered them, they were not able to endure so much as the sterneness of their countenance, or the fierceness of their looks. The whole Army conceived such a fear thereof, that all mens minds were wonderfully appalled. This fear began first amongst the Tribunes and Commanders of horse, and such others as for friendship sake followed *Cæsar* from Rome, and had small or no skill in matter of war. These men finding some one excuse and some another, of very earnest businesse which called them home, desired leave to depart. Some others, whom shame would not suffer to forsake the Camp, bewrayed the like passion in their countenances and behaviour: for hiding themselves in their Tents, they either bewailed their destiny secretly to themselves, or otherwise with their acquaintance and

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familiar friends. They lamented the danger they were all like to fall into; so that throughout the whole Camp there was nothing but making & signing of Testaments. And through the tal, and fearfulness of these men the old souldiers and Centurions, and such as had great experience in the Camp, began by little and little to apprehend the terror wherewith the rest were amazed: and those that would seem to be lesse fearfull, said, they feared not the enemy, but the nar rowness of the wayes, and the greatnesse of the woods that were between them and Ariovittus; or otherwise they cast doubts where they might have provision of Corn. And many stur'd not to tell Cæsar, that whensoever he should give commandment to march forward, or advance the Standards, the souldiers would refuse to do it.

OBSERVATION.

Wherein forthat we find a strange alteration, no way answerable to that courage which a late-gotten victory doth usually breed in noble spirits; it shall not be amiss a little to insist upon the quality of the accident, and to gather such brief instructions from their weaknesse, as may best serve to qualify the amazement of horror, and mitigate the frensy of to violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of Nature cannot promise any such learnings, as may discover the true means and secret motions whereby a fore-conceived fear doth trouble the senses, and astonish the mind; yet such the history offereth it to our learning, give me leave only to note the strangenesse of the circumstance, and rudely to delineate the portraiture of a beast of fencer seen then well known, using the unwieldy pile for my pencill, and tuning my speech to a warlike auditory. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receive intelligence of an eminent evil, which may either dispossest the soul of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth, the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their sovereign Mistrisse, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secreter pavilions of the body, where the chiefest part of the soul is most resident: and so they leave the frontier quarters of her kingdom naked and ungarrisoned, the better to strengthen that caputall City of the heart, out of which the life cannot fly, but to the utter ruine and destruction of the whole body. For fear is not only a perturbation of the soul proceeding from the opinion it hath of some evil to come; but it is also a contraction and closing up of the heart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward parts, to assist that place which giveth life and motion to all the rest. In this Chaos and confusion of humours and spi-

rits, when the multiplicity of faculties (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their service, and by the order of nature should be disposed into severall instruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the mind, which presently rise from these advertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disorderly mixture of so many severall properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our judgement or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate uniformity of place which nature requireth in the powers of the mind. And hence proceedeth that amazement and astonishment, which so daunteth the hearts of men, when they are taken with this passion, that because the soul giveth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremity of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperour, in an overthrow which he had given him by the Hagenes, was stricken with such an excellente fear, that he could not betake himself to flight (*Ado pavor etiam auxilia formidat*) until one of his chief Commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep sleep, threatened him with present death, if he would not prevent the ruine of the Empire, by using that means which was only left for his safety.

Again, if in that turbulent consistory the spirits chance distinctly to receive any apprehension proceeding from the forging faculty of the soul, they carry it presently to execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemency, that they leave no place for better advice and reknowledge. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremity of fear, to avoid one evil we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater danger in the means we use to avoid a lesse; because reason did not first try the apprehension, before it was delivered to externall Agents. And so we find in the battel between Germanicus and the Almans, that two grosse troupes of souldiers were driven into such an extasy of fear, that taking contrary courtes to avoid one & the same danger, they either of them fled to that place which the other had quitted; neither could they be advised by each others flights, that the places which they sought after afforded them no remedy.

And albeit reason be called to counsell when a parlee is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultations, that the will of it self concludeth to betray vertue to dishonour, and so to purchase peace with the losse of the souls chiefest treasure: which ought ever to be estimated at a higher rate then any other happiness which can betide the mind. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused fear, or is more

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amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there any misery greater, or any bondage more shameful, servile or vile, then this, which maketh men very abjects of all other creatures, to redeem the evil which the danger threateth: and then doth shame follow after to base a part, and aggravate the burthen of the sin with loathsome disgrace, and penitent discontentment; adding oftentimes Aloes to Wormwood, and making the end grievouler then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed fear, and fear yieldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, & shame being alwayes mingled with wrath and anger, revengeth it self upon it self, and bringeth more peril then the first danger could threaten.

Whereby it appeareth that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another; so on the contrary part some are bridled and restrained by others: for as envy, hatred and anger rise oftentimes of love; so is joy lessened with grief, envy with mercy, and fear with shame.

But forasmuch as all such perturbations proceed of ignorance and inconsideratenesse, whereby we think that the evil is greater then indeed it is; let us consider what disposition of our judgement best moderateth the violent heat of these affections. And first, touching the passages whereby the soul receiveth her advertisements, as they are of divers natures, the chiefest whereof are the eye and the ear; so are their avises different in quality, and require a severall consideration to be rightly discerned. The intelligence by the eye is more certain then that which cometh by the way of hearing; forasmuch as the eye is a witness it self of every action whereof it taketh notice, neither is it deceived in its proper object: and therefore the judgement is not much troubled to determine definitively how great or how small the danger is, when the relations carry alwayes that certainty. And albeit the ear in like manner be not deceived in her proper object, for it faithfully giveth up that sense which sound hath delivered unto it; yet forasmuch as the fantasy hath greater scope to coin her vain conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessary that the discounting faculty be called for an assistant, before the judgement can truly determine: and then it will appear that the truth doth not alwayes answer the report which is made thereof; inasmuch as diseased spirits will not stick to dilate or qualify relations, according to the key wherein they themselves are tuned. And therefore this first cometh to be considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of these two senses the first intelligence was received. But concerning the judgement it self this is most certain, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the soul. And again, the purer the judgement is, and the higher it is hited up from earthly natures, being no further interested there-

in then to hold a resolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affections which trouble and molest it: for then it better discerneth the truth and falsehood, good or evil that is in things.

To redresse this inconvenience, Cæsar betook himself to the fittest and most proper remedy; which was by the authority of his speech to restore reason to her former dignity, and by discourse, which fear had interrupted in them, to put down a usurping passion, which had so troubled the government of the soul, recalling it to the mean of true resolution, which was to moderate audacity with warinesse, but not to choak valour with beauly cowardice: for these Oratory inducing persuasions were not the least point of their discipline; considering how they framed the inward habite of the mind (being the fountain and beginning of all motion) to give life and force to those actions, which the severity of outward discipline commanded. For as laws and constitutions of men enforce obedience of the body: so reason and persuasions must win the souls consent, according to that saying, *Homines duci volunt, non cogi*.

Chap. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Army concerning this fear.

Cæsar being informed of these things, called a Councell of war, admitting all the Centurions, of what degrees or orders soever, unto the same. And being thus assembled, he greatly blamed them, First, that any should be so inquisitive, as to imagine to themselves whither, & upon what service they were carried. Concerning Ariovittus, he had in the time of Cæsars Consulship most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome: and why then should any man misdeem that he should so unadvisedly go back from his duty? For his own part he was verily persuaded, that if Ariovittus once knew his demands, and understood the reasonable offers that he would make him, he would not easily reject his friendship, or the favour of the people of Rome. But if he were so mad as to make war upon them, why should they fear him? or why should they despair either of their own prowess, or of Cæsars diligence? For if it came to that point, the enemy that they were to encounter had been tried what he could do twice before; first in the memory of their fathers, when the Cambri and Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, at what time the Army merited no lesse honour then the General: and now of late again in Italy, at the insurrection of the Bondmen; who were not a little

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furthered through the practice and discipline they had learned of the Romans. Whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute; inasmuch as whom for a time they feared without cause, being naked and unarmed, the same men afterwards (although well armed and conquerors withal) they nobly overcame. And to be short, these were no other Germans than those whom the Helvetians had vanquished in divers conflicts; and not only in their own Country, where the Helvetians dwell themselves, but also even at home at their own doors: and yet the same Helvetians were not able to make their party good against our Armies.

If any man were moved at the sight and overthrow of the Galles, upon inquiry he should find, that being wearied with continuall wars (after that Ariovillus had for many months together kept himself within his Camp, in a boggy and fenny Country) and despairing of any occasion of battel, he suddenly set upon them as they were dispersed, and so overcome them, rather by policy then by force. Which although it tooke place against savage and unskillfull people, yet was not Ariovillus so simple as to think that he could insnare our Armies with the like subtilties. As for those that feared the cause of their fear to be the difficulty of provision of Corn, and the dangerousness of the way, they seemed very arrogant in their conceits, in presuming to direct their Generall, as if he had not known what pertained to his duty. The Sequans and Lingons had understood that charge; besides that Corn was almost ripe every where in the fields: and what the wayes were should shortly be seen.

Whereas it was given out that the souldiers would not obey his Mandates, nor advance their Standards, he little valued it; for he was well assured, that if an Army refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either because he was thought to be unfortunate in his enterprises, or else for that he was notoriously convicted of Avarice: but the whole course of his life should witness his innocency, and the overthrow of the Helvetians his happinesse. And therefore that which he was minded to have put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following, at the fourth watch he would dislodge from thence; that without further delay he might understand, whether shame and respect of their duty would prevail more with them, then fear or cowardise. And though he wist that no man else would follow him, yet

notwithstanding he would go with the tenth legion alone, of whom he had no doubt or suspicion, and would take them as a guard to his person.

Cæsar had chiefly favoured this legion, and put much trust in them for their valour.

Upon the making of this speech, the minds of all men were wonderfully changed; for it bred in every one a great alacrity and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to give him thanks by their Tribunes for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readinesse to set forward to the war. And then likewise the rest of the legions made means by the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions of the first Orders, to give Cæsar satisfaction; protesting they neither doubted nor feared, nor gave any censure of the issue of that war, but alwayes left it to the wisdom of the Generall.

Their satisfaction being taken, and a view being made of the wayes by Divitiacus (whom of all the Galles he best trusted) and report being by him made, that in seiching a compassse of fifty miles he might carry his Army in open and champaign Countreies; in the fourth watch of the night, according to his former saying, he set forward.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the speech it self are presented many specialities, both concerning their discipline and Military instructions, which deserve examination: amongst which I note first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Council; *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus*: whereas there were usually no more admitted to their council of war but the Legates, Ogestors, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first Orders; which I understand to be the first *Hastates*, the first *Principes*, and the first *Pilani* of every legion. And this is manifestly proved out of the fifth Commentary, where *Cæra* was besieged by *Ambiorix*: in which amongst other there were two valiant Centurions, *Passio* and *Tarcus*, between whom there was every year great emulation for place of preferment: *Et non primis ordinibus appropriabant*, saith *Cæsar*; that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower orders of the legion and were very near the dignity of the first cohort; wherein, as in all the rest, there were three maniples, and in every maniple two orders.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE first motive which he useth to recall their exiled judgement, discovered their breach of discipline: for contrary to the course of Military

ry government, they had presumed not only to make inquiry, but to give out whether, and upon what service they were carried; which in the rigour of Camp-policy could not passe without due punishment. For what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, then to suffer it to be measured with the vulgar conceits, or weighed in the balance of such false judgements? especially when those weak Censors are to be Actors and Executioners of the designe: for then every man will sue the nature of the action according to his own humour; although his humour be led with blindness, and have no other direction, then an uncertain apprehension of profit or disadvantage.

And in this case there cannot be a better president then Nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a work of absolute perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look upon, but yield themselves to be guided by a Moderator of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their ability to the direction of some wise and prudent Captain, that beholdeth the action in true honour, and balanceth the losse of many particulars with the health and safety of the publick good. For if every man should prescribe who should obey? *Tam nescire quædam milites, quam scire oportet*, saith *Otho* in *Tacitus*, upon the like disorder, and again, *Perendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitant, res militares continentur*. Which proveth that the greatest virtue which is required in a souldier is obedience; as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

IN the reason which he useth to prove their disparity of valour in regard of the Romans, who were superiour to the Helvetians that had oftentimes overthrowen the Germans, he strengtheneth the argument with the advantage of the place, and saith that the Helvetians had put them to the worst, not onely where the Helvetians dwelt themselves, but even in their own Country, and at home at their own doors: as though an enemy were charged with greater fury in the presence of a mans own Country and dearest friends, then in a strange and unknown land.

This question was handled in the *Roman Senate* by *Fabius Maximus*, and *Scipio* surnamed *Africanus*, when they late in counsell how to rid their Country of that subtle *Carthaginian*; that for sixteen years space had fretted like a canker the beauty of *Italy*, wasted the land, and brought it to desolation, sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duty, overthrowen their Armies, slain their Consuls, and threatened their imperiall City with ruine and destruction. *Fabius*, upon the motion to make

war in *Africa*, thought it agreeable to nature first to defend that which was their own, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in *Italy*, then let war be set on foot in *Africa*; and first let them be without fear themselves, before they went about to terrify others: for those forces afforded little hope of victory in another kingdome, that were not able to free their own Country from so dangerous an enemy. *Alcibiades* overthrowen the *Athenian* Commonwealth with the like counsell: and concerning *Hannibal*, let them be sure of this, that they should find him a forer enemy in his own Country then in another kingdome.

Scipio on the other side, carried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor example to impugn *Fabius* his authority: for he shewed that *Agathocles* the *Syracusan* king, being a long time afflicted with the *Punic* war, averted the *Carthaginian* from *Sicily* by transporting his forces into *Africa*. But how powerfull it was to take away fear by retorting danger upon the Oppressour, could there be a preferer example then *Hannibal*? There was great difference in the nature of the action, between the spoil and waite of a strangers Country, and to see their own native Country wasted with sword and destruction: *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsi*. For he that invadeth anothers kingdome, easily discovereth both the advantage which may be taken against the enemy, and the strength wherupon he resteth. And amongst the variable events of war, many unexpected occasions arise, which present victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances to alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen.

With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no lesse doubt then importance was handled by two famous and worthy Captains, whose minds (as it seemed) were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their own humour, then to determine in sincerity of judgement upon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their positions. But to leave other commodities or disadvantages which were annexed unto either part, I will onely set down some reasons, to prove how valour and courage may either grow or be abated by the accidents which rise in a war of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimony of an infallible truth being grounded upon the propriety of mans nature; that as advantage bringeth hope of victory, and hope conceiveth such spirits as usually follow, when the thing which is hoped for is effected, and thereby the courage becometh hardy and resolute in victory: so on the other side, disadvantage and danger breed fear, & fear so checketh valour, and controulleth the spirits, that vertue and honour give place to distrust and yield

up their interest to such directours as can afford nothing but diffidence and irresolution.

Neither can it be denied but he that setteth upon an enemy in a strange country, and so preventeth such attempts as might be made upon his own territories, hath that advantage which giveth life unto actions, and stealeth his enterprise with resolution. For besides the commodity of leaving when he list, and proceeding as far forth as he shall find his means able to fortunate his attempts, he knoweth that the strife and controversy is not for his native Country, which he quietly enjoyeth, and is reserved at all times to entertain him, howsoever Fortune shall favour his designs: but for a Strangers Kingdom, which his ambition thirsteth after, wherein, so far much as the riches and wealth of that State are laid before them as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is achieved thereby, every mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased, without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the mind. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his own Kingdom, and in the sight of his subjects have his land consumed with ruine and destruction; the danger will disturb the powers of the soul, that though the turbulent disorder of the weaker parts, the better faculties will lose their prerogative of advising how the enemy may be best resisted, when as every man shall apprehend the terror of the danger, and few or none conceive the true means to avoid it.

And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his soul, as the piety and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution; yet the motives are of such weight, as will rather make them diffident of their own worth, as insufficient to maintain so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: so far much as the terror and fear of so great a danger will present a greater measure of woes to their minds, then the hope of victory can afford them joy.

Hence therefore groweth the difference between him that seeketh to maintain that estate which he hath in possession by force of Arms, and another that seeketh to increase his means by valour. For the former is presented with the danger of losing all his estate; which affrighteth and troubleth, having no other reward propounded unto him: and the other looketh upon the advantage which he gaineth by overcoming, which much increaseth his valour, without any losse or disadvantage, if he chance to be put to the worst. And therefore there is alwayes great odds between him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that means become desperate, having nothing further to lose; and another that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to lose it: for fear will to dismay his mind, that he will ra-

ther distrust his own ability, then entertain a resolution of valour.

To prove this, we need not seek other examples, then those imperiall Cities in whose cause this controversy was first moved. For when *Hannibal* was come into *Italy*, and had defeated *Sempronius* the Consul at *Trebia*, the *Romans* were driven into such an extasy of terror, that they believed verily that the enemy was then coming to assault the City; neither had they any hope or aide in themselves to keep or defend the same. On the other side, *Scipio* was no sooner landed in *Africa*, but there was such a tumult in *Carthage*, as though the City had been already taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which *Hannibal* by a conquering Army in *Italy* had confirmed for sixteen years together, prevail in the apprehension of so imminent a danger. And then that which *Fabius* borrowed of Nature to teach the *Romans* (that first men ought to defend their own, before they seek other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the *Carthaginians*: for with all speed they sent for *Hannibal* out of *Italy*, to be their Champion against young *Scipio*. If therefore other things be correspondent (as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either Nation to be considered) I take it much better for a Prince to invade an enemy in his own country, then to attend him at home in his own Kingdom.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

THE last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it self peradventure as faulty as any other: wherein he shewed great Art and singular Wisdom. For he that hath once offended, and is both burdened with the guilt of conscience and upbraided with the reproach of men, can hardly be persuaded that his fault can be purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memory of the fact will never be blotted out with any virtuous action, but still remaineth, to cast dishonour upon the offender, and to accuse him of dishonesty.

And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an error being once rashly committed, through despair of remission admitteth no true penitency, but either draweth on more grievous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Sceler scelus inveniendum est*; or maintaineth his error by wilfull obstinacy: as it is said of the Lion, that being found by Hunters in a Cave, he will rather dy in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his property is thus expressed, *ingrediendo cecus, exiendo potens*. This did *Cæsar* wisely prevent by clearing the tenth legion of that of which

he accused the rest of the Army; which made them the more earnest to answer his expectation, inasmuch as they were witness to themselves of a common error: and the other legions envying at their fortune, resolved to shew as great alacrity in the sequel of the war, and to deserve more then the judgement of the Emperour had imputed to their fellows.

Chap. XVII.

The treaty between Cæsar and Ariovistus.

Cæsar.

THE seventh day, as he continued on his march, his Espials brought him word that *Ariovistus* with all his forces was within twenty four miles of that place: who as soon as he understood of *Cæsar*'s coming, sent Embassadors unto him, declaring that so far much as he was come somewhat nearer, and that he might do it without danger, he was content to admit of a parlee. *Cæsar* refused not the offer, thinking now to find him reasonable, in that he offered of his own accord what he had formerly denied at *Cæsar*'s request: and thereby was in good hope, that understanding what was required, he would in the end consider of the many favours he had received from the people of Rome, and desist from such wilful courses.

The fifth day following was appointed for the Treaty. In the mean time there passed often Messages reciprocally between them. *Ariovistus* required that *Cæsar* would not bring any footmen to the parlee, for that he feared to be circumvented by treachery; and therefore thought fit that either party should come only with their Cavalrie: otherwise he would not give meeting.

Cæsar, not willing to put off the Treaty for any such cause, nor yet daring to put himself in trust to the French horse, thought it most convenient to leave the French Riders behind him, and to set the souldiers of the tenth legion (whom he best trusted) upon their horses; that if he stood in need, he might have a faithfull guard of his friends about him. Whereupon one of the souldiers said prettily, that *Cæsar* had done more for them then he had promised; for he had said before he would make the tenth legion as a guard to his person, and now he had imrolled them all for horsemen.

There was a great and open Plain, and in the midst thereof a rising Mount, which was almost in the mid way between both the Camps: and thither, according to the agreement, they came to parlee. The legion which *Cæsar* had brought

with him on horseback, he placed two hundred paces from the said Mount: and likewise the horsemen of *Ariovistus* stood in the same distance. *Ariovistus* requested they might talk on horseback, and bring each of them ten persons to the conference. At their meeting, *Cæsar* began his speech with a commemoration of the favours and benefits the Senate had done unto him, in that he was by their authority intituled by the name of a King and a Friend, and thereupon had received great gifts: Which favour fell but unto a few, and was by the Romans given only to men of great desert: whereas he, without any occasion of access unto them, or other just cause on his behalf, had obtained those honours through his courtesy, and the bounty of the Senate.

He shewed him further what ancient and reasonable causes of amity tied them so firm to the *Heduns*: what Decrees and orders of Senate had oftentimes been made in their favour and behoof: That from all antiquity the *Heduns* had held the principality of Gallia, and that long before they were in amity with the Romans. The people of Rome had always this care, not only to endeavour that their Allies and confederates should not lose anything of their property; but also that they might increase in dignity and reputation: and therefore who could endure to see that forced from them, which they quietly possessed when they entered league with the Romans?

In like manner he required the performance of such things which he had formerly given in charge to his Embassadors; that he should not make war either upon the *Heduns*, or their Associates: that he should restore their hostages: and if he could not return any part of the Germans back again over the Rhene, yet he should forbear to bring any more into that Countrey.

Ariovistus made little answer to *Cæsar*'s demands, but spake much of his own virtues and valour; That he was come over the Rhene, not out of his own desire, but at the mediation and intreaty of the Galls; that he had not left his house and kindred but with great hope of high rewards; the possessions he had in Gallia were given him by themselves; their hostages were voluntarily delivered unto him; he took tribute by the law of Arms, which was such as Conquerours might lay upon the vanquished; he made no war upon the Galls, but the Galls made war upon him: All the States of Gallia came to fight against him, and had put themselves into the field, whose forces were in one battell all dispersed.

persed and overthrown. If they were desirous to make another triall, he was ready to undertake them: but if they would have peace, it were an injury to retract that tribute which of their own accord they had paid untill that time. He expected that the Amity of the people of Rome should be rather an honour and a safety, then a losse unto him, and that he had sought it to that end: but if by their means the tribute due unto him should be retracted, he would as willingly refuse their friendship as he had desired it. In that he had brought so many Germans into Gallia, it was rather for his own defence, then of any purpose to subdue the Country; as might appear by that he had not come thither but upon treaty, and yet no way on foot but for his own defence. He was seated in Gallia before the Romans came thither; neither had the people of Rome before that time carried their Army beyond the bounds of their Province: and therefore he knew not what he meant to intrude himself into his possessions. This was his Province of Gallia, as that was ours: and as it was not lawfull for him to command in our quarters, so it was not fitting that they should disturb his government.

In that he alleadged the Hedvans were by decree of Senate adopted into the amity of the people of Rome; he was not so barbarous, or unacquainted with the course of things, as to be ignorant that in the last warre of the Allobroges they were aiding and assisting to the Romans: and in the quarrell the Hedvans had with the Sequans, the Romans were in like manner assisting unto them. Whereupon he had good occasion to suspect that Cæsar, under pretence of league and amity, kept his Army in Gallia for his ruine and destruction: and that if he did not depart and withdraw his Army out of those Countreies, he would no longer take him for a friend, but for an enemy. And if his fortune were to slay him, he should perform a very acceptable service to many noble and chief men of Rome (as he had well understood by Letters and Messengers he had received from them) whose favour and amity he should purchase by taking away his life. But if he would depart, and leave him the free possession of Gallia, he would gratify him with great rewards: and what war soever he desired to be undertaken, should be gone through without all, without his perill or charge.

Many things were spoken by Cæsar, to shew why he could not desist from that course; for neither was it his use, nor the custome of the people

of Rome, to forsake their well-deserving Associates: neither could he think that Gallia did rather belong to Ariovistus then the Romans. The Arveins and Ruteni were in due course of warre subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus: whom the people of Rome had pardoned, and not reduced to a Province, or made them Suspendiaries. And if antiquitie were looked into, the people of Rome had good claim to that Countrey: but forasmuch as the intencion and will of the Senate was they should remain a free people, they were suffered to be governed by their own lawes, and left unto themselves, notwithstanding any former conquest by force of Armes.

Whilst these things were treated of in parlee, it was told Cæsar that Ariovistus horsemen did approach nearer to the Mount, and that accosting our men they assaulted them with stones and other weapons: whereupon he brake off, and betooke himself to his Party, commanding them not to cast a weapon at the enemy. For albeit he well perceived he might without perill of that celtic legion give battell to his Cavalry; yet he thought fit to refrain, least it should be said he had intrapped them with a parlee, contrary to faith made and agreement. After it was reported amongst the vulgar souldiers how arrogantly Ariovistus had carried himself in the treaty, forbidding the Romans to frequent any part of Gallia, and that their Cavalry had assaulted our men, and that thereupon the parlee brake off; the Army was possessed with a greater alacrity and desire to fight then before. Two dayes after Ariovistus sent Messengers to Cæsar, signifying that he desired to treat with him concerning those things which were left imperfect, and thereupon willed him to appoint another day of meeting; or if he liked not that, to send some unto him with authority to conclude of such things as should be found expedient. Cæsar was unwilling to give any further meeting; and the rather, for that the day before the Germans could not be restrained from violence and force of Armes. Neither did he think he might safely expose the person of any of his followers to the inhumanity of such barbarous people; and therefore thought it fittest to send unto him M. Valerius Proculus the sonne of C. Valerius Cabiurius, a vertuous young man, and well bred, whose father was made free of Rome by C. Valer. Flaccus: which he did the rather in regard of his singular integrity, and his perfectnesse in the French tongue, which Ariovistus through long continuance had learned; and that the Germans had

had no cause of offence against him. And with him he sent M. Titius, that was familiarly acquainted with Ariovistus, with instruction to hear what was said, and to make report thereof to Cæsar. Whom as soon as Ariovistus saw come into his Camp, he cried out in the presence of his Army, demanding wherefore they came thither, and whether they were not sent as Spies. And as they were about to make answer, he cut them off and commanded them to be put in Irons.

The same day he removed his Camp, and lodged himself under a hill, six miles from Cæsar. The next day he brought his forces along by Cæsar's Camp, and incamped himself two miles beyond him; of purpose to cut off all such corn and convoies as should be sent to the Romans by the Hedvans and Sequans. From that day forward by the space of five dayes together, Cæsar imbushelled his men before his Camp; to the intent that if Ariovistus had a mind to give battell, he might do it when he would. But Ariovistus all this while kept his Army within his Camp, and daily sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the Romans.

This was the manner of fighting which the Germans had practised: there were 6000 horsemen, and as many strong and nimble footmen, whom the horsemen had selected out of the whole host, every man one for his safeguard: these they had always at hand with them in battell, and unto these they resorted for succour. If the horsemen were over-charged, these ever stepped in to help them. If any one were wounded or unhorsed, they came about him and succoured him. If the matter required either to adventure forward, or to retire speedily back again, their swiftnesse was such (through continuall exercise) that hanging on the horse-mane by the one hand, they would run as fast as the horses.

OBSERVATION.

Footmen
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horsemen.

IT may seem strange unto the souldiers of our time, that the footmen should be mingled pell-mell amongst the horsemen, without hurt and disadvantage to themselves; so unlikely it is that they should either succour the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some have imagined that these footmen in the encounter cast themselves into one body, and so charging the enemy assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, &c. of others which I will alledge to this purpose, plainly evince that these footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist every particular man as his owne and occasion required: and therefore

the choise of these footmen was permitted to the horsemen, in whose service they were to be employed; that every man might take his friendly, in whom he reposed greatest confidence. When they were overcharged, these stepped in to help them; if any man were wounded or unhorsed, he had his footman ready to assist him: and when they were to go upon any speedy service, or suddenly to retire upon advantage, they stayed themselves upon the mane of the horses with one hand, and so ran as fast as the horsemen could go. Which services they could not possibly have performed without confusion and disorder, if the footmen had not severally attended upon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election.

The principall use of these footmen of the Germans consisted in the aid of their own horsemen upon any necessity, not so much regarding their service upon the enemy, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romans had long before practised the same Art to a more effectual purpose; namely, as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troupes of horse then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memory which history mentioneth, is recorded by Livie in the second Punic war, at the siege of Capua, under the regiment of Quintus Fulvius the Consul; where it is said that in all their conflicts, as the Roman legions returned with the better, to their cavalry was always put to the worst: and therefore they invented this means, to make that good by Art which was wanting in force.

Out of the whole army were taken the choicest young men, both for strength and agility, and to them were given little round bucklers, and seven darts apiece in stead of their other weapons: these souldiers practiced to ride behind the horsemen, and speedily to light from the horses at a watch-word given, and so to charge the Enemy on foot. And when by exercise they were made so expert, that the novelty of the invention no whit affrighted them, the Roman horsemen went forth to encounter with the enemy, every man carrying his foot-souldier behind him; who at the encounter suddenly alighting, charged upon the enemy with such a fury, that they followed them in slaughter to the gates of Capua. And hence, saith Livie, grew the first institution of the Velites: which ever after that time were enrolled with the legions. The author of this stratagem is said to be one Q. Navius a Centurion, and was honourable rewarded by Fulvius the Consul for the same.

Salust in the history of Jugurth saith, that Marins mingled the Velites with the Cavalry of the associates, ut quacunq; invaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent. The like practice was used by Cæsar, as appeareth in the third book of the Civil war; saving that in stead of the

Observations upon Cæsars

the *Velites*, he mingled with his horsemen four hundred of the lustiest of his legionary souldiers, to resist the cavalry of *Pompey*, while the rest of his Army passed over the river *Genusum*, after the overthrow he had at *Dyrrachium*: *qui tantum proficere*, saith the text, *ut equestri pralio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerant, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se recipere*. Many other places might be recited; but these are sufficient to prove that the greatest Captains of ancient times strengthened their cavalry with footmen dispersed amongst them. The *Roman* horsemen, saith *Polybius*, at the first carried but a weak limber pole or staffe, and a little round buckler; but afterwards they used the furniture of the *Grecians*: which *Iosephus* affirmeth to be a strong lance or staffe, and three or four darts in a quiver, with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The use of their lance was most effectual when they charged in troupe, pouldron to pouldron; and that manner of fight afforded no means to intermingle footmen: but when they used their darts, every man got what advantage of ground he could, as our *Carbines* for the most part do, and to the footmen might have place among them: or otherwise for so good an advantage they would easily make place for the foot-men to serve among them. But howsoever it was, it appeareth by this circumstance how little the *Romans* feared troops of horse, considering that the best means to defeat their horse was by their foot companies. But to make it more plain, of many examples I will only alledge two; the one out of *Livie*, to prove that the *Roman* horsemen were not comparable for service to footmen: the other out of *Hirtius*, to shew the same effect against strangers, & *Numidian* horsemen.

Lib. 3. de bello Africano.

In the Consulships of *L. Valerius* and *Marcus Horatius*, *Valerius* having fortunately overthrown the *Equi* and the *Volsce*, *Horatius* proceeded with as great courage in the war against the *Sabines*; wherein it happened, that in the day of battell the *Sabines* reserved two thousand of their men to give a fresh assault upon the left Corner of the *Romans*, as they were in conflict: which took such effect, that the legionary footmen of that Corner were forced to retreat. Which the *Roman* horsemen (being in number six hundred) perceiving, and not being able with their horse to make head against the enemy, they presently forsook their horses, and made hast to make good the place on foot; wherein they carried themselves so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gave the like advantage to their footmen against the *Sabines*, and then betook themselves again to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point; the *Numidians*, as *Cæsar* witnesseth, were the best horsemen that ever he met with, and used the same Art as the

Germans did, mingling among them light-armed footmen. An Ambuscado of these *Numidians* charging the legions upon a suddain, the history saith that *primo impetu legiones Equitatus & levis armaturæ hostium nullo negotio loco pulsæ & dejectæ est de colle*. And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged upon the rearward of the Army, according to the manner of the *Numidian* fight, the history saith, *Cæsariani interim non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se convertissent, & pila viribus contenta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum milium ad numerum vertebant*. So that to free himself of this inconvenience, he took his horsemen out of the rearward, and placed his legions there, *ita vim hostium per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat*. And ever as he marched, he caused three hundred souldiers of every legion to be free and without burthen, that they might be ready upon all occasions; *Quos in Equitatum Labienus immisit*. *Tum Labienus, conversis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multus ejus occisus, compluribus vulneratis: milites legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter incertum ire ceperunt*. I alledge the very words of the history, to take away all suspicion of falsifying or wringing any thing to an affected opinion. If any man will look into the reason of this disparity, he shall find it to be chiefly the work of the *Roman* pile (an unresistible weapon) and the terror of horsemen; especially when they were cast with the advantage of the place, and fell so thick that there was no means to avoid them.

But to make it plain that any light-armed footmen could better make head against a troupe of horse, then the Cavalrie of their own parties, although they bear but the same weapons: let us consider how nimble and ready they were that fought on foot, either to take an advantage, or to shun and avoid any danger; casting their darts with far greater strength and more certainty, then the horsemen could do. For as the force of all the engines of old times, as the *Balistæ*, *Catapultæ* and *Tormentæ*, proceeded from that stability and resting Centre which nature affordeth as the only strength and life of the engine; so what force soever a man maketh, must principally proceed from that firmesse and stay which Nature, by the earth, or some other unmoveable rest, giveth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that lifteth up a weight from the ground, by so much treadeth heavier upon the earth, by how much the thing is heavier then his body. The footmen therefore having a surer stay to counterpoize their forced motion then the horsemen had, cast their darts with greater violence, and consequently with more certainty.

CHAP.

Chap. XVIII.

Cæsar preventeth *Ariovistus* of his purpose, by making two Camps.

Cæsar.

When *Cæsar* perceived that *Ariovistus* meant nothing lesse then to fight, but kept himself within his Camp; least peradventure he should intercept the *Sequans*, and others of his Associates, as they came with convoies of Corn to the *Romans*, beyond that place wherein the *Germans* abode about six hundred paces from their Camp, he chose a ground meet to incamp in: and marching thither in three battells, commanded two of them to stand ready in Armes, and the third to fortify the Camp. *Ariovistus* sent sixteen thousand foot and all his horse to interrupt the souldiers, and hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding *Cæsar*, as he had before determined, caused two battells to withstand the enemy, and the third to go through with the work: which being ended he left there two legions, and part of the associate forces, and led the other four legions back again into the greater Camp.

The next day *Cæsar*, according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his Camps; marching a little from the greater Camp, he put his men in array, and profered battell to the enemy: but perceiving that *Ariovistus* would not stirre out of his trenches, about noon he conveyed his Army into their severall Camps. Then at length *Ariovistus* sent part of his forces to assault the lesser Camp. The encounter continued very sharp on both parts until the evening; and at sun-setting, after many wounds given and taken, *Ariovistus* conveyed his Army again into their Camp. And as *Cæsar* made inquiry of the captives, what the reason was that *Ariovistus* refused battell, he found this to be the cause; The *Germans* had a custome, that the women should by casting of Lots and Southsaying declare whether it were for their behoof to fight or no: and that they found by their Arts the *Germans* could not get the victory, if they fought before the new Moon.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe what especiall importance this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the *Romans* observed, and by which they conquered so many Nations: for besides the safety which it afforded their own troups, it served for a hold well-fenced and man-

ned, or as it were a strong fortified town in any part of the field where they saw advantage; and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselves, or impeach the enemy, by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking up his Camp, besides many other advantages, all averring the saying of *Domitius Corbulo*, *dolabra vincendum esse hostem*: a thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed by the Commanders of such forces as serve the States in the United Provinces of *Belgia*; whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertain the use of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoever, which may be thought worthy executioners of the deeds of Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

In the second place we may observe that there was no Nation so barbarous (for I understand the *Germans* to be as barbarous in regard of the motions of religion, as any known Nation of that time, being in a Climate so near the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make use in their greatest affairs, of that superstition to which their mind was naturally intrahled, and forge propheties and divinations, as well to stir up as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best serve to advantage their proceedings. Neither did *Cæsar* let slip the occasion of making use of this their religion: for understanding by their prisoners that their divinations forbade them to fight before the new Moon, he used all the means he could to provoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischieving might prejudice their resolution to return Conquerors. Which may serve to prove, that a superstitious people are subject to many inconveniences, which industry or Fortune may discover to their overthrow.

It is recorded that *Columbus* being General of some forces which *Ferdinando* king of *Casile* sent to discover the *Welt Indies*, and suffering great penury for want of victuals in the Ile of *Jamaica*, after that he had observed how the *Indians* worshipped the Moon, and having knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he told the inhabitants that unless they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly appear towards them, by changing his bright shining face into obscurity and darknesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poor *Indians*, stricken with a superstitious fear of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing back that might assist their enemies to depopulate and over-run their own Country.

Chap. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to give them battell, and the Germans dispose themselves therunto.

Cæsar:

HHe next day Cæsar left a sufficient Garrison in each of his Camps; and forasmuch as the number of his legionary souldiers was small, in respect of the multitude of the Germans, he placed all the Auxiliarie troupes for a shew before the lesser Camp: and putting his legions in a triple battell, he marched towards the Camp of Ariovistus. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting every Tribe and people by themselves, in like distance and order of battell (as the Harudes, Marcomans, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians and Suevians) and environing their whole Army with Caris and carriages, that there might be no hope at all left to save any man by flight. And in these they placed their women, that they by their out-stretched hands and teares moving pity, might implore the souldiers, as they descended by course to the battell, not to deliver them into the bondage and thraldome of the Romans.

Cæsar assigned to every legion a Legat and a Questor: that every man might have an eye-witness of his valour: and he himself began the battell with the right Cornet, forasmuch as he perceived that part of Ariovistus Army to be the weakest.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THe Romans, even from the infancy of their state, were ever zealous admirers of true honour, and alwayes desired to behold with the eye to what measure of vertue every man had attained; that the tongue with greater fervency of spirit might sound out the celebration of *Macte virtute*, which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped upon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom; considering that the most precious things that are lose much of their worth, if they be not sited with other correspondent natures, whose sympathy addeth much more excellency then is discerned when they appear by themselves without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which Nature hath given to the eye-pleasing Diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificiall form? or what perfection can the form give, without a foile to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them, if the light do not illuminate it? or what avail all these, where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a judgement to value it, and an heart to embrace it? Such a union hath Nature imprinted in the diversitie of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, in whose


carriage there is a far greater exactnesse of correspondence required to approve them honourable, then was requisite to make the jewel beautifull. And this did Cæsar in all his battells; amongst the rest, that at *Alesia* is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, utroque & laudis cupiditas, & timor ignominie ad virtutem excitabat.* And when Livie would expresse how valiantly an action was carried, he saith no more but *in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*: which is as much as to say, that forasmuch as the Romans were diligent observers of every mans worth, rewarding vertue with honour, and cowardise with reproch, every man bent his whole endeavour to deserve the good opinion of his Generall, by discharging that duty which he owed to the Commonwealth with all loyalty and faithfulness of spirit.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Romans had four formes of the front of their battell. The first was called *Acies Recta*, when neither the cornets nor the battell was advanced one before another, but were all carried in a right line, and made a straight front; & this was their most usuall manner of imbatelling.

The second forme of the front was called *Obliqua*, when as one of the cornets was advanced nearer unto the enemy then the rest, to begin the battell: and this was commonly as *Vegetius* noteth the right cornet; for the right cornet of an Army had great advantage against the left of the enemies, in regard of their weapons and furniture. But Cæsar did it in this place, because he perceived that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a Maxime of great authority, That the weakest part of an enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an Armie: for so favourable are mens judgements to that which is already happened, that the sequele of every action dependeth for the most part upon the beginning. *Dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet*, saith a Poet: and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequele by the nature of a precedent cause, that the end must needs ere from the common course, when it doth not participate of that quality which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good end without a good beginning: for although the beginning be oftentimes disastrous and unluckie, and the end fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an evil end. And therefore that his men might foresee a happy end in a good beginning, it behoved him with the best of his Army to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third form of the front is called *Simulata*, when both the cornets are advanced forward, and



and the battell standeth backward off from the enemy, after the fashion of a half-moon. *Scipio* used it in *Spain*, having observed some dayes before that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best souldiers were alwaies in the midlt; and therefore *Scipio* put all his old souldiers in the corners, and brought them out first to charge upon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controversie, before the other that were in the midlt could come to fight.

The last form is called *Gibbosa*, or *gibbera* *Acies*, when the battell is advanced, and the two cornets lag behind. This form did *Hannibal* use in the battell of *Cannae*; but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his souldiers, and placed his weakest in the midlt, that the *Romans* following the retreat of the battell, which was easily repell'd, might be inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

Chap. XX.

The Battell between *Cæsar* and *Arivillus*.

Cæsar.

THe sign of the battell being thereupon given, our men charged upon the enemy very fiercely; and they on the other side returned so speedy a counterblow, that the legions had no time to cast their pikes, and in that regard made hast to betake themselves to their swords: But the Germans, according to their manner, putting themselves into a *Phalanx*, received the force of their swords. In the battell there were many legionary souldiers seen to leap upon the *Phalanx*, and to pull up with their hands the targets that covered it, and so to wound and kill those that were underneath: and so the left Cornet of the enemy was overthrown and put to flight.

Now while the right Cornet was thus busied, the left Cornet was overcharged with an unequal multitude of the Germans: which young *Crassus* the Generall of the horse no sooner perceived (having more scope and liberty then any of the Commanders that were in the battell) but he sent *tertium Aciem*, the third battell, to rescue and aid their fellows that were in danger; by means whereof the fight was renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight, and never looked back untill they came to the *Rhene*, which was about fifty miles from the place where they fought. Where some few of them saved themselves by swimming: others found some boats, and so escaped. *Arivillus* fighting upon a little Bark tied to the shore, recovered the other side, and so saved himself: the rest were all slain by the horsemen. *Arivillus* had two wives: one a

Swevian, whom he brought with him from home; and the other of *Notica*, the sister of *King Vocion*, sent unto him by her brother into *Gallia*, and married there: both these perished in that fight. His two daughters likewise being there, one was slain, and the other taken.

As *Cæsar* pursued the German horsemen, it was his chance to light upon *Valerius Proculus*, as he was drawn up and down by his Keepers bound in three chains: which accident was as gratefull to him as the victory it self; being so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, and a man of sort in the Province, whom the barbarous enemy (contrary to the law of Nations) had cast into prison. Neither would Fortune by the losse of him abate any thing of so great pleasure and contentment: for he reported that in his own presence they had three severall times cast lots whether he should be burned alive; and that still he escaped by the fortune of the lots. And *M. Titius* was found in like manner, and brought unto him. The same of this battell being carried beyond the *Rhene*, the *Swevians* that were come to the banks of the *Rhene* returned home again: whom the inhabitants neare upon that river pursued, finding them terrified and distracted, and slew a great number of them.

Cæsar having thus ended two great warres in one Summer, brought his Army into their wintering Campes, somewhat sooner then the time of the year required; and leaving *Labienus* to command them, himself returned into the hither *Gallia*, to keep Courts and publick Diets.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis *Phalanx* here mentioned can hardly be proved to be the right *Macedonian Phalanx*; but we are rather to understand it to be so termed, by reason of the close and compact imbatellling, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the *Helvetian Phalanx*. Secondly, I observe that *Cæsar* kept the old rule concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of *Triarii* be not mentioned in his history; yet he omitted not the substance, which was, to have *primam*, *secundam*, & *tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* should begin the battell, and the second should come fresh and assist them: or peradventure if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battell were joyned together, and so charged upon the enemy with greater fury and violence; but at all adventures the third battell was ever in *subsidio*, as they termed it, to succour any part that should be overcharged; which was a thing of much consequence, and of great

wisdom. For if we either respect the encouragement of the souldiers, or the casualty of Fortune, what could be more added to their discipline in this behalf, then to have a second and a third success, to give strength to the fainting weaknesse of their men, and to repair the disadvantage which any accident should cast upon them? Or if their valour were equally ballanced, and victory stood doubtfull which of the two parties she should honour, these alwayes slept in, being fresh, against weary and over-laboured spirits, and to draw victory in despite of casualty unto themselves.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING use of lots, it shall not be amisse to look into the nature of them, being in former times to generall, that there was no Nation, civil or barbarous, but was directed in their greatest affairs by the sentence of lots. As we may not refuse for an undoubted truth, that which Salomon saith in the sixteenth of Proverbs, *The lots are cast into the lap, but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord*: through the knowledge whereof Joshua was directed to take *Achan*, the Marriners *Jonas*, and the Apostles to consecrate *Matthias*: So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindnesse in the way of truth could direct them no further then to senselesse superstition, and put them in mind of a duty which they owed, but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed; whether these, I say, were perswaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destiny, and as the Gods would have it, it remaineth doubtfull.

Aristotle, the wisest of the heathen concerning things naturall, nameth that event casuall, or proceeding from Fortune, of which the reason of man could assign no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause. So that whatsoever happened in any action besides the intent of the agent and workman, was termed an effect of Fortune, or chance of hab-nab: For all other effects, which depended upon a certainty and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casuall, or subject to the inconstancy of chance. And because many and sundry such chances daily happened, which like *terre filii* had no Father, and could not be warranted as lawfull children either to nature or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of Fortune, as the principall efficient and sovereign Motor of all such unexpected events: that is, they made nothing else the Governesse and Directresse of many things. Which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all naturall causes, and was desired with celestially honours, as the Poet saith, *Te Nos facimus Fortuna deam, caloque locamus*. By the providence of

this blind Goddesse, which held her Deity by the Tenure of mens ignorance, were all casuall actions directed, and especially lots; the event whereof depended only upon her pleasure and decree. Neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, and the event could not have been called *Sors*, but must have been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certain foregoing cause.

Whereby we see upon how weak an axletree the greatest motions of the godlesse world were turned, having irregularity and uncertainty for the *Intelligentie* that governed their revolutions. And herein all sorts of men (although in divers respects) rested as well contented as if an Oracle had spoken unto them, and revealed the mysteries of fatall destiny.

Rome directed the main course of her government by the fortune of this mock-destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancy with the free choice of their Commanders, and suted their obedience with a well-liking authority: yet the publick affairs which each Consul was severally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an enemy were entered into their confines to depopulate and wast their territories, the lots assigned this Consul for the government of the City, and the other to command the legions; and to manage the war.

If forces were to be sent into divers Provinces, and against severall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could give to either Consul his task; but their peculiar charges were authorized by lots. If any extraordinary actions were to be done in the City, as the dedication of a Temple, the sanctifying of the Capitol after a pollution; *Sors omnia versat*, that did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weak foundation of this practise in their Theologie and deepest Divinity) we may not think but these skilfull Architects of that absolute government, wherein vertue joynd with true wisdom to make an unexampled pattern, we may not think, I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no other way be prevented but by the use of lots. For when things are equally levelled between divers objects, and run with indifference to equall stations, there must be some controlling power to draw the current towards one Coast, and to appropriate it unto one channel, that the order of Nature be not inverted, nor a well-established government disturbed. So the state of Rome casting many things with equall charge upon her two sovereign Magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be invented to intereste the one in that office, and to discharge the other, then to appoint an Arbitrator, whose

whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be said why it was so, but that it was so. For if the wisdom of the Senate had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily have burst out into civil discord, considering the often contentions between the Senate and the people, the factions of Clients, and the constant mutability of every mans private affections necessarily inclining unto one, although their worth were equall, and by true reason indiscernable; which might have made the one proud of that which peradventure he had not, and cast the other lower then would have well becomed his virtues: and therefore to cut off these with many other

inconveniences, they invented lots, which without either reason or will might decide such controversies.

By this it appeareth how little the ancient Law-makers respected the ground and reason of an ordinance, so the commodity were great, and the use important to the good of the State: for as they saw the thing it self to be casuall, so they saw that casuall things are sometimes more necessary then demonstrative conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculative consideration of Lawes and Statutes to belong to the common people; but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the Commonwealth flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of Cæsar his warre in Gallia.

The second Commentary of the wars in GALLIA.

The Argument.

LIke as when a heavy body lieth upon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it cover but a small parcell of the whole surface, yet the other quarters are burthened and kept under with a proportionable measure of that weight, and through the union and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one Totality, feel the same suppression which hath really seised but upon their fellow part: In like manner the *Belgæ*, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple Continent, seemed to repine at that heavy burthen which the Roman Empire had laid upon the Province, the *Hedui*, and other States of that kingdome. And least it might in time be further removed, and laid directly upon their shoulders, they thought it expedient whilst they felt it but by participation, to gather their severall forces into one head, and try whether they could free their neighbour Nations from so grievous a yoke, or at the least keep it from coming any nearer unto themselves. And this is the Argument of this second book, which divideth it self into two parts: the first containing the wars between Cæsar & all the States of *Belgia* united together; the second recording the battels which he made with some of the States thereof in particular, as time and occasion gave him means to effect it.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar hasteth to his Army, marcheth towards the Confines of the Belgæ, and taketh in the men of Rheims.

Cæsar.

WHILE Cæsar was in his winter quarters in the higher Gallia, there came every day fresh rumours to him (the same thing being also certified by let-

ters from Labienus) that all the Belgæ, being a third part of Gallia, had leagued together against the people of Rome, and had given mutual hostages one to another. The grounds of their confederacy were these: First, they were afraid that Cæsar having settled all the rest of Gallia

in quiet, would bring his armies upon them. Secondly, they were solicited to do it by some of the Galles, such namely who as they did not desire the company of the Germans longer in Gallia, so they were very much troubled to think that the Roman army should winter and settle themselves there; and such again as levity and inconstancy prompted to seek new governments; lastly such as saw that it was an easy matter for those men that were powerfull and had the command of monies to seise upon kingdoms in Gallia, which they could not so easily do in those parts where the Romans bore sway. Cæsar being moved with letters and other intelligence to this purpose, levied two new legions in the further Gallia, and as soon as summer came on sent them by Q. Pedius his Legate into the further Gallia: and as soon as there was forrage in the fields he himself came to the army. He had before given charge to the Senones and other of the Galles that bordered upon the Belgæ, to learn every day what they could of their doings, & to give him an account thereof. These presently informed him that of a certainty there was nothing in Belgia but mustering of souldiers, and gathering their forces into one head. He thought it not therefore safe to make any further delay; but having made provision of corn, he drew out his Army from their wintering camps, and within fifteen dayes he came to the borders of the Belgæ. As soon as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for, the men of Rhemes being the uttermost of the Belgæ, next adjoining to the Celæ, thought it best to entertain a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the chief men of their State, unto Cæsar, to submit themselves and all that they had to the mercy of the Roman Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsell of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracy against the Romans. For proof whereof they were ready to give hostages, to receive them into their towns, and to furnish them with corn or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belgæ were all in Arms, and the Germans on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succour: yea their madnesse was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold back the Sueffones from that attempt being their brethren and kinsmen in blood, and using the same laws and customs as they did, having both one magistrature and one form of government; but they would needs support the same quarrell which the rest of the Belgæ had undertaken.

OBSERVATION.

I Might here take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular revolt in a generall cause; and how a confederate State may in regard of their own safety forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoever the universall society hath enacted prejudiciall to their common weal; but that I onely intend to discover warlike practices, leaving these questions of law and policy to men of greater judgement and better experience. Onely I observe in the behalf of the Roman government, that such cities as yielded to the Empire, and became tributary to their treasury (howsoever they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldom or never repented them of their fact, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that State, and of the due respect observed towards them.

Chap. II.

The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

Cæsar inquiring of the Embassadors Cæsar, which came from Rhemes what the States were that had taken Armes, and what they were able to do in winter of Warre, found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germans, who passing over the Rhene some out of mind, and finding it to be a fertile country, drove away the Galles and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these onely of all the Galles kept the Cimbri and Teutoni from entering into their country; and in that regard they challenged to themselves great authority, and vained much in their feats of Armes. Concerning their number they had these advertisements; The Bellovaci exceeded all the Belgæ in provesse, authority, and number of men, being able to make 100000 fighting men, and out of that number had promised 60000 towards this undertaking, and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. Next to them lay the Sueffones, who dwelt in a large and fruitful country, and had lately Divitiacus for their king, being the most powerfull man in all Gallia, who had in possession a great part of these countreys, and also of Britain it self. Galba was their king now, on whom, for his singular justice and prudence, generally with one consent they bestowed the management of the war. They had 12 walled towns, and promised to set forth 50000 men. The Nervii, who were the most barbarous amongst them all, and dwelt furthest off, promised

^a The country about B. avoia.

^b The country about Soulois.

^c The people about Tournay.

^d Atrebas.
^e Amiens.
^f Vermandois.
^g Terrene.
^h Liege.
ⁱ 300000.
in all.

sed as many; the d Atrebatii 15000. the e Ambiani 10000. the f Vellocausti and g Veromandui as many; the h Morini 25000. the i Menapii 9000. the j Calætes 10000. the k Aduaticii 29000. the l Eburones, Condrusi, and others 40000. Cæsar encouraging the men of Rhemes to persist in their faithfulness to the Roman Empire, propounded unto them great offers and liberall promises of recompence, and commanded all their Senate to come before him, and bring with them their Noble mens Sons to be given up for hostages: which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And having received two especiall advertisements from the men of Rhemes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: he provided for the first by persuading Divitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keep asunder the power of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might avoid the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the Marches of the Bellovaci, and sack their Territories with sword and confusion. Which Divitiacus promised to perform, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Upon the second advertisement, which presented unto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giving them battell, but first to prove by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their provesse could do, and what his own men durst do.

OBSERVATION.

THIS rule of making tryall of the worth of an enemy, hath alwayes been observed by prudent and grave commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true judgement of the event may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philolophers, which teacheth that the word non paratum, I wisit not, was never heard out of a wise mans mouth, hath any place in the course of humane actions; it ought especially to be regarded in managing these main points, whereon the State of Kingdoms and Empires dependeth. For, unlesse we be perswaded that blind Chance directeth the course of this world with an uncertain confusion, and that no foresight can sway the ballance of our hap into either part of our fortune, I see no reason why we should not by all means endeavour to ground our knowledge upon true causes, and level our proceedings to

that certainty which riseth from the things themselves. And this is the rather to be urged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an enemy with equality of number, referring their valour to betried in the battell; not considering that the eye of itself cannot discern the difference between two champions of like presence and outward carriage, unlesse it see their strength compared together and weighed as it were in the scale of triall: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to observe, before he would adventure the hazard of battell. For, besides his own satisfaction, it gave great encouragement to his men, when they saw themselves able to countermatch an enemy, and knew their task to be subject to their strength. Neither did he observe it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we find that he never encountered any enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour, to make head against them: which equality of strength being first laid as a sure foundation, he used his own industry and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as advantages to overway his adversaries; and so drew victory maugre fortune unto himself, and seldom failed in any of his battells.

Chap. III.

Cæsar passeth his Army over the river * Axona, La Disne, leaving Titurius Sabinus encamped on the other side with six cohorts.

AS soon as Cæsar understood as well Cæsar, by his discoverers, as from the men of Rhemes, that all the power of the Belgæ was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to passe his Army over the River Axona, which divided the men of Rhemes from the other Belgæ, and there encamped. Whereby he brought to passe that no enemy could come on the back of him to work any disadvantage; and that corn might be brought unto him from Rhemes and other cities without danger. And further, that he might command the passage back again, as occasion should serve, to his best advantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the river with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate to encamp himself on the other side of the river with six cohorts, commanding him to fortify his camp with a rampier of 12 foot in altitude, and a trench of 18 foot in breadth.

OBSERVATION.

IF it be demanded, why Cæsar did passe his Army over the river, leaving it on his back, and did

did not rather attend the enemy on the other side, and to take the advantage of hindring him, if he should attempt to passe over; I will set down the reasons in the sequels of this warre, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more evident. In the mean time let us enter into the particularities of these six cohorts, that we may the better judge of such troupes which were employed in the services of this war. But that we may the better conjecture what number of souldiers these six cohorts did contain, it seemeth expedient a little to discourse of the companies and regiments which the Romans used in their Armies.

And first we are to understand, that the greatest and chiefest regiment in a Roman Armie was termed by the name of *Legio*; as *Varron* saith, *quod leguntur milites in delectu*; or as *Plutarch* speaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus essent miliares*; so that it taketh the name *Legio*, of the choice and selecting of the souldiers. *Romulus* is said to be the first author and founder of these legions, making every legion to contain 3000 souldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as *Festus* recordeth, unto 4000; and afterward again from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion untill *Hannibal* came into Italy, and then it was augmented to 5000: but that proportion continued only for that time. And again, when *Scipio* went into Africa, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonia to keep the Province from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of *Cæsar* it cannot be gathered that a legion in his time did exceed the number of 5000 men, but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himself saith that in this warre in Gallia his souldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the civile warre, where he saith that in *Pompey* his Army were 110 cohorts, which amounted to the number of 55000 men; and it being manifest as well by this number of cohorts, as by the testimony of divers authours, that *Pompey* his Army consisted of 11 legions; if we divide 55000 into 11 parts, we shall find a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout being generally known to be the usual rate of a legion, the Romans always expressed the strength of their Army by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is said that *Cæsar* had eight legions; which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as necessarily attended the Army. Further we are to understand that every legion had his peculiar name, by which it was known and distinguished from the rest: and that it took either from their order of musters, or enrollement; as that legion

which was first enrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in the choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we read in this history, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *legiones Germanice, Pannonice, Britannice*, and such others: and sometime of their Generall, as *Augusta, Claudius, Vespasiana legiones*, and so forth: or to conclude, from some accident of quality, as *Rapax, Vindex, Fulminifera*, Plundering, Victorious, Lightnings, and such like. And thus much of the name and number of a legion: which I must necessarily distinguish into divers kinds of souldiers, according to the first institution of the old Romans, and the continual observation thereof unto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller parts whereof a Legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to understand that after the Consuls had made a generall choice and sworn the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of *Velites*. Their place in regard of the other souldiers was both base and dishonourable: not only because they fought afar off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forlorn hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kind, they proceeded to the choice of them which they called *Hastati*, *Hastati* a degree above the *Velites* both in age and wealth, & termed them by the name of *Hastati*, forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Javelin, which the Romans called *Hasta*; but before *Polybius* his time they used Pikes; notwithstanding their ancient name continued unto the later time of the Empire. The third choice which they made, was of the strongest and lustiest-bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called *Principes*: the rest that remain'd were named *Triarii*, as *Varron* saith, *Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur*: These were always the eldest and best-experienced men, and were placed in the third division of the battell, as the last help and refuge in all extremitie. *Polybius* saith that in his time the *Velites*, *Hastati*, and *Principes* did consist of 1200 men apiece, and the *Triarii* never exceeded the number of 600, although the generall number of a legion were augmented: whereof *Lupinus* alledgeth these reasons; First, because these *Triarii* consisted of the best of the souldiers, and so might countervail a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, they seldom came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controversy grew very doubtfull. Lastly, we may well conjecture that the voluntaries and extraordinary followers ranged themselves amongst these Tribunes, and so made the third battell equal to either of the

former: but howsoever they never exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth that in *Polybius* his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this division of their men, consisted the ground of that well-ordered discipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their yeares and ability, they reduced their whole strength into severall classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the generall composition of their whole body, every part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth was answerable to the same: and so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct in parts and properties; that from every accident which met with any part of the Army, the judgement might determine how much or how little it imported the whole body: besides the great use which they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment, a matter of no small consequence, in the excellency of their government.

The souldiers at their enrollement being thus divided according to their yeares and ability, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they divided the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, each of them into 10 companies, making of those three sorts of souldiers 30 small regiments, which they called *Manipuli*: And again, they subdivided every manipule into two equal parts, and called them *Ordines*, which was the least company in a legion, and according to the rate set down by *Polybius*, contained 60 souldiers. In every *Ordo* there was a Centurion or Captain, and a Lieutenant, whom they named *Optio* or *Tergiductor*. The maniples of the *Triarii* were much lesser then the maniples of either the *Hastati* or the *Principes*; forasmuch as their whole band consisted but of 600 men. The *Velites* were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other maniples; and therefore the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* were called *Subsignati milites*, to make a difference between them and the *Velites*, which were not divided into bands, and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that every Manipule had 40 *Velites* attending upon it. And now I come to the description of a Cohort, which the history here mentioneth.

The word *Cohors* in Latine doth signify that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house, which from the same word we call a court: and *Varron* giveth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farm house, saith he, many out-buildings joynted together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of severall maniples joynted together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for every le-

gion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these three maniples were not all of one and the same kind of souldiers, as three maniples of the *Hastati*, three of the *Principes*, and three of the *Triarii*, as *Patricius* in his *Parallels* seemeth to affirm; for so there would have remained an odd manipule in every kind, that could not have been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a manipule of the *Hastati*, a manipule of the *Principes*, and a manipule of the *Triarii*; and so all the thirty maniples were included into ten cohorts, and every cohort was as a little legion, forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of souldiers that were in a legion. So that making a legion to contain five thousand men, a cohort had five hundred; and so these six cohorts which he encamped on the other side of the river under the command of *Titinius Sabinus*, contained three thousand souldiers: but if you make a legion to consist but of four thousand two hundred, which was the more usual rate, there were two thousand five hundred and twenty souldiers in these six cohorts.

By this therefore it may appear that a legion consisted of four sorts of souldiers, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and every cohort contained three maniples, and every manipule two orders, and every order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe, and every Centurion had his *Optio*, or Lieutenant, that stood in the tail of the troupe.

When a legion stood ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy, the least body or squadron that it contained was a manipule; wherein the two orders were joynted together, making jointly ten in front, and twelve in file: and so every five files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all adventures. In the time of the Emperours, their battalions consisted of a cohort, and never exceeded that number how great soever the Army were.

Polybius distinguishing a manipule into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, known by the name of *Primus ordo*; and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, he that was present of them two commanded the whole manipule. And so we find that the Centurion of the first place was called *Prior Centurio*: in which sense *Cæsar* is to be understood, where he saith that all the Centurions of the first cohort were slain, *præter principem priorem*. From whence we gather two specialities: first, the priority between the Centurions of the same Manipule; for a cohort consisting of three Maniples, whereof the first Manipule were *Triarii*, the second *Principes*, and the third *Hastati*.

fati, and every Maniple containing two orders, and every order a Centurion, he saith that all the Centurions of this cohort were flains, saving the first or upper Centurion of the *Principes*. The second thing which I observe, is the title of the first cohort: for these ten cohorts whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthinesse; and that which was held the worthiest in the censure of the Electors, took the priority both of place and name, and was called the first cohort; the next, the second cohort; and so consequently unto the tenth and last.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of preeminence, both in imbatelling and in encamping, according either to the seniority of their inrollment, or the favour of their Generall, or their own vertue: And fo we read that in theſe wars in *Gallia* the tenth Legion had the firſt place in *Cæſar's* Army. And thus much concerning the diſtitions and ſeverall companies of a Legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the ſame.

Upon this deſcription it ſhall not be amiſſe briefly to lay open the moſt apparent commodi- ties depending upon this diſcipline; the excel- lency whereof more plainly appeareth, being compared to that order which Nature hath obſerved in the frame of her wortheſt creatures: for it is evident that ſuch works of Nature come neareſt to perfect excellency, whoſe materiall ſub- ſtance is moſt particularly diſtinguiſhed into parts, and hath every part indued with that property which beſt agreeth to his peculiar ſervice. For being thus furniſhed with diverſity of inſtruments, and theſe directed with fitting abilities, the creature muſt needs expreſſe many admirable effects, and diſcover the worth of an excellent nature: whereas thoſe other bodies that are but ſlenderly labour'd, and find leſſe favour in Nature's forge, being, as abſorbtives, or barbarouſly compoſed, wanting the diverſity both of parts and faculties, are no way capable of ſuch excellent uſes, nor fit for ſuch diſtinct ſervices, as the former that are directed with ſo many properties, & inabled with the power of ſo well-diſtinguiſh'd faculties. Which better works of Nature the *Romans* imitated in the Architecture of their Army, dividing it into ſuch neceſſary and ſerviceable parts as were beſt fitting all uſes and employ- ments; as firſt Legions, and legions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and theſe into files; wherein every man knew his place, and kept the ſame without exchange or confuſion: and thus the univerſall multitude was by order diſpoſed into parts, untill it came unto a unity. For it cannot be denied but that theſe centuries were in themſelves ſo ſenſibly diſtinguiſhed, that every ſouldier carried in his mind the particular Map of his whole century: for in imbatelling, every century was diſpoſed into five files, containing

twelve in a file; whereof the leaders were al-
ways certain, and never changed but by death or
some other speciall occasion; and everie leader
knew his follower, and every second knew the
third man, and so consequently unto the last.

Upon these particularities it plainly appeareth how easy a matter it was to reduce their troops into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flank, or flank front, when they were broken and disranked to rally them into any form, when every man knew both his own and his fellows station. If any companies were to be employed upon sudden service, the general *Orders* of the Army being so deeply imprinted in the mind of the commanders, would not suffer them to tire in taking out such convenient troops, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safety of the Army, or nature of the action. At all occasions and opportunities these principles of advantage offered themselves as ready means to put in execution any design or stratagem whatsoever: the project was no sooner resolved of, but every man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important in regard of the life and spirit of every such parts their familiarity was sweetened, or rather strengthened with the mutual acquaintance and friendship one of another; the captain marching always in the head of the troop, the ensign in the middle, and the lieutenant in the rearward, and every man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend: which bred a true and unfeigned courage, both in regard of themselves and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending upon this order were no small means to cut off all matter of civile discord, and intestine dissention: for here every man knew his place in the File, and every File knew his place in the Century, and every Century in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Army; and to every soldier had his place according to his virtues and every place gave honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall government of this age with bloodshed and murders; whereof *France* is too true a witness, as well in regard of the *French* themselves as of our *English* forces that have been sent thither to appeale their tumults: for through defect of this order, which allecteth to every man his due place, the controversy grew between Sir *William Drumme* and Sir *John Burrows*, the issue whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our Commanders in *France* have been negligent, so I may not forget to give due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the *English* troops in the service of the States in the United Provinces, where they are very curi-

ous in appointing every man his place in the File, and every File in the Troup, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reviving the *Roman* discipline.

To conclude this point, I will only touch in a word the benefit which the *Romans* found in their small battalions, and the disadvantage which we have in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied but that such troops stand better appointed for disposition and array of battels which standing strong to receive a shock, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for the principal things which are required in setting of a battell, are to order the troops, that the depth in flank may serve conveniently to withstand the assault, taking up no more men than may well serve for that purpose, and giving means to the rest to fight with the enemy: and in these two points were both their defensive and offensive considerations comprehended. But smaller troops and battalions afford this convenience better than great squadrons, which drown up many able men in the depth of their flanks, and never suffer them to appear, but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butchery of the enemy. The *Macedonian Phalanx*, as I have noted in the first book, never carried above sixteen in flank, and brought five hundred to fight in front. And these little battalions (considering them as they stood in battell ray) made as great a front or greater than that of the *Phalanx*, keeping a depth answerable to the fame; besides the second and third battell, which always were to succour them, which the *Phalanx* wanted: neither would their thick and close imbatellling admit any such succour behind them. Now if we compare the advantages and difcommodities which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds between them. These great squadrons are not feasible but in plain and open places, where they may either stand immovable, or make easy and flow motions without shaking, or disordering their body: but the lesser are a scanning for all places, champaign or woody, level or uneven, or of what site or quality soever. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battalions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interested in the disorder as the said ranks are, and hath lesse means to rally it self then any other lesser company: but if any violence chance to rout a Maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Army then that part which it taketh: Neither can the disanking of any one part betray the safety of the Army to disorder and confusion, forasmuch as their distinction served to cut off such inconveniences, and yet no way hindered the generall uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter; but I only point at it, and leave the due consideration thereof to the

judgement of our Commanders, and return to our history.

CHAP. IV.

The Belgæ attempt the surprize of * *Bibrax* : *Cæſar* * Bray in
ſendeth ſuccour unto it. the county

THere was a town called Bibrax, belonging to the state of Rhemes, about eight miles from Cæsar's camp, which the Belgæ thought to have surprised as they came along to meet with Cæsar; and suddenly assaulted it with such fury, that the townsmen could hardly hold out the first day. The Celtæ and Belgæ use one and the same manner in assaulting a town: For having beset the whole compassse of the wall with ranks of soldiers, they never cease flinging of stones untill they find the wall naked of defendants; and then casting themselves into a Tectudo, they approach to the gate and undermine the walls. Which thing was easily effected here; for so great was the number of them that threw stones and darts, that it was impossible for the defendants to abide upon the walls. Assoone as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rhemes, a man of great birth and authority in his countrey, who at that time was governour of the town, and had been before with Cæsar, to treat and conclude a Peace, sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to hold out any longer. The same night about midnight (using the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, & Slingers of the Iles of Balears to relieve the town; by meanes whereof the townsmen were put in good hope to make their party strong, and the enemy made hopelesse of winning the town: and therefore after a small stay, having depopulated their fields, and burned their villages and out-buildings, they marched with all their power towards Cæsar's Camp, and within lesse then two miles of the Army they incamped their whole host; which, as was gathered by the smoke and fire, took up more ground then eight miles in breadth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the description of their assault, we are to observe two circumstances. The first is, the manner they used in a sudden surprise: The second is, the form and quality of a *Tesfudo*. Although *Cæsar* seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a town as peculiar to the *Gallies*, yet we may not think but that the *Romans* used it as often as they had occasion to surpris any city: but be-

To take a town by surprise:

cause the *Gallies* knew no other means to take a town but this, therefore he stretch it down as peculiar unto them. The *Romans* called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, *Cingere urbem corona*, forasmuch as the souldiers inclosed the town with a circle, and so resembled a crown or garland. *Ammianus* speaketh of a triple crown of souldiers which encompassed a town: And *Josephus* telleth of *Jotapata*, which the *Romans* besieged *duplici pedum corona*, with a double circle of footmen: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen outmost of all. There is no further matter to be observed but this, that in surprising a town, they incircled it round about with thick continued ranks of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entred as they could.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The *Tessudo* requireth a larger discourse, and is lively described in *Livie* after this manner. In the *Amphitheatre*, where the people did often assemble to see strange fights and publick shews, were brought in (saith he) sixty lusty young men, who after some motion and seemly march, cast themselves into a square troupe, and roofing their heads close with their targets, the first rank which made the front of the *Tessudo*, stood up right on their feet; the second rank bowed it self somewhat lower; the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequently unto the last rank, which kneeled on the ground: and so they made a body resembling halfe the side of an house, which they called *Tessudo*. Unto this Squadron so strongly combined together came two souldiers running some an hundred and fifty foot off, and threatening each other with their weapons, ran nimbly up the side of the roof; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy that would have entred upon it, sometimes again encountering each other in the midst of it, leaped up and down as steadily as if they had been upon firm ground. And which is more strange, the front of a *Tessudo* being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men upon the said *Tessudo*, and fought in an equall height with other souldiers that stood upon the said wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the souldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, carried not their Targets over their heads as the other did, but covered their bodies with them; and so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise thrown against it, could any way hurt them; and whatsoever weight fell upon the *Tessudo*, it quickly glyded down by the declivity of the roof, without any hurt or annoiance at all.

Thus far *Livie* goeth; neither do I know

what to say further of it: the chiefeft use thereof was in a surpris or sudden attempt against a town, before the townsmen were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This invention served them to approach the wall with safety, and so either to undermine it, or to climb up: and to that end they oftentimes erected one *Tessudo* upon another. *Tacitus* saith that the souldiers climbed upon the wall *super iteratam tessudinem*, by one *Tessudo* made upon another. And this was the ancient form and use of a *Tessudo* in a sudden assault or surpris.

Dio Cassius in the acts of *Antony* saith, that being galled with the *Parthian* Archers, he commanded his whole Army to put it self into a *Tessudo*: which was so strange a fight to the *Parthians*, that they thought the *Romans* had sunk down for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horses, drew their swords to have made execution: and then the *Romans*, at a watch-word given, rose again with such a fury, that they put them all to sword and flight. *Dio* describeth the same *Tessudo* after this manner: They placed, saith he, their baggage, their light-armed men and their horsemen in the midst; and those heavy-armed footmen that carried long gutter-ailed Targets, were in the utmost circles next unto the Enemy: the rest (which bare large ovall Targets) were thronged together throughout the whole troupe, and so covered with their Targets both themselves and their fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy but a roof of Targets, which were soiled together, that men might safely go upon them.

Further, we oftentimes read that the *Romans* cast themselves into a *Tessudo*, to break through an Enemy, or to rout and dislance a troupe. And this use the *Romans* had of a *Tessudo* in field services, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a *Tessudo* in regard of the strength, for that it covered and sheltered as a shell covereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a *Tessudo*.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, we may observe how carefully *Cæsar* provided for the safety of such succours as he sent unto *Bibrax*: for he commanded the same messengers that came from the town to direct them, as the best and surest guides in that journey; least peradventure through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconveniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a war; but deriveth an extraordinary importunity to perswade the necessity of this diligence: for a Generall that hath perfectly discovered the nature of the country through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the quality of the wayes, the compendiousness of turnings, the nature of the hills,

hills, and the course of the rivers, hath all these particularities as main advantages, to give means to many severall attempts upon an enemy. And in this point *Hannibal* had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the Commanders of his time, in making use of the way by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an Army by an unknown and undiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold upon uncertain adventures, is subject to as many casualties and disadvantages as the other hath opportunities of good fortune. Let every man therefore perswade himself that good Discoverers are as the eyes of an Army, and serve for lights in the darknesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good providence, and make the path of safety so manifest, that we need not stumble upon casualties. *Cæsar* in his journey to *Ariovistus*, used the help of *Drutacius* the *Heduan*, in whom amongst all the *Gallies* he reposed greatest confidence, to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would undertake his voyage unto *Britannie*, he well informed himself by Merchants and travaylers of the quantity of the Island, the quality of the people, their use of war, and the opportunity of their havens. Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but he sent *Caius Volusenus* in a ship of war, to see what he could further discover concerning these points. *Suetonius* addeth moreover, that he never carried his Army *per insidiosa itinera* through places where they were subject to be way-laid, unless he had first well discovered the places.

Concerning the order which skilfull Leaders have observed in discoveries, we are to know that this point consisteth of two parts; the one, in understanding the perfect description of the country; the second, in observing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we find as well by this as other histories, that the *Romans* used the inhabitants of the country for Guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not erre in so important a matter: provided alwaies that their own scouts were ever abroad to understand what they could of themselves, that they might not altogether rely upon a strangers direction. The motions of the Enemy were observed by the horsemen: and these for the most part were *Veterans*, well experienced in the matter of warre, and so the Generall received found advaisements: and yet they were not too forward upon any new motion, unless they found it confirmed by divers wayes; for some *Epipals* may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the *Helium* war. If therefore the use and benefit which prudent and wise Commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought upon the ignorant, have any authority to perswade a circum-

spect care herein, this little that hath been spoken may be sufficient for this point.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

The souldiers which *Cæsar* sent to relieve *Bibrax* were Archers of *Creta* and *Numidia*, and Slingers of the *Iles Baleares*, which are now called *Majorca* and *Minorica*: which kind of weapon becaule it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceits are held up with the fury of these fiery engines, I will therefore in brief discover the nature and use thereof.

The *Latines* (saith *Isidore*) called this weapon *fundus*, quod ex ea fundantur lapides, becaule out of it stones are cast. *Plinie* attributeth the invention thereof to the *Islanders* called *Baleares*. *Florus* in his 3 book and 8 chap. saith that these *Baleares* used three sorts of slings, and no other weapon besides; and that a boy had never any meat given him before he had first struck it with a sling. *Strabo* distinguisheth these three sorts of slings which the *Baleares* used, and saith that they had one sling with long reines, which they used when they would cast as farre off; and another with short reines, which they used near at hand; and the third with reines of a mean file, to cast a reasonable distance. *Lipsius* saith that in *Colonna Antonina* at *Rome* he observed that the *Balearean* was made with one sling about his head, another about his belly, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinary manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold: the first was hemp or cotton, the second hair, and the third finewire; for of either of these stuffs they commonly made them. The form and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the middle, with an Ovall compasse, and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or reines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twice or thrice about their head, and so to cast out the bulle: *Virgil* speaking of *Mezentius* saith,

Ipse iter addita circum caput egit habere.
He stretch the rein three times about his head. But *Vegetius* preferreth that skill which cast the bulle with once turning it about the head. In *Sindus* we find that these *Baleares* did commonly cast a stone of a pound weight: which agreeth to these names in *Cæsar*, *fundus libralis*. The leaden bullets are mentioned by *Salustius*, in the warre with *Jugurth*, and by *Livie*, where he saith that the Consul provided great store of arrows, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst divers nations, as well in regard of the readinesse and easy reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bulle fled very farre, with great violence. The distance which they could easily

* Nova Eng. Jani.

The order
whi h is to
be observed
in discovery
very.

The necessity of good discovery.

easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse.

Lib. 8.

Fundū Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda. Fundum according to Varro is so much ground as a man may sling over. Which *Vegetius* interpreteth to be six hundred foot. Their violence was such, as the same authour affirmeth in his first book and sixteenth chap. that neither helmets, gat erdine, nor corselet could bear out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slain *sine invidia sanguinis*, as he saith in the same place. *Lucreece*, *Ovid*, and *Lucan*, three of the Latine Poets say, that a bullet skillfully cast out of a sling went with such violence, that it melted as it flew: whereof *Seneca* giveth this reason, Motion, saith he, doth extenuate the ayre, and that extenuation or subtilty doth inflame; and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoever, *Diodorus Siculus* affirmeth that these *Balearean* slingers brake both target, head-piece, or any other armour whatsoever.

Lib. 8. de
nat. quat.

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by *Livy*, and the other by *Vegetius*. That in *Livy* is called *Castrophendo*, which cast a short arrow with a long thick head: the other in *Vegetius* is called *Fustibalis*, which was a sling made of a cord and a staffe. But let this suffice for slings and slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light-armed souldiers, and used chiefly in assaulting, and defending towns and fortresses, where the heavy-armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Harquebusiers, which in their proper nature are *levis armatura milites* light-armed souldiers, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

Chap. V.

Cæsar confronteth the Belgæ in form of battell, but without any blow given: the Belgæ attempt the passing of the river *Axona*; but in vain, and to their losse: they consult of breaking up the war.

Cæsar.

Cæsar at the first resolved not to give them battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the generall fame and opinion conceived of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his own men durst do. And when he found that his own men were nothing inferior to the Belgæ, he chose a convenient place before his camp, and put his Army in battell: the bank where he was encamped rising somewhat from a plain levell, was no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steep, and the front rose a slope by little and little, untill it came again to a plain, where the legions were imbatellled. And lest the enemy abounding in multitude, should circumvent his

men and charge them in the flank as they were fighting, (which they might easily do with their number) he drew an overthwart ditch behind his Army from one side of the hill to the other, six hundred paces in length; the ends whereof he fortified with bulwarks, and placed therein store of engines. And leaving in his Camp the two legions which he had last enrolled in Lombardy, that they might be ready to be drawn forth when there should need any succour, he imbatellled his other six legions in the front of the hill, before his Camp. The Belgæ also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There lay between both the Armies a small Marsh: over which the enemy expected that *Cæsar* should have passed, and *Cæsar* on the other side attended to see if the Belgæ would come over, that his men might have charged them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Cavalry on both sides encountered between the two battells: and after long expectation on either side, neither party adventuring to passe over, *Cæsar* having got the better in the skirmish between the horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his own men, and the contesting of so great an Army, and therefore he conveyed all his men again into their Camp. From that place the enemy immediately took his way to the River *Axona*, which lay behind the Romans Camp: and there finding fords, they attempted to passe over part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortress which *Q. Titurius* kept, or break down the bridge, or spoile the territories of the State of *Rhemes*, and cut off the Romans from provision of corne. *Cæsar* having advertisement thereof from *Titurius*, transported over the river by the bridge all his horsemen, and light-armed Numidians, with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himself. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them; the rest like desperate persons, adventuring to passe over upon the dead carcases of their fellows, were beaten back by force of weapons: and the horsemen incompassed such as had first got over the water, and slew every man of them.

When the Belgæ perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes of winning *Bibrax*, of passing the River, and of araving the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their own provisions began to fail them; they called a council of war, wherein they resolved that it was

best

best for the State in generall, and for every man in particular, to break up their Camp, and to return home unto their own houses: and into whose confines or territories soever the Romans should first enter, to depopulate and wast them in hostile manner, that thither they should hasten from all parts, and there give them battell; to the end they might rather try the matter in their own country, then abroad in a strange and unknown place, and have their own household provision alwayes at hand to maintain them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that *Divitiacus* with a great power of the *Ædui* approached near to the borders of the *Bellovac*; who in that regard made hast homeward to defend their country.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First we may observe the Art which he used to countervail the strength of so great a multitude, by chusing out to convenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battell: and having both the sides of the hill to steep, that the enemy could not ascend nor climb up, but to their own overthrow; he made the back-part of the hill strong by Art, and so placed his souldiers as it were in the gate of a fortress, where they might either issue out or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred security and safety before the vain opinion of fool-hardy resolutions, which favourerth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisdom: for he ever thought it great gain to loose nothing; and the day brought alwayes good fortune, that delivered up the Army safe unto the evening; attending untill advantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet *Cæsar* was never thought a coward.

And now it appeareth what use he made by passing his Army over the river, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather then on the side of the State of *Rhemes*: for by that means he brought to passe, that whatsoever the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the land, his forces were ready to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of *Bibrax*: and yet notwithstanding he lost not the opportunity of making slaughter of them as they passed over the river. For by the benefit of the bridge which he had fortified, he transported what forces he would, to make head against them as they passed over; and so he took what advantage either side of the river could afford him.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

And here the Reader may not marvell, if when the hills are in labour, they bring forth but a

moule; for how soon is the courage of this huge Army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? but being hastily carried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed upon the sight of an enemy: which is no strange effect of a sudden humour. For as in Nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durability or lasting qualitie of all actions proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the mind that are carried with an untemperate violence, and favour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away even with the smoak thereof; and bring forth nothing but leafurable repentance. And therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualify their hasty resolutions with a mistrustfull lingering; that when their judgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedy execution.

But that which most bewrayeth their indiscreet intemperance in the hot pursuit of this enterprise is, that before they had scarce seen the enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open field, their victuals began to fail them: for their minds were so carried away with the conceit of war, that they had no leisure to provide such necessities as are the strength and finew of the war. It was sufficient for every particular man to be known for a souldier in so honourable an action, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States in like manner thought it enough to furnish out forty or fifty thousand men apiece, to discharge their oath, and to save their hostages, committing other requirites to the generall care of the confederacy: which being directed by as unskillfull governours, never looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to overthrow the Roman Empire. And thus each man relied upon anothers care, and satisfied himself with the present garbe. So many men of all sorts and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation what State should seem in greatest forwardness, were motives sufficient to induce every man to go, without further inquiry how they should go. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to be seen, considering the weakness of particular judgements, that having the lives of so many men depending altogether upon his providence, and engaged in the defence of their State and country, he do not fail in these main points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designs. To conclude this point, let us learn by their error so to carry a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling it, then it was before we first took it to our charge; as it here happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other end, then to give *Cæsar* just occasion to make war upon them with such

H assu-

Observations upon Cæsars

assurance of victory, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood meet with the like strength again, in the continuance of that war. And this was not only *gravius bellum successorum traderet*, to leave a more considerable war unto his successors, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued war; but to draw a dangerous war upon their heads that otherwise might have lived in peace.

Chap. VI.

The Belge break up their Camp, and as they return home, are chased and slaughtered by the Romans.

Cæsar,

His generall resolution being entertained by the consent of the whole council of warre, in the second watch they departed out of their camp with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or government, every man pressing to be foremost on his journey, and to be first at home: in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof Cæsar having notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his Camp. In the dawning of the day, upon certain intelligence of their departure, he sent first his horsemen under Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta two Legates, to stay the reeward, commanding Labienus to follow after with three legions: these overtaking the Belge, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And while the reeward staid, and valiantly received the charge of the Romans, the vanguard being out of danger, and under no government, as soon as they heard the alarm behind them, brake out of their ranks and betook themselves to flight: and so the Romans slew them as long as the sun gave them light to pursue them; and then sounding a retreat, they returned to their Camp.

OBSERVATION.

It hath been an old rule amongst souldiers, That a great and negligent error committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to treachery. We read of *Fulvius* a Legate in the Roman Army lying in *Tuscane*; The Consul being gone to *Rome* to perform some publick duty, the *Tuscans* took occasion by his absence to try whether they could draw the *Romans* into any inconvenience; and placing an ambuscado near unto their camp, sent certain souldiers attired like shepherds, with droves of cattell to passe in view of the Roman Army: who handled the matter so, that they came even to the rampier of the camp. Whereat the Legate wondering as at

a thing void of reason, kept himself quiet untill he had discovered their treachery, and so made frustrate their intent. In like manner Cæsar not perswaded that men should be so heedlesse, to carry a retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not discamp his men to take the opportunity of that advantage, untill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was unlikely. And thus 308000 Belge were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romans, for want of government and order in their departure.

Chap. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belge into the Countrey of the Sueffones; and there besiegeth Noviodunum. * Noyon. * Cæsar.

He next day after their departure, before they could recover themselves of their fear and flight, or had time to put themselves again in breath, Cæsar, as it were continuing still the chase and victory, led his Army into the countrey of the Sueffones, the next borderers unto the men of Rhemes: and after a long journey came unto Noviodunum a town of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed along by it. For he understood that it was altogether unfurnished of defensive provision, having no forces within to defend it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore having fortified his camp, he began to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Sueffones, that had escaped by flight, were received into the town: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought unto the wall, the mount raised, and the turrets built, the Galles being amazed at the highnesse of the workes, such as they had never seen nor heard of before, and the speed which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to treat of giving up the town; and by the mediation of the men of Rhemes obtained their suit.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

In this relation we may observe the industrious art which the Romans used in assaulting, & taking holdes & towns; wherein we find three sorts of engines described, *Vinea*, *Agger*, and *Turres*.

Vinea is thus described by *Vegetius*: A little strong-built house or hovell, made of light wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the roof was supported with divers pillars of a foot square, whereof the foremost were eight foot high, and the hindmost six, and between every one of these pillars there was five foot distance. It was alwayes made with a double roof, the first or lower roof was of thick planks, and the upper

Lib. 4.
A Vinea or
Vine de
fortified.

per roof of hurdles, to break the force of a weight without further shaking or disjoining the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the souldiers that were under it: the whole length was about sixteen foot, and the breadth seven, the upper roof was commonly covered with green or raw hides, to keep it from burning. Many of these hovels were joynted together in rank, when they went about to undermine a wall: the higher end was put next unto the wall, that all the weights which were thrown upon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the four sides and groundfils had in every corner a wheel, and by them they were driven to any place as occasion served. The chiefest use of them was to cover and defend the souldiers, as they undermined or overthrew a wall. This engine was called *Vinea*, which significth a Vine, for it sheltered such as were under the roof thereof, as a Vine covereth the place where it groweth.

Agger or mount.

Aggers, which we call a mount, is described in divers histories to be a hill or elevation made of earth and other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, untill it approached near unto the place against which it was built; that upon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an advantage of height. The matter of this mount was earth and stones, faggots and timber. *Josephus* saith that at the siege of *Jerusalem* the *Romans* cut down all the trees within 11 mile compass, for matter and stuff to make a mount. The sides of this *Agger* were of Timber, to keep in the loose matter: the forefront which was towards the place of service, was open without any timber-work; for on that part they still raised it, and brought it nearer the walls. That which was built at *Masfita* was 80 foot high, and that at *Avaricum* 80 foot high and 30 foot broad. *Josephus* and *Egeffippus* write that there was a fortress in *Judea* 300 cubites high: which *Sulla* purposing to win by assault, raised a mount 200 cubites high; and upon it he built a castle of stone 50 cubites high, and fifty cubites broad; and upon the said castle he erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, and so took the fortress. The *Romans* oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a haven, and commonly to over-top a town, that so they might fight with much advantage.

Towers or Turrets described.

Amongst other engines in use amongst the *Romans*, their moveable Turrets were very famous: for they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with wheels put under them were driven to the walls of the town. These turrets were of two sorts, either great or little: the lesser sort are described by *Virginius* to be fixtie cubites high, and the square side seventeen cubites; the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the breadth at the base, and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner

pillars were at the base nine inches square, and six inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, and windowes in every story. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the square side 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the base; and in every one of these were commonly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept between the stories; for the lowest commonly was 7 cubites and 12 inches high, the highest story 5 cubites, and the rest 4 cubites and a third. In every one of these stories were souldiers and engines, ladders and casting bridges, by which they got upon the wall and entered the town. The forefront of these turrets was covered with iron and wet coverings, to save them from fire. The souldiers that removed the tower to and fro, were always within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-work by Broken-wharfe in *London* much resembleth one of these towers.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

UPON the building of these mighty engines, it was no marvell if the *Suetonies* submitted themselves to such powerful industry. For whatsoever is strange and unusual, doth much affright the spirits of an enemy, & breed a motion of distrust & diffidence, whenas they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practises: for novelty alwayes breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes being unknown, we apprehend it as diverse from the usual course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangeness thereof: and wonder, as it addeth worth to the noveltie, so it inferreth diffidence, and so consequently fear, the utter enemy of martiall valour.

Chap. VIII.


Cæsar carrieth his Army to the Territories of the *Bellovacii*, *Ambiani* and the *Nervi*.

Cæsar taking for pledges the chiefest of their Citie, and amongst the rest king *Galba's* own two sons, upon the delivery of all their Armes received the *Suetonies* to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the *Bellovacii*; who having conveyed both themselves and their goods into the town called *Bratupantium*, and understanding that *Cæsar* was come within five mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying by the stretching forth of their hands, and by their suppliant words, that they yielded themselves up to *Cæsar's* disposal, and would no longer bear armes against the people of *Rome*. And so again when he was come near the town, and had there set down his army, the very boyes and women appearing upon the walls with extended hands (as their custome is) besought

Cæsar.

The Bellovacii taken to mercy.

H 2



CÆSARS march where in every Legion had his Cariadges in front.

Observations upon Cæsars

sought peace of the Romans. For these Divitiacus became a mediator, who after the Belgæ had broken up their Camp, had dismissed his Heduan forces and was returned to Cæsar. The Hedui, saith he, have alwayes found in the Bellovaci a faithfull and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not been betrayed by their nobility (who made them believe that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Romans, and suffered all villany and despite at their hands) they had never withdrawn themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romans. The authors of this counsel perceiving into what great misery they had brought their countrey, were fled into Britanie: wherefore not only the Bellovaci, but the Hedui also in their behalf besought him to use his clemency towards them. Which thing if he did, it would very much greaten the esteem & authority of the Hedui amongst the Belgæ, who formerly in their wars had recourse to them for supplies and assistance. Cæsar, in regard of the Hedui and Divitiacus, promised to receive them to mercy; but forasmuch as the State was very great, and more populous and powerfull then other towns of the Belgæ, he demanded six hundred hostages. Which being delivered and their armour brought out of the town, he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani: who without further lingering, gave both themselves and all that they had into his power. Upon these bordered the Nervii; of whom Cæsar found thus much by inquiry, That there was no recourse of Merchants unto them, neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their countrey: for they were persuaded that by such things their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Further, he learned that these Nervii were a savage people, and of great valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgæ for yielding their necks to the Roman yoke, openly affirming that they would neither send Embassadors, nor take peace upon any condition.


Cæsar having marched three dayes journey in their countrey, understood that the river Sabis was not past ten miles from his camp; and that on the further side of this river all the Nervii were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the Romans. With them were joyned the Atrebatæ and Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides they expected a power from the Aduatici. The women

and such as were unfit for the field, they bestowed in a place inaccessible for any Army, by reason of fens and bogs and marshes. Upon this intelligence, Cæsar sent his discoverers and Centurions before to chuse out a fit place to encamp in.

Now whereas many of the surrendered Belgæ and other Gallies were continually in the Roman Army, certain of these (as it was afterward known by the captives) observing the order which the Romans used in marching, came by night to the Nervii, and told them that between every legion went a great sort of carriages; and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soon as the first legion was come into the camp, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set upon them upon a suddain before they were disburdened of their carriages, and so to overthrow them: which legion being cut off and their stuffe taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this advice, that forasmuch as the Nervii were not able to make any power of horse, but what they did they were wont to do with foot, that they might the better resist the cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any rode into their marches, their manner was to cut young trees half asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thorns and briars planed between them they made them so thick, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them: so that when by this occasion the passage of the Roman Army must needs be hindered, the Nervii thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The place which the Romans chose to encamp in was a hill of like levell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the river Sabis: and with the like levell on the other side rose another hill directly against this, to the quantity of two hundred paces; the bottome whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the Nervians kept themselves close: and in the open ground, by the river side, were only seen a few troupes of horse, and the river in that place was about three foot deep.

Cæsar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power. But the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Nervii: for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand, Cæsar (as his custome was) led



CÆSARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand

led six legions alwayes in a readinesse, without burthen or carriage of any thing but their Armes: after them he placed the baggage of the whole Army. And the two legions which were last inrolled, were a reeward to the Army, and guarded the stuffe.

OBSERVATION.

THis treacherous practice of the surrendered *Belga* hath fortunately discovered the manner of *Cæsar's* march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carriage of a march, by this circumstance it may be gathered that *Cæsar* principally respected safety, and secondly conveniency. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of hostility, he was content in regard of conveniency, to suffer every legion to have the oversight of their particular carriages, and to insert them among the troupes, that every man might have at hand such necessaries as were requisite, either for their private use or publick discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy, he then omitted convenient disposition in regard of particular use, as disadvantageous to their safety; and carried his legions in that readinesse, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march or incumbrance of their carriages, receive the charge in that form of battell as was best approved by their military rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitors.

The old *Romans* observed likewise the same respects: for in unsafe and suspected places they carried their troupes *agmine quadrato*, in a square march, which, as *Livie* seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments which might hinder them in any suddain alarme. Neither doth that of *Hirtius* any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith that *Cæsar* so disposed his troupes against the *Bellovacis*, that three legions marched in front, and after them came all the carriages, to which the tenth legion served as a reeward; and so they marched *pene agmine quadrato* almost in a square march. *Seneca* in like manner noteth the safety of *agmen quadratum*, where he saith that where an enemy is expected, we ought to march *agmine quadrato* ready to fight. The most materiall consequence of these places alledged is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their usuall manner of imbatrelling; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratum* or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the

same disposition of parts as were observed in *quadrata Acie*, in a square body. For that triple forme of imbatelling which the *Romans* generally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each battell, contained almost an equall dimension of front and file: and so it made *Acie quadratam* a square body; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum* a square march.

Polybius expresseth the same in effect, as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the carriages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the country was plain and champain, and gave space and free scope to clear themselves, upon any accident the *Romans* marched in a triple battell of equall distance one behind another, every battell having his severall carriages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselves according to the opportunity of the place either to the right or left hand; and so placing their carriages on the one side of their Army, they stood imbatelled ready to receive the charge.

The contrary form of marching, where the place afforded more security, and gave scope to conveniency, they named *agmen longum* a long march or train; when almost every manipule or order had their severall carriages attending upon them, and strove to keep that way which they found most easy both for themselves and their impediments. Which order of march as it was more commodious then the former in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous where the enemy was expected: and therefore *Cæsar* much blamed *Sabinus* and *Cotta* for marching, when they were deluded by *Ambiorix*, *longissimo agmine* in a very long train; as though they had received their advertisements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

And albeit our modern wars are farre different in quality from them of ancient times, yet in this point of discipline they cannot have a more perfect direction then that which the *Romans* observed, as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Conveniency: whereof the first dependeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken then that manner of imbatelling, which shall be thought most convenient if an enemy were pretent to confront them? for a well-ordered march must either carry the perfect forme of a battell, or contain the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfection of strength which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore a prudent and circumspect Leader, that desired to frame a strong and

The manner of the Roman march.

The two respects which Cæsar had in ordering a march.
1. Safety.
2. Conveniency.

Agmen quadratum.

* Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.

* 60. Epil.

Agmen longum.

Lib. 5. de bello Gall.

The use that may be made of this, in our modern wars.

Observations upon Cæsars

orderly march, is diligently to observe the nature and use of each weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest use and advantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequently inter the best and exactest disposition of imbatellings, as the said forces are capable of; which, if it may be observed in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactness of imbatelling will not admit convenient carriage of such necessary adjuncts as pertain to an Army, the inconvenience is to be relieved with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgement shall be found expedient; that albeit the form be somewhat changed, yet the principles and grounds, wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplify the practices of many great and experienced commanders, what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Army the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their severall judgements thought most expedient in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that observed this rule before prescribed, did seldom miscarry through an unsafe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper use in that diversity of weapons in his Army, how they are serviceable or disadvantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy; and he will speedily order his battel, dispose of his march, and bestow his carriages, as shall best fall out both for his safety and convenience.

Cæsars custom was to send his Cavalry and light-armed footmen before the body of his Army, both to discover and impeach an Enemy; for these troops were nimble in motion and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the rereward than in the front, the horsemen marched in the tail of the Army, and gave security where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in *Africa* against the *Numidians*; he then removed them as he best found it convenient, and brought his legionary souldiers, which were the linews and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the hulk of the Army, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antique prescription and uniformity of custom, according as he found himself best able to disadvantage an Enemy, or make way to victory.

Chap. IX.

The Romans begin to fortify their camp: but are

interrupted by the Nervii. Cæsar maketh hast to prepare his forces to battell.

HHe Roman horsemen, with the sling-ers and archers, passed over the river, and encountred the Cavalry of the Enemy: who at first retired back to their companies in the wood, and from thence sallied out again upon them; but the Romans durst not pursue them further then the plain and open ground. In the mean time the six legions that were in front, having their work measured out unto them, began to fortify their camp. But as soon as the Nervii perceived their former carriages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imbatelled within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen: which being easily beaten back, the Nervii ran down to the river with such an incredible swiftnesse, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods, at the river, and charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence having passed the river, they ran up the hill to the Roman camp, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Cæsar had all parts to play at one instant: the flag to be hung out, by which they gave the souldiers warning to take Arms, the battel to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the souldiers to be recalled from their work, and such as were gone farre off to get turf and matter for the rampier, to be sent for, the battel to be ordered, his men to be incouraged, and the sign of battel to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortnesse of time, and the sudden assaults of the Enemy.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.


AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes, so especially in their camp-discipline they strove to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academy, or a City of civile government, then a camp of souldiers; so carefull were they both for the safety, and skillfull experience of their men at Arms. For touching the first, they never suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a camp, wherein they were inclosed with ditch and rampier, as in a walled town: neither was it any new invention or late found out custom in their State, but in use amongst the ancient Romans, and in the time of their kings. Their manner of encamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centurions that went before to chuse out a convenient place, having found a fit situation

The Centurions made choice of place

Porta Prætoria

THE ROMAINE CAMPE



Principia

Prætorium

Principia

Quintana

Quintana

Porta Decumana

tion for their camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperours pavilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the camp; from whence he might easily overview all the other parts, or any alarme or *signum pugnae* might from thence be discovered to all quarters. This pavilion was known by the name of *Prætorium*, for as much as amongst the ancient Romans the Generall of their Army was called *Prætor*. In this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they stuck up a white ensign, and from it they measured every way a hundred foot, and so they made a square containing two hundred foot in every side; the Area or content whereof was almost an acre of ground: the form of the *Prætorium* was round and high, being as eminent among the other tents, as a Temple is amongst the private buildings of a City; and therefore *Josephus* compareth it to a Church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or chair of the estate, and the place of divination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of majesty and authority.

The Generals tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the pavilion lay most commodious for forage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions, every legion divided one from another by a street or lane of fifty foot in breadth; and according to the degree of honour that every legion had in the Army, so were they lodged in the camp, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towards the sides which was of meaner reputation. And again, according to the place of every cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pavilion of the Emperour, towards the heart of the camp; and so consequently every maniple took place in the cohort, distinguishing their preeminence by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outwards, according as they distinguished the place of their legions. There went a street of fifty in breadth overthwart the midst of all the legions, which was called *Quintana*, for that it divided the fifth cohort of every legion from the sixth.

Between the tents of the first maniples in every legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a way of a hundred foot in breadth throughout the whole camp, which was called *Principia*; in this place the Tribunes sat to hear matters of justice, the souldiers exercised themselves at their weapons, and the leaders and chief commanders frequented it as a public place of meeting; and it was held for a reverent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperours pavilion, in a direct line to make even and straight the upper side of the *Principia*, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched, every Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: above them, towards the head of the camp, were the Legates and Treasurer: the

upper part of the camp was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Army.

Polybius describing the manner of encamping which the Romans used in his time, whenas they had commonly but two legions in their Army, with as many associates, placeth the *Abletti* and *Extraordinarii*, which were select bands and companies, in the upper part of the camp, and the associates on the outside of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier that compassed the whole camp about, was two hundred foot distant from any tent: whereof *Polybius* giveth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the camp in battell array, might there dissolve themselves into maniples, centuries and decuries, without tumult or confusion; for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And again, if occasion were offered to fall out upon an Enemy, they might very conveniently in that spacious room put themselves into companies and troupes: and if they were assaulted in the night, the darts and fire-works which the Enemy should cast into their camp, would little indamage them, by reason of the distance between the rampier and the tents.

Their tents were all of skins and hides, held up with props, and fastened with ropes: there were eleven souldiers, as *Vegetius* saith, in every tent, and that society was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chieft was named *Decanus*, or *Capitaneus*.

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions, every maniple having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his Century; the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: the souldiers being girt with their swords and daggers, digged the ditch about the camp, which was alwayes eight foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not far off, the ditch was alwayes eleven or fifteen or eighteen foot in latitude and altitude, according to the discretion of the Generall: but what scantling soever was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in height, and sometimes four, made after the manner of a wall, with green turfs cut all to one measure, half a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place wherein they were incamped would afford no such turfs, they then strengthened the loose earth which was cast out of the ditch with boughs and faggots, that it might be strong and well-fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung

The *Prætorium*.

The lodging of the legions.

Quintana.

Principia.

The tents of the Tribunes.

The space between the tents and the rampier.

The ditch and the rampier.

Agger. 1 over

over the ditch, they used to stick with thick and sharp stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firm; and these for the most part were forked stakes; which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. *Varron* saith that the front of the rampier thus stuck with stakes, was called *vallum a varicando*, for that no man could stride or get over it.

Vallum.

Prætorii porta.

The camp had four gates: the first was called *prætorii porta*, which was always behind the Emperours tent; and this gate did usually look either toward the east, or to the Enemy, or that way that the Army was to march. The gate on the other side of the camp opposite to this, was called *Porta Decumana*, *a decimis cohortibus*; for the tenth or last Cohort of every legion was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the souldiers went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this way their offenders were carried to execution. The other two gates were called *Portæ principales*, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected place which they called *principis*, only distinguished by these titles, *leva principalis* and *dextra*, the left and the right-hand principall gate. All these gates were shut with doors, and in standing Camps fortified with Turrets, upon which were planted Engines of defence, as *Balistas*, *Catapultæ*, *Tormentæ*, and such like.

Castra æstiva.

The Romans had their summer Camps, which they termed *Æstiva*, and their winter Camps, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*. Their summer camps were in like manner distinguished, according to the time which they continued in them. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called them *Castra* or *Mansiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called them *Æstiva* or *Sedes*. And these were more absolute, as well in regard of their tents, as of their fortifications, then the former wherein they stayed but one night. The other which they called *Hiberna* had great labour and cost bestowed upon them, that they might the better defend them from the winter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, and that they had their armory, hospital, and other publick houles. These camps have been the beginning of many famous towns, especially when they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did, upon the banks of *Euphrates*, *Danov*, and the *Rhene*. The order which they always observed in laying out their Camp was to uniform, and well known to the Romans, that when the Centurions had limited out every part, and marked it with different enignes and colours, the Souldiers entered into it as into a known and familiar City; wherein every society or small contubernie knew the place of his lodging: and which is more, every particular man could assign the pro-

per station of every company throughout the whole Army.

The use and commodity of this incamping I have briefly touched in my first book: but if I were worthy any way to commend the excellency thereof to our modern Souldiers, or able by perswasion to reestablish the use of incamping in our wars, I would spare no pains to achieve so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, then if myself had compassed a new-found-out means: and yet reason would deem it a matter of small difficulty, to gain a point of such worth in the opinion of our men, especially when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our leaders, majesty to our Armies, and terror to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victory to our nation. But sith hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vain-glory and fool-hardiness, contempt of vertue and denision of good discipline, to repugne the designs of honour and so far to overmaster reason, that it suffereth not former harms to bear witness against error, nor correct the ill achievements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to urge this point any further, I will leave it to the carefull respect of the wise.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE fury of the Enemy and their sudden assault disturbed the ceremonies which the Roman discipline observed, to make the Souldiers continually apprehend the weight and importance of that action, which might cast upon their state either sovereignty or bondage, that they were all for the most part omitted: notwithstanding they are here noted under these titles; the first was *vexillum proponendum*, quod erat *insigne cum ad Arma concurrere oporteret*, the hanging out the flag, which was the sign for betaking themselves to their arms: for when the Generall had determined to fight, he caused a skarlet coat or red flag to be hung out upon the top of his tent, that by it the Souldiers might be warned to prepare themselves for the battel; and this was the first warning they had; which by a silent aspect presented blood and execution to their eyes, as the only means to work out their own safety, and purchase eternall honour. The second was *Signum tubæ dandum*, the proclaiming the battel by sound of trumpet: this warning was a noise of many trumpets, which they termed by the name of *classium a calando*, which signifieth calling; for after the eye was filled with *species* suitable to the matter intended, they then halted to possess the care, and by the sense of hearing to stir up warlike motions, and fill them with resolute thoughts, that no dissident or base conceits might take hold of their mindes. The third was *miles cohortandi*, the encouraging of the souldiers.

diers: for it was thought convenient to confirm this valour with motives of reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions. The use and benefit whereof I somewhat enlarged in the *Helvetian* war, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, if my speech might carry credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or be thought worthy regard to men so much addicted to their own fashions. The last was *signum dandum*, the sign giving; which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselves from their enemies. *Hirtius* in the war of *Africk* saith, that *Cæsar* gave the word *Felicitas*; *Brutus* and *Cassius* gave *Liberty*; others have given *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, and such like words, as might be ominous to a good success.

Besides these particularities, the manner of their delivery gave a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times and cues; whereof *Cæsar* now complaineth, that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controversy, there is no matter of such consequence in it self, but may be much graced with ceremonies and complements, which like officers or attendants add much respect and majesty to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner and of lesse regard.

CHAP. X.

The battel between Cæsar and the Nervii.

Cæsar.

IN these difficulties two things were a help to the Romans: the one was the knowledge and experience of the souldiers; for by reason of their practice in former battels, they could as well prescribe unto themselves what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding *Cæsar* had given commandment to every Legate, not to leave the work or forsake the legions untill the fortifications were perfected; yet when they saw extremity of danger, they attended no countermand from *Cæsar*, but ordered all things as it seemed best to their own discretion. *Cæsar* having commanded such things as he thought necessary, ran hastily to encourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion; where he used no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, have courageous hearts, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And forasmuch as the enemy was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to encounter them, he gave them the sign of battel: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them

And therefore I rather take it to be something else than a word.

already closed and at the encounter. For the time was so short and the enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their head-pieces, or to uncase their targets: so that what part they lighted into from their work, or what ensign they first met withall, there they stayed; least in seeking out their own companies, they should lose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Army being embattled rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, and the brevity of time, then according to the rules of art; as the legions encountered the enemy in divers places at once, the perfect view of the battel being hindered by those thick hedges before spoken of, there could no succours be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needfull to be done: and therefore in so great uncertainty of things, there happened divers casualties of fortune.

The souldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their pikes with the advantage of the hill, did drive the *Atrebatæ*, breathless with running and wounded in the encounter, down into the river; and as they passed over the water, slew many of them with their swords. Neither did they stick to follow after them over the river, and adventure into a place of disadvantage, where the battel being renewed again by the Enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like manner two other legions, the eleventh and the eighth having put the *Vetomandui* from the upper ground, fought with them upon the banks of the river; and so the front and the left part of the camp was well-near left naked. For in the right corner were the twelfth and seventh legions, whereas all the Nervii, under the conduct of *Bo-duognatus*, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possess themselves of the highest part of the camp.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light-armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the Enemy, as they were entering into the camp, met with their enemies in the face, and so were driven to fly out another way. In like manner the pages, and souldiers boys, that from the *Decumane* port and top of the hill had seen the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit over the river, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemy in their camp, betook them to their heels as fast as they could. At the same time rose a great

I hub-

hubbub and outcry of those that came along with the carriages, who being extremely troubled and dismayed at the business, ran some one way and some another. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treviri (who for their prowess were reputed singular amongst the Gallies, and were sent thither by their State to aid the Romans) first when they perceived the Roman camp to be possessed by a great multitude of the Enemy, the legions to be overcharged and almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidianians to be dispersed and fled, that without any further expectation they took their way homeward, and reported to their State that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and that the Enemy had taken their carriages.

Cæsar departing from the tenth legion to the right corner, finding his men exceedingly overcharged the ensignes crowded together into one place, and the souldiers of the twelfth legion so thick thronged on a heap, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slain, the ensign-bearer killed, and the ensign taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grievously wounded that he could scarce stand upon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning tail and forsaking the field; the Enemy on the other side giving no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any means or succour to relieve them; he took a target from one of the hindmost souldiers, (for he himself was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battle, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be advanced toward the enemy, and the Maniples to be enlarged, that they might with greater facility and readinesse use their swords.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

This Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefeſt Centurion of the twelfth legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarii that was of the first Cohort in that legion: for that place was the greatest dignity that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipilis*, or simply *Primipilus*, and sometimes *Primipilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly pushed

the mandates and edicts of the Emperour and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions at all times had an eye unto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensign of every legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignity without speciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of divers Authours. We read farther, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribuneship was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding there was a law made, I know not upon what occasions, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of *P. S. Baculus*.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

AND here I may not omit to give the Target the Target any honour I may: and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in *Cæsars* hand, as in the place of greatest dignity, and much honouring the excellency thereof. *Polybius* maketh the Target to contain two foot and an half in breadth, overthwart the convex surface thereof, and the length four foot, of what form or fashion soever they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Targets amongst their legionaries; the first carried the proportion of that figure which the Geometricians call *Ovals*, a figure of an unequal latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the ends like unto an egge, descried in *plano*: the other sort was of an equal latitude, and resembled the fashion of a gutter-tile, and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made was a double board, one fattened upon another with lint and Bulls glew, and covered with an Ox hide, or some other stiffe leather; the upper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keep it from cleaving; and in the midst there was a bolle of iron or brasse, which they called *Umbo*. *Romulus* brought them in first among the Romans, taking the use of them from the *Sabines*. The wood whereof they were made was for the most part either fallow, alder, or fig-tree: whereof *Plinie* giveth this reason; forasmuch as these trees are cold and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made upon the wood, was presently contracted and shut up again. But forasmuch as the Target was of such reputation among the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatnesse of their Empire, let us enter a little into the consideration of the use & commoditie thereof; which cannot be better understood then by that comparison which *Polybius* hath made between the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I have thought good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons.

I Promised in my sixth booke that I would make a comparison between the weapons of the Romans and Macedonians: and that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies, how they do differ one from another; and in what regard the one or the other were either inferior or superiour: which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And forasmuch as the Armies of the Macedonians have given so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by overcoming the Armies as well of *Asia* as of *Greece*, and that the battels of the Romans have conquered as well those of *Africa*, as all the Eastern countries of *Europe*; it shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times have not once, but many times seen triall both of their battels and forces: that knowing the reason why the Romans do overcome, and in their battel carry away the better, we do not as vain men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason happy victours; but rather looking into the true causes, we give them their due praises, according to the direction of reason and sound judgement. Concerning the battels between *Hannibal* and the Romans, and concerning the Romans losses, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexterity and industry of *Hannibal*. But we have intreated thereof when we made mention of the battels themselves; and the end it self of that warre doth especially confirm this our opinion: for when they had gotten a Captain equall with *Hannibal*, even consequently he with all his victories vanished. And he had no sooner overcome the Romans, but by and by rejecting his own weapons, he trayned his Army to their weapons: and so taking them up in the beginning, he continued them on unto the end.

And *Pyrrhus* in his war against the Romans did use both their weapons and order, & made as it were a medly both of the cohort and phalanx: but notwithstanding it served him not to get the victory, but always the event by some means or other made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not unfit that I should say something, least in being altogether silent, it might seem to prejudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it have the disposition and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose it self against it, or to sustain the violence thereof; as may easily by many documents be approved. For when an armed man doth stand firm in the space of three foot in so thick an array of battel, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis or scantling sixteen

foot, but according to the true and right conveniency of them fourteen cubites, out of which are taken four allowed for the space between the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butt end thereof, whiles he stands in a readinesse to attend the encounter; being thus ordered, I say, it is manifest that the length of ten cubites doth extend it self before the body of every armed man, where with both his hands he doth advance it ready to charge the Enemy. By which meanes it followeth that some of the pikes do not only extend themselves before the second, third, and fourth ranks, but some before the foremost, if the phalanx have his proper and due thicknesse, according to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behind: as *Homer* maketh mention when he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortify another; one head-piece is joyned to another, that they may stand united & close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truly set down, it must follow that the pikes of every former rank in the phalanx do extend themselves two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they have between themselves: by which may evidently be seen the assault and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of sixteen ranks in depth or thicknesse. The excess of which number of ranks above five, forasmuch as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the foremost ranks, they grow utterly unprofitable, and cannot man by man make any impression or assault: but serve only by laying their pikes upon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustain and hold up the sways and giving back of the former ranks which stand before them; to this end, that the front may stand firm and sure; and with the thicknesse of their pikes they do repell all those darts, which passing over the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those ranks which are more backward.

And farther, by moving forward with the force of their bodies, they do so presse upon the former, that they do make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the foremost ranks should give back.

This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx, we must now speak on the contrary part touching the properties and differences, as well of the Armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battel. For every Roman souldier for himself and his weapon, is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the encounter are moved man by man, every one covering himself with his target, and mutually moving whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which use their swords, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest that they have three foot more allowed them to

stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from back to belly, that they may use their weapons with the better commodity. And hence it cometh to passe that one *Roman* souldier taketh up as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the *Macedonian* Phalanx: so that one *Roman* is as it were to oppose himself against ten pikes, which pikes the said one souldier can neither by any agility cometo offend, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behind him are not only unable to repell their force, but also with convenience to use their own weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible that any batel being assaulted by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustain the violence thereof, if it have his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the *Romans* do overcome, and that those that do use the phalanx are voyd of the hope of victory? Even from hence, that the *Roman* Armies have infinite commodities, both of places and of times to fight in. But the phalanx hath onely one time, one place, and one kind whereto it may profitably apply it self: so that if it were of necessity that their enemy should encounter them at that instant, especially with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only not without dangers, but in all probability likely that the phalanx should ever carry away the better. But if that may be avoyded, which is easily done, shall not that disposition then be utterly unprofitable, and free from all terror? And is farther evident that the phalanx must necessarily have plain and champain places, without any hindrances or impediments, as ditches, uneven places, vallies, little hills and rivers; for all these may hinder and disjoyn it. And it is almost impossible to have a Plain of the capacity of twenty *stadia*, much lesse more, where there shall be found none of these impediments. But suppose there be found such places as are proper for the phalanx: if the Enemy refuse to come unto them, and in the mean time spoil and sack the Cities and country round about, what commodity or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? for if it remain in such places, as hath been before spoken of, it can neither relieve their friends, nor preserve themselves. For the convoies which they expect from their friends are easily cut off by the Enemy, whiles they remain in those open places.

And if it happen at any time that they leave them upon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose that the *Roman* Army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not adventure it self in grosse at one instant, but would by little and little retire it self; as doth plainly appear by their usual practice. For there must not be a conjecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that

which they do. For they do not so equally frame their batel, that they do assault the Enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the Enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx do presse them that come to assault them and be repelled, the force of their order is dissolved. For whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that do assault them, these do disjoyn themselves from part of their Army; by which means there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: so that now they need not any more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth, but to assault where the breach is made, both behind and upon the sides. But if at any time the *Roman* Army may keep his due propriety and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place being not able to do the like, doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great between the goodnesse of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities imposed upon an Army: which is, to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemy. For all these occasions necessarily accompany an Army, and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory, to which the *Macedonian* phalanx is no way fit or convenient; forasmuch as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular disposition, without a convenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: but the *Roman* Army is apt for all these purposes. For every souldier amongst them being once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time nor occasion; keeping alwayes the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the Army, or particularly by himself man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is advantageous, so the end doth answer the expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because many of the *Gracians* are of an opinion that the *Macedonians* are not to be overcome. And again, many wondered how the *Macedonian* phalanx should be put to the worke by the *Roman* Army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth *Polybius* in comparing the weapons and embattelling of the *Romans*, with the use of Arms amongst the *Macedonians*: wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered, according as the wise *Gracians* could best proportion it with that form of batel, which might give most advantage to the use thereof: so that if our Squadrons of Pikes jump not with the per-

fect manner of a phalanx, (as we see they do not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the wisdom of the *Gracians* and the experience of other nations imputed unto it. But suppose we could allow it that disposition in the course of our warres, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of *Polybius*, the said manner of imbattelling is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight, I hold it not so profitable a weapon as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as *Ireland* is, where the use is cut off by such inconveniences as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtlesse, if our Commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike and *Ireland*, they would not proportion to great a number of them in every company as there is; for commonly half the company are Pikes, which is as much as to say in the practice of our wars, that half the Army hath neither offensive nor defensive weapons, but onely against a troupe of horse. For they seldome or never come to the push of pike with the foot companies, where they may charge and offend the enemy: and for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more advantage to play upon them afarre off with shot, it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand fair in the mean time to entertain a volley of shot with the body of their battalion. As I make no question but the pike in some services is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my self there are weapons, if they were put to triall, that would countervail the pike, even in those services wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the judgement of *Polybius*, of all other weapons whatsoever, as well in regard of the divers and sundry sorts of imbattelling, as the quality of the place wheresoever: for their use was as effectual in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troops and great companies; in thin and spacious imbattelling, as in thick-thronged *Testudines*.

Neither could the nature of the place make them unserviceable; for whether it were plain or covert, level or unequal, narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the target was as necessary to defend as the sword to offend: besides the conveniency which accompanieth the target in any necessity imposed upon an Army, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedy retreat, to incamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as *Polybius* saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accompany an Army. The use of this weapon hath been too much neg-

lected in these later ages, but may be happily renewed again in our Nation, if the industry of such as have laboured to present it unto these times in the best fashion, shall find any favour in the opinion of our Commanders. Concerning which target I must needs say thus much, that the light target will prove the target of service, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made proof are so heave and unwieldy (although they be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the use thereof) that they overcharge a man with an unsupportable burthen, and hinder his agility and execution in fight with a weight disproportionable to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Harquebusers and Musketers, are stronger in the offensive part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for service. Neither did the *Romans* regard the proof of their targets further then was thought fit for the ready use of them in time of batel, as it appeareth in many places both in the Civil wars, and in these Commentaries: for a *Roman* Pike hath oftentimes darted through the Target, and the body of the man that bare it, and fastened them both to the ground; which is more then a Musket can well do, for the bullet commonly refteth in the body. And although it may be said that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it serveth to prove that their targets were not proof to their offensive weapons, when they were well delivered, and with good direction. For I make no doubt but in their battels there were oftentimes some hindrances, which would not suffer so violent an effect as this which I speak off: for in a volley of shot we must not think that all the bullets fly with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proof will hardly hold out some of them, so slender Armes, and of no proof, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a batel or encounter at hand, a man shall meet with more occasions suiting the nature and commodity of this light Target, then such as will advantage the heavy Target of proof, or countervail the surplus of weight which it carrieth with it.

Some men will urge, that there is use of this Target of proof in some places and in some services: which I deny not to those that desire to be secured from the extremity of peril. But this falleth out in some places, and in some particular services; and hindereth not but that the universall benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

Thus much I am further to note concerning the sword of the Targetiers, that according to the practice of the *Gracians*, it must alwayes hang on the right side; for carrying the Tar-

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get upon the left arm, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance. And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side it must be very short, otherwise it will never be readily drawn out: I say, that the sword of the Targetiers, in regard of the use of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, whereas the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compass of his Target, as such as look into the true use of this weapon will easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the use of the Pike and the Target.

Chap. XI.

The battel continueth, and in the end Cæsar overcometh.

Cæsar.

AT the presence of their Generall the soldiers conceived some better hopes; and gathering strength and courage again, when as every man bestirred himself in the fight of the Emperor, the brunt of the enemy was a little stayed. Cæsar perceiving likewise the seventh legion, which stood next unto him, to be sore over-laid by the enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little to join the two legions together, and so by joining back to back, to make two contrary fronts; and being thus secured one by another from fear of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the meantime the two legions that were in the rearward to guard the carriages, hearing of the battel, doubled their pace, and were deserv'd by the enemy upon the top of the hill. Titus Labienus, having won the Camp of the Nervii, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the river, sent the tenth legion to help their fellows: who understanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fled in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Camp, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there happened such an alteration and change of things, that even such as were sunk down through extreme grief of their wounds, or leaned upon their Targets, began again to fight afresh; and the Pages and the boyes perceiving the enemy amazed, ran upon them unarmed, not fearing their weapons.

The horsemen also striving with extraordinary valour to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionary soldiers. Howbeit the Enemy in the utmost peril of their lives shewed such

manhood, that as fast as the foremost of them were overthrowen, the next in place bestir'd their carcases, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise overthrowen, and their bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained possest themselves of that Mount of dead carcases, as a place of advantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the piles returned them again to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered that there was great reason to deem them men of haughtie courage, that durst passe over so broad a River, climb up such high rocks, and adventure to fight in a place of such inequality; all which their magnanimity made easy to them. The battel being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Nervii being well-near swallowed up with destruction the elder sort with the women and children, that before the battel were conveyed into Ilands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, and saw now that there was nothing to hinder the conquerour, nor any hope of safety to the conquered, by the consent of all that remained alive sent Embassadors to Cæsar, and yielded themselves to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their State affirmed, that of six hundred Senators they had now left but three, and of sixty thousand fighting men, there was scarce five hundred that were able to bear Armes. Cæsar, that his clemencie might appear to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting unto them the free possession of their townes and countrey, and streightly commanding their borderers not to offer them any wrong or injury at all.

OBSERVATION.

AND thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battel, which *Ramus* complaineth of as a confused narration, much differing from the direct and methodicall file of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good which learned Rhetoricians have observed in their Oration, That an unperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect manner; then by *Ramus* leaves, if any such confusion do appear, it both favoureth of eloquence, and well fitteth the turbulent carriage of the action, wherein order and skill gave place to Fortune, and providence was swallowed up with peradventure. For that which *Hurtius* of the overthrow he gave to *Pharnaces* may as well be said of this, that he got the victory, *plurimum adjuvant deorum benignitate, tum qui cum omnibus belli casibus intersunt, tum præcipue in quibus nihil ratione potuit adjuvare*, *stravi*.

Lib. de Militia Ju. Cæ.

Lib. II.

Commentaries.

stravi; by the very great favour and assistance of the gods; who as they give aid in all cases of war, so especially in those where reason and good skill are at a losse. For so it fell out in this battel, and the danger proceeded from the same cause that brought him to that push in the battel with *Pharnaces*: for he well understood that the *Nervii* attended his coming on the other side the river *Sabis*: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his Camp in the face of an enemy without fear or danger, as we have seen in his warre with *Ariovistus*; when he marched to the place where he purposed to incamp himself with three battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Armes to receive any charge which the enemy should offer to give, that the third battel in the mean time might fortify the Camp. Which course would easily have frustrated this stratagem of the *Nervii*, and made the hazard lesse dangerous: but he little expected any such resolution, so contrary to the rules of Militarie discipline, that an enemy should not stick to passe over so broad a river, to climb up such steep and high Rocks, to adventure battel in a place of disadvantageous, and to hazard their fortune upon such inequalities. And therefore he little mistrusted any such unlikely attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his own overthrow, if the legions had been ready to receive them.

Which may teach a Generall that which *Cæsar* had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courtes; nor too careful in his best advised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily be prevented, and the safest course weakened with an unexpected circumstance: to powerfull are weak occurrences in the main course of the weightiest actions, and so infinite are the ways whereby either wisdom or fortune may work. Neither did this warn him to provide for that which an enemy might do, how unlikely soever it might seem unto him; as appeareth by that accident in the battel with *Pharnaces*. Which practice of attempting a thing against reason and the art of warre, hath found good successe in our modern warres, as appeareth by the *French* histories: notwithstanding it is to be handled sparingly, as no way favouring of circumspect and good directions, forasmuch as *Temeritas non semper felix*, *Rashnesse* does not always speed well, as *Fabius* the great answered *Scipio*.

The chiefest helps which the *Romans* found, were first the advantage of the place; whereof I spake in the *Helvetian* warre. Secondly, the experience which the souldiers had got in the former battels, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they carried themselves as men acquainted with such casualties. Lastly, the valour and undaunted judgement of the Generall, which overwaied the perill of the battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein

we may observe, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battel rested upon his directions, he wholly intended warinesse and circumspection: so in the hazard and perill of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valour, and over-topt fury with a higher resolution.

Chap. XII.

The *Aduatici* betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Cæsar.

AD *Aduatici* before-mentioned coming with all their power to aid the *Nervii*, and understanding by the way of their overthrow, returned home again; and forsaking all the rest of their Towns and Castles, conveyed themselves and their wealth into one strong and well-fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steep downfalls, saving in one place of two hundred foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easy ascent: which passage they had fortified with a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones and sharp beames upon the walls, ready for an assault. This people descended from the *Cimbri* and *Teutoni*, who in their journey into Italy, left such carriages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conveniently take along with them, and 6000 men to look to them: who, after the death of their fellows, being many yeares disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes invading other States, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in.

At the first coming of the *Roman Army*, they sallied out of the town, and made many light skirmishes with them: but after that *Cæsar* had drawn a rampier about the town of twelve foot in height, fifteen miles in compass, and had fortified it with Castles very thick about the town, they kept themselves within the wall. And as they beheld the *Vines* framed, the Mount raised, and a tower in building as farre off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing speeches from the wall, began to aske with what hands, and with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the *Romans* were but little men in respect of the *Galles*) a tower of that huge massie weight should be brought unto the walles. But when they saw it removed, and approaching near unto the town (as men astonished at the strange and unaccustomed sight thereof) they sent Embassadors to *Cæsar* to intreat a peace,

Cæsar.
Eicher
Doway or
Boddac in
Brabant.

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peace, with this message: They believed that the Romans did not make war without the special assistance of the Gods; that could with such facility transport engines of that height, and bring them to encounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town: and therefore they submitted both themselves and all that they had to Cæsar's mercy, desiring one thing of him earnestly, which was, that if his goodnesse and clemency (which they had heard so high praises of) had determined to save their lives, he would not take away their Arms from them; forasmuch as all their neighbours were enemies unto them, and envied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliver up their Armour: so that they had rather suffer any inconvenience by the people of Rome, than to be butchered by them, whom in former time they had held subject to their command.

To this Cæsar answered; that he would save the City rather of his own custome, then for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Rams touched the wall; but no condition of remedy should be accepted without present delivery of their Armes: for he would do by them as he had done by the Nervii, and give commandment to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the City, they seemed contented to do whatsoever he commanded them: and thereupon casting a great part of their Armour over the wall into the ditch, inasmuch as they fill'd it almost to the top of the rampier, and yet (as afterward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that day carried themselves peaceably. Towards night Cæsar commanded the gates to be shut, and the souldiers to be drawn out of the town, least in the night the townsmen should be any way injured by them. But the Aduaticci, having consulted together before (forasmuch as they believed that upon their submission the Romans would either set no watch at all, or at the least keep it very carelessly) partly with such Armour as they had retained, and partly with targets made of bark, or wrought of wicker, which upon the sudden they had covered over with leather, about the third watch, where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest, they issued suddenly out of the town with all their power: but signification thereof being presently given by fires, as Cæsar had commanded, the Romans hastened speedily to that place. The Enemy fought very desperately, as men in the

last hope of their welfare, encountering the Romans in a place of disadvantage, all their hopes now lying upon their valour: at length, with the slaughter of four thousand, the rest were driven back into the town. The next day, when Cæsar came to break open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the souldiers, and sold all the people and spoil of the town: the number of persons in the town amounted to fifty three thousand bondslaves.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the surprize attempted by the Belge upon Bibract, I set down the manner which both the Gauls and the Romans used in their sudden surprising of a town: wherof if they failed (the place importing any advantage in the course of war) they then prepared for the siege in that manner as Cæsar hath described in this place. They environed the town about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the said rampier with many Castles and Fortresses, erected in a convenient distance one from another; and to they kept the town from any foreign succour or relief: and withall secured themselves from fallies, or other stratagems which the townsmen might practice against them. And this manner of siege was called *circumvallatio*; the particular description wherof I referre unto the history of Alesius, where I will handle it according to the particulars there set down by Cæsar.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE Ram, which Cæsar here mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Roman Engines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our wars. *Vitruvius* doth attribute the invention thereof to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadix, wanting a fit instrument to raze and overthrow a Castle, they took a long beam or timber-tree, and bearing it upon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake down the uppermost rank of stones; and so descending by degrees they overthrew the whole tower. The Romans had two sorts of Rams; the one was rude and plain, the other artificiall and compound: the first is that which the Carthaginians used at Cadix, and is portrayed in the column of Trajan at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by *Josephus*; A Ram, saith he, is a mighty great beam, like unto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of iron fashioned like unto a Ram, and thereof it took the name. This Ram is hanged by the midle with ropes unto another beam, which lieth cross a couple of pillars: and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward and recoiled backward,

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ward, and so beateth upon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any tower so strong, or wall so broad, that is able to stand before it.

The length of this Ram was of a large cantling; for *Plutarch* affirmeth that *Antony* in the *Parthian* war had a Ram fourecore foot long. And *Vitruvius* saith that the length of a Ram was usually one hundred and six, and sometimes one hundred and twenty; and this length gave great strength and force to the engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Century or order of souldiers; and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Century; and so the Ram played continually upon the wall without intermission. *Josephus* saith that *Titus*, at the siege of *Jerusalem*, had a ram for every legion. It was oftentimes covered with a Vine, that the men that managed it might be in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a town had continued out untill the ram had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptance of rendry; forasmuch as by their obstinacy they had brought in perill the lives of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affordeth such mercy as the Victor pleaseth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THE Aduaticci, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small security which one State can give unto another, that commendeth their safety to be protected by it: for as *Architas* the *Pythagorean* saith, A body, a Family, and an Army are then well governed, when they contain within themselves the causes of their safety; so we must not look for any security in a State, when their safety dependeth upon a foreign protection. For the old saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere*, Neither walls nor friends will save him, whom his own weapons do not defend. Although in this case the matter was well qualified by the majesty of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of *Gallia*; wherof the *Hedui* with their associates were very gainful witnesses: but amongst kingdoms that are better suited with equality of strength and authority, there is small hope of safety to be looked for, unless the happy government of both do mutually depend upon the safety of either Nation. For that which *Polybius* observed in *Antigonus* king of *Macedonia*, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature esteem no man either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall find them answerable to their projects. And contrariwise it cutteth off many occasions of practices and attempts, when it is known that a State is of it self able and ready to resist the designs of foreign enemies, according to that of *Manlius*; *Ostendit modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant*

vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent, Do but shew them war, and you shall have peace: let them see you are provided to repell force, and they will do you nothing but right.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

THE manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great use in the night season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appear far greater then indeed it is; forasmuch as that part of the aire which is next unto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire it self, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance. And contrariwise in the day time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the clear brightness of the air doth much obscure that light which proceedeth from a more grosse and materiall body: and therefore their custome was to use fire in the night, and smook in the day, futing the transparent middle with a contrary quality, that so it might more manifestly appear to the beholder.

THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

AND albeit after the victory, the Romans inflicted divers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as *Flavius Lucanus* saith in *Lib. 25. Livie*, there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercy then the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to have used towards a conquered Nation were these; either they punished them by death, or sold them for bondslaves *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub jugum*, or merced them in taking away their territories, or made them tributary States.

Of the first we find a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Cæsar having overthrown the *Veneti* by sea, inasmuch as they had retained his Embassadors by force, contrary to the law of Nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*.

Festus saith that an enemy was said to be sold *sub corona*, inasmuch as the captives stood crowned in the Market-place where they were set out to sale: as *Cato* saith in his book *De re militari*, *Ille populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus supplicatum est; quam re male gesta coronatus venieat*; That the people may rather for well performing go to supplicate crowned, then for ill performance be sold crowned. And *Gellius* affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, forasmuch as the souldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about to keep them together; and this round-about-standing was called *corona*. *Festus* saith that oftentimes they used a spear, and there-

To give notice of an Alarme by fire.

Lib. 25.

The punishment which the Romans laid upon a conquered Nation.

Circumvallatio.

In the seventh Commentary.

Aries, or the Ram.

Cales.

Aries finis.

Aries composita.

therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: forasmuch as amongst the Greeks, by the spear or pike was signified the power of Armes, and majestic of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub jugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a pair of gallows, under which they cauled all the captives to passe, as a sign of bondage: for they had to conquered them by force of Armes, that they laid upon their neck the yoke of thralldome.

Livie saith that *Quintius* the Dictator dismissed the *Aquos sub jugum*; and this *jugum* was made of three speares, whereof two were stuck upright in the ground, and the third was tied overthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub jugum* were ungirt, and their weapons taken from them, as *Festus* saith.

Sometimes again they took away their lands and territories, and either sold it for money, and brought it into the treasury, or divided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farmment: of all which *Livie* hath many pregnant examples.

Of the second sort, the felling of the *Vei* in his fifth book, and of 7000 *Samnites* in his ninth book. Of the third, that remarkable example of passing the two Consuls *T. Petrus Calpurnius*, and *Spurius Postumius*, with the Legates, Tribunes, and whole Roman Army *sub jugum*, by *Caius Pontius* leader of the *Samnites*, in his ninth book. Of the fourth in all kinds thereof frequently through his history.

The third Commentary of the warres in GALLIA.

The Argument.

THis Commentarie beginneth with an Accident which happened in the latter end of the former Sommer, wherein the *Belge* had so lean a harvest: and then it proceedeth to the war between *Cæsar* and the *Veneti*; *Crassus* and the *Aquitani*; *Titurius Sabinus* and the *Curiosolite*; and *Titus Labienus* with the *Treviri*.

CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba being sent to clear the passage of the *Alpes*, is besieged by the *Seduni* and *Veragri*.

Cæsar.

Cæsar taking his journey into Italy, sent *Sergius Galba* with the twelfth legion and part of the horsemen unto the *Nantuates*, *Veragri* and *Seduni*, whose territories are extended from the river *Rhone* and the *Lake Lemanus*, unto the tops of the highest *Alpes*. The end of this voyage was chiefly

Crassus taken in all the maritime Cities that ly to the Ocean: the legions cavied into their wintering Camps. *Cæsar.* He same time *Pub. Crassus*, whom he had sent with one legion to the *Veneti*, *Unelli*, *Osilini*, *Curiosolite*, *Scluvii*, *Aulerci*, and *Rhedones*, being the maritime Cities that lay to the Ocean, advertised him that all those States had yielded themselves to the people of Rome. The warres being thus ended, and all *Gallia* being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this ware among other barbarous people, that from Nations beyond the *Rhene* there came *Embassadors* to *Cæsar*, offering both hostages, and obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he then hastied into *Lombardie*, after he had placed his legions in their wintering Campes, willed them to repair unto him again in the beginning of the next Sommer. He himself therefore, after he had first disposed his army into winter-quarters amongst the *Camutes*, *Andes*, and *Turonens*, cities next to those places where his warres had been, took his journey forthwith for Italy. For these things, upon the sight of *Cæsar's* Letters, a generall supplication was proclaimed in Rome for fifteen dayes together: which honour before that time had happened to no man.

Of this supplication I will speak in the latter end of the fourth book.

named *Orodorus*. This town being sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mighty high hills, was divided by a river into two parts; whereof he gave one part to the *Galles*, and the other he chose for his wintering Camp, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampier. After he had spent many dayes of wintering, and given order that corn should be brought thither for provision; he had intelligence upon a sudden, that the *Galles* in the night time had all left that part of the town that was allotted unto them; and that the hills which hung over the valley wherein the town stood, were possessed with great multitudes of the *Seduni* and *Veragri*. The reasons of this sudden commotion were chiefly the paucity of the Roman forces, not making a compleat legion forasmuch as two cohorts wintered amongst the *Nantuates*; besides many particular souldiers that were wanting some being gone to fetch in provisions, and others upon other necessary occasions. And besides their being thus contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such advantage, that they were persuaded by reason of the steep declivity of the hill, that the Romans would not indure the brunt of the first assault. Besides this, it grieved them exceedingly to have their children taken from them under the title of hostages; and the *Alpes*, which nature had exempted from habitation, & placed as bounds between two large kingdomes, to be seized upon by the Roman legions, not for their passage so much, as for their perpetual possession, & to be united to their Province.

Upon these advertisements *Galba*, not having as yet finished the fortification of his Camp, nor sufficiently made provision of corn and forrage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of war, being secured of their amity and obedience, both by hostages and rendry, presently called a Councell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which Councell the minds of many were so amazed with the terror of so unexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed souldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the Enemy, and no hope left of any succour or relief, that they could think of no other way for their safety, then leaving behind them their baggage and impediments, to sallie out of their Camp, and so to save themselves by the same way they came thither. Notwithstanding the greater part concluded to referre that resolution to the last push, and in the meantime to attend the fortune of the event, and defend the Camp.

VHigh advice although at this time it forced to small effect, yet it better suited the valour of the Romans, and favoured more of tempered magnanimity, then that former hazard, which argued the weakness of their minds; by their over-hasty and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to break through the thickest troupes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to save themselves by the help of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terror, and a stronger impression of fears, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashness is fitter sooner of fear, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a lesse troubled eye, and qualified the terror of death with the life of their spirit, reserving extremity of help to extremity of perill, and in the mean time attended what chances of advantage might happen unto them upon any enterprise the enemy should attempt; they, I say, gave greater scope to Fortune, and enlarged the bounds of changing accidents.

CHAP. II.

The enemy setteth upon the wintering Camp: *Galba* overthrotteth them.

THe Councell being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such things as were agreed upon for their defence, but the enemy, at a watchword given, assaulted the Camp on all sides with stones and darts, and other casting weapons. The Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vain any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soever of their camp seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of help, thither they came with succour and relief. But herein they were over-matched; for the enemy being spent and wearied with fight, whensoever any of them gave place and forsook the battell, there were always fresh combatants to supply it. But the Romans, by reason of their small number, had no such help: for their extremity in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for weariness nor wounds to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And having thus fought continually the space of six hours when both strength & weapons wanted, the enemy persisting with greater fury to fill the ditch, & break down the rampier, & their hopes relying upon the last expectation, *P. S. Bacu.*

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the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to be sore wounded in the Nervian battel, and Caius Volutenus Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ran speedily to Galba and told him, that the only way of safety was to break out upon the enemy, and to try the last refuge in that extremity. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease a while from fighting, and only to receive such weapons as were cast into the Camp; and so to rest themselves a little and recover their strength: and then at a watch-word to sallie out of their Camp, and lay their safety upon their valour. Which the souldiers executed with such alacrity and courage of spirit, that breaking out at all the gates of the Camp, they gave no leisure to the enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfy his judgement touching so unexpected a noveltie. And thus Fortune being suddenly changed, the Romans encompassing those who came with full expectation of spoiling their camp, slew more then the third part of thirty thousand, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay upon the hills near about them. Having thus overthrowne the enemies whole strength, and taken their armes, they drew again into their quarters.

OBSERVATION.

Which strange alteration lively describeth the force of novelty, and the effectuall power of unexpected adventures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the Camp, and the Gallies charged it by assault, the victory held constant with the Gallies, and threatened death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any means to recover hope of better successe, but by trying another way; which so much the more amazed the Gallies, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victory, by a set fight continuing the space of six houres, without any likelihood of contrariety or alteration. Which practise of frustrating a design intended by an indirect and contrary answer, served the Romans oftentimes to great advantage; as besides this present example, in this commentary we shall afterward read, how Titinius Sabinus defeated the Ibelli with the same stratagem, and overthrow them by crupcion and falling out, when they expected nothing but a defensive resistance from the rampier. From whence a Commander may learn to avoid two contrary inconveniences, according as the quality of the warre shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a judicious eye will easily discover) that a sally made out at

divers ports of a hold, will much mitigate the heat of a charge, and controll the fury of an Enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place, what advantage soever he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himself of good fortunes, if he appoint certain troupes in readinesse to receive the charge of any eruption; that the rest that are busily employed in the assault may provide to answer it without disorder or confusion. Which order if the Gallies had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceived.

CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Province: the Ibelli give occasion of a new warre.

After this battell, Galba unwilling to try fortune any further, and considering that he had met with busineses which he never dreamed of when first he came thither to quarter, especially finding himself in want both of corn and forrage, having first burned the town, the next day he returned towards the Province, and without let or resistance brought the legion safe into the Nannuates, and from thence to the Allobroges, and there he wintered.

After these things were dispatched, Cæsar supposing for many reasons that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further fear of any new warre, the Belgæ being overthrown, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alps subdued and vanquished, in the beginning of the winter was gone into Illyricum, having a great desire to see those nations. But there grew a suddain tumult and dissension in Gallia upon this occasion: Pub. Crassus wintering with the seventh legion in Aniou near unto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of corn in those parts, he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen and Tribunes into the next cities to demand corn, and other provisions for his legion: of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent unto the Ibelli, Marcus Trebius to the Curiosolite, Q. Velanius and Titus Silius to the Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authority amongst all the maritime nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with which they did traffick in Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour States in skill and experience of sea-faring matters; having command of as many ports as lay to those seas, and the most part of such as used those seas tributaries to their State. These Veneti first adventured to retain Silius and Velanius, hoping thereby to recover their hostages which they had

had given to Crassus. The summatte Cities induced by their authority and example, (as indeed the resolutions of the Gallies are sudden and hasty) for the same reason laid hold upon Trebius and Terrasidius; and sending speedy ambassages one unto another, conjured by their princes and chiefest magistrates to do nothing but by common consent, and to attend all the same event of fortune; soliciting also other cities and States, rather to maintain that liberty which they had received of their Ancestours, then to indure the servile bondage of a stranger.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The circumstance in this history which noteth the sudden breaking out of wars, when the courts of things made promise of peace, sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse in calculating the nativity of After-chances: which to seldom answer the judgement we give upon their beginnings, that when we speak of happinesse, we find nothing but misery; and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not marvel, if when almost all nations are at odds, and in our belt conceits threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace: or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquillity, and through the uncertainty of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles; there follow greater wars in the end then the former time can truly speak of. Which being well understood, may humble the spirits of our haughty politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times under the premises of their weak projects, and predestinate succeeding ages according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of shall break the main stream of our judgements, and falsify the Oracles which our understanding hath uttered. And it may learn them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander to prevent an evil that may cross his designe, (how unlikely soever it be to happen) by handling it in such manner as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it self both the causes of his being, and the direct means to resist the repugnancy of a contrary nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

This practice of the Veneti may instruct a circumpect Prince in cases of this nature, to have a more watchfull eye over that Province or city which shall be found most potent and might

ty amongst the rest, then of any other inferior State of the same nature and condition: for as example of it self is of great authority, making The Author. improbabilities seem full of reason, especially when the intention shall sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull means, and graced with the Act of superiour personages, it must needs be very effectuall to stir up mens minds to approve that with a strong affection, which their own single judgement did no way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this advantage to a Prince, which difference cannot afford, that albeit example do set on foot any rebellious motion, yet no supereminency shall authorize the same.

CHAP. IIII.

Cæsar having advertisement of these new troubles, hasteth into Gallia, and prepareth for the warre.

All the maritime States being by this means drawn into the same conspiracy, they sent an ambassage unto Crassus in the name of them all, that if he would have his men again, he must deliver up the hostages which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, inasmuch as he was then a great way distant from his Army, he commanded Gallies and ships of warre to be built upon the river Loire, which runneth into the Ocean, and that Gallie-men, Mariners, and ship-masters should be mustered in the Province: which being speedily dispatched, as soon as the time of the year would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacy understanding of Cæsar's arrivall, and considering how hainous a fact they had committed, in detaining the Ambassadors and casting them into irons, whose name is held sacred and inviolable amongst all nations; prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, and especially such necessities as pertained to shipping and sea-fight.

THE OBSERVATION.

From hence I may take occasion briefly to touch the reverent opinion which all nations, how barbarous soever, have generally conceived of the quality and condition of Embassadors: and what the grounds are of this universally received custome, which in all ages and times hath held authentically. And first we are to understand that all mankind (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane society, that albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are unnatural), as proceeding from corruption and defect) drive them into extrem

discord and disunion of spirits, and break the bonds of civile conversations, which otherwise we donaturally affect; yet without a necessary entercourfe and traffick of societies, we are not able to keep on foot the very discord it self in terms of reason and orderly proceedings, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion and go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bonds of Nature, and so powerfull are the laws which she enacteth. And therefore it it were for no other end which might sort to the benefit of either party, (as there are many good uses thereof) yet to hold up the quarrell and keep it from falling, making war according to the grounds of reason, the entercourfe of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hatefull violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made: a law, ought as religiously to be observed as an Oracle of our own belief. Secondly, forasmuch as the end of war is, or at the least should be, peace, which by treaty of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seem to be barbarous as to maintain a war which onely intendeth blood, and propoeth as the chiefest object the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and civile government; such as refuse the entercourfe of messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are justly condemned in the judgement of all nations as unworthy of humane society. Last of all, it is an injury of great dishonour, and deserveth the reward of extreme infamy, to revenge the matter his quarrell upon a servant, and punish Embassadors for the faults of their State: considering that their chiefest duty consisteth in the faithfull relation of such mandates as they have received; which may as well tend to the advancement and honour of that City to which they are sent, as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire war or peace, the free liberty & holy order of Embassadors is reverently to be respected, and defended from brutish and unnaturall violence.

CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either party in the entercourfe of this warre.

HE Veneti conceived great hope of their enterprise, by reason of the strength of their situation: forasmuch as all the passages by land were broken and cut off with armes and creeks of the sea; and on the other side navigation and entercourfe by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether unacquainted with the channels and shelves of the coast, and there were so few ports. Neither did they think that the Roman Army could long continue there without corn, which was not to be

had in those quarters. And if it happened that the course of things were carried contrary to this probable expectation, yet they themselves were strong in shipping, whereas the Romans had none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and Islands of that coast where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow sea to be far different from that which they were accustomed unto in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution they fortified their townes, stored them with provision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes, against whom Cæsar (as it was reported) would begin to make war, taking the Orlini, Lexovii, Nannetes, Ambialites, Morini, Menapii, Diablintes, as consorts and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Cæsar to undertake this war: as namely the violent detaining of the Roman knights; their rebellion after they had yielded themselves by rendy, and given hostages of their loyalty; the conspiracy of so many Cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and States to the like insolency. And therefore understanding that almost all the Galles were inclining to novelty and alteration, and of their own nature were quick and ready to undertake a war; and further, considering that all men by nature desired liberty, and hated the servile condition of bondage, he prevented all further insurrections of the other States with the presence of the Roman forces in severall places at once; and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalry unto the Treviri, that bordered upon the Rhene: to him he gave in charge to visit the men of Rhemes and the rest of the Belgæ, to keep them in obedience; and to hinder such forces as might peradventure be transported over the river by the Germans, to further this rebellious humour of the Galles. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus with twelve legionary cohorts and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, lest there might come any aid from those nations, & such considerable forces join together. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions unto the Lexovii, Curiosoliti, and Ucelli, to disappoint any practice which rebellious minds might intend. And making D. Brutus chief Admirall of the navy, & of those French ships which he had got together from the Pictones, Santones, & other provinces which continued quiet & obedient, he gave him in charge to move towards Vannes with what speed he could: and he himself marched thitherward with the foot forces.

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THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first book I observed the authority which the Roman Leaders had to undertake a war, without further acquainting the Senate with the consequence thereof: in this place let us observe the care and circumspection which the Generals had, who did not undertake a troublesome and dangerous war upon a humour, or any other slender motion; but diligently weighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the peill and hazard of the war, with the good and consequence of the effect, informed their judgements of the importance of that action, and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labour. And thus we find the reasons particularly delivered that moved Cæsar first to undertake the Helvetian war; and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariovistus; then followeth the necessity of that war with the Belgæ; and now the motives which induced him to this with the maritime Cities of Bretagne; and so consequently of his passage into Germany, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he layeth down as the grounds and occasions of those wars, and could not be avoyded but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let us observe the means he used to prevent the inclination of the Galles, and to keep them in subjection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into divers quarters of that Continent, and so feeling the wavering disposition of the further skirts with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his legionary souldiers, which he sent ready to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not break out to the prejudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the advantage which he gained in the opinion of the Enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the upshot of that quarrell, that he had disposed the greatest part of his Army upon other services, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

CHAP. VI.

The manner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.

THE situation of almost all these Cities was such, that being built in points & promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened always twice in 12 houres, be approached by foot-forces nor yet with shipping for again in an ebbe the vessels were laid on the ground, and so left as a prey to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea with mounts which they raised equall to the walls of the town, and were at the point of entering and taking it; yet the townsmen having

such store of shipping, would easily convey both themselves and their carriages into the next towns, and there help themselves with the like advantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Roman fleet by reason of continuall winde and foul weather, durst not adventure to put out of the river Loire into so vast a sea, wherein the havens and roads were few, and farre distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Galles was thus built and rigged: the keel was somewhat flatter then the Romans shipping, the better to bear the ebbs and shallows of that coast: the fore-deck was altogether erect and perpendicular; the poupe was made to bear the hugeness of the billowes and the force of the tempest. And in a word they were altogether built for strength: for the ribs and seats were made of beams of a foot square, fastned with iron pinnes of an inch thick: instead of cables they used chaines of iron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linen, or ignorant of the use thereof, or because sailes of linen would hardly serve to carry ships of that burthen, or endure the tempestuousnesse of those seas, and the violence of the winds.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman navy with this kind of ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speedy nimbleness with force of oars; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foul weather, were farre inferior unto them: for the strength of them was such that they could neither hurt them with their beak-heads, nor cast a weapon to any purpose into them by reason of their altitude, and high-built bulkes. And if any gust chanced in the mean time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the weather, their shipping would better bear the rage of the sea, and with greater safety shelter it self amongst flats and shallows, without fear of rocks or any such hazards of all which chanceth the Roman navy stood continually in danger.

OBSERVATION.

AND here let it not seem impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall use which we Islanders have of navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as far forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a souldier: which albeit they may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret: yet forasmuch as they stand for true principles of regularity, and well-

The causes of the ebbing and flowing of the sea.

Cæsar.

well-approved rules in our Art of navigation, let us take them for no less than they effect, and give them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heavens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet forasmuch as they serve to direct our knowledge to a certainty in that variety and seeming inconstancy of motion, we esteem of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right sphere (for in that position the Naturalists chiefly understand celestial influence to have operation in this liquid element of the water) it is divided by the Horizon and Meridian into four quarters: the first quarter is that between the east horizon and the noon meridian, which they call a flowing quarter; the second from the noon meridian to the west horizon, which they make an ebbing quarter; the third from the west horizon to the midnight meridian, which they likewise call a flowing quarter; and again from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heaven. The instruments of these sensible qualities and contrary effects are the sun and the moon, as they are carried through these distinct parts of the heaven. And although experience hath noted the moon to be of greatest power in watry motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force which the sun yieldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therefore we are to understand, that when the moon or the sun begin to appear above the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heaven which I termed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount up to their meridian altitude, so it increaseth until it come to a high flood. And again, as those lights passing the meridian decline to the west, and run the circuit of the ebbing quarter, so the water decreaseth and returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they set under the west horizon, and enter into the second flowing quarter, so the sea beginneth again to flow, and still increaseth until they come to the point of the night meridian: and then again it floweth, according as the sun and moon are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian to the west horizon.

And hence it happeneth that in conjunction or new of the moon, when the sun and the moon are carried both together in the same flowing and ebbing quarters, that then the tides and ebbs are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moon, when these lights are carried in opposite quarters, which we have described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing, that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as

both these Planets, through the symbolizing quarters wherein they are carried, do joyn their forces to make perfect this work of Nature in the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And contrariwise in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moon, when as the moon is carried in a flowing quarter, and at the same instant the sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of Nature doth necessarily require, then are the tides lessened, as daily experience doth witness.

And forasmuch as both the right horizon and the meridian also divide every diurnal circle, which either the sun or the moon make in their revolutions, into equal parts; it followeth that every tide is continually measured with the quantity of six houres: and therefore that which Cæsar here faith must needs be true, that in the space of twelve houres there are always two high tides. And least any man should imagine that every inland City standing upon an ebbing and flowing river, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule; let him understand that this which I have delivered is to be conceived principally of the sea it self, and secondarily of such ports and havens as stand either near or upon the sea: but where a river shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding Meanders before it come to the place of calculation, it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought convenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martial knowledge.

Concerning the shipping of the Romans, The manner whereof posterity hath only received the bare of their shipping.

Names Longas. Triremes.
Onerarias. Quadriremes.
Altharias. Quinqueremes.

The first we may understand to be Gallies or ships of service; the second ships of burthen; the third ships that were driven forward with force of oares; and the rest sounding according to their Names, for I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Now whether these Names Longas and Altharias, were a severall sort of shipping by themselves, or the general Names of the Quadriremes, Triremes and Quinqueremes, forasmuch as every kind of these might be called both Longas and Altharias; as it yet remaineth in controversy, so it is not much material to that which we seek after. But that which most troubleth our sea-Criticks is, in what

sense they may understand these vocabularies, Triremes, Quadriremes, and Quinqueremes: whether they were so termed in regard of the number of rowers or water-men that hailed continually at an oare, as the custome of the Gallies is at this day; or otherwise, because a Trireme had three orders of oares on either side, a Quadrireme four, and a Quinquereme five, whereof they took their distinction of Names.

Such as hold that a Trireme had on each side three ranks of oares, and so consequently of a Quadrireme and Quinquereme, alledge this place of Livie to make good their opinion. In the wars between Rome and Carthage, Lælius meeting with Asdrubal in the streights of Grubra, each of them had a Quinquereme and seven or eight Triremes a piece: the current in that place was so great that it gave no place to Art, but carried the vessels according to the fall of the Billow: in which uncertainty the Triremes of the Carthaginians closed with the Quinquereme of Lælius; which either because she was *ponderosa tenacio*, as Livie saith, or otherwise for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus semidentibus vertebat, facilius regeretur*, in regard of the pluralitie of banks of oares which resisted the billow and steamed the currents, she sunk two of the Triremes, and so got the victorie. From hence they prove that a Quinquereme had *plures remorum ordines* then a Trireme had; and therefore it took the name from the pluralitie of banks of oares, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oare.

But the contrary opinion doth interpret *Ordo remorum* to be a couple of oares one answering another on each side of the vessel, which we call a pair of oares: So that a Quinquereme being far greater and longer then a Trireme, had more paires of oares then a Trireme had, and those oares were handled with five men at one oare, according to the use of our Gallies at this day.

But to leave this, and come to their manner of sea-fights: we must understand that the Romans wanting the use of Artillery, and managing their ships of war with force of oares, failed not to make use of their Art in their conflicts and encounters by sea: for all their ships of service, which we term men of war, carried a strong beak-head of iron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ran one against another, with as great violence and fury as their oares could carry them. And herein Art gave great advantage; for he that could best skill to turn his ship with greatest celerity, and to frustrate an offer, or with speedy and strong agitation follow an advantage, commonly got the victory.

In the battel which D. Brutus had with the *Massilians*, we read that two Triremes charging the Admirall wherein Brutus was, one at the one side and the other at the other, Brutus and his Mariners so cunningly handled the matter, that

when they should come to the huts they speedily in a trice of time wound themselves from between them, and the two Triremes met with such a carriere one against another, that one brake her beak-head, and the other split with the blow.

For this skill and fortune which *Euphranor*, the Rhodian was of great fame in Cæsars time although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that whom Fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes referreth to a harder destiny; as other sea-men besides *Euphranor* can truly witness.

This first brunt being ended, when they came to grapple and bording one of another, then the art and practices of their land services came in use: for they erected turrets upon their decks, and from them they fought with engines and casting-weapons, as slings, arrows, and pikes; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionary soldier find any difference when he came to the point between their fight at sea and that at land; saving that they could not be martialled in troops and bands, in regard whereof the sea-service was counted more base and dishonourable; and the rather, inasmuch as it decided the controversy by slings and casting-weapons, which kind of fight was of lesse honour then buckling at handy-blows.

CHAP. VII.

The battel continueth: and Cæsar overcometh.

THe Romans having taken one town after another, the enemies still conveyed themselves to the next; so that Cæsar deeming it but lost labour, whilst he could neither hinder their escape, nor do them any mischief, resolved to wait the coming of his navy. Which was no sooner arrived, but the enemy despoiling it, presently made out 220 saile of ships well-appointed and furnished in all respects to oppose them. Neither did Brutus the Admirall, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his navy know what to do, or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Gallies was so strong, that the beak-head of their Quinqueremes could perform no service upon them; and although they should raise turrets according to their use, yet these would not equal in height the poop of the Enemies shipping; so that therein also the Gallies had advantage. For as the Romans could not much annoy them with their weapons, in regard they lay so low under them; so on the contrary their darts must needs fall with great advantage upon the Romans. Yet one thing there was amongst their provisions which stood them in great stead: for the Romans had provided great sharp books

I. or

Lib. 28.

The manner of sea-fights.

Lib. 2. de bello civili.

or sickles, which they put upon great and long poles; these they fastened to the tackling which held the main-yard to the mast; and then haling away their ship with force of Oares, they cut the said tackling, and the main-yard fell down. Whereby the Galles, whose only hope for their navy consisted in the sailes and tackling, lost at one instant both their sailes and the use of their shipping: And then the controversy fell within the compasse of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Galles; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Cæsar and the whole Army, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the hills and cliffs which afforded near prospect into the sea, were covered with the Roman Army.

Their main-yards being cut down, and the Romans (though every ship of theirs had two or three of the enemies about it) endeavouring with great fury to board them, failed not to take many of their ships: which the Galles perceiving, and finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began all to fly, and turning their ships to a fore-wind, were upon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out very fitly for the Romans, who now fighting ship to ship easily took them, inasmuch that of so great a navy very few (through the help of the evening) escaped to land, after they had fought the space of eight houres: with which battel ended the warre with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritime nations. For all sort of people both young and old, in whom there was either courage, counsell, or dignity, were present at this battell, and all the shipping they could possibly make was here engaged, taken and lost; so that such as remained knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their towns any longer; and therefore yielded themselves to Cæsar: towards whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people not to violate the law of nations by injuring Embassadors: for he slew all the Senate with the sword, and sold the people for bond-slaves.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this battel I chiefly observe the good fortune which usually attendeth upon industry: for amongst other provisions which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the use of this war, they had made ready these hooks, not for this intent wherein they were employed, but at all occasions and chances that might happen, as serviceable complements rather than principall instruments: and yet it to fell out, that they proved

the only means to overthrow the Galles. Which proveth true the saying of Cæsar, that industry commandeth fortune, and buyeth good successe with extraordinary labour: for industry in action is as importunity in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason, and striveth through continuall pursuit, to make good the motives by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition which will easily admit whatsoever is required. In like manner diligence and labour some industry, by circumspect and heedfull carriage, seldom fail either by hap or cunning to make good that part whereon the main point of the matter dependeth. For every action is entangled with many infinite adherents, which are to interested in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherents, some of them are by wildome foreseen, and directed to that course which may fortuate the action; the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, and are all under the regimen of fortune; forasmuch as they are beyond the compasse of our wisest reach, and in the way either to assist or disadvantage. Of these industry hath greatest authority, inasmuch as she armeth her self for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.

Chap. VIII.

Sabinus overthroweth the * Unelli, with the * La Perche manner thereof.

While these things happened in the Cæsar. State of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entreats with his forces into the confines of the Unelli. Over these Viridovix ruled, who was at present made commander in chief of all the revolted cities, which furnished him with a great & potent army. Besides this the * Aulerci, * Eburovices, and * Lexovii * Roane, * Eborac. having slain their Senate, because they would not countenance the warre, shut their gates, and joyned with Viridovix. Also there came great multitudes to them out of Gallia, men of broken fortunes, thieves and robbers, whom the hope of prey and spoil had made to preferre the warres before husbandry and day-labour. Sabinus incamping himself in a convenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But Viridovix being lodged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his camp, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battel gave him opportunity to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not only to be suspected by the Enemy of cowardise, but to be taunted with the reprobfull speeches of his own souldiers. The opinion of his being fearfull thus settled in the minds

minds of the enemy, he used all means to increase it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy durst approach the very rampier of the Camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the Generall, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but upon some good opportunity, or in a place of advantage. In this generall persuasion of fear, Sabinus chose out a subtile-witted Gall, an auxiliarie in his army, whom he perswaded with great rewards and further promises to fly to the Enemy, and there to carry himself according to the instructions which he should give him. This Gall coming as a revoler to the Enemy, laid open unto them the fear of the Romans; the extremity that Cæsar was driven into by the Veneti; and that the night following Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his camp, and to make all the haste he could to relieve Cæsar. Upon which advertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this opportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other devises, they would go and assault the Roman camp. Many circumstances perswaded the Galles to this resolution: as first the lingring and doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battel; secondly, the intelligence which this fugitive had brought; thirdly, the want of victuals, wherein they had been negligent and unadvisedly carelesse; fourthly, the hope they conceived of the war of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly believe that which they would have come to passe. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridovix nor the rest of the Captains to dismisse the Councell, untill they had yielded that they should take Armes, and go to the Roman Camp. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and faggots to fill up the ditch; and with cheerfull hearts, as though the victory were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped; which was the top of a hill, rising gently from a level. The quantity of one thousand paces. Hither the Galles hastened with all expedition: and to the intent the Romans might not have so much time as to put on their Armour, the Galles for haste ran themselves out of breath.

Sabinus incouraging his souldiers, gave the sign of battel; and sallying out at two severall gates of his Camp upon the enemy, who were hindered with their loads of rubbish, it fell out that through the opportunity of the place, the wearinesse and unexperience of the Enemy, the valour of the Roman souldier, and their exercise infor-

mer battels, that the Galles could not indure the brunt of the first encounter, but presently besook themselves to flight. Ours being fresh and lusty pursued after and slew great numbers of them: then chasing their horse, suffered very few of them to save themselves by flight. And so it happened, that at one time Sabinus had news of the overthrow at Sea, and Cæsar of Sabinus victory by Land. Upon these victories all the Cities and States yielded themselves to Titurius: for as the Galles are prompt to undertake a warre; so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.

OBSERVATION.

His practice of a counterfeit fear was often put in use by the Roman Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an Enemy, as to draw them into an inconvenience, and so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battel. Cæsar coming to succour the camp of Cicero, made such use of this Art, that he put to rout a great Army of the Galles with a handfull of men, which I will refer unto the place where it is particularly set down by Cæsar.

The chiefest thing in this place which brought them to their overthrow was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in business of small consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the mind shall dispose her self to one only intent, and in the upshot meet with a counterbuffe to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceed in a course of victory, and humour our conceits with that we wish and would have to happen, and in the end meet either with bondage or death, must our best wits be appalled, having neither respite nor means to think how the evil may be best prevented? Which the wise Romans well understood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shamefull cowardise, by such as knew not the secrets of wildome; while they in the mean time forelaw their good fortunes, shrowded under the cloak of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a Leader so to take the opportunity of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the design, as for his own safety, and the security of his Army. For order is as the sinews and strength of martiall discipline, uniting the particular members into the firm composition of a well-proportioned body: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited parts, how able or infinite soever.

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Let these examples instruct a Leader so to take the opportunity of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the design, as for his own safety, and the security of his Army. For order is as the sinews and strength of martiall discipline, uniting the particular members into the firm composition of a well-proportioned body: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited parts, how able or infinite soever.

I might here alledge infinite examples to confirm this truth: but let the battel of *Drenx* serve for all; wherein the Protestants, overcharging the Catholick Army, followed the retreat to hard, that they quickly became Matters of the field; and then neglecting martiall discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victory more glorious by slaughter and mortality. The Duke of *Guise* all this while budged not a foot; but in unexampled patience kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their Generall that was taken, untill the regiment of the Prince of *Condé* was likewise dispersed and broken: and then perceiving no difference of order between the victor Protestant and the vanquished Catholick, he dissolved that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspence, and so changed the fortune of the day, that he took the chieftest of their Princes prisoners, with little or no losse of his own men: So powerfull is order in the deeds of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victory. And thus we have first seen the inconveniences which a counterfeit fear, well dissimled, may cast upon a credulous and unadvised enemy, when pretence and appearance had brought them into an error, which their own credulity doth afterward avouch: and secondly, what strength and safety consisteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw down, and to set up.

CHAP. IX.

The proceedings of *Cæsar* in Aquitania.

Cæsar.

AT the same instant of time it happened also, that *Pub. Crassus* coming into Aquitania (which both in regard of the large extension of the Countrey, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make warre in those parts where *L. Valerius Præconius* the Legate was slain, and the Army overthrowen, and where *Lucius Manlius* was faine to fly, with the losse of his carriages; he thought that his affaires required no mean diligence: and therefore having made provision of Corn, and mustered many Auxiliary forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men by name from *Tolouse*, *Carcaſſone*, and *Narbonne*, cities bordering upon the province, he carried his Army into the confines of the *Sontiates*. Which was no sooner known, but they levied great forces both of horse and foot, and with their horse, in which their principall strength consisted, charged upon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as ours followed the retreat, suddenly the infantry of the *Gallies* showed it self in a Val-

* *Evocat.*

ley as it lay in ambush. These setting upon the Romans renewed the battel, and there the fight continued hot a long time. The *Sontiates* being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitania rely upon their virtue; and the Romans on the other side desired to shew what they were able to do of themselves, without their grand Captain, and under the conduct of a young souldier. At length the enemy overwaged with provesse, and wearied with wounds, betook themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number, and then marched directly to the town of the *Sontiates*, and laid siege unto it: the siege grew hot, the Romans approaching the walles with vines, towers, and mounts. The townsfolk defended themselves sometimes by sallying out, sometimes by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the Aquitani are very skilfull. But when they perceived the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated *Crassus* to accept their rendry. Which being granted, and all the Army intending the delivery of their Armes, *Agantuanus* their chief Magistrate fled out in the meantime at another port of the City, with six hundred devoted companions, whom they called *Soldurii*; whose manner is, to enjoy all good things in common with those whom they have chosen for their friends; and if any misfortune befall them, either to dy with them, or presently kill themselves: neither was it ever known in the memory of man, that any of them refused to dy when his friend was slain. But as they attempted to escape, the souldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his evasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betook themselves to Armes, and so after a sharp conflict repelled him again into the town; where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissive multitude; which was granted. *Crassus*, having taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the *Vocates* and *Tarulates*.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THese skilfull and experienced men which *Crassus* sent for out of all the Cities in Aquitania, were those whom the Romans called *Evocati*, such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their laws from giving their names in musters, either by reason of their yeares, or the magistracy which they had borne, or for some other causes which gave them that privilege: and in that regard were sent for by Letters, intreating their assistance in the carriage of that war,

as men well acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferior to the Centurions for advice and direction, although they had no part in command or authority.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this fight we may further observe their manner of defence against Mounts and Cavaliers; which we find chiefly to be Mines. *Josephus* in the Jewish war saith, that the Romans having raised an exceeding high mount, the Jews undermined the same with such Arts that as they digged underneath, they supported the Mount with huge props and planks that it might not shrink: and watching a time of greatest advantage, they set all the timber-work which underpropped the mount on fire; which taking fire with the help of Brimstone and Pitch, the Mount fell upon a sudden, to the great terrour & amazement of the Romans.

Lib. 7. de Bello Gall.

At the siege of *Atvaricum*, we find how the *Gallies* by undermining did take the earth from the Mount, as fast as it was carried unto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it unfeittall. But if it were for the most part made of wood, or other combustible matter, they fought then by all means to burn it; as it happened at the siege of *Masilis*: and oftentimes when both burning and undermining failed, they confronted it with another Mount within the walles, to disappoint the disadvantage by equall contesting of it, and so made it unprofitable.

Concerning Mines, thus much may I say without prejudice to that Art, that the chieftest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a designed place; which is best got by instrument, and help of Geometry, where other marks of certainty are wanting. Secondly, the direction of the Mine, that we may not erre in our course which the Compass affordeth. Thirdly, the strengthening of the Mine with timber-work, if need require. Lastly, the countermining and cross-meeting. All which parts have very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse than may be thought pertinent for this place.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe strange contract between these *Soldurii* and their Chieftain may well deserve a place amongst these observations: especially considering the obligatory conditions which either party stood bound to observe: for the Captain was to make his *Soldurii* partakers of all his happiness in this life, in regard whereof they were to take care of whatsoever ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall misery, took hold of their head,

these devoted were tied voluntarily to follow him the self-same way: neither in any memory was there (saith he) ever man found that refused to dy, if he to whom he was devoted chanced to be slain. Which bloody league of amity as it was repugnant to the course of Nature, multiplying particular destiny to a generall calamity; so was it dangerous in a well-ordered State, if the Ring-leader were either ambitious, or sought to practice any thing contrary to good government: for he himself would presume much upon the assistance of his *Soldurii*; and they on the other side must needs wish well to his attempts, that were to be interested in his life and death.

CHAP. X.

The *Gallies* raise new forces against *Crassus*.

THe barbarous *Gallies* were much troubled, that a town of that strength both by nature and art should so soon be taken; and therefore they sent Embassadors into all quarters, conjured one with another, confirmed their covenants with mutuall hostages, and levied what power they were able to make; sending for aid out of Spain, and from other States that bordered upon Aquitania. At the coming of these forces they began to make warre with a great power, and with many souldiers of great fame: for they appointed such Leaders as had seen the experience of *Sertorius* his warres, and were great in the opinion of men for their skill and knowledge in the Art Militarie. These, according to the custome of the people of Rome, began to take places of advantage, to fortifie their Camp, and to intercept the Romans from free passage of convoies, and necessary intercourses. Which when *Crassus* perceived, and considering withall that his own forces were so few that he could not well dismember them upon any service or advantage, and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding a sufficient garrison in his Camp, by which means corn and provision would in time grow scarce with him, whilst the enemy waxed every day stronger; he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to give them battel.

The matter being referred to a Council of warre, when he understood that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to give them battel: and in the dawning putting his men in a double battel, and placing the Auxiliary forces in the middest, he attended to see what the enemy would do. The *Gallies*, although they were perswaded that they might ad-

Observations upon Cæsars

venture battel, both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowess of warre, as also in respect of the paucity of the Romans; yet they thought it better to block up the passages, and so cut off all carriages and convoies of corn, and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of Corn should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with travell, heavily laden with their burthens, and dejected in their spirits. This resolution being approved by the whole Councell of the Galles, when the Romans imbatelled their forces, they kept their men within their Camp.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Sertorius. This Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna, and when Sylla had overthrown both the elder and younger Marius, he fled into Spain, and there maintained the quarrell on foot against Pompey and Metellus, and overthrew them in many battels: but in the end was treacherously slain by Perpanna at a banquet. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; and under him were these Captains brought up which Cæsar commendeth for their skill in Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Two means to achieve victory and to overcome our enemies. In histories propounding to our consideration the deeds and monuments of former ages, we may observe two especial means which the great Commanders of the world have entertained to achieve victory, and over-matter their enemies: the first by cunning and wise carriage of a matter before it come to trial by blows; the second by forceable means and waging of battel: the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soul; and the other depending upon the strength and ability of the body.

Concerning the first, it hath ever been held more honourable, as better futing the worth of the spirit and the divine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the adverse part may be weakened by wit, and prevented in the projects of their better fortunes by anticipation of means and occasions, and so through advantages taken from their own proceedings, to be driven to that exigent which may determine of the controversy before they come to blows, and conclude the matter by terms of Art taken from the directions of good providence. For to speak a truth, the action of battel, as it is the last part in that faculty, so it is the worst in regard of Christian duty, and better fitteth the progeny of Iamach his second wife (which the Divines do note to be born to the ruine and destruction of mankind) then the children of grace, whose joy consisteth in peace and love.

Cæsar in the first of the Civile wars respected

the same thing, but from other grounds: for having shut up Afranius and Petreus in a place of disadvantage, so as he might have cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victory coming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captains that were earnest upon the enemy; *Cui, etiam secundo pralio, aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritis milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur?* Why should he lose any of his souldiers in battel, though he got the day? why should he suffer those to be wounded who had deserved so highly at his hands? or why should he hazard his good fortune? And this course did these Galles take which under Sertorius had learned the Roman Art, and the Roman industry: and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romans at their own weapon.

This first means is principally to be embraced, as the safest way in these uncertain and casual events: for that which reflecteth upon corporall strength, and maketh execution the means to a conclusion, is very terrible even to the better party, full of hazard, and of little certainty. For it were a miracle of Fortune never heard of yet, so to carry a battel upon what advantage or means soever, that the victor Army should buy so great a fortune without bloodshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophy to Honour at the sole cost of the Enemy, without losse or expence of his own treasure.

And for the uncertainty in a battel, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in every small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that partie, and make both sides unconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and fear, joy and sorrow? And therefore Cæsar thought it not best to tempt the waywardnesse of Fortune, when by other means he might obtain his desires.

This, I say, is chiefly to be embraced, if our means will afford us that happiness: but howsoever I hold it wilddone so to entertain this course of victory, that we omit not the chiefest helps of furtherance when it cometh to blows; but to think of this conquest by art and wit, as necessary if our means will serve us to compass it; & of the other, as necessary whether we will or no: for the history maketh it plain, that when Brutus found himself destitute of means to undertake that course of victory which proceeded from providence and discreet carriage, he then betook himself necessarily to the latter, and by the help of battel fought to free himself from those disadvantages into which the Galles had brought him.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

I observe further out of this place, that what course soever be taken, a discreet Leader will not

Lib. III.

Commentaries.

Not to forsake an advantage.

not easily forgoe an advantage without great assurance of a better fortune, nor change the certainty of a benefit upon probabilities of other hopes, until it have paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to perform. For so he might forgo his fortune, by presuming too much upon the favour of future chances, which are often seen to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

Further I observe this double battel to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their usual manner was to make a triple battel, that the first might have a second and a third help; but where their number would not afford that commodity, they then made two battels, that there might be the succour of a second supply. But they never fought with one single battel, for ought that may be gathered by their histories.

THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

The place where forces are best bestowed in battel.

The last thing which I observe is the place where Cæsar bestowed the Auxiliary forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battel, which is here said to be in *medium Aciem*; for as their Army were divided into three battels, so every battel was divided into three parts, the two cornets and the battel, wherein these Auxiliary forces were in this service bestowed: of these he afterward faith, that inasmuch as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serve the Romans in time of battel with stones and weapons, and to carry earth and turf to the Mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battel, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battel hath not such scope to sling out, or take advantage of place to do mischief, as the cornets have: for wheresoever there have been set battels fought, the strength of their Army consisted always in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battel; and as long as these stood sound, the victory went always certain on that part; for the cornets both kept the enemy from incompassing about the body of their Army, and had the advantage also of charging upon the open side of their adversary.

At the battel of Cannæ, Hannibal put the weakest of his forces in the battel, and advancing them towards the enemy left the two cornets behind: so that when the enemy came to charge upon the battel, they easily beat them back, and as they followed the retreat fell in between the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Army consisted; and being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and overthrown. And thus we see the advantage which a Generall hath when his

two cornets stand firm, although the battel shrink in the encounter. Hannibal in the battel he had with Scipio in Africk placed the Strangers in the front and in the rereward; according peradventure as he found their number, and the use of their Armes: which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather upon the judgement of a Generall, then of any prescription that can be given in this matter.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar taketh the Camp of the Galles; and with their overthrow endeth that warre.

Cæsar understanding their drift, and finding his men chearfull and willing to fight, the whole army crying out that they would stay no longer, but immediately set upon the enemies in their camp, encouraged his souldiers, and to the contentment of all men went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill up the ditch, and others with casting weapons to beat the Galles from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliary forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the souldiers that fought, and to carry earth and turf to the Mount, that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, & to cast their weapons from the higher ground to the great hurt of the Roman souldier, the horsemen in the meantime riding about the Camp of the Galles, brought word to Cæsar, that the rampier at the Decumane port was not fortified with such diligence as they found it in other places, but would admit an easy entrance. Cæsar dealt earnestly with the Commanders of the horse to encourage their men with great promises and rewards, and instructed them what he would have done. They, according to their instructions, took four cohorts that were left in the Camp fresh and noway tired, and carrying them a further way about, that they might not be discovered by the Enemy, while all mens eyes and minds were intent upon the fight, they speedily came to the place of the fortifications which the horsemen had found to be weak; which being easily broken down, they had entered the Camp before the Enemy either saw them or could tell what was done. And then a great clamour and shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renewing their force, as it falleth out alwayes in hope of victory, began to charge them afresh with great fury. The Galles being

circumvented on each side, and despairing of their safety, casting themselves over the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But forasmuch as the Countrey was open and champaign, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of fifty thousand which came out of Aquitania and Spain, there scarce remained the fourth part.

Upon the news of this fight the most part of the Aquitani yielded to Cæsar, and of their own accord gave him hostages: amongst these were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preiciani, Vocates, Tarusates, Elulates, Garites, Ausci, Garummi, Siburzates, and Cocalates. Only some few that lived farther off, trusting upon the coming on of winter, held off and did not submit themselves.

OBSERVATION.

Lib. 3.
Avertimen-
to secundo.

FROM this place *Brancatio* taketh occasion to dispute, how an Enemy that is strongly incamped, and for some advantage will not remove, may be dislodged whether he will or no. A point of great consequence in matter of warre, and therefore deserveth due consideration. Concerning which he layeth this down for a maxim; that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot; and that camps and lodgings are taken by the head. By which is meant, that he who purpoeth to win a fortresse well manned and provided, must first get the foot, and take hold of the ditch, and then seize himself upon the rampier, and to get the place: for he saith that mounts and eminent elevations are of little use against fortresses or scones, unless they over-top them; which may be easily prevented, by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtain in flank, according as the enemy shall carry his mounts aloft; and so they shall never come to over-top the holds. But all Camps and lodgings are taken by the head; that is, by mounts and elevations, which by the advantage of their height command the champaign: for he holdeth it impossible to raise a mount within the Camp in so short a time, to contend that which the enemy shall make without.

Lib. de bel-
lic Gallico.

This foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discover a way how to raise a mount, maugre the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillery, or murder them all within their trenches. And thus he taketh from Cæsar at the siege of *Gergobin*. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like unto the line which the Germanians call *Helicall*. By this double ditch he maketh his approach to any place of most advantage, where he may in a night raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to play upon any quarter of the Camp. The nature of this practice I referre to our judicious souldiers,

who may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in *Brancatio* himself. Thus much I dare affirm in the behalf of these works, that they were of high estimation amongst the Romans, whom daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to find out the readiest means both for security and victory. And if our souldiers could be brought to take the commodity of these works, either by persuasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practices: but our men had rather fly upon desperate adventures, and seek victory in the jaws of death, than to clear all hazard with pains and diligence.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar undertaketh the warre with the *Morini* and *Morini*.

At the same time also, although the Sommer was almost at an end, yet forasmuch as all Gallia was in peace, and the *Morini* only with the *Menapii* stood out in Armes, and had never either sent Embassadors, or otherwise treated of Peace; Cæsar thinking that war might quickly be ended, led his Army into their Countrey. At his coming he found them to carry their warres farre otherwise then the rest of the *Galles* had done: for understanding that the greatest Nations of Gallia, which had waged battel with the Romans, were beaten and overthrown; and having whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conveyed both themselves and their goods into those quarters. Cæsar coming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortify his Camp, not discovering any enemy near about him; but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods, and assaulted the Romans; but being speedily driven in again, with the losse of many of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, they had some few of their men slain.

The time that remained Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting down the woods: and lest the souldiers might be taken unawares while they were busied in that work, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut down on either side of the Army, that they might serve for a defence against sudden assaults. A great quantity of ground was thus rid within a few dayes, so that their goods and cattell was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened such a continuall rain, as forced them to leave off

off the work; and the souldiers could no longer indure to ly in tents of skinnes: and therefore Cæsar, after he had washed and spoiled their Countrey, burned their towns and their houses, carried back his Army, and placed them amongst the *Auleri*, *Lexovii*, & in other cities to winter in, which were subdued in the late wars.

OBSERVATION.

THE *Irish* rebels having the like commodity of woods and bogges, do entertain the like course of warre as the *Morini* did with Cæsar. The means which he used to disappoint them of that practice was, to cut down the woods; which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of war, let them consider that the Roman discipline wrought greater effects of valour, then can be made credible by the use of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of it self was able to frame patterns of unexampled magnanimities, their industry was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such unceasing travell, that the souldiers thought it great happinesse when they came to wage battel with the Enemy; and could have meanes to quit their continuall travell with the hazard of their lives.

Neither let it seem strange that the Romans undertook to cut down the woods; but rather let us admire their facility in so difficult a task: for as the history witnesseth, *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*, a great quantity of ground was rid in a few dayes, with incredible speed. And after the woods were cut down, they took more paines in placing it on each side of the legions to hinder any suddain assault, then they did in cutting it down: which deserveth as great admiration as the former part. There is another place in the sixth book of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serve to acquaint us with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The *Eburones*, or the men of *Liege*, had the like commodity of woods and bogges, and made use of them in the warre they had with Cæsar. The matter, saith he, required great diligence, not so much in regard of the perill of the whole Army (for there could no danger come from an enemy that was frightened and dispersed) as the safety of every particular souldier, which in part did pertain to the welfare of the whole Army. For the desire of a booty carried many of the souldiers farre from the body of the Army; and the woods being full of unknown and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thick together, or close imbatelled. If he desired to have the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to be rooted out, he must of force make many small companies, and divide his men into many bodies: but if he would have the Maniples to keep at their Ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Roman Army required, then the place was a shelter and defence to the enemy. Neither did they want courage to lay Ambushments, and to circumvent such as they found alone straggling from their companies. In these difficulties there was as much done as diligence could do, providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all mens minds were set on fire with revenge) then to hurt the enemy with the losse of the Roman souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the *Eburones*, and they should have all the prey for their labour: that the life of the *Galles* rather then his legionary souldiers, might be hazarded in those woods; as also that with so great a multitude, both the race and name of that people might be quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation which concern the true motion of the *Irish* wars, which may be better observed by such as know those warres by experience, then by my self that understand them only by relation: and therefore to prevent such exceptions as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases, I will leave it to be done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentary.

M

THE

The fourth Commentary of the warres in GALLIA.

The Argument.

U He *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri* are driven to seek new seats in *Gallia*; they drive the *Menapii* out of their territories: but in the end are overthrown by *Cæsar*. That warre being ended, he maketh a bridge upon the *Rhene*, and carrieth his Army over into *Germany*. He taketh revenge upon the *Sicambri*, and giveth liberty to the *Ubii*: returneth into *Gallia*, and carrieth his Army over into *Britannie*; with the occurrences of that warre.

CHAP. I.

* Those of the * *Uspetes* and * *Tenchtheri* bring great multitudes of people over the *Rhene* into *Gallia*. The nature of the *Suevi*, of *Italia*.

Cæsar. **U** He winter following, Pompey and *Craffus* being *Consuls*, the *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri*, two German nations, passed over the *Rhene* with great multitudes of people, not farre from the place where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their sitting was, the ill inweat which for many years together they had received of the *Suevi*, the greatest and warlikest nation amongst the Germans. For these *Suevi* had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearly furnished their warres with a thousand men apiece; and kept as many at home to maintain both themselves and their Armies abroad: and these the year following were in *Armes*, and the other stayed at home and performed the like duty; and so by this means they all continued their experience both of tillage and matter of warre. No man had any ground proper to himself, neither might they abide longer then a year in one place. They lived chiefly upon cattell and milk, and used much hunting; which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continuall exercise, and liberty of life, being never brought up to any calling or ieyed to any discipline, nor urged to anything against their disposition) that they were strong and of a large stature: and they had used themselves so to it, that they never cared for any cloathing in the coldest place they came in, more then skins and hides, which covered

but part of their body, the rest being naked: and they wash their bodies usually in the rivers. They have merchants that frequent their ports, not so much to bring them any commodities from abroad, as to buy the prey and spoil they take in warre. And whereas the *Gallies* take much delight in oxen and other beasts, and stick not to give any price for them; the Germans care not for the bringing of them amongst them, but rather use their own mishapen ugly cattel, which by daily inuring they bring to perform any service. Their horsemen oftentimes in time of battel forsook their horse, and fought on foot; their horses being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might return unto them. Neither was there any thing accounted more base, or uselesse in the course of their life, then to use furniture for horses: and therefore they would adventure to charge upon great troups of horse that used Equipage, with a few of their own quality. They admitted no wine to be brought in unto them, least it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them unapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion was, to have their bordering Territories ly waste and desolate: for so it would be thought that many States together could not resist their conquering valour: and it was reported that the countrey lay waste from the *Suevi* one way six hundred miles together.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practice of the *Suevi* it appeared, how little a naked resolution of valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral caci-

age and civile discretion, to make use of that greatnesse which prowesse hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike and of good ability, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it forced to no other end then to maintain barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; whereas true valour is always subordinate to the preservation of Commonweals, and is as the defensive Armes of civile society. Which I have the rather noted, inasmuch as it resembleth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular hauiour of our young Gallants; whose naked valour revealing it self only in the lie and in the stabbs, for want of other assittant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a metall, leadeeth them into such inconveniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof into giddy-headed rashnesse; and in lieu of vertues guerdon, is repaid with irrisiō.

CHAP. II.

The motives inducing the *Uspetes* to come over the *Rhene* into *Gallia*.

Cæsar. **U** Ext unto these *Suevi* inhabited the *Ubii*, a very ample and potent State: and through their intercourse and traffick with merchants, being seasoned also with the manners of the *Gallies* their neighbours, somewhat more civil then the rest of the Germans. With these the *Suevi* had often waged battel: and albeit they could not expel them out of their countrey forasmuch as their State was very great and populous; yet by continuall incursions they brought them under, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri* before mentioned: for having made head against the *Suevi* for many years together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions, and wandering the space of three years through the Continent of Germany, at last they arrived where the * *Menapii* inhabited the banks on either side the river *Rhene*: who being terrified with the arrivall of such a multitude, forsook all their dwellings beyond the river, and planted themselves on this side of the waters, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

* Geldres and Cleve.

The *Uspetes* with their associates having tried all means, and nor finding themselves able to passe over by force for want of boats, nor by stealth by reason of the diligent watch of the *Menapii*, gained a retreat to their old habitation: and after three dayes journey, their horsemen in one night speedily returned again, and slew the *Menapii* both unguarded and unprovided, For

they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to return over the river into their towns and houses. These being slain and their shipping taken, they got over the river before the rest of the *Menapii* had any notice of their coming: by which means they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that winter upon the provision they found there.

Cæsar understanding of these things, and fearing the weaknesse of the *Gallies*, inasmuch as they are sudden and quick in their resolutions, and withall desirous of novelty, he durst no way trust their unconstancy: for it was their practice and custome to stay travellers and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about Merchants in faires and markets, and learn of them whence they came, and what news they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearsayes they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but soon repent themselves being grounded upon such weak intelligence as was usually coined to please the multitude. Which circumstance being known, *Cæsar* to prevent a greater warre, hastened to his Army sooner then he was wont to do.

OBSERVATION.

SUCH as have spent their time in the contemplation of Nature, and have made diligent search of the temperature and quality of climates and nations, have all with one consent made *Choler* the Regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people with such attributes as the said humour usually breedeth. Neither have these conditions which *Cæsar* so long ago observed in the ancient *Gallies*, any disresemblance from that which the learned of this age have delivered concerning the nature of the said inhabitants; but that irrefoluble constitution, which breeds such novelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same unto these times in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes and people, or what else so long a time hath changed: which argueth the unresistible power of celestiall influence, establishing an uniformity of nature, according as the site of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The reason of the diversity in the temperature of nations which are differenced by North and South, is not without apparent cause attributed to their propinquity or distance from the course of the sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern and Southern climates of the earth, and separateth the inhabitants thereof by the dominion of their active qualities. But the reason why two Nations which are both in the same

M 2 climate,

Observations upon Cæsars

climate, and under the same parallel, receiving the virtue of the celestiall bodies by the same downfall and rebound of their beams, being differenced only by East and West, are so much united in nature, and so unlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be, as some have imagined, forasmuch as the all-inclosing sphere, which remaineth quiet and immoveable above the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diversly distinguished with variety of properties, which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth, and so keep a perpetuall reidency of one and the same quality in one and the same place, and make also the variety of fashions in such parts as otherwise are equall favourites of the heavens majesty, by receiving an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the said quarters of the earth are in themselves diversly noted with severall qualities, which appropriate the self-same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other unknown cause: I will leave every man to satisfy himself with that which seemeth most probable unto him, and proceed to the discovery of this cholerick passion. Wherein I will endeavour to shew how impatiency, sudden resolution, and desire of novelty, are naturall adjuncts of this humour. And if Cæsar made use of this Philosophy in the managing of that war, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first I must lay for a maxime that which long experience hath made authentically, that the motions of the mind are either quick or slow, according as the complexion is tempered either with heat or cold: for as the phlegmaticall humour is of a moitt, cold and heavy nature, begetting weak and grosse spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a livelesse disability; so is the motion of the internall faculties proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments whereby it moveth: and therefore men of this waterish constitution are no way apt to receive an impression, nor to entertain any sensible apprehension, unless it be beaten into them with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceed as slowly in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choice of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flava bilis*, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the active vertue of the fire, doth so purify the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the vivacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented unto them with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the Species is so readily received, and possesseth the apprehending faculty with such facility of entrance, that it moveth the other powers of the soul with as great efficacy at

the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troupes of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of undoubted truth. It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtle and fit disposition of the instruments, which proceedeth from heat the chiefest quality in choler) that the object is at the first moment so strongly settled in the first receiving faculty, that the other powers of the mind with as great speed manifest their offices concerning the apprehension, and deliver a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them to impatient of delay, and so suddenly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discourive power to examine the substance thereof by conference of circumstances, nor to give judgement according to the course of the intellectuall court. It becometh therefore every man in that unsteady disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, and not to give place to resolution, before his judgement be informed by discourse of the strength or weakness of the conceived opinion.

But to leave these speculative meditations to Philosophers of learned conceit; forasmuch as the right use of passions is either true wisdom, or cometh nearest to the same; I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best becometh a souldier, or how it availeth or disadvantageeth in matter of war. And first it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sincerity of a good judgement, then this of anger which we now speak of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaseeth it self in his own actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to shew it self, and convince a false pretended cause as the author of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage even against truth and innocency. *Piso* condemned a souldier for returning from foraging without his companion, being perswaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution the other that was missing returned, and with great joy of the whole Army they were carried to the Generall, thinking to have much gratified him with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despayte being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withall, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent: the first because the sentence of death was past against him, and was not to be recalled without the breach of law: the second for that he was the cause of the death of his companion: and thirdly the executioner, for not obeying his commandment.

Concerning matter of war, as it consisteth of differenced parts, so hath choler divers effects. In case of discourse and consultation, whenas the powers of the mind ought to be clear of all violent

Lib. III.

Salust.

lent affections, it greatly darkeneth the understanding, and troubleth the sincerity of a good judgement, as Cæsar noted in his speech to the Senate concerning *Catiline*: and therefore a Commander must by all means endeavour to avoyd even the least motions of so hurtfull a passion, and season his affections with that gravity and constancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may either hinder his understanding, or withhold his will from following that course, which reason appointeth as the best means to a fortunate success; always remembering that all his actions are presented upon a stage, and passe the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud grave and patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdom, and disallow of passionate and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how just soever otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and fury of battell, I take anger to be a necessary instrument to set valour on foot, and to overwage the difficulties of terror with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of the mind stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to be the fittest means to advance the valiant carriage of a battell; for as fear is treacherous and unsafe, so anger is confident and of an unquenchable heat. And therefore a Commander ought by all means to suggest matter of anger against an Enemy, that his men may behold them with a wrathfull regard, and thirst after the day of battell, to satisfy their fury with the blood of their adversaries. If any urge that it hath been heretofore observed of the *Galles*, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the later end they were lesse then women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for service, as we seem to make it: I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was observed in the *Galles*, and the passion of anger well kindled in the mind: for the first is subject to alteration and contrariety of actions; but the other is furious, invincible, never satisfied but with revenge. And so that of *Aristotle* is proved true, that anger serveth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue: wherunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature; for we do manage other weapons, and this doth manage us; our hand guideth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth us, & not we it, as it happened in the reign of *Tiberius* amongst the mutinous legions at *Vetera*: and therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom he maketh the object of that anger which kindleth in his Army. For as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regard of obedience, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his souldiers.

But to leave this hasty matter, and fall nearer

Commentaries.

that which we seek after: I may not omit the Prognostication which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the naturall disposition of the people; the event whereof proved the truth of his predictions: which sheweth what advantage a learned Generall that hath been somewhat instructed in the school of Nature, hath gained of him whom only experience hath taught the active rudiments of the war, and thinketh of no further lesson in that art, then that which the office of a Serjeant or Lancaprefado containeth.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar cometh to his Army, marcheth towards the Germans, and by the way treateth of conditions of Peace.

Cæsar being come to his Army, found that to have happened which he before suspected: for some of the States of Gallia had sent messengers unto the Germans, to leave the banks of Rhene, and to come further into the Continent, where they should find ready whatsoever they desired. Whereupon the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the land as farre as the confines of the *Eburones* and the *Condrusi*, who were under the protection of the *Treviri*. The Princes of the *Galles* being called together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered concerning their revolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their loyalty, he commanded certain troupes of horse to be levied, and resolved to make war upon the Germans; and having made provision of corn, he directed his march towards them. From whom, as he was on the way within a few dayes journey of their Camp, he received this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make war upon the Romans first, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood if they were justly provoked; for their ancient custome was to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet thus much they would confesse, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driven by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the law of Armes, they might prove profitable friends unto them. They only yielded to the *Suevi*, to whom the Gods in fear of Armes were inferior; any other Nation they would easily conquer.

To this Cæsar answered, what he thought fit; but the purpose of his speech was, That he could

Tacit.
1. Annal.

could not make any league with them if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable that they that could not keep their own, would get possessions out of other mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome amongst the Ubii, whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the injury of the Suevi, and desiring aid against them; thus much he himself would intreat of the Ubii. The messengers went back with these Mandates, promising within three dayes to return again to Cæsar: in the mean time they desired him not to bring his Army any nearer their quarters. Which request Cæsar denied. For understanding that a few dayes before a great part of their Cavalry were passed over the Mota to the Ambivariti, there to pillage and get provisions, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the return of their horsemen.

The river Mota hath its rise from the mount Vogelius in the dominions of the Lingones, and having run farre, it receiveth the river Wallis, which is a part of the Rhene: these two joining make the island of the Batavi: fourscore miles below which it falleth into the sea. The Rhene ariseth amongst the Lepontii, a people inhabiting the Alpes; and after a tedious course through the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci and Treviri, drawing near the sea, it divides into severall branches, and so makes many considerable islands, most of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous people, some whereof live only upon fish and the eggs of birds: after this the river empties it self at severall mouthes into the Ocean.

When Cæsar was come within twelve miles of their Camp, their Ambassadors returned, and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them. But being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those troupes of horse which marched before the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter: and that he would give them leave to send messengers to the Ubii: of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and Senate would swear faith and safe continuance unto their people: neither would they require more then three dayes to negotiate this business. Cæsar conceived this intreaty to import nothing else then the return of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within three dayes; notwithstanding he promised them to march but four miles

further that day, to a convenient watering-place, and bade that a considerable number of them should come thither to him next day, that he might know what they desired: in the mean time he sent to the Commanders of the horse that were before, not to provoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustain the charge untill he came nearer with the Army.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe his dissembling of the practice of the Galles with the Germans; and the encouragement which he gave them in a faithfull and loyall affection to the people of Rome, when he himself knew they had started from that duty which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for he well understood that his presence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; and therefore to have objected unto them their errors, had not been to heal, but to discover their wound. Only he took the way to cut off their hopes of any practices which they might attempt against the Roman people; and held them in the mean time in the appearance of faithfull friends, that they might not be discouraged by the detection of their revolt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, upon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans if they continued on this side the Rhene, we may observe how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such contents and denials, as might manifest his readiness to further what he made shew of, and not weaken the means of his best advantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewell of Gallia, and plant themselves in the possessions of the Ubii; so was he loath to yield to any condition which might disadvantage his forcible constraint, or weaken his command, if persuasion failed: for he well knew that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a parlee, then any other motive how reasonable soever.

Moreover we may observe how careful he was not to impose upon the Germans a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by proposing unto them the allocation of the Ubii) by which they might avoid the hazard of battel. Which thing was alwayes observed by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neither of those noble instruments whereby man worketh such wonders (I mean the hand and the tongue) had ever brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, unless they had been forced there-

therunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict upon a violent guard, we give occasion to the Enemy, by the way of Antipertus, to redouble his strength, and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which Cæsar Mæcius calleth ultimum and maximum telum, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appear by these examples.

Some few of the Sannites, contrary to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, having made incursions into the territories of the Roman confederats, the Senate of that State sent to Rome to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction. But being rejected, Claudius Pontius General of their forces, in an excellent Oration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not hearken to peace, but chose rather to be revenged by war; and therefore necessity constrained them to put on Arms: *Justum est bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in Armis spes est*. That war is just which is necessary; and it is piety in those men to take up arms, who have no hope but in taking up arms. The issue thereof was, that the Sannites intrapped the Romans in a place of advantage, so that they were forced upon dishonourable terms to save their lives, as it is at large in the ninth book of Livie.

Caius Manlius conducting the Roman legions against the Veiis, part of the Veian Army had entered the Roman Camp; which Manlius perceiving, he haisted with a band of men to keep the breach, and to shut in the Vei: which they no sooner perceived, but they fought with that rage and fury that they slew Manlius; and had overthrown the whole Camp, had not a Tribune opened them a passage by which they fled away.

In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Roman Captains, being entered into the City of the Veiis, that he might take it with greater facility, and dilarme the Enemy of that terrible weapon of necessity, he caused it to be proclaimed, that no Veian should be hurt that was found unarmed. Whereupon every man cast away his weapon, and so the town was taken without bloodshed.

Let a souldier therefore take such hold of occasions and opportunities as are offered unto him, that in time of battel he may seem to cast necessity upon his own cause, and retain it in his pay: considering how the power thereof altereth the works of Nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations; being never subject to any ordinance or law, and yet making that lawfull which proceedeth from it.

CHAP. III.

The Germans, contrary to their own request made to Cæsar, set upon the Roman horsemen, and overthrow them.

Notwithstanding the Germans request Cæsar concerning the truce, as soon as they saw the Roman horsemen, which were in number five thousand (whereas the Germans had not above eight hundred horse, those that went over the Mota to forrage not being yet returned) they charged upon the Romans not expecting any hostile encounter, inasmuch as their Ambassadors were newly departed from Cæsar, and had obtained that day of truce: but being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their usuall custom, forsook their horse, and fighting on foot ran our horses into the bellies, and overthrew many of our men, so that they easily put the Romans to flight; who never looked back, untill they came into the sight of the legions. In that battel were slain 74 Roman horsemen, & amongst the rest Piso an Aquitane, a valiant man, and born of noble parentage, whose grandfather was the chief ruler in his city, and called friend by the Roman Senate. This Piso seeing his brother compassed about by the enemy, brake in upon them and rescued him: but having his horse wounded under him in the action, and being dismounted, he fought stoutly on foot, still such time as the enemy hemm'd him in, and gave him severall wounds; then he fell down. Which his brother seeing as farre off (for he had left the battel) he clapp'd spurs to his horse, and rushing upon the throng to rescue him, was there slain.

After this battel Cæsar thought it not safe either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and meant nothing but warre: And to attend any longer untill their horsemen returned, was but to give them that advantage against him, especially considering the weaknesse of the Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this battel had gained great reputation; and therefore he durst not give them space to think upon it.

OBSERVATION.

This cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speak somewhat concerning that main controverie of policies, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great Commanders are alwayes to be attended with integrity and faithfull accomplishment thereof. Wherein I will only set down such arguments and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honesty on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christian mind) and the daily practice of States-men on

* Colonia Agrippina.

* Wall.

Pons
auræa
facta
est
hoste

Vinctur
laqueis
fugulo qui
provocat
hostem.

on the other side, alledge to make good their contrary assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend virtue in a shew, and not in *esse* and being, and study to maintain their states only with humane reason, not regarding the authority of divine ordinance, let this down as a *maxime* in their Art; That he that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end forcing to his contentments, must in all respects be like qualified, both in judgement and disposition, as the party is with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared to hold himself strong in the matter, which he undertaketh. For a wrangler that cometh with mere strength to encounter another that hath both strength and cunning, may bestrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skills, and be laught at as an unworthy Champion for serious sports: in like manner in this universal confusion of infidelity, wherein subtilty flyeth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity of spirit to wind through the labyrinth of falsehood, and avoyd the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and bestrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity. For it is the course that every man taketh which must bring us to the place to which every man goeth: and he that opposeth himself against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceits, and never attain that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore as craft and deceit are so generally, it becometh a man of publick negotiations to carry a mind apt and disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that which ancient writers report of *Achilles*, who was sent to *Chiron* the Centaur, half a man and half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of Princely carriage; that of the brutish part he might learn to strengthen himself with force and courage, and of the humane shape to manage reason, that it might be a fit instrument to answer or prevent whatsoever mans wit might forge to overthrow it. Neither ought a private man to wonder at the strangeness of these positions, considering that the government of kingdoms and Empires is carried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affairs in a well-ordered State: wherein truth-breakers and faithlesse dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they necessarily enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helm of government, and are to shape the course of a State according to the variation of times and fortunes, derive their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferiour subjects are no more capable, then men are able to understand the works of the Gods: and therefore they are called *arcana imperii*, secrets of State, to be revered rather then looked into.

To conclude, the affairs of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small

a compass, that a mean capacity may easily apprehend the advantages or inconveniences which may ensue upon the contract; and therefore it is requisite they should stand to the adventure, and their judgement is worthily taxed with the losse: but the busineses of the Commonweal are both subject to so many casualties of fortune, and rely upon such unexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, how provident soever, to foresee the issue in that variety of chances. Besides that every particular subject is much interested in the fortune of the event, and may justly challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwrack through the error of their Pilot: And so the safety of the State doth balance out the losse of credit in the Government.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirm virtue to be the same both in Prince and people; neither doth condition of state or calling, or the quality of publick or private businesse alter the nature and essence of goodness: for to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity were to break the bond of civill society, which is the basis and ground-plot of all States and Commonweals. They do not deny but that a wise Prince may to carry a treaty, that he may seem to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he may use with great honour the practices and stratagems of war, when the fortune of both parties consisteth upon their own industry: but to break any covenants agreed upon may well get a kingdom, but never honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means whereby a State is continued in happy government: whereof thus much I dare say by the warrant of this History, that he who fallieth his word upon advantage, howsoever he regardeth his honour, had need to pay them home in regard of his own safety: for if they once recover the losse, and get any advantage against those truth-breakers, they will find as little favour as the *German*s did with *Cæsar*.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar marcheth directly to the Camp of the *German*s, and cutteth them all in pieces, and sendeth that warre.

Vpon these considerations, *Cæsar* manifesteth his resolution to the *Legates* and *Questor*, there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next day very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chieftest of the *German*s came unto *Cæsar* into his Camp, to excuse their fraudulent practice, and withall to continue their petition of truce. Whereof *Cæsar* was exceeding glad,

glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camp, commanding his horsemen to follow the *German*s, because they had been daunted with so late an overthrow: And making a triple battell, marched speedily eight miles, and so came upon the *German*s before they had notice what had happened. Who being terrified with our sudden arrivall, and the departure of their own leaders, knew not whether it were their best course to bring forth their forces, or defend their Camp, or otherwise to seek their safety by flight. Which tumult and fear was no sooner perceived by the Roman souldiers, they brake into the Camp, and were at first a little refreshed. In the mean time the women and children (for they had brought all they had over the Rhene) fled everyone away: which *Cæsar* perceiving sent his horsemen to pursue them. The *German*s hearing the clamour and shriekings behind their backs, and seeing their friends pursued and slain, d'd cast away their weapons, forsoke their ensignes, and fled out of the Camp: and coming to the confluence of the Maie and the Rhene, such as had escaped cast themselves into the river: where what through fear, weariness, and the force of the water, they were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man. The number of the enemy was 430000, with women and children. To them whom he had retained in his Camp, he gave leave to depart: but they fearing the cruelty of the *Gall*es for the mischief they had done them, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which *Cæsar* agreed unto.

OBSERVATION.

This relation affordeth little matter of war, but only a severe revenge of hatefull treachery: notwithstanding I will hence take occasion to discover the offices of the *Questor* and the *Legates*; and shew what place they had in the Army. And first concerning the *Questor*, we are to understand that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same Count which was called to create the Generall. His office was to take charge of the publick treasure, whether it came out of their *Barbarum* for the pay of the Army, or otherwise was taken from the enemy.

Of him the souldiers received their stipend, both in corn and money: and what other booties were taken from the enemy, he either kept them or sold them for the use of the Commonweal.

The *Legates* were not chosen by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as Assistants and Coadjutors to the Emperour for the publick service, and were altogether directed by the Generall, in whole attendance they had the absolute com-

mand: and their number was for the most part uncertain, but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Army.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar maketh a bridge upon the Rhene, and carrieth his Army over into Germany.

THe *German* war being thus ended, *Cæsar* thought it necessary to transport his Army over the Rhene into the Continent of Germany for many causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the *German*s were so easily perswaded to bring their Colonies and their vagrant multitudes into Gallia, he thought good to make known unto them, that the Roman people could at their pleasure carry their forces over the Rhene into Germany. Moreover, those troupes of horse which were absent at the late overthrow of the *German*s, being gone as I said before for spoil and provision over the Moselle, after they saw their friends overthrown, were fled into the confines of the *Sicambri*, and joyed with them. To whom when *Cæsar* sent Messengers to demand them to be sent unto him, they answered that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene: and if the *German*s were interdicted Gallia, why should *Cæsar* challenge any authority in their quarters? Lastly the *Ubii*, who amongst all the rest of the *German*s had only accepted of *Cæsar*'s friendship, and given pledges of their fidelity, had made earnest suite unto him to send them aid against the *Suevi*; or at the least to transport his Army over the Rhene: that would serve their turns, that would be help and encouragement enough to them; for the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, and of such fame, what with *Atio*villus overthrow, and this last service, that it sounded honourable amongst the farthest Nations of Germany, so that it was the greatest safety to have them their friends. For these reasons *Cæsar* resolved to passe the Rhene: but to carry his Army over by boat was neither safe, nor for his own honour, nor the majesty of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficulty, by reason of the breadth, swiftnesse and depth of the river, to make a bridge: yet he resolved to try what he could do, otherwise he determined not to passe over at all. And so he built a bridge after this manner.

At two foot distance he placed two trees of a foot and halfe square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the river: these he let down into the water with engines, and drove them in with commanders, not perpen-

dicularly after the fashion of a pile. but gable-wise, and bending with the course of the water: opposite unto these he placed two other trees, joyned together after the same fashion, being forty foot distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottom of the water, and reclining against the course of the river. These two pair of couples thus placed he joyned together with a beam of two foot square, equall to the distance between the said couples, and fastened them at each end on either side of the couples with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the work and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the stream was, and the faster it fell upon the timber-work, the stronger the bridge was united in the couplings and joints. In like manner he proceeded with couples and beams, untill the work was brought unto the other side of the river: and then he laid straight planks from beam to beam, and covered them with hurdles; and so he made a floor to the bridge. Moreover on the lower side of the bridge he drove down supporters, which being fastened to the timber-work, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water: and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boats, or what else the enemy might cast down to trouble the work or hurt the bridge. Within ten dayes that the timber began to be cut down and carried, the work was ended, and the Army transported. Cæsar leaving a strong garison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri. In the mean time Embassadors came to him from many cities desiring peace and the friendship of the Romans: whom Cæsar answered courteously, and required hostages of their fidelity.

OBSERVATION.

IT shall not be amiss to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge, as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Cæsar; whom we may observe to imitate with as great plenty of wit and diligence, in presenting unto us the subtilty of his invention in such manner of handy-works, as upon any other part of his actions; as this particular description of the bridge may sufficiently witness: Besides the fortifications at Alesia, and the intrenchments in Britain, for the safety of his Shippings, with many other works, which he might well record as the greatest deligences of an heroic spirit, and the wonderfull effects of magnanimous industry, that succeeding

ages might not boast either of Art or prowess which his virtue had not expell'd, or otherwise might wonder at that worth which they themselves could not attain unto. And to that purpose he entertained *Varronius* the Father of Architecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that faculty, as his Master Cæsar is in feats of Armes. By whose example a great Commander may learn, how much it importeth the eternity of his fame to beautify his greatest deligences with Art, and to esteem of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall Muses to shew themselves under the shape of a sensible form; which albeit, through the rudeness of the matter, fall far short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beauty expelleth such a majesty of Art, that no time will suffer the memory thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double potts, whereof the first order bending with the stream, and the lower rack against the stream, when they came to be coupled together with overthwart beams, which were fastened in the couplings with braces which he nameth *Fibulas*, the more violent the stream fell upon the works, the faster the joints of the building were united, as may better appear by a modell of that making, then can be expressed by any circumstance of words.

I might hence take occasion to speak of the diversity of bridges, and of the practices which antiquity hath devised to transport Armies over Rivers: but inasmuch as it is a common subject for all that undertake this Military task, and hath been handled by *Lupus* upon the occasion of this bridge, I will refer the Reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, inasmuch as Cæsar made the means correspondent to that end which he intended. For considering that the chiefest end of his passage was, to let the Germans understand that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the Rhene, and that a river could not so separate their territories; but that they were able to joyn both the Continents together, and make a common road-way where it seemed most impassable: he thought it best to passe over his Army by a bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories as united unto Gallia, or to be united at the pleasure of the Romans with a firm *Isthmus*, and plain passage by foot, which in times past had alwayes been separated by a mighty river. Neither would a transportation by boat have wrought that effect, forasmuch as the daily use thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination of an unaccessible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily understand that they were not so

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farre off, but that they might be overtaken, and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to prove that a passage over a river by a bridge is more honourable, safe, and of greater terror to the enemy, then any other way that can be devised; especially if the river carry any depth, such as the Rhene is: otherwise, if it have either shallows or fords, whereby men may wade over without any great incumbrance, it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge, but rather to think of it as of a place incumbered with such hindrances as men often meet with in a march.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh revenge upon the Sicambri: giveth liberty to the Ubii, and returneth again into Gallia.

Cæsar.

UHe Sicambri understanding that Cæsar was making a bridge over the Rhene, prepared themselves to fly; and at the perswasion of the *Ulipetes* & *Tenchtheri* forsook their country, and conveyed themselves and their possessions into woods and solitary Deserts. Cæsar continuing a few dayes in their quarters, having set on fire their villages and houses, and burned up their Corn and provisions, came to the *Ubii*, promising them aid against the *Suevi*: by whom he understood that as soon as the *Suevi* had intelligence that he was about to make a bridge, calling a Councell, according to their manner, they sent unto all quarters of their States that they should forsake their towns, and carry their wives and children and all that they had into the woods; and that all that were able to bear Armes should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their Country; and there they attended the coming of the Romans, and were resolved in that place to give them battle. Which when Cæsar understood, having ended all these things in regard whereof he came into Germany, which was chiefly to terrify the Germans, to be revenged upon the Sicambri, to set the *Ubii* at liberty; having spent in all eighteen dayes beyond the Rhene, and done enough as well in regard of his own honour, as the good of the commonwealth, he returned into Gallia, and brake up the bridge.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a voyage into Britanie: he enquireth of Merchants concerning the nature of that people.

Cæsar.

Although the Summer was almost spent, and that in those parts the winter hastened on apace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolved to go over into Britanie, forasmuch as he understood

that in all the former wars of Gallia, the Enemy had received most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the year would not suffer him to finish that war; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Islands, to understand the quality of the inhabitants, and to know their crafts, their ports, and their landing-places, whereof the Gallies were altogether ignorant; for seldom any man but merchants did travell unto them. Neither had they discovered anything but the sea-coast, and those regions which were opposite unto Gallia. And therefore calling merchants together from all quarters, he neither could understand of what quantity the Island was; what nations or of what power they were that inhabited it; what use or experience of war they had; what laws or customs they used; nor what havens they had to receive a navy of great shipping.

OBSERVATION.

AS the Germans had oftentimes stirred up motions of rebellion amongst the Gallies, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdome; so the Britans had upheld most of their wars, by furnishing them with such supplies as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Cæsar or the Roman people would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable government in Gallia, as they had chafused the insolence of the Germans, and sent them back again with greater losse then gain; so was it necessary to make the Britans know, that their assistance in the war of Gallia would draw more businesse upon them then they were well able to manage. For as I have noted in my former discourses, the causes of an unpeaceable government are as well externall and foreign, as internall and bled in the body; which need the help of a Physician to continue the body in a perfect state of health, & require as great a diligence to qualify their malicious operations, as any internall sicknesse whatsoever.

In the second Commentary I briefly touched the commodity of good discovery: but because it is a matter of great consequence in the fortunate carriage of a war, I will once again by this example of Cæsar remember a Generall not to be negligent in this duty. *Suetonius* in the life of our Cæsar reporteth, that he never undertook any expedition, but he first received true intelligence of the particular site and nature of the Country, as also of the manners and quality of the people; and that he would not undertake the voyage into Britany, untill he had made perfect discovery by himself of the magnitude and situation of the Island. Which *Suetonius* might understand by this first voyage, which Cæsar would needs undertake in the later end of a Summer, although it were, as he himself saith, but to discover.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that governed the world in their time, gave great honour to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of war in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discovery and knowledge of a Country; without which all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in wars, were frivolous and of no effect. And therefore *Xenophon* in the life of *Cyrus* sheweth, that his expedition against the King of *Armenia* was nothing but a repetition of such sports as he had used in hunting. Howsoever, if the infinite examples registered in history, how by the dexterity of some Leaders it hath gained great victories, and through the negligence of others irrecoverable overthrows, are not sufficient motives to persuade them to this duty; let their own experience in matters of small moment manifest the weakness of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they have in hand. But let this suffice in the second place to prove the necessity of good discovery, and let us learn of *Cæsar* what is principally to be inquired after in the discovery of an unknown country: as first, the quantity of the land; secondly, what Nations inhabit it; thirdly, their use of war; fourthly, their civil government; and lastly, what Havens they have to receive a Navy of great shipping. All which circumstances are such principall Arteries in the body of a State, that the discovery of any one of these demands would have given great light concerning the motion of the whole body.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth *C. Volusenus* to discover the coast of *Britanie*; and prepareth himself for that voyage.

Cæsar.

Cæsar sent out *Caius Volusenus* with a Galley to discover what he could concerning these things, with charge that having made perfect discovery, he should return again unto him as speedily as might be: he himself marching in the mean time with all his forces unto the *Morini*; forasmuch as from thence lay the shortest cut into *Britanie*. Thither he commanded that ships should be brought from all the maritime Cities of that quarter, and namely that fleet which he had built the year before for the war at *Vannes*. In the mean time his resolution being known, and carried into *Britanie* by Merchants and others, many private States of that Island sent Embassadors unto him, promising him hostages of their loyalty, and signifying their readiness to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberal promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them back again. And with them he sent *Comius*, whom

he had made King of *Atrax*, whose wisdom and verine he held in good account, and whom he took to be faithful to him, and of great authority in those Regions. To him he gave in charge to go to as many of the States as he could, and persuade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and acquaint them that *Cæsar* himself would presently follow after.

Volusenus having taken what view of the Countrey he could (for he durst not go on shore to commit himself to the barbarism of the enemy) after five dayes returned to *Cæsar*, and related unto him all that he had discovered. Whilst *Cæsar* stayed in those parts for the furnishing of his fleet, the *Morini* sent messengers unto him, excusing themselves for their former faults, that being a rude and barbarous people, and altogether unacquainted with our customs, they had made war against the people of *Rome*; and withall manifesting their readiness to obey his commands.

Cæsar not willing to leave any enemy behind him, or to engage in a new war at this time of the year, or to neglect his voyage into *Britanie* for such small matters, willingly accepted of their submission, having first received many hostages of them: and having made ready eighty ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he divided the Gallies to the *Questor*, the Legates, and the Commanders of the horse. There were also eighteen ships of burthen more, which lay wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen. The rest of the Army he committed to *Q. Titurius Sabinus* and *Luc. Aurunculeius Cotta*, commanding them to go to the confines of the *Menapii*, & into those parts of the *Morini* who had sent no Embassadors to him: and appointed *P. Sulp. Rufus* a Legate to keep the Port with a sufficient garriſon.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar saileth into *Britanie*, and landeth his men.

These things being thus dispatched, *Cæsar* having a good wind, in the third watch he put out to Sea, commanding his horsemen to embark themselves at the further Port and follow him; which was but slowly performed. He himself arrived upon the coast about the fourth hour of the day, where he found all the Cliffs possessed with the forces of the enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the hills lay so steep over the seas, that a weapon might easily be cast from the higher ground

ground upon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing-place; notwithstanding he cast anchor until the rest of the Navy were come up unto him.

In the mean time calling a Councell of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared unto them what advertisements he had received by *Volusenus*, and told them what he would have done; and withall admonished them that the course of Military affairs, and especially Sea matters, that had so sudden and unconstant a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, having both wind and tide with him, he weighed anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, unto a plain and open shore.

The Britains perceiving the Romans determination, sent their horse and chariots (which they commonly use in war) before; & the rest of their forces followed after to the place where the Romans intended to land. *Cæsar* found it exceeding difficult to land his men for these reasons: the ships were so great that they could not be brought near unto the shore; the soldiers in strange and unknown places, having their hands laden with great and heavy weapons, were at one instant to go out of the ship, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemy; whereas the Britains either standing upon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in known and frequented places, and managed their horses accustomed to such services.

The Romans being terrified with these things, and altogether unskillfull of this kind of fight, did not use the same courage as they were wont to do in land-services. Which when *Cæsar* perceived, he caused the Gallies, that were both strange to the Britains, & render for use, to be removed from the ships of burthen, and to be rowed up and down, and laid against the open side of the enemy; that from thence with slings, engines, and arrows, the Enemy might be beaten up from the water side: which stood the Romans in good stead. For the Britains being troubled with the strangeness of the Gallies, the motion of their Oars, and the unskill kind of engines, were somewhat dismayed and began to retire back, and give way to the Romans. But the soldiers still lingering, and especially for fear of the depth of the seas, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion desiring the Gods that it might fall out happily to the legions, If you will, faith he, forsake your Eagles, O ye soldiers, and betray it to the enemy; for mine own part, I will do my duty both to the Commonwealth and to my Imperator. And having spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himself into the Sea, and carried the En-

gle towards the Enemy. The Romans exhorting one another not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the ship: which when others that were near at hand perceived, they followed them with as great alacrity, and pressed towards the enemy to encounter with them.

The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keep any order of battel, nor to get any firm footing, nor to follow their Ensignes, forasmuch as every man kept with those Ensignes which he first met withall) were wonderfully troubled. But the Enemy acquainted with the flats and shallows, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, would set upon them incumbered and unprepared, and many of them would over-lay a few: others would get the advantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troops of them. Which when *Cæsar* perceived, he caused the shipboats and smaller vessels to be manned with soldiers; and where he saw need of help, he sent them to rescue such as were overcharged.

As soon as the Romans got footing on the firm lands, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight: but they were not able to follow them; nor take the Island at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to *Cæsar*'s mounted fortune.

THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

UPON this circumstance of landing, I may justly take occasion to handle that controversy which hath been often debated by our English Captains; which is, whether it be better in question of an invasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing upon our Coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to give him battel. It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion that we ought not by any means to encounter an enemy at his landings, for so we might much endanger our selves and our Countrey, did ground themselves upon the authority of *Monsieur de Langey* not observing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes as border one upon another in the same Continent: but where their territories are disjoyned by so great a bar as the Ocean, & they have not such means to surprize one another, it were mere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appear by the sequel of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons that may be urged to prove it unsafe to oppose an enemy

my at his landings, not as being urged by that party (for I never heard any probable motive from them which might induce any such opinion) but set down by such as have looked into the controversies, both with experience and good judgement.

And first it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: for being ignorant in what place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will prove more frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defensive forces be sufficient according to the particular quality of every place subject to danger: which, considering the large extension of our maritime parts, and the many landing-places on our Coast, will require a greater number of men than this Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number as might seem in some sort sufficient, yet the uncertainty of the time of the enemies arrival would require that they should be lodged either upon, or near the places of danger many days at least, if not many weeks, before the instant of their attempt; which would exhaust a greater mass of Treasure, than could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected that all our landing-places are of such disadvantage for the defendants, that it were no safety at all to make head against him at the landing: for inasmuch as such places are open and plain, they yield no commodity to shelter the defendants from the fury of the artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long boats and landing vessels; which beating upon the beach (for most of our landing-places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to endure the inconvenience thereof.

The third objection may arise from the disparity both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either party. For the first, it must needs be granted that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the quality of the forces, it is with us question that a great and potent Prince (for such a one it must be that undertaketh to invade the territories of so absolute and well-obeyed a Princess as her Majesty is) would draw out the flow of his soldiery wheretoever; besides the gallant troops of voluntaries which do commonly attend such services. Now these being his qualified and drawn into one head, and being so make as it were but one body, how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like virtue and experience.

These are the reasons which may be drawn

from the disadvantage which they have that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that have been urged by such as maintain this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the answer of these reasons, I will lay this down for a principle, That it is impossible for any foreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to invade a State so populous, and respective of their Sovereign (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dissimble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest my self in the example of the year eighty eight, which proveth the discovery of the pretended invasion before it could come to execution.

Concerning therefore the first objection, it cannot indeed be denied but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtful, and therefore our care must generally extend it self to all places of access: but that our defensive forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in question.

To prove that our forces are sufficient, we must necessarily enter into particulars, wherein I will take *Kent* for a precedent, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceive not my self, is a shore of as large extension upon the maritime parts as any other within this kingdom. For the breadth thereof enlarging it self from the point of *Nesse* by *Lyde*, which is the uttermost skirke upon the coast of *Sussex*, unto *Margate* upon the coast of *Essex*, is by computation about twenty four miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugeness of the cliffs, which do inclose a great part of that skirke, and partly in regard that much of that quantity which may be landed upon hath such eminent and difficult places near adjoining, as an Army that should put it self there on shore, should find it self being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces.

Further, it cannot be denied but that generally along the coast of *Kent* there are to many rocks, shelves, flats, and other impediments, that a Navie of great ships can have no commodity to anchor near the shore; and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor:

chour: all which particularities duly considered, it will appear that this large skirke of *Kent* will afford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an Army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that to publish a treatise as this would admit with good discretion such an exact relation as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would undertake to make it so evident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity, and quality of the places themselves, as no man of an indifferent judgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular satisfaction in this public discourse, give me leave, submitting my self always to better judgements, to give a general taste of that means as would secure all places with a competent number of men.

Having shewed you before the circuit of the maritime parts of *Kent*, I would observe this order: first, to make a triple division of all such forces as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be twelve thousand, of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of *Nesse*, and three thousand about *Margate*, and six thousand about *Fenkington*, which I take to be so to dispose of them, as they might not only face one another in the same line, but as every three Lord, red one upon another, so they should mutually give help one unto another, as occasion should be offered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about *Nesse*, not only the six thousand lodged as before should march to their succours, but such also of the *Sussex* forces as were near unto that part, and so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a force would in few hours be assembled for the reinforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole forces are thus lodged in the centre of the Shire, which is nearer to all parts than any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them an especial care be had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regiments and companies, as the Country might afford best opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the later part of this objection, which toucheth the uncertainty of time when the enemy shall make his approaches, I hold it most requisite that our defensive forces should be drawn into a head, before the enemy should be discovered near our coast, ready to put himself on shore: for it were a givell absurdity to imagine that companies could upon such a sudden be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition as the necessity of

the occasion would require. Now, for that last banding respect of her Majesties cesses, which is urged to such extremity, as it would be unportable for this State to bear, as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that supposed immoderate expense; so I assure my self, that men of sound judgement will deem it much out of season to dispute about unnecessary things, when the whole kingdom is brought in question of being made subject to a stranger.

*Ut jugalem homines surgunt de nocte latrones:
Non expersiscent, ut ipsi servent?
Thieves rise by night to cut the throats of men:
Will not then then arise to save thy self?*

The enemy (per adventure) hath kept thirty thousand men in pay two months before, to make havock of our Country, and to bring us into perpetual thraldome; shall we think it much to maintain sufficient forces upon our Coasts, to assure our lives that no such enemy shall enter into our Country? The expense of this charge would be qualified by our good espial, which would proportion our attendance with the necessity which is imposed upon us to be careful in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to prove that our forces are sufficient to keep the Sea-coast, and that the uncertainty of time when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty which the care and respect of our Prince and Country imposeth upon every good subject; which is the substance of the first reason which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason, which toucheth the disadvantage of the place in regard of the fury of the Enemies artillery; true it is, that such places as yield the Enemy commodity of landing are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no covert at all. What then? shall a soldier take every place as he findeth it, and use no art to qualify the disadvantages thereof? Or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of advantage, rather than he will relieve with industry the discommodity of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious Commander, being in seasonable time lodged with convenient forces upon any of those places, yea upon the beach it self, which is as unfit to make defensible as any place whatsoever, would use such industry as might give sufficient security to his forces, and over-weigh the Enemy with advantage of place; especially considering that this age hath afforded such plentiful examples of admirable inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies attempt, that our Commanders may have some time to make ready store of Gabions, and hand-baskets, with such moveable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.

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Neither let this trouble any man; for I dare avouch it, that if our forces are not drawn into a head before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some inland place to give them battle, our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to bethink our selves of these necessities, and we will easily overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the firm land to repel an Enemy, weakened with the Sea, tossed with the billows, troubled with his weapons, with many other hindrances and discouragements, which are presented unto him both from the Land and the Sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of *Fall* in the year ninety seven, can somewhat judge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the Sea, the steepness of the Cliffs, and the troublesome of their Armes, the soldiers were to be incumbered, that had not the Enemy been more than a coward, he might well with two hundred men have kept us from entering any part of that Island.

The answer
to the third
reason.

Concerning the third Objection, this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to regard that our forces do equal them in number, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing: for we know that in places of advantage and difficult access, a small number is able to oppose a great; and we doubt not but, all circumstances duly considered, we shall proportionably equal the Enemy both in number and quality of their forces: always presupposed, that our State shall never be destitute of sufficient forces trained and exercised in a competent manner, to defend their Country from foreign Enemies. For the neglect thereof were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward to make a prey of us, and to make us unapt not only to oppose an Enemies landing, but to defend our selves from being overrun as other Nations living in security without due regard thereof have been.

And thus much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the commodities which follow upon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousness of this opinion: as first, we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any warring, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentiful a Country as this is, especially considering that we

have no strong towns at all to repose our selves upon. Whereof we need no further testimony then is delivered unto us out of the seventh book of these Commentaries, in that war which Cæsar had with *Vercingetorix*.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakened at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malecontents and ill-disposed persons either to make head themselves, or to fly to the Enemy. Fourthly, 'tis madness to adventure a kingdom upon one stroke, having it in our disposition to do otherwise: with many other disadvantages which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The word *Imperator*, which the Eagle-bearer attributed to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be given to a Roman Leader: and as *Zonaras* in his second Tome saith, was never given but upon some great exploit, and after a just victory obtained; and then in the place where the battle was fought, and the Enemy overthrown, the General was saluted by the name of *Imperator* with the triumphant shout of the whole Army; by which acclamation the soldiers gave testimony of his worth, and made it equivalent with the most fortunate Commanders.

This Ceremony was of great antiquity in the Roman Empire, as appeareth by many Histories, and namely by *Tacitus*, where he saith that *Vercingetorix* gave that honour to *Besud*, that he should be saluted *Imperator* by the legions; which he sheweth to be an ancient dignity belonging to great Captains, after they had foiled the Enemy with an eminent overthrow. For every victory was not sufficient whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certain number of the Enemies to be slain. *Appian* in his second book saith, that in old time the name of *Imperator* was never taken but upon great and admirable exploits: but in his time ten thousand of the Enemy being slain in one battle was a sufficient ground of that honour. *Cicero* saith that two thousand slain in the place, especially of *Thracians, Spaniards or Galles*, did worthily merit the name of *Imperator*. Howsoever, it seemeth by the same Author that there was a certain number of the Enemy required to be slain, where he saith, *Se iusta victoria Imperatorem appellatum*, that he was called *Imperator* upon a due and full victory.

Of the
name Im-
perator.

1. Annal.

Phil. 14.

Lib. 2
epist. 9.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

The Britans make peace with Cæsar, but break it again upon the loss of the Roman shipping.

Cæsar.



The Britans being overthrown in this battle, as soon as they had recovered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Cæsar to intreat for peace, promising hostages, and obedience in whatsoever he commanded. And with these Ambassadors returned *Comius of Arras*, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britany, and whom the Britans at his first landing with Cæsar's mandates, had seized upon and thrown into prison; but after the battle they released him, and becoming now suitors for peace, threw all the blame thereof upon the multitude, excusing themselves as ignorant of it, and so desiring to be pardoned. Cæsar complained, that whereas they sent unto him into Gallia to desire peace notwithstanding at his coming they made war against him without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance he commanded hostages to be delivered unto him: which they presently performed in pairs, and the rest being to be set further off, they promised should likewise be rendered within a short time. In the mean while they commanded their people to return to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their States to Cæsar. The peace being thus concluded, four days after that Cæsar came into Britany, the eighteen ships which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind: and approaching so near the coast of Britany, that they were within view of the Roman Camp, there arose such a sudden tempest, that none of them were able to hold their course; but some of them returned to the port from whence they came, other some were cast upon the lower part of the Island, which lieth to the West-wards, and there casting anchor took in so much water, that they were forced to commit themselves again to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened that the moon being in the full, the tides were very high in those seas; whereof the Romans being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies that transported the army which were drawn up upon the shore were filled with the tide, and the ships of burthen that lay at anchor were shaken with the tempest. Neither was there any help to be given unto them; so that many of them were rent and split in pieces, and the rest lost both their anchor cables and other tackling, and by that means became altogether unseizable. Where at the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for

there was no other shipping to recover them back again, neither had they any necessities to new furnish the old; and every man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia, forasmuch as there was no provision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britany, that were assembled to converse of such things as Cæsar had commanded them to perform, when they understood that the Romans wanted both their horsemen, shipping, and provision of corn, and considering of the paucity of their forces by the small circuit of their Camp, that which made it of less compass than usual beings, that Cæsar had transported his soldiers without such necessary carriages as they used to take with them; they thought it their best course to rebel, and to keep the Romans from corn and convoys of provisions, and so prolong the matter untill winter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrown and cut off from returning into Gallia, never any man would adventure to bring an Army into Britany. Therefore they conspired again the second time, and conveyed themselves by stealth out of the Camp, and got their men privily out of the fields, to make head in some convenient place against the Romans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Concerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof, it hath already been handled in the second book: to which I will add thus much, as may serve to shew how the Romans became so ignorant of the spring-tides, which happen in the full and new of the Moon. It is observed by experience, that the motion of this watery element is altogether directed by the course of the moon; wherein she exerciseth her regency according as she findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And forasmuch as all mediterranean seas, and such gulfs as are inclosed in sinues and bolomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallness of their quantity, are not so capable of celestial power as the Ocean it self; it consequently followeth that the *Tuscan* seas, where with the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon as the main sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit, and through the plentiful abundance of his parts, better answereth the virtue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking her course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a current between the *Orcades* and the main of *Norvegia*, that she filleth our channel between *England* and *France* with great swelling tides, and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters than

then in any other parts of the world. And hence it happeneth that our river of *Thames*, lying with her mouth so ready to receive the tide as it cometh, and having withall a plain levelled belly, and a very small fresh current, taketh the tide as far into the land as any other known river of *Europe*. And for this cause the *Romans* were ignorant of the spring-tides in the full of the moon.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Such as either by their own experience, or otherwise by observation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the government of Commonweals, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation that either hath long lived in liberty, or been governed by Commanders of their own chusing, is made subject to the yoke of bondage, or reduced under the obedience of a stranger. For as we are apt by a naturall inclination to civile society; so by the same nature we desire a free disposition of our selves and possessions, as the chiefest end of the said society: and therefore in the government of a subdued State, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the Victour, or how indirectly soever it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captive people behold it as a part of their adversaries overthrow; and conceive thereupon such spirits as answer the greatnesse of their hope, and tort with the strength of their will, which alwayes maketh that seem easy to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason that the *Britans* altered their resolution of peace, upon the losse which the *Romans* had received in their shipping.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken navy: the *Britans* set upon the *Romans* as they harveſted; but were put off by *Cæsar*.

Cæsar, although he had not discovered their determination, yet conjecturing of the event by the losse of his shipping, and by their delay of giving up hostages, provided against all chances: for he brought corn daily out of the fields into his Camp; and took the hulls of such Ships as were most dismembred, and with the timber and brasse thereof he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessities to be brought out of *Gallia*. Which being handled with the great industry and travell of the Souldiers, he lost only twelve ships, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in action, the seventh legion being sent out by course to fetch in corn, and little suspecting any motion of war, as part of the souldiers continued in the field, and the rest went & came between them and the Camp, the station that watched before the gate of the Camp gave advertisement to *Cæsar*, that the

same way which the legion went there appeared a greater dust then was usually seen. *Cæsar* suspecting that which indeed was true, that the *Britans* were curre into some new resolutions, he took those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and he rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him; and went that way where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his men overcharged with the Enemy, and scarce able to sustain the assault, the legion thronged together on a heap, and weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For when they had harveſted all other quarters, there remained one piece of corn, whether the Enemy suspected the *Romans* would at last come, and in the night time conveyed themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued untill the *Romans* were come into the field: and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed, and occupied in reaping, they suddenly set upon them, and slaying some few of them, routed the rest, and incompassed them about with their horsemen and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Chariots was, first to ride up and down, and cast their weapons as they saw advantage; and with the terror of their horses and ruting of their wheels to disorder the companies; and when they had wound themselves between any troops of horse, they forsook their Chariots, and fought on foot: in the mean time the guiders of their chariots would drive a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their masters needed any help, they might have an easy passage unto them. And thus they performed in all their fights both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firm stability of footmen; & were so ready with daily practice, that they could stay in the declivity of a steep hill, & turn short or moderate their going as it seemed best unto them, and run along the beam of the coach & rest upon the yoke, or harness of their horses, & return as speedily again at their pleasure. The *Romans* being thus troubled, *Cæsar* came to rescue them in very good time: for at his coming the Enemy stood still, & the souldiers gathered their spirits unto them, & began to renew their courage that was almost spent. *Cæsar* taking it an unfit time either to provoke the Enemy or to give him battel, continued a while in the same place, & then returned with the legions into the Camp. While these things were a doing, and the *Romans* thus busied, the *Britans* that were in the field conveyed themselves all away.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

By this we plainly find that there were usually two cohorts (which according to the rate of one hundred and twenty in a maniple amounted to the number of 720. men) which kept the day-

day-watch before the gate of the Camp, and were alwayes in readinesse upon any service. The commodity whereof appeareth by this accident: for considering that the advertisement required halte and speedy recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue, to have so many men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might give what help they could untill the rest of their fellowes came in.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Their manner of fight with Chariots is very particularly described by *Cæsar*, and needeth not to be stood upon any longer: only I observe that neither in *Gallia*, nor any other country of *Europe*, the use of Chariots is ever mentioned; but they have ever been attributed as a peculiar fight unto the Eastern Countiees, as suitable to the plain and level situation of the place, whereof we find often mention in the Scripture. Which may serve for an argument to *Geoffrey of Monmouth*, to prove the *Britans* descent from *Troy* in *Asia*, where we likewise find mention of such Chariots.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, we may observe the discreet and moderate temper of his valour, and the means he used to make his souldiers confident in his directions: for notwithstanding the *Britans* had exceedingly urged him to make hazard of a present revenge; yet finding it an unfit time, (inasmuch as his men had been somewhat troubled with the fury of the *Britans*) he thought it best to expect some other opportunity. And again, to avoid the inconveniences of a fearfull retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his souldiers that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull respect of their safety: which gave his men resolution when they were carried upon service, being assured that what service soever they were employed upon was most diligently to be performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that war: whereas if they had perceived that headstrong fury (which carrieth men on with a desire of victory, and never looketh into the means whereby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason have drawn back from such employments, and valued their safety above the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion which the souldiers have of a good General; which is a matter of great importance in the course of war.

CHAP. XIII.

The *Britans* make head with their forces; and are beaten by *Cæsar*: his return into *Gallia*.

After this for many dayes together there followed such tempests and foul weather, that both the *Romans* were constrained to keep their Camp, and the *Britans* were kept from attempting anything against them. But in the mean time they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the small number of the *Roman* forces, and amplifying the greatnesse of the booty, and the easy means offered unto them of perpetuall liberty, if they could take the *Roman* Camp. Shortly upon this, having gathered a great company both of horse & foot, they came to the place where the *Romans* were incamped. *Cæsar* (although he foresaw the event by that which before had hapned, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would avoid the danger by flight) yet having some thirty horse, which *Comius* of *Attras* had carried with him at his coming into *Britany*, he imbatellled his legions before his Camp, and so gave them battel. The Enemy not being able to bear the assault of the *Roman* souldiers, turned their backs and fled: the *Romans* followed them as far as they could by running on foot, and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their towns far and near, they returned to their Camp. The same day the *Britans* sent messengers to *Cæsar* to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into *Gallia*. And forasmuch as the *Aequinoctium* was at hand, he thought it not safe to put himself to the sea in winter with such weak shipping: and therefore having got a convenient time he hoisted sail a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe unto the Continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same haven, put in somewhat lower into the land: the souldiers that were in them which were about three hundred being set on shore, and marching towards their Camp, the *Morini*, with whom *Cæsar* at his going into *Britany* had made peace, in hope of a booty, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them upon pain of death to lay down their weapons: and as the *Romans* by casting themselves into an Orbe began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them there were suddenly gathered together about six thousand of the Enemy. Which thing being known, *Cæsar* sent out all the horsemen to relieve them. In the mean time the *Romans* sustained the force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly about the space of four hours; and receiving themselves only some few wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. As soon as the *Roman* horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast away their weapons

pons and sleds, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

OBSERVATION.

OF all the figures which the *Tattici* have chosen to make use of in military affairs, the circle hath ever been taken for the fittest to be applied in the defensive part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all parts whatsoever is contained within the circumference of that *Area*: and therefore Geometry termeth a circumference a simple line, forasmuch as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another, the figure notwithstanding will remain the same, because of the equall bending of the line throughout the whole circumference. Which property as it proveth an uniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end, this is front or this is flank: so doth that which *Euclide* doth demonstrate in the third of his Elements, concerning the small affinity between a right line and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatnesse of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which howsoever they seem as speculative qualities, conceived rather by intellectuall discourse than manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proved the strength of this figure in a defensive part, above any other manner of imbatrelling, let us not neglect the knowledge of these naturall properties, which discover the causes of this effect: neither let us neglect this part of military knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain valour, and the finew of all our ability: for order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a well-ordered discipline to be irregular, or void of order. And therefore the *Romans* did neither eat nor sleep without the direction of the Consul, or chief Commander; otherwise their valour might rather have been termed fury than virtue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time, it never failed as long as the said order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore how important it is for a Commander to look into the diversity of orders for imbatrelling, and to weigh the nature thereof, that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The *Romans* termed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body both with a concave and a convex surface: in resemblance whereof I understand this *Orbe* of men imbatelled to be so named; which might peradventure consist of five, or more, or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so many circles described about one Centre; so

that either the midst thereof remained void, or otherwise contained such carriages and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbatrelling was never used but in great extremity: for as it was the safest of all others, so it gave suspicion to the souldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battell; as will hereafter appear by the testimony of *Cæsar* himself in the fifth Commentary, upon the occasion which happened unto *Sabinus* and *Cotta*.

CHAP. XIII.

UHe next day *Cæsar* sent *Titus Labienus* a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of *Britany*, against the revolved *Morini*; who having no place of refuge because their bogs and fens were dried up, where they had sheltered themselves the year before, they all fell under the power of his mercy. *Q. Titurius* and *A. Cotta* the Legates, who had led the legions against the *Menapii*, after they had wasted their fields, cut up their corn, burned their houses (for the *Menapii* were all hid in thick woods) returned to *Cæsar*. These things being thus ended, *Cæsar* placed the wintering Camps of all his legions amongst the *Belgæ*; to which place two only of all the Cities in *Britany* sent hostages unto him, the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended, upon the relation of *Cæsar's* letters, the Senate decreed a supplication for the space of twenty dayes.

OBSERVATION.

IN the end of the second Commentary we read of a supplication granted by the Senate for fifteen dayes; which was never granted to any man before that time since the first building of the City: but forasmuch as in this fourth year of the wars in *Gallia* it was augmented from fifteen unto twenty dayes, I thought it fit to refer the handling thereof unto this place. We are therefore to understand, that whensoever a *Roman* Generall had carried himself well in the wars, by gaining a victory, or enlarging the bounds of their Empire, that then the Senate did decree a supplication to the gods in the name of that Captain. And this dignity was much sought after: not only because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged with the concourse and gratulation of the *Roman* people; but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honour in the *Roman* government: And therefore *Cato* nameth *Lib. 12.* it the prerogative of a triumph. And *Livie* in *Lib. 10.* his 26 book saith that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was there

there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured with supplication and thanksgiving to the gods for things happily effected. The manner of the Ceremony was, that after the Magistrate had publicly proclaimed it with this form or stile, *quod bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset*, that he had happily and successfully administered the affairs of the commonweal, the *Roman* people clothed in white garments and crowned with garlands, went to all the Temples of the gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victory in the name of the Generall. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplication was at first included within one or two dayes at the most, as appeareth by *Livie* in his third book, where he saith that the victory gained by two severall battels was spitefully shut up by

the Senate in one dayes supplication; the people of their own accord keeping the next day holy, and celebrating it with greater devotion than the former.

Upon the victory which *Camillus* had against the *Veii* there were granted four dayes of supplication; to which there was afterward a day added, which was the usuall time of supplication unto the time that *Pompey* ended the war which they called *Mithridaticum*, when the usuall time of five dayes was doubled and made ten, and in the second of these Commentaries made fifteen, and now brought to twenty dayes. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of well doing, which the *Romans* propounded both at home & abroad to such as endeavoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge to the benefit of their Commonwealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentary.

The fifth Commentary of the wars in GALLIA.

The Argument.

Cæsar causeth a great navy to be built in *Gallia*: he carrieth five legions into *Britany*, where he maketh war with the *Britanni* on both sides the river *Thames*. At his return into *Gallia* most of the *Galles* revolt; and first the *Eburones*, under the conducti- on of *Ambiorix*, set upon the Camp of *Q. Titurius* the Legate, whom they circumvent by subtilty, and then besiege the Camp of *Cicero*: but are put by, and their Army overthrown by *Cæsar*.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar returneth into *Gallia*: findeth there great store of shipping made by the souldiers, and commandeth it to be brought to the haven *Itius*. + *Calice* +

Ulcus Domitius and Appius Claudius being Consuls, *Cæsar* at his going into Italy from his winter-quarters (which he yearly did) gave order to the Legates to build as many ships that winter as possibly they could, & to repair the old; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch than those which are used in the mediterranean seas, for the speedier lading and unlading of them, and because the tides in these seas were very great: and forasmuch as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the botome than such as were usuall in other places, and all of them to

be made for the use of *Oares*, to which purpose their low building served very conveniently. Other necessities and furniture for rigging he gave order to have brought out of Spain. *Cæsar*, after an assembly of the States in *Lombardy*, went presently into *Illyricum*, where he heard that the *Pirustæ* infested the province by their incursions. As soon as he came thither he levied souldiers, and appointed them a rendezvous. Which the *Pirustæ* hearing of, they sent embassadours presently to him, excusing the business as not done by publick consent, and expressing a readinesse to make any satisfaction that should be demanded. *Cæsar* having heard their message, appointed them to give hostages, and to bring them by such a day, or else they must expect nothing but war and ruine to their city. Hostages were brought by the appointed time; whereupon *Cæsar* depured certain to arbitrate differences between the cities, and to punish as they saw cause for it. These things being

being over, he returned forthwith into Lombardy, and thence to his army in Gallia.

THE OBSERVATION.

This *Itinus Portus Flouide* thinketh to be *Calis*; others take it to be *Sunt Omer*: partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in it self very low, hath notwithstanding very high banks, which incompass the town abouts and in times past was a very large haven. To this may be added the distance from this town to the next Continent of the Island of *Britany*, which *Strabo* maketh to contain 320 furlongs, which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leagues: *Cæsar* maketh it thirty miles. This is the haven which *Pliny* calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum*.

CHAP. II.

Cæsar preventeth new motions amongst the *Treviri*, and goeth to his navy. *Dumnorix* seeketh to accompany him into *Britany*: his flight and death.

Cæsar leaving souldiers enough to do this business, himself marched with four legions and eight hundred horse into the country of the *Treviri*; in regard they neither came to the assembly of States, nor were obedient to his commands, and were farther reported to sollicite the Germans beyond the *Rhene* to new commotions. This city was the most powerfull of all *Gallia* for matter of horse, having likewise a great force of foot, and lying so conveniently upon the *Rhene* for assistance: wherein there was at this time a contention betwixt *Induciomarus* and *Cingetorix* who should be chief ruler. *Cingetorix* as soon as he heard of the coming of *Cæsar* with his army, came in to him, assuring him of the fidelity of his party, and their constancy to the friendship of the people of *Rome*; discovering withall unto him the present proceedings amongst the *Treviri*. On the contrary *Induciomarus* gathered together what horse and foot he could, resolving upon nothing else then war: securing all the old and young folk not fit to bear arms in the wood *Arduenna*, which is a very large wood, beginning at the *Rhene*, and running through the middle of the *Treviri*, to the borders of the people of *Rheims*. While things were thus preparing, divers of the chief of the city, some through the favour they bare to *Cingetorix*, others affrighted at the coming of our army, came forth to *Cæsar*; and since they could not do it for the whole city, they endeavoured to make every man his own peace. *Induciomarus* seeing this, and fearing to be left at last alone, sent *Embassadors* to *Cæsar*, excusing what he had done in not coming to him, which he said was done onely to keep the city the better in obedience; for if all the nobility should

have left it, the common people would have been apt to have made new troubles: that the city was now at his command, and if *Cæsar* would give leave, he was ready to wait upon him in his camp, and to lay the lives and fortunes of himself and the whole city at his feet. *Cæsar*, albeit he well knew why all this was spoken, as also what had put him besides his former resolution, yet rather then spend the summer in those parts, having all things in readiness for his *British* wars, he commanded *Induciomarus* to come to him, and bring two hundred hostages with him. *Induciomarus* did as *Cæsar* commanded, and withall brought along with him his son and all that had any near relation unto him: whom *Cæsar* bade be of good cheer, and exhorted to continue firme in his duty and fidelity. After this calling to him the chief of the *Treviri* man by man, he reconciled them to *Cingetorix*, as well looking at the desert of the man himself, as at his own interest and advantage, to have such a man bear the chief sway in his city, who had expressed so notable affection and goodwill towards him in this business. It troubled *Induciomarus* not a little to find his respect and authority thus impaired; inasmuch that he who before was no friend to us, being vexed at this became a bitter enemy.

Things thus settled here, *Cæsar* came with his legions back to the port called *Itius*: where he understood that forty ships which were built amongst the *Meldæ* were hindered by tempests that they could not keep their course, but were forced back from whence they came; the rest were well provided and ready to set saile. Hither also were gathered all the cavalry in *France*, to the number of four thousand, and the chief men of every city: some few of which, whose fidelity *Cæsar* had had experience of, he intended to leave at home; and to take the rest along with him for hostages, lest in his absence they should begin any new stirs in *Gallia*.

Amongst the rest was *Dumnorix* the *Heduan* formerly mentioned. Him of all the rest *Cæsar* intended to take with him, knowing him to be a man desirous of change, greedy of rule, a man of courage and resolution, and one of greatest authority amongst the *Galles*. Besides this, *Dumnorix* had given out at a meeting of the *Hedui*, that *Cæsar* had conferred upon him the government of the city: which much troubled the *Hedui*; yet they durst not send any man to *Cæsar* to hinder or revoke it. This *Cæsar* came to hear of. When he saw he must go with the rest, first he besought with all the intreaties he could that he might stay in *Gallia*; alleging one while that he was afraid of the sea, having as yet never been used to sailing, another while that he had some religious ac-

count

counts that kept him here. When he perceived this would not serve his turn, but go he must, he began to deal with the rest of the chief men of the *Galles*, taking them man by man, and persuading them to continue in their own country; telling them that it was not without ground *Cæsar* went about to despoile *Gallia* thus of its nobility, his drift being to carry them over into *Britany* and there murder them, whom he was afraid to put to death amongst their friends at home. He went further, to engage them to fidelity, and to tie them by oath to proceed upon joint consultation to the atting of what should be thought of most concernment and behoof for the good of *Gallia*. These things were by divers persons related to *Cæsar*, who as soon as he knew thereof, in regard of the great respect he bare to the *Heduan* State, he resolved by all means possible to curb and deter *Dumnorix* from those courses; in regard that he saw him thus to increase in his madness, he thought it seasonable to prevent his endamaging either the Commonwealth or himself. So staying in the place where he was about twenty five dayes, the North-west wind (a wind that usually blowes in those parts) all that while hindering his putting to sea; he made it much of his business to keep *Dumnorix* quiet, and yet at the same time to spy out the whole drift of his designs. At last the wind and weather serving, he commanded his souldiers and horsemen on ship-board. And whilst every mans mind was taken up about this, *Dumnorix* with the rest of the *Heduan* horsemen, unknown to *Cæsar*, had left the camp, and were marching homewards. Which when *Cæsar* heard, he stopt his voyage, and letting every thing else alone, sent a great part of his cavalry to attack him, and bring him back, with command that if he stood upon his defence and did not readily obey, they should dispatch him. For he could not believe that this man could mean any good to him, if he once got home, since he made so light of his commands when present with him. The horse having overtaken him, he stood upon his guard and made resistance, imploring also the aide of those that were with him; still crying out, that he was a Free-born man and of a Free city. Whereupon they, as they were commanded, hem'd him in, and so killed him: the *Heduan* horsemen returning every man to *Cæsar*.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar saileth into *Britany*: landeth his forces, and seeketh the enemy.

Cæsar.

Cæsar having prepared all things in readiness, he left *Labienus* in the Continent with three legions, and two thousand horse, both to keep the haven and make provision of the corn, and also to observe the motion of the

Galles, and to doe according as he saw time and occasion, and with five legions, and the like number of horse as he left in the continent, about sun-setting he put out to sea with a soft south-wind, which continued until midnight; then ceasing he was carried with the tide until the morning; when he perceived that the land lay on his left hand; and again as the tide changed, he laboured by rowing to reach that part of the land where he had found good landing the year before. Wherein the souldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of oares, they made their great ships as burthen to keep way with the *Gallies*. About high noon they arrived in *Britany* with all their ships: neither was there any Enemy seen in that place; but as afterward *Cæsar* understood by the Captives, the *Britans* had been there with a great power, but being terrified with the infinite number of shipping which they discovered from the shore (for with the ships of provision, and private vessels which severall persons had for their own convenience, there were in all above eight hundred) they forsook the shore, and hid themselves in the upland country. *Cæsar* having landed his men, and chosen a convenient place to incamp, as soon as he understood by the captives where the enemy lay, in the third watch of the night he marched towards them, leaving ten cohorts and three hundred horse under *Quintus Atrius* for a garrison to his shipping: which he the lesse feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft and open shore. He marched that night about twelve mile before he found the Enemy. The *Britans* sending out their horse and chariots to a river that ran between them and the Romans, and having the advantage of the upper grounds, began to hinder the Romans and to give them battell: but being beaten back with our horsemen, they conveyed themselves into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by Art and Nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their civil wars: for all the entrances were shut up with great trees layd overthwart the passages. And the *Britans* showed themselves out of the wood but here and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the fortification. But the souldiers of the seventh legion, with a *Tessudo* which they made, and a mount which they raised, took the place, and drove them all out of the woods, without any losse at all, saving some few wounds which they received. But *Cæsar* forbade his men to follow after them with any long pursuit, because he was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that day being spent he would employ the rest thereof in the fortification of his Camp.

OBSERVATION.

Cæsar having taken what assurance of peace he could with the *Galles*, both by carrying the

Observations upon Cæsars

the chiefest of their Princes with him, and by leaving three legions in the Continent to keep the vulgar people in obedience; he embarked all his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same casualties; and take the benefit of the same adventures: which being neglected the year before, drew him into many inconveniences for want of horse, which being embarked at another Haven, met with other chances, and saw other fortunes, and never came to him into *Britany*. The place of landing in this second voyage was the same where he landed the year before; and by the circumstances of this history, may agree with that which tradition hath delivered of *Deale* in *Kent*, where it is said that *Cæsar* landed. In the first year we find that he never removed his Camp from the sea shore, where he first feared himself; although his men went out to bring in corn, as far as they might well return again at night: but now he entered further into the *Ilands*, and within twelve miles march came unto a river, which must needs be that of *Camberbury*, which falleth into the Sea at *Sandwich*.

In that hee saith that the garrison of his shipping consisted of ten Cohorts, which I have said to be a legion: we must understand that *Cæsar* left not an entire legion in that garrison; but he took ten cohorts out of his whole forces, peradventure two out of every legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his shipping.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar returneth to his Navies, to take order for such losses as had happened by tempest the night before.

Cæsar.

THe next day early in the morning he divided his forces into three companies, & sent them out to pursue the enemy: but before they had marched any far distance, and came to have the reverend of the Enemy in view, there came news from *Q. Atrius*, with whom he left the ten cohorts, and the charge of the shipping, that the night before there was such a tempest at sea, that the whole Navy was either fore-beaten or cast on shore, and that neither anchor nor cable could hold them, nor yet the Sailers endure the force of the weather: and that there was great loss in the shipping, by running against one another in the violence of the tempest.

Upon these news *Cæsar* caused the legions to be called back again, and to cease for that time from following the enemy any further. He himself returned to the navy, where he found that to be true which he had heard, and that about forty ships were lost, and the rest not to be repaired but with great industry and pains.

First therefore he chose ship-wrights and carpenters out of the legions, and caused others to be sent for out of *Gallia*, and wrote to *Labiennus* to make ready what shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour, yet he thought it best to hute up all the ships on shore, and to inclose them within the fortification of his camp. In this business he spent ten daies, without intermission either of night or day, until he had drawn up the ships, and strongly fortified the camp, leaving the same garrison which was there before, to defend it.

THE OBSERVATION.

WHerein we may behold the true image of undaunted valour, & the horrible industry (as *Tully* termeth it) which he used to prevent Fortune of her stroke in his business, and comprehend casualties and future contingents within the compasse of order, and the bounds of his own power; being able in ten daies space to set almost eight hundred ships from the hazard of wind & weather, & to make his Camp the Road for his Navy, that so he might rest secure of a means to return at his pleasure.

CHAP. V.

The Britans make *Castivellanus* General in this war. The Island, and the manners of the people described.

Cæsar returneth to the place from *Cæsar*, whence he came, found far greater forces of the Britans there assembled than he left when he went to the Navy: and then by public consent of the Britans the whole government of that war was given to *Castivellanus*, whose kingdom lay divided from the maritime States with the river *Thames*, beginning at the sea, and extending itself four score miles into the *Iland*. This *Castivellanus* made continual war with his neighbour States: but upon the coming of the Romans they all forgot their home-bred quarrels, and cast the whole government upon his shoulders, as the fittest to direct in that war.

The inner part of *Britany* is inhabited by such as memory recordeth to be born in the *Iland*; and the maritime coast by such as came out of *Belgia*, either to make incursions or invasions; and after the war was ended they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the cities from whence they came. The country is very populous, and well inhabited with houses, much like unto them in *Gallia*. They have great store of cattle, and use brass for money or iron rings weighed at a certain rate. In the mediterranean parts

parts there is found great quantity of *Tyn*, and in the maritime parts, iron; but they have but little of that: their brass is brought in by other Nations. They have all sorts of trees that they have in *Gallia*, excepting the *Fig* and the *Reech*. Their religion will not suffer them to eat either *Hare*, *Hen*, or *Goose*; notwithstanding they have of all sorts, as well for novelty as variety. The Country is more temperate, and not so cold as *Gallia*. The *Iland* lieth triangle-wise; whereof one side confronteth *Gallia*, of which side that angle wherein *Kent* is, the usual place of landing from *Gallia*, pointeth to the East, and the other angle to the South. This side containeth about 500 miles. Another side lieth toward *Spain* and the West, that way where *Ireland* lieth, being an *Iland* half as big as *England*, and as far distant from it as *Gallia*. In the mid-way between *England* and *Ireland* lieth an *Iland* called *Mona*, besides many other smaller *Ilands*; of which some writes that in winter-time for thirty daies together they have continuall night: whereof we learned nothing by inquiry; only we found by certain measures of water, that the nights in *England* were shorter then in the Continent. The length of this side, according to the opinion of the inhabitants, containeth seven hundred miles. The third side lieth to the North and the open sea, saving that this angle doth somewhat point towards *Germany*. This side is thought to contain eight hundred miles. And so the whole *Iland* containeth in circuit 2000 miles. Of all the inhabitants they of *Kent* are most courteous and civile; all their Country bordering upon the sea, and little differing from the fashion of *Gallia*. Most of the in-land people sow no Corn, but live with milk and flesh, clothed with skins, & having their faces painted with a blew colour, to the end they may seem more terrible in fight: they have the hair of their head long, having all other parts of their body shaven saving their upper lip. Their wives are common to ten or twelve, especially brethren with brethren, & parents with children; but the children that are born, are put unto them unto whom the mother was first given in marriage.

OBSERVATION.

In the descriptions of the ancient *Britans* we may first observe their pedigree, according to the Heraldry of that time: wherein we must understand, that in those ages the Nations of the world thought it no small honour to derive their descent from a certain beginning, and to make either some of their Gods, or some man of famous memory the Father of that progeny, and founder of their State; that so they might promise a fortunate continuance to their government, being first laid and established by so powerful a means. But if this failed, they then brag-

ged of antiquity, and cast all their glory upon the fertility of their soil, being so strong and fruitful that it yielded of it self such a people as they were. And so we read how the *Athenians*, forasmuch as they were ignorant from whence they came, wore an Oaken leaf in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And hereupon also grew the controversy between the *Egyptians* and the *Scythians* concerning antiquity: wherein the *Egyptians* seemed to have great advantage, because of the fertility and heat of their country; whereas the *Scythians* inhabited a cold climate, unfruitful, and an enemy to generation. Of this sort were the *Britans* that inhabited the mediterranean part of the *Iland*: who not knowing from whence they came, nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common received opinion, that they were born and bred of the earth. The sea-coast was possessed by such as came out of the Continent, and retained the names of the Cities from whence they came, as a memoriall of their progenitors.

The form of the *Iland* is very well described, and measured out according to the scale of our modern Geographers. For concerning the difference of longitude between the Eastern angle of *Kent*, and the furthest point of *Cornwall*, they make it eight degrees; which in a manner jumpeth with *Cæsars* dimensionation. The other sides are somewhat longer: and therefore *Tacitus* in the liroo of *Agricola*, compareth it to a Carpenters Axe, making that side which bordereth upon *France* to resemble the edge, and the other two sides to incline by little and little one towards another, and so make the *Iland* narrower at the top, according to the form of that instrument. He setteth down the whole compasse of the *Iland*, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers; who by the quantity of the circuit did usually judge of the content, not considering that the Area of every figure dependeth as well on the quantity of the angle, as the length of the side.

Concerning the temperature of *Britany* in regard of the cold Winters in *France*, we must understand that *Britany* hath ever been found of a more temperate constitution in regard of sharp and cold winters, then any other country lying under the same parallel: Whether the cause thereof may be imputed to the continual motion of the sea about the *Iland*, which begetteth heats as some have imagined; or to the site thereof in regard of other Continents from whence the wind alwayes lieth, & carrieth with it the nature of the Country by which it passeth; (& so the *Iland* having no other Continent lying North to it, from whence the wind may rise, but all for the most part upon the South, hath no such cold winds to dis Temper it as other parts of *Germany*, which are under the same parallel: but the Southern wind, which

is so frequent in *Britany*, tempereth the air with a mild disposition, and to keepe it warm; or whether it become ether unknown cause, our Philosophers rest unsatisfied. But as touching *Gallia* it may be said, that forasmuch as it beareth more to the South then this Iland doth, the aire thereof by reason of the continual heat, is of a far purer disposition; and so pierceth more then this grosser aire of *Britany*, and carrieth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper, and of a far colder disposition.

This Iland which *Cæsar* nameth *Mona*, is known at this time by the name of *Man*, and lieth between *Cumberland* and *Ireland*. *Ptolemy* calleth it *Moneda*. *Tacitus* calleth *Anglesey* by the name of *Monas*, peradventure from the nomination of the *Britans*, who called it *Tyr mon*, the land of *Mon*.

Concerning those places where the night continueth in the miditt of winter for thirty daies together, they must be sited 6. degrees beyond the circle *Arctick*, and have a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of *Astronomy*. In that he found the nights in *Britany* shorter then in the Continent, we must understand it to be onely in summer: for the more oblique the horizon is, the more uneven are the portions of the diurnall circles which it cutteth; and the nearer it cometh to a right horizon, the nearer it cometh to an equality of day and night: and hence it happeneth, that in summer time, the nights in *France* are longer then here in *England*; and in winters, shorter. The like we must understand of all Southern and Northern Countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the civility of the *Kentishmen*, and their courteous disposition above the rest of the *Britans*, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought civility unto all other Nations: of whom such as were first seated in their possessions, and entertained society, were the first that brought in civill conversation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of civill government. So we find that first the *Assyrians* and *Babylonians* (as nearest to the Mountains of *Armenia* where the Ark rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their States into Commonweales or Monarchies of exquisite government, flourishing with all manner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other Countries lay either waste, or overwhelmed with Barbarisme. From thence it flowed into *Egypt*; out of *Egypt* into *Greece*; out of *Greece* into *Italy*; out of *Italy* into *Gallia*; and from thence into *England*: where our *Kentishmen* first entertained it, as bordering upon *France*, and frequented with Merchants of those Countries.

Divers skirmishes between the *ROMANS* and the *BRITANS*.



*U*pon this occasion of their heavy Armour, I will describe a Legionary souldier in his compleat furniture, that we may better judge of their manner of warfare, and understand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learn, that their legionary souldiers were called *milites gravis armature*, souldiers wearing heavy Armour, to distinguish them from the *Velites*, the Archers, Slingers, and other light-armed men. Their offensive Armes were a couple of Piles, or as some will but one Pile, and a

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Spanish

Spanish sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defensive Armes were a helmet, a corselet, and boots of brasse, with a large Target; which in some sort was offensive, in regard of that *umbo* which stuck out in the miditt thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first book, and the Target in the second. The sword, as *Polybius* witnesseth, was short, two-edged, very sharp, and of a strong point. And therefore *Livy* in his 22. book saith, that the *Galles* used very long swords without points; but the *Romans* had short swords, readier for use. These they called *Spanish* swords, because they borrowed that fashion from the *Spaniard*. The old *Romans* were so girt with their swords, as appeareth by *Polybius*, and their monuments in Marble, that from their left shoulder it hung upon their right thigh, contrary to the use of these times; which, as I have noted before, was in regard of their target, which they carried on their left arme. This sword was hung with a belt of leather, beset with studs, as *Varro* noteth. And these were their offensive weapons.

Lib. i.

Plin. lib. 20.

Their Helmet was of brasse, adorned with three Ostrich feathers of a cubit in length; by which the souldier appeared of a larger stature, and more terrible to the Enemy, as *Polybius* saith in his sixth book. Their breast-plate was either of Brasse or Iron, jointed together after the manner of scales, or platted with little rings of Iron: their boots were made of bars of brasse, from the foot up to the knee. And thus were the legionary souldiers armed, to stand firme, rather then to use any nimble motion, and to combine themselves into a body of that strength, which might not easily recoil at the opposition of any confrontation: for agility standeth indifferent to help either a retreat or a pursuit; and nimble-footed souldiers are as ready to flie back, as to march forward; but a weighty body keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffle. So that whensoever they came to firme buckling, and felt the enemy stand stiff before them, such was their practice and exercise in continual works, that they never fainted under any such task, but the victory went alwaies clear on their side. But if the enemy gave way to their violence, and came not in but for advantage, and then as speedily retired before the counterbuffle were well discharged, then did their nimbleness much help their weakness, and frustrate the greatest part of the *Roman* discipline. This is also proved in the overthrow of *Sabinus* and *Cottus*, where *Ambiorix* finding the inconvenience of buckling at handy-blows, commanded his men to fight a far off; and if they were assaulted, to give back, and come on again as they saw occasion: which he wearied out the *Romans* that they all fell under the execution of the *Galles*. Let this suffice

therefore to shew how unapt the *Romans* were to flie upon any occasion, when their Armour was such that it kept them from all starting motions, and made them suitable to the staid and well assured rules of their discipline, which were as certain principles in the execution of a standing battell; and therefore not to fit either for a pursuit, or a flight.

Concerning the unequal combat between a horseman and a footman, it may be thought strange that a footman should have such an advantage against a horseman, being overmatched at least with a Sextuple proportion both of strength and agility: but we must understand that as the horse is much swifter in a long carriere, so in speedy and nimble turning at hand, wherein the substance of the combat consisteth, the footman far exceedeth the horseman in advantage, having a larger mark to hit by the Horse, then the other hath. Besides the horseman ingageth both his valour and his fortune in the good speed of his horse, his wounds and his death do consequently pull the rider after, his fear or fury maketh his master either desperate or slow of performance, and what defect soever ariseth from the horse, must be answered out of the honour of the rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soever draweth us into the society of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible be contained in the compasse of our own power.

The sword which we manage with our owne hand affordeth greater assurance then the harquebuse, wherein there are many parts belonging to the action, as the powder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof if the least fail of his part, we likewise faile of our fortune. But how probable soever this seemeth, this is certain, that in the course of the *Roman* wars the horse were ever defeated by the foot, as is manifestly proved in the first of these books.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar giveth the *Britans* two severall overthrowes.



*U*pon the next day the Enemy made a stand upon the hills a far off from the camp, and shewed themselves not so often; neither were they so busie with our horsemen as they were the day before. But about noon, when *Cæsar* had sent out three legions and all his cavalry to get forrage, under the conduction of *Caius Trebonius* a Legate, they made a sudden assault upon the forragers, and fell in close with the Ensignes & the legions. The *Romans* charged very fiercely upon them, and beat them back: neither did they make an end of following them, untill the horsemen trusting

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to them; put them all to flight with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they give them respite either to make heads, to make a stand, or to forsake their chariots.

After this overthrow all their Auxiliary forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great power. Cæsar understanding their determination, carried his Army to the river Thames, and so to the confines of Cassivellaunus; which river was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly. At his coming he found a great power of the Enemy to be embattled on the other side, and the bank fortified with many sharp stakes, and many other also were planted covertly under the water. These things being discovered to the Romans by the Captives and fugitives, Cæsar putting his horse before, caused the legions to follow suddenly after: who notwithstanding they had but their heads clear above the water, went with that violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the bank, and betook themselves to flight.

OBSERVATION.

His attempt of Cæsar seemeth so strange to Br. Mart. O. that he runneth into strange conclusions concerning this matter: as first, that he that imitaterh Cæsar may doubt of his good fortunes; for his proceeding in this point was not directed by any order of war: and that a great Commander hath nothing common with other Leaders: but especially he crieth out at the baseness of the Britans, that would suffer themselves so cowardly to be beaten. But if we look into the circumstances of the action, we shall find both Art and good direction therein: for being assured by the fugitives that the river was passable in that place, and in that place only, he knew that he must either adventure over there, or leave Cassivellaunus for another Summer, which was a very strong inducement to urge him to that enterprise. The difficulty whereof was much relieved by good direction, which consisted of two points; First, by sending over the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better endure the charge of the enemy than the footmen could, that were up to the neck in water; and withall to shelter the footmen from the fury of the Enemy.

Secondly, he sent them over with such speed, that they were on the other side of the water before the enemy could tell what they attempted: for if he had lingered in the service, and given the enemy leave to find the advantage which he had by experience, his men had never been able to have endured the hazard of so dangerous a service. It is hard to conjecture at the place where this service was performed; for since the building of London bridge, many foords have

been scoured with the current and fall of the water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they do.

CHAP. VIII.

The conclusion of the British war. Cæsar returneth into Gallia.

Cassivellaunus having no courage to contend any longer, dismissed his greatest forces, and retaining only four thousand chariots, observed our journeys, keeping the wood-countries, and driving men and cattell out of the fields into the woods, where he knew the Romans would come: and as their horse strayed out either for forrage or booty, he sent his chariots out of the woods by unknown ways, and put their horsemen to great perill: in regard whereof the horsemen durst never adventure further then the legions, neither was there any more spoil done in the Country, then that which the legionary souldiers did of themselves.

In the meantime, the Trinobantes, being almost the greatest State of all those Countreies (from whom Mandubratius had fled to Cæsar into Gallia, for that his father Imanuentius holding the kingdome, was slain by Cassivellaunus) sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to offer their submission, and to intreat that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppression of Cassivellaunus, & sent unto them to take the kingdome. Cæsar having received from them forty pledges, & Corn for his Army, sent Mandubratius unto them. The Trinobantes being thus kept from the violence of the souldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci and Cassi yielded themselves to Cæsar. By these he understood that Cassivellaunus his town was not far off, fortified with woods & bogs, & well stored with men & cattell. The Britans call a town, a thick wood inclosed about with a ditch and a rampier, made for a place of retreat, when they stood in fear of incursions from the borderers. Thither marched Cæsar with his Army, & found it well fortified both by Art and Nature: & as he assaulted it in two several places, the enemy unable to keep it, cast himself out of the town by a back way: and so he took it. Where he found great store of cattell, and slew many of the Britans.

While these things were a doing, Cassivellaunus sent messengers into Kent, which as was said lies upon the sea, and wherein there were four severall Kings, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax: them he commanded with all the power they could make to set upon the camp where the Navy was kept. To the Kings coming to the place were overthrown by a fury which the Romans made out upon them, many of them being slain, and Lugotorix a great

a great commander taken prisoner. This battell concurring with the former losses, and especially moved thereunto with the revolt of the fore-named cities, Cassivellaunus intreated peace of Cæsar by Cornus of Arras. Cæsar being determined to winter in the Continent, for fear of suddain commotions in Gallia, and considering that the Summer was now far spent, and might easily be lingred out, he commanded pledges to be brought unto him, and set down what yearly tribute the Britans should pay to the Romans; giving withall a strict charge to Cassivellaunus to do no injury either to Mandubratius or the Tribonantes. The hostages being taken, he carried back his Army to the sea, where he found his shipping repaired: which as soon as he had caused to be set afloat, in regard partly of the great number of prisoners he had, and that some of his ships were cast away, he determined to carry his Army over at twice. And so it happened, that of so great a fleet, in so many voyages, neither this year nor the year before there was not any one ship missing which carried over our souldiers: only of those which were to be sent back to him after they had landed the first half, and those which Labienus caused afterwards to be made, three-score in number, few could make to the place, the rest were all kept back. Which Cæsar having for some time expected in vain, and fearing that the time of year would not long serve for sailing, for the Equinoctiall was at hand, was forced to dispose his souldiers closer and in lesse room. So taking the opportunity of a calme sea, he set sail about the beginning of the second watch, and came to land by break of day, his whole fleet arriving in safety.

OBSERVATION.

And thus ended the war in Britany: which affordeth little matter of discourse, being indeed but a scrambling war, as well in regard of the Britans themselves, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman legions, would never adventure to buckle with them in any standing battell; as also in regard there were no such towns in Britany as are recorded to have been in Gallia, which might have given great honour to the war, if there had been any such to have been besieged and taken in by Cæsar.

And although Tacitus saith that Britany was rather viewed then subdued by Cæsar, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agricola; yet we find here that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirt or the heart of Britany (for our Historians do understand them to have inhabited that part which lieth as far as York (shire and Lancashire) were brought under the Roman Empire by Cæ-

sar: who was the first that ever laid tribute upon Britany in the behalf of the people of Rome; or cast upon them the heavy name of a subdued people.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BUT least I may seem negligent in these occurrences of Britany, as not deeming the alteration happening in this Island by the power of Rome worthy due memory; I will briefly set down the state thereof from this Area, during the lives of the twelve Emperours.

Julius Cæsar's next successours, first Augustus and then Tiberius, thought it policy to retrain the infinite desire of enlarging the Roman Empire, & so left this entrance into Britany unsecured. Caligula is said to have had a meaning to invade it, but did nothing. Claudius transported legions and aides, and first sent Aulus Plautius Governour, and after him Ostorius, who overthrew king Caradocus in battell, and shewed him at Rome to Claudius; to Agrippina, and the Lords of the Senate: who affirmed the fight to be no lesse honourable then when P. Scipio shewed Siphaces, or L. Paulus Perseus. Him D. dius Gallus succeeded, who being old and full of honour, thought it sufficient to keep that which his predecessours had gotten. Next unto D. dius came Veranus, only memorable in dying the first year of his Proprætorship: but Suetonius Paulinus following, got a great name, first by invading Anglesey, a strong with inhabitants, and a receptacle for fugitives; secondly, by overthrowing Boadicea Queen of the Icenis, in a battell comparable to the victories of old times: wherein fourscore thousand Britans were slain, with the losse of foure hundred Roman souldiers. But being thought to be over-severe, he left his charge to Petronius Turpilianus; who compoling former troubles with a milder carriage, was succeeded by Trebellius Maximus; whose easie course of government taught the Britans good manners, and made the souldiers first wanton with ease, and then mutinous: which by his gentle intreaty being ended without blood-shed, he left his place to Vespasian Bolanus, of like loosenesse of discipline, but in stead of obedience got much good will. The errors of these three soft Proprætors were holpen by Petilius Cerealis, a great Commander, and worthy his place; he subdued the Brigantes, and left the place to Julius Frontinus, who with no lesse happinesse vanquished the Silures. The last was Agricola, fortunate in divers battells against the Britans, and as unhappy in his reward; for Domitian maligning his honour, first discharged him of his place, and then, as it is thought, poisoned him. And this was the state of Britany under the twelve Emperours.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their wintering Camps, and quieteth the Carnutes.

Cæsar.
* Eliezer
Cambrey,
Amien., or
S. Quintin.

After he had put his ships in harbour, and held a Council of the Gallies at Samarobrina; forasmuch as that year, by reason of the drought, there was some scarcity of corn in Gallia, he was constrained to garrison his Army, and to disperse them into more cities than he had done the years before. And first he gave one legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Quintus Cicero, to be carried to the Nervii; another to L. Rotcius, to be conducted to the Eburones; a fourth he commanded to winter amongst the men of Rhemes, in the marches of the Treviri, under T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgium, with whom he sent Mar. Crassus his Quæstor, L. Munatius Plancus, and C. Trebonius, Legates; he sent one legion, that which he had left inrolled beyond the river Po in Italy, with five cohorts, unto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose country lyeth between the Male and the Rhene, and was under the command of Ambiorix and Cativulcus; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeus Cotta. By distributing his legions in this manner, he thought to remedy the scarcity of corn; and yet the garrisons of all these legions, excepting that which Rotcius carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of one hundred miles. And until his legions were settled, and their wintering camps fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

There was amongst the Carnutes a man of great birth called Talgetius, whose ancestors had borne the chief rule in their State. This man, for his singular prowess and goodwill towards him, for he had done him very good service in all his wars, Cæsar restored to the dignity of his forefathers. Before he had reigned three years, his enemies with the complicity of divers of his citizens kill'd him in the open streets: which thing was complained of to Cæsar. Who fearing in regard so many men had a hand in it, lest that the city should by their instigation revolt, commanded L. Plancus immediately to march with his legion thither from his quarters in Belgium, and there to winter: and whomsoever he could learn to be the ring-leaders in the death of Talgetius, he should take hold of them, and send them to him. Meantime while Cæsar had notice from all his Legates and Quæstors to whom he had delivered his legions, that they were settled in winter garrisons, and their garrisons fortified.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Have heard it oftentimes contradicted by some that understand not the weight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Army keeping head continually in one part of a kingdom, was more burthensome to the Commonwealth in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular Cities and Families, before the time of the muster and inrollment: for say they, in the general account of the publick weale it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000. men be maintained with necessary provisions in one intire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout every part of the Countrey; forasmuch as every man hath but a competent quantity allotted unto him, which he cannot want in what sort or condition of life soever he be ranged: neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are united together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wheresoever. But such as look into the difference with judgement, shall find a marvellous inequality, both in regard of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the means whereby it is provided: for first we must understand, that an Army lying continually in one place, falleth so heavy upon that part that it quickly consumeth both the far and the flesh, (as they say) and leaveth nothing unspent, which that part can afford them; and without further supply of provisions would in a small time come to utter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plenty of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherein there cannot be observed that proportion of moderate taking, to victuall the Army with a sufficient competency, but the partiall respect which the purveyours and victuallers will have to their private commodity, will quickly make an inconvenience either in the countrey from whence it is taken, or in the Army for which it is provided, according as the error may best advantage their particular; what discipline soever be established in that behalf. Whereas on the contrary part, when every particular man of that multitude shall be billeted in a severall family, throughout all parts of the kingdom, the charge will be so insensible in regard of the expence of the said families, that the countrey will never feel any inconvenience. And if every householder that had received into his house one of the said Army, should give a true account of that which riseth above his ordinary expence by the addition of one man, it would fall far short of that treasure which is necessarily required to maintain the said number of men united together into one body.

Neither doth the difference consist in the quantity of victuals which every man hath for

CHAP. X.

Ambiorix attempteth to surprize the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, praideseth to take them by guile.

Fifteen daies after the legions were settled in their wintering camps, there began a sudden tumult and rebellion by the means of Ambiorix and Cativulcus, who having received Sabinus and Cotta into their confines, and brought them in corn to the place where they lay; at the inducement of Induciomarus of Triers, they stirred up their people to rebellion: and suddenly surprising those that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the camp. But when our men had took Arms, and were got up upon the rampiers, and had overmatched them in a skirmish of horse, which made a fall out of the camp upon the Gallies; Ambiorix despairing of good success, withdrew his men from the assault: and then after their manner they cryed unto us, that some of our company should come and speak with them, for they had somewhat to discover touching the publick State, whereby they hoped all controversies might be ended. Whereupon Caius Carpineus a Roman horseman, and one of Titurius his familiar friends, and one Q. Junius a Spaniard, who divers times before had been sent by Cæsar to Ambiorix, were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himself much indebted to Cæsar for many courtesies; in that by his means he was freed from a pension which he payed to the Aduaticis, and for that both his own son and his brothers son, whom the Aduaticis had held in prison under the name of hostages, were by Cæsar released and sent home again. And touching the assault of the camp, he had done nothing of himself, but by the impulsion of the State; among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authority over him, as he himself had in regard of the people: who were likewise inforced to his war, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Gallies, whereof his small means might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to think himself able with so small a power to overthrow the people of Rome; but it was a generall appointment throughout all Gallia, upon this day to assault all Cæsars garrisons, to the end that one legion might not give relief unto another. Gallies could not easily deny the request of Gallies, especially when it concerned their publick liberty. Now having satisfied that duty which he owed to his Country, he had respect to Cæsar & his benefits; in regard whereof he admonished them, and prayed

prayed Titinius for the hospitality that had been between them, that he would look to the safety of himself and his soldiers. There was a great number of Germans that had already passed the Rhene, and would be here within two days; and therefore let them advise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceived it, to depart with their soldiers out of their wintering-places either to Cicero or Labienus, of whom the one was not past fifty mile off, and the other a little further. For his own part he promised them thus much, and confirmed it by oaths, that they should have safe passage through his territories; for so he should both do a pleasure to his country in disburthening it of garrisons, and shew himself thankful to Cæsar for his benefits. This speech being ended Ambiorix departed, and Carpineus and Junius made report thereof to the Legates.

OBSERVATION.

LEander his counsell, to use the Foxes skin where the Lions saileth, doth shew that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, then the powers of our body are overcome with force. For oftentimes the mind is so disquieted with the extremity of perturbations, that neither the apprehension can take sound instructions, nor the judgement determine of that which is most for our good; but according as any passion shall happen to reign in our disposition, so are we carried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of error, or mistrust of well-succeeding: whereas the body continueth firme in his own strength, and is subject onely to a greater weight of power, by which it may be subdued and overthrown. It behoveth us therefore to take good heed, that our surest hold be not unfattened by the subtilty of the Fox, when it hath continued firm against the force of the Lion: and that the treachery of the spirit do not disadvantage those means, which either our own power or opportunity hath gained in our actions. Wherein a Commander cannot have a better rule for his direction, then to beware that violence of passion do not hinder the course of sound deliberation: and withall to be jealous of whatsoever an Enemy shall, either by speech or action, seem to thrust upon him, how colourable soever the reasons may be which are alleged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the mind be not confirmed by the virtue of her better faculties to resist the motion of fruitlesse apprehensions, it may easily be seduced (either by fear or vain imaginations, diffident conceptions or over-easie credulity, with many other such disturbing powers) from that way which a good discretion, and an understanding free from passion would have taken.

First therefore I hold it necessary to have the

consistory of our judgement well settled with a firme resolution, and with the presence of the mind, before we enter into deliberation of such things as are made happy unto us by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will give some help to a good conclusion, when we consider how improbable it is that an Enemy, whose chiefest care is to weaken his adversary, and bring him to ruine, should advise him of any thing that may concern his good; unless the profit which he himself shall thereby gather, do far exceed that which the contrary part may expect.

I grant that in civile wars, where there are many friends on either party, and have the adverse cause as dear unto them as their own, there are oftentimes many advertisements given, which proceed from a true and sincere affection, and may advantage the party whom it concerneth, as well in preventing any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be weighed by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof we have many pregnant examples in the civile wars of France, &c. particularly in *Monsieur la Non* his discourses: but where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humours contending for that which peculiarly belongeth unto one of them, where care to keep that which is dearest unto them possesseth the one, and hope of gain stirreth up the other, there is commonly such an universall hatred between them, that they are to look for small advantage by advertisements from the enemy. Which if the Romans had well considered, this subtle Gall had not disposed them of their strength, nor brought them to ruine.

CHAP. XI.

The Romans call a councill upon this advertisement, and resolve to depart, and joyn themselves to some other of the Legions.

THe Romans being troubled at the suddennesse of the matters, albeit the things were spoken by an Enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moved them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones, being base and of no reputations, durst of themselves make war against the people of Rome. And therefore they propounded the matter in a councill; wherein there grew a great controversie among them. Labienus, and most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashly, nor to depart out of their wintering-camps without expresse commandment from Cæsar; forasmuch as they

they were able to resist never so great a power, yea even of the Germans, having their garrisons well fortified: an argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the Enemy, and given them many wounds. Neither wanted they any victuals; and before that provision which they had was spent, there would come succour from other garrisons and from Cæsar. And so conclude, what was more dishonourable or savourless of greater inconstancy, then to consult of their weightiest affairs by the advertisement of an Enemy? Titinius urged vehemently to the contrary, that it then would be too late for them to seek a remedy, when a greater power of the Enemy accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when any blow were given to any of the next wintering-camps. He took Cæsar to be gone into Italy; for otherwise the Carnutes would not have adventured to kill Talgetius; neither durst the Eburones have come so proudly to the camp. Let them not respect the authority, but the thing itself: the Rhene was not far off, and he knew well that the overthrow of Ariovistus, and their former victories were grievous to the Germans. The Gallies were vexed with the contumelies they had received, being brought in subjection to the Roman Empire, and having lost their former reputation in deeds of Arms.

And to conclude, who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprize such a matter without any ground or certainty thereof? but howsoever things stood, his counsell was sure and could bring no harm: for if there were no worse thing intended, they should but go safely to the next garrisons; or otherwise if the Gallies conspired with the Germans, their onely safety consisted in celerity. As for the counsell of Cotta and such as were of the contrary opinion, what excuse or compellation could be had thereof? wherein if Ambiorix here were not present danger, yet assuredly there might be famine to be feared by long siege. The dispute being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders earnestly repugning it; Do as please you, since you will needs have it, said Sabinus, (and that he spake with a loud voice, that a great part of the soldiers might well heare him) for I am not he that most feareth death among you: let these be wise; and if any mischance happen unto them, they shall ask account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldst let them, they might joyn themselves within two daies to the next garrisons, and with them sustain what chance soever their common destiny should allot them; and not perish with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellows. After these words they began to rise out of the Councill; but hold was laid upon them both:

emcreary was made that they would not by their dissension and obstinacy bring all unto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or staid, so that they all agreed upon one thing; whereas in disagreeing there was no likelihood of well doing. The dispute was prolonged untill midnight; at length Cotta yielded, and the sentence of Sabinus took place. And thereupon it was proclaimed that they should set forth by the break of day. The rest of the night was spent in watching. Every soldier sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leave behind him of such necessities as he had prepared for winter. All things were disposed in such sort, to make the soldiers believe that they could not stay without danger, and that the danger might be augmented by wearying the soldiers with watching.

OBSERVATION.

BY the resolution in this dispute it appeareth how little a grave and wise deliberation availeth, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former observation: for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded upon things certain, and well known to the whole Councill; and yet the fear of Sabinus was such, that it carried the conclusion by such supposed assertions as the quality of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether upon that which the Enemy had suggested, and not upon any certain knowledge of the truth. Neither is it often seen when a Councill disputeth upon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether clear from such troublesome motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partiality of a strong affection; so powerful is passion in the government of the soul, and so interessed in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the uncertainty of mans judgments, from whence all contrary & different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a council of war should so much vary in case of deliberation, when as many especial points of military discipline remain yet undecided, having the authority of the great Commanders of all ages to testify the truth on either part; whereof I could alledge many examples. But concerning the issue and event of our deliberations, what can be more truly said then that of the Poet?

Et male consultis pretium est prudentia
fallax;
Nec fortuna probat causas sequiturque
merentes;
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fer-
tur.

Q

Scilicet

Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogatque regatque; Majus, et in propriis ducit mortalia leges.

Notwithstanding, forasmuch as our wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it self the good direction of most of the occurrences which fall within the course of our business, or if we need needs miscarry, yet it somewhat helpeth our ill fortune to think that we went upon best probabilities; it shall not be amiss to set down some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to understand that as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend only particularities, which being carried unto the apprehension are disposed into formes and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their severall properties; from whence there arise intellectuall notions, and rules of Art, wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so he that intendeth to debate a matter with found deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions and a knowledge in generall, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the materiall substance of every action. He therefore that can give best direction, either by experience or judicious discourse, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can best advise which is the safest way to avoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will alledge two examples: the one modern in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seeme not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meer Apology: yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular circumstances, it may give great light to that which we seek after.

Lib. 9.

The modern example is taken out of *Guicciardin*, from the wars which *Lewis the French King* had with the *Pope* and the *Venetians* concerning the State of *Ferrara* and the Dutchy of *Millain*: wherein there arose a controversie among the *French Captains*, whether it were better to go directly to seek the Enemy, who albeit they were lodged in a strong and secure place, yet there was hope that with the vertue of Arms and impetuosity of artillery they might be dislodged, and driven to retreat; or otherwise to take the way either of *Modena* or *Bologna*, that so the Enemy for fear of losing either of those towns might quit their hold, and by that means *Ferrara* should be freed from the war. *Monfieur Chaumont* the General of the *French* inclined to the former advise: But *Trivulce*, a man of great authority and experience, having been an executioner in 18. battells, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seek the Enemy to fight with him; and I have always heard great Captains hold this as a firm principle. Not to attempt the

fortune of a battell, unless there be either an offer of an especial advantage, or otherwise compulsion by necessity. The rules of war give it to the enemy that is the invader, and hath undertaken the conquest of *Ferrara* to seek to assail and charge us; but to us, to whom it is sufficient to defend our selves, it cannot be but impertinent to undertake an action contrary to all direction and discipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by evident reason, that there is no possibility to execute that devise but to our harms and disadvantage: for we cannot go to their camp but by the side of a hill, a streight and narrow way, where all our forces cannot be employed; and yet they with small numbers will make resistance, having the opportunity of the place favourable to their vertues. We must march by the rising of a hill, one horie after another, neither have we any other way to draw our Artillery, our baggage, our carts and bridges, but by the streight of the hill: and who doubteth not but in a way so narrow and cumbrous, every artillery, every cart, or every wheel that shall break will stay the Army a whole hour at the least? By which impediments every contrary accident may put us to disorder. The Enemy is lodged in covert, provided of victuals and forrage; and we must incamp all bare and naked, not carrying with us that which should serve for our necessary nouriture, but expect the things to come after, which in reason ought to go with us. To attempt new enterprises, whereof the victory is less certain then the perills, is contrary to the gravity and reputation of a Leader; and in actions of the war, those enterprises are put to adventure that are done by will and not by reason. Many difficulties may compell us to make our abode there two or three dayes; yea the snows and rains, joined with the extremity of the season, may suffice to detain us: how shall we then do for victuals and forrages? What shall we be able to do in the wars, wanting the things that should give us strength and sutenance? what is he that considereth not how dangerous it is to go seek the Enemy in a strong camp, and to be driven at one time to fight against them & against the discommodity of the place? If we compell them not to abandon their camp, we cannot but be enforced to retire; a matter of great difficulty in a country so wholly against us, and where every little distavour will turn to our great disadvantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that grave discourse, in the discovery of the particular occurrences incident to that enterprise; which being laid open to their confused judgements, did manifestly point at the great disadvantages which were to be undergone by that attempt.

The other example is of more antiquity, taken out of *Lactius*, and concerneth the arraignment of certain Senators for the friendship that had

Annal. 6.
part

past between *Sejanus* and them. Amongst whom *M. Terentius* thus answered for himself, according as it hath of late been published by translation.

It would be peradventure less behovefull for my estate to acknowledge, then to deny the crime I am charged with: but hap what hap may, I will confesse that I have been *Sejanus* friends, and that I desired so to be, and that after I had obtained his friendship I was glad of it. I had seen him joint-officer with my father in the government of the prætorian cohort, and not long after in managing the City affairs, and matters of war: his kinsmen and allies were advanced to honour: as every man was inward with *Sejanus*, so he was graced by *Cæsar*: and contrariwise such as were not in his favour lived in fear, and distressed with poverty. Neither do I alledge any man for an example of this; all of us who were not privy to his last attempts, with the danger of my only estate I will defend: not *Sejanus* the *Vulsinensis*, but a part of the *Clandian* and *Julian* family, which by alliance he had entred into. Thy son in law, *Cæsar*, thy companion in the Consulship, and him who took upon him thy charge of administering the Commonwealth, we did reverence and honour. It is not our part to judge of him whom thou dost exalt above the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest judgement of things the gods have given, and to us the glory of obedience is left. We look into those things which we see before our eyes, whom thou dost inrich, whom thou dost advance to honours, who have great power of hurting or helping; which *Sejanus* to have had no man will deny. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift it is not lawfull to found, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the end reach unto them. Think not only, Lords of the Senate, of *Sejanus* last day; but of sixteen years, in which we did likewise fawn upon and court *Savins* and *Pomponius*; and to be known unto his freed men and partners was reckoned for a high favour. What then? shall this defence be generally, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past and his later actions? No: but let it by just bounds and terms be divided: let the treasons against the Commonwealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour be punished; but as for the friendships, duties, pleasures and good turns, the same end shall discharge and quit thee, O *Cæsar*, and us.

The constancy of this Oration prevailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus we see how particularities decide the controversy, and make the way plain to good direction.

CHAP. XII.

The Romans take their journey towards the next legion; and are set upon by the Galles.

As soon as the day-light appeared, *Cæsar*, they set forth of their Camp (like men perswaded that the counsel had been given them not by an Enemy, but by *Ambiorix* an especial friend) with a long-tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carry. The Galles understanding of their journey by their noise and watching in the night, secretly in the woods some two miles off layed an Ambuscado in two severall places of advantage, and there attended the coming of the Romans: and when the greatest part of the troups were entred into a valley, suddenly they shewed themselves on both sides the vale, pressing hard upon the rereward, and hindering the foremost from going up the hills, and so began to charge upon the Romans in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could be. Then at length *Titurius*, as one that had provided for nothing beforehand, began to tremble, ranne up and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearfully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him; as it happeneth for the most part to such as are forced to consult in the instant of execution.

OBSERVATION.

It now plainly appeareth by this negligent and ill-ordered march, and the unlocked for encounter which the Galles gave them, that fear had ratified in the judgement of *Sabinus* the smooth suggestion of *Ambiorix*, with an approbation of a certain truth; and layed that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would have discerned to be but weak, and of no probability: which so much the more amazed *Titurius*, by how much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betrayed good counsel to a course full of danger; which, as *Cæsar* noteth, must needs fall upon such, as are then to seek for direction when the business requireth execution. I have handled already the inconveniences of disappointments, and therefore at this time will but bring it only into remembrance, that we may take the greater care to prevent an accident of that nature: wherein as the best remedy for an evil is to foresee it, according to the saying, *Previsa pereunt mala*, evils foreseen fall of themselves; so the greatest mischief in an evil is when it cometh unthought of, and besides our expectation, for then it falleth upon us with a supernaturall weight, and affrighteth the mind with a superstitious astonishment, as though the divine powers had prevented our delinquencies

with an irremediable calamity, and cut off our appointment with a contrary decree: although peradventure the thing it self carry no such importance, but might be remedied, if we were but prepared with an opinion that such a thing might happen.

It were no ill counsell therefore, what resolution soever be taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to crosse our intentions, as that which is likely to happen from the direction of our chiefest projects; and so we shall be sure to have a present mind in the midst of our occasions, and feel no further danger then that which the nature of the thing inforceth.

CHAP. XIII.

The Romans cast themselves into an Orbe, and are much discouraged.

Cæsar.

Bell Cotta, who had before thought that these things might happen by the way, and for that cause would not be the author of the journey, was not wanting in anything that concerned their common safety: for both in calling upon the souldiers and encouraging them, he executed the place of a Commander; and in fighting, the duty of a souldier. And when they found that, by reason of the length of their troupe, they were not able in their own persons to see all things done, and to give direction in every place; they caused it to be proclaimed, that they should all forsake their baggage, and cast themselves into an Orbe. Which direction although in such a case it be not to be reproved, yet it fell out illfavouredly: for it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gave the Enemy greater encouragement, inasmuch as it seemed that that course was not taken but upon a great fear and in extremity of perill. Moreover it happened, as it could not otherwise chuse, that the souldiers went from their Ensignes, to take from the carriages such things as were most dear unto them: and there was nothing heard amongst them but clamours and weepings. But the Barbarous Gallies were not to learn how to carry themselves. For their Commanders caused it to be proclaimed, that no man should stir out of his place; for the prey was theirs, and all that the Romans had laid a part was reserved for them: and therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the victory. The Romans were equall to the Gallies both in number of men and valour; and albeit they were destitute of good Captains and of good fortune, yet they reposd in their manhood all the hope of their safety: and as often as any cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the Enemy on that part.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled the nature of an Orbe, with such properties as are incident to a Circle; wherein I shewed the convenience of this figure, in regard of safe and strong imbattelling. I will now add thus much concerning the use thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbattelling for a defensive strength, and therefore never used but in extremity; so we must be very careful that the sudden betaking of our selves to such a refuge do not more dismay the souldiers, then the advantage of that imbattelling can benefit them. For unlesse a Leader be carefull to keep his men in courage, that their hearts may be free from despair and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or body soever, when the particular members shall be senselesse of that duty which belongeth unto them? For order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giving means to manage our valour with advantage. In the war of Africk we read, that Cæsars legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quickly turned it to a better use, by advancing the two Corners two contrary wayes; and so divided the Enemy into two parts, and then beat them back, to their great disadvantage.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I Need not stand upon this order which the Gallies here took concerning pillage, that no souldier should forsake his station, or dislance himself in hope of spoil; which is a thing that from the very infancy of wars hath often changed the fortune of the day, and sold the honour of a publick victory for private lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, let that which Guicciardine reporteth of the battel of Taro suffice to warn a well-directed Army, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name King of France received at that time, as by the losse which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seek after pillage untill the victory be obtained.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

The insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Cæsar now complaineth as the only want which these Romans had to clear themselves of this danger, bringeth to our consideration that which former times have made a question; which is, Whether it were the vertue of the Roman Leaders, or the valour of their souldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatness, and made their people and Senate Lords of the world. Polybius weighing the causes of a victo-

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ry which the Carthaginians gained of the Romans, by the counsell and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, having before that time received divers overthrowes during the time of those wars in Africk; concludeth that it was more in the worthinesse of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary vertue of the souldiers, that the Romans achieved so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hannibal; who from the beginning of the second Punick war, still gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and streightning the jurisdiction of mighty Rome, untill it had got a Leader matchable to that subtle Carthaginian, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that famous battel between the old Romans and the last Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballanced, both in number and quality of their souldiers, having both the same Armes, the same use of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had been in a Civile war. Neither could Fortune tell by the presence of their Armes where to bestow her favour, or where to shew her disdain; but that the worthinesse of the Roman Leaders brought the odds in the tryall, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Whereby it appeareth how much it importeth the whole fortune of the Army, to have a Leader worthy of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequality between two equall Armies, then the wisdom and experience of a grave Commander, or the disability of an unskilfull Leader; which are so powerfull in their severall effects, that there is greater hope of a herd of Harts led by a Lion, then of so many Lions conducted by a Hart.

CHAP. XIV.

Ambiorix directeth the Gallies how they might best fight with advantage, and frustrate the weapons of the Roman souldiers.

Cæsar.

He which thing when Ambiorix perceived, he commanded his men to throw their casting weapons as far off, and keep themselves from coming near at hands, and where the Romans charged them to give way, for that by reason of the lightnesse of their armes and their daily exercise the Romans could do them no harm: and again, as they saw them retire to their Ensignes, then to pursue them. Which commandment was so diligently observed by the Gallies, that as oft as any cohort sallied out of the Orbe to give an assault, the Enemy gave backe as fast as they could; and in the mean time there was no help but that part must be left naked and open to the inconvenience of casting weapons: and again as they retired so

their place, they were circumvented, as well by them that had given place unto them, as by such as stood next about them. And if they went about to keep their ground, they could neither help themselves by their manhood, nor standing thick together avoid the darts that such a multitude cast upon them. And yet notwithstanding these inconveniences, besides the wounds which they had received, they stood still at their defence, and having so spent the greatest part of the day (for they had fought eight houres together) they committed nothing dishonourable, or unworthy of themselves.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Have spoken already of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbattelling, and in firm standing, and buckling at handy-blows: as may appear by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to give back and follow on again, as the lightnesse of their Armes gave them opportunity. In like manner in the first book of the Civile wars, in the battel between Cæsar and Afranius, it appeareth that Cæsar his souldiers were bound to keep their array, not to leave their Ensignes, nor without a weighty occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Afranius fought thin and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laid unto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and give back, as they had learned of the Portugals and other Barbarous Nations.

CHAP. XV.

The Romans are overthrowen.

Hen T. Baluentius, who the year before had been principall of that legion, a valiant man and of great authority, had both his thighs darts through with a javelin; and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his son, was slain; and L. Cotta the Legate, as he busily encouraged all the cohorts and centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moved with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix as far off encouraging his men, sent Cn. Pompeius unto him, to intreat him that he would spare him and his souldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to treat, he might: for he hoped to obtain so much of the people to save the souldiers, but for himself, he should have no harm at all: for the assurance whereof, he gave him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, and that if he liked that they two should go out of the battell, and have conference with Ambiorix, he doubted not but to obtain of him the safety of themselves and the

Cæsar.

their soldiers. Cotta absolutely denied to go to an armed enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes and Centurions as were present to follow him; and when he came near to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast away his arms, he obeyed, and willed those that were with him to do the same. In the mean time while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a solemn protestation of purpose, Titurius was by little and little compassed about and slain. Then, according to their custom, they cried victory; and taking up a howling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault, and routed their troops. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly was slain; the most part of the soldiers with him. The remnant retired into their camp; amongst whom L. Petrolidius the Eagle-bearer, when he saw himself overcharged with enemies, threw the Eagle within the rampier, and fighting with a great courage before the Camp was slain. The rest with much ado endured the assault until night; and in the night, being in despair of all success, slew themselves every man. A few that escaped from the battell came by unknown ways through the woods to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

OBSERVATION.

And thus have we heard of the greatest losse that ever fell at any one time upon Cæsar his Army, from the time that he was first Proconsul in Gallia, unto the end of his Dictatorship. For in the two overthrowes at Dyrrachium he lost not above 1000 men; and in that at Gergovia not so many; but here fifteen cohorts were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men or thereabout. Which maketh cowardise and ill direction the more hateful, in regard that the great victory which his valour obtained in Pharsalia cost him but the lives of two hundred men.

The resolution of such as returned to the Camp witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman soldiers; if a valiant Leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had been absolute Commanders there had been great hope of better fortune in the successe. But here it happened as it commonly doth, that where there are many that are equal sharers in the chief authority, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion than the rest; which being a property rather of passion than of judicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperate opposition of a true discerning understanding. And so consequently it falleth out, that one coward having place and authority in the Councell, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the

Leaders: for his timorousnesse lieth alwayes to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptory in opinion, and base in case of perill; all which are enemies to good directions and the onely instruments of mitchieving fortune.

CHAP. XVI.

Ambiorix hasteth to besiege Cicero, and stirreth up the Aduatici, the Nervii, and so raiseth a great power.

Ambiorix took such spirits unto him upon this victory, that with his horsemen he went immediately unto the Aduatici, being the next borderers upon his kingdom, without intermission of night or day, commanding his footmen to follow him. The Aduatici upon his opening the matter being stirred up to commotions, the next day after he came to the Nervii, exhorting them not to let slip this occasion of recovering to themselves perpetuall liberty, and recovering them of the Romans for the wrongs they had received. He told them that two Legues were already slain; and a great part of the Army overthrown: it was now no great matter suddenly to surprize the Legion that wintered with Cicero; to the performance whereof he offered himself to be their assistant. These remonstrances easily persuaded the Nervii; and therefore they dispatched speedy messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, Leuaci, Pleumosi and Gorduni, who were all under their dominion, and raised very great forces; and with them they hastened to the camp where Cicero wintered, before any inkling of the death of Titurius was brought unto him.

OBSERVATION.

The ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the basenesse of a small and ignoble State to so high a point of resolution, that they durst adventure upon the Roman legions, being settled in the strength of their Empire by the memory of so many victories in Gallia, wanted now no means to make an overture to a universal commotion, propounding liberty and revenge to the Galles (two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people) if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that counsell which his example had proved sure and easie. Which may serve to shew that he that will attempt upon doubtful and unsafe Principles, will take great advantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient means for his greatest designs.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Cicero defendeth his Camp from the surprize of the Nervii, and prepareth himself against a Siege.

Cæsar.

It happened to Cicero also (as it could not otherwise chuse) that many of the soldiers that were gone into the woods for timber and munitions were cut off by the sudden approach of the Enemies horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Nervii, and Aduatici, with all their confederates and clients began to assault the Camp. The Romans brook them speedily to their weapons, and got upon the rampier. With much ado they held out that day: for the Galles trusted much upon celerity; hoping if they sped well in that action, to be victors ever after.

Cicero dispatched letters with all speed to Cæsar, promising great rewards to him that would carry them: but all the wayes were so fore-laid that the Messengers weretaken. In one night there was built in the camp one hundred and twenty towers, of such timber as was brought in for fortification; and whatsoever wanted of the rest of the work was perfected.

The enemy the next day with a far greater power assaulted the Camp, and filled up the ditch. The Romans made the like defence as they had done the day before; the like was continued divers dayes after. The Romans made no intermission of their work at any part of the night, nor gave any rest either to the sick or the wounded. Whatsoever was needfull for the next dayes assault, was provided in readines the night before: a great number of stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and many murall piles were made; the towers were steeled in their stories; Pinacles and Parapets were set up of bundles; and Cicero himself being sickly and of a weak constitution, took not so much pleasure as to rest himself in the night time: so that the soldiers of their own accord compelled him by intreaty to spare himself.

OBSERVATION.

This Cicero is said to be the brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Orator, and to him were the letters sent which are found in his Epistles directed Quinto fratri. In this action his courage deserved as great reputation in the true centre of honour as ever his brother did for his eloquence pro Roscio. And if it had been the others fortune to have performed the like service, he had made it the greatest exploit that ever was: and had achieved by arms. Wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industry which was used in raising to many towers in so small a time; for providing the night before such things as were necessary for

the next dayes defence; for making so many stakes hardened in the end with fire for the defence of the rampier; and for the store of these murall piles, which resembled the form of the ordinary pile, but were far greater and weightier, in regard they were to be cast from the rampier; which gave them such advantage by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arm, they were very effectually and of great terrour.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Nervii propound the same things to Cicero which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus; but are rejected.

Cæsar.

Then the Princes and chief Commanders of the Nervii, which had any entrance of speech and cause of acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speak with him. Which being granted, they propounded the same things which Ambiorix had used to deceive Sabinus; all Gallia were in Arms; the Germans were come over the Rhene; Cæsar and the rest were besieged in their wintering-camps; Sabinus and his men were cut in pieces; and for the more credit to it they shew him Ambiorix. They said, they were much deceived if they expected any help from those who were at present scarce able to help themselves. Notwithstanding they carried this mind to Cicero and the people of Rome, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them, which they would not suffer to be made a common practise. They might depart in safety whither they would, without disturbance or fear of danger. Cicero only made this answer; That it was not the custom of the people of Rome to take any article or condition from an armed Enemy; but if they would lay their Arms aside, let them use his furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiate it with Cæsar: there was great hope, in regard of his justice and equity, that they should not return unsatisfied.

OBSERVATION.

The first attempt which Ambiorix made upon the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta was but short; but here, what with the pride of the former victory, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carry it by assault. For the first assault of a place, especially when it cometh by way of surprize, is of greater hope to the assailants and of greater danger to the defendants, then such as afterward are made in the sequele of the war: for after the first brunt the heat of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which

is most violent in the beginnings, and afterward groweth cold and remiss, as also with the harms and perill which they meet with in the encounter; and on the contrary side, the defendants having withstood the first furies, where-in there is most terrour and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firm against any charge whatsoever.

CHAP. XIX.

The Nervii besiege *Cicero* with a ditch and a rampier, and work means to set fire on their tents.

Cæsar.

THe Nervii disappointed of this hope, carried a ditch and a rampier round about the camp: the rampier was eleven foot high, and the ditch fifteen foot deep: which they had learned of the Romans, partly by being conversant among them certain years before, and partly by the prisoners and captives which they had taken. But they had no iron tools fit for this purpose, but were driven to cut up turf with their swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carry it away with their Mantles and Giberdines. Whereby may be gathered what a multitude of men there were at the siege; for in less than three hours they finished the fortification of fifteen miles in circuit. The dayes following the enemies built towers to the height of the rampier, prepared great hooks and strong penthouses, or safeguards of boards and timber, according as the captives had given them instruction. The seventh day of the siege being a very windy day, they cast hot bullets of clay out of slings, & burning darts upon the cabins of the Romans, which after the manner of the Gallies were thatched with straw. These cabins were quickly set on fire, which by the violence of the wind was carried over all the camp. The enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the victory were already gotten, began to bring their Towers and Testudines to the rampier, and to scale it with ladders. But such was the valour of the Roman souldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and overcharged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their face; yet no man forsook the rampier, or scarce looked back at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage. This was the worst day the Romans had, and yet it had this issue, that a very great number of the enemies were slain and wounded; for they had so thronged themselves under the rampiers, that the windmost hindered the foremost from retiring back. The flame at length abating, and the enemies having brought on one of

their towers to the very works, the Centurions of the third cohort drew back themselves, and their men from the place where they stood, and with signs and voices called to the enemies to enter if they thought good: but none of them durst approach. Then did they by casting stones from all parts beat them from the works, and set their tower on fire.

OBSERVATION.

THis one example may serve to shew the excellency of the Roman discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Art. For they perceiving that the fortune of wars consisted chiefly in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their souldiers in that forme of discipline as might struggle with inconveniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so overcame all difficulties and hinderances with a constant perseverance and a courage invincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious Commander, that seeketh to overtop the trophies of honour with the memory of his exploits, will quickly perish by his own direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker than the means which lead him to his designs. For where the weight is greater than the strength, the engine will sooner break then lift it up. Let a discreet Leader therefore so level his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceed the ability of his particular means: but first let him be well assured what his souldiers can do, before he resolve what he will do: or otherwise let him so inable them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth may answer the height of his desires, and follow his aspiring mind with a resolution grounded upon knowledge and valour; and so making their ability the ground of his designs, he shall never faile of means to perform what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath within these late years repaid our Commanders in many parts of Christendome with losse and dishonour, when as they have measured the humour of their poor needy and undisciplined souldier by the garb of their ambitious thoughts, and so laid such projects of difficulty, as were very unfitable in the particularity of occurrences to that which their souldiers were fit to execute.

CHAP. XX.

The emulation between two Centurions, Pulpio and Varenus, with their fortines in the encounter.



Here were in this legion two valiant men, Titus Pulpio and L. Varenus, Centurions, coming on a piece to the dignity of the first order. These two were at continual debate which of them should be preferred one before another, and

and every year contended for place of preferment with much strife and emulation. Pulpio, at a time that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now stood doubtfull; or what other place he did look for to make trial of his manhood. This is the day, saith he, that shall decide our controversies. And when he had spoken these words, he went out of the fortification; and where he saw the Enemy thickest, he fiercely set upon them. Then could not Varenus hold himself within the rampier, but for his credite sake followed after in a reasonable distance. Pulpio cast his pile at the enemy, and struck one of the multitude through the arme running out against him. He being slain, the enemies cover him with their shields, and all cast their weapons at Pulpio, giving him no respite or time of retreat. Pulpio had his target struck through, and the dart stuck fast in his girdle. This chance turned aside his scabbard, and hindered his right hand from pulling out his sword; in which disadvantage the enemy pressed hard upon him. Varenus came and rescued him. Immediately the whole multitude, thinking Pulpio to be slain with the dart, turned to Varenus: who speedily be took him to his sword, and came to hand; strook; & having slain one, he put the rest somewhat back. But as he followed over-hastily upon them, he fell down. Him did Pulpio rescue being circumvented and in danger: & so both of them, having slain many of the enemy, retired to their Camp in safety, to their great honour. Thus Fortune carried as well the contention, as the encounter of them both, that being Enemies, they nevertheless gave help to save each others life, in such sort as it was not to be judged which of them deserved greatest honour.

OBSERVATION.

Cæsar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthy to be related amongst the deeds of Armes contained in these Commentaries. Wherein we are first to observe the grounds of this quarrell, which was their continual strife for place of preferment, which they fought after, by shewing their valour in time of danger, and approving their worth by the greatness of their desert: a contention worthy the Roman discipline, & may serve for a pattern of true honour full of courage, accomplished with vertue. For these Simulations which desire of honour had cast between them, brought forth emulation, which is the spur of vertue, far from enmity or hatefull contention: for the difference between these two qualities is, that enmity hunteth after destruction, & only rejoyceth in that which bringeth to our adversary utter ruine, dis-

honour, or ill achievement; but emulation contendeth only by well deserving to gain the advantage of another mans fame, that useth the same means to attain to the like end; and is always mixed with love, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the sympathy of their desires, not seeking the overthrow of their Competitors, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foul and unfortunate calamity, that he may still continue to shew the greatness of his worth, by the opposition of inferior actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A vertue rare and unknown in these dayes, and would hardly find subjects to be resident in, if she should offer her help in the course of our affairs, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositions of our times: For we can no sooner conceive the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the uttermost of our malice, and reflecteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed parties, then with thousand of Trophies deservedly erected to our honour. Which maketh me wonder, when I look into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time which brought forth such honest effects of vertue, to their glory and our ignominy, having learned better rules then were known unto them; or whether the world weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection as it did in those dayes; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remiss and negligent, that vertue hath no part in us but words of praise, our whole practice being consecrated to actions of reproach. The injuries, murders, scandalous carriages of one towards another, which in these dayes are so readily offered and so impatiently digested, will admit no satisfaction but private combat; which in the first Monarchies was granted only against strangers & foreign enemies, as the only objects of Arms and wrath, and capable of that justice which the private sword should execute: for they well perceived that these single batels were as sparkles of civile discord, and intestine wars; although not so apparent in the generall view of their State, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good government. And if there were a true record of such as have been either slain or wounded within these forty years, either in this kingdom, or in France, or in Germany, by this licentious and brutish customs, I make no question but they would amount to a number capable of that fearfull stile which is attributed to Civile wars.

Neither is there any law, how rigorous or hard fover, that can give reliefe to this disorder.

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disorders, but the restraint will draw on as great enormities, and as intolerable in a good government. *Ratur's* King of the *Lumbards* forbade his subjects this manner of combat: but shortly after he was constrained to recall the Edict for the avoiding of greater evils; although he protested the thing to be both inhumane and barbarous. The like Edict was published in *France* by *Philip the Fair*; but was within two years revoked again at the instant request of his Subjects, in regard of the murders and assassinations committed in that kingdom.

The only remedy that I find to take effect in this case, was that of late time which the Prince of *Metz* in *Pi. mont* invented to prevent this evil: for perceiving how ordinary quarrels and blood-shed were in his camp, he assigned a place between two bridges for the performance of the *Duelum*, with this charge, that he that had the worst should always be slain, &c. cast from the ridge into the water. The danger joyned with dishonour (which by this Decree attended such as undertook private combat), made the souldiers wiser in their carriage, and put an end to their fedition and civile discords. But that which is yet worst of all is, that custom hath now made it so familiar, that every tittle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a private combat: a cross look calleth another mans honour in question; but the word *Lye* is of as great consequence as any stab or villany whatsoever. Whereat we may well wonder, how it happeneth that we feel our selves to much exasperated at the reproach of that vice which we so ordinarily commit: for in the custom of these times, to cast upon us the *Lye* is the greatest injury that words can do unto us; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a property in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption unto which we are most subject.

I speak not this to qualifie the foulness of this vice; for I hold a *Lye* to be a monster in nature, one that containeth *GO D*, and feareth man, as an ancient Father saith: but to shew the crookedness of our disposition, in disdaining to acknowledge that fault which we so commonly commit. But I would fain learn when honour first came to be measured with words: for from the beginning it was not so. *Cæsar* was often called to his face thief and drunkard, without any further matter: and the liberty of invectives which great personages used one against another, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I think our *Lie* might too; for I take him that returneth the *Lie*, and so let- teth it self untill further proof, to have as great advantage in the reputation of honour as the former that first gave the disgrace.

CHAP. XXI.

Cæsar findeth means to advertise *Cæsar* of this Accident; who halting, raises the siege, and putteth the Enemy to a great slaughter.

As the siege grew daily hotter and stranger, and specially for that a great part of the souldiers were laid up with wounds, and the matter brought into a few mens hands that were able to make any defence; so they sent out Letters and Messengers the more often to *Cæsar*: of whom some were taken, and in the sight of our souldiers tortured to death. There was one within the place besieged of the Nation of the *Nervi*, called *Vertico*, of honest parentage, who in the beginning of the siege had fled to *Cicero*, and carried himself faithfully in that service. This man did *Cicero* chuse, perswading him with hope of *Liberty*, and other great rewards, to carry Letters to *Cæsar*: which he took, and having tied them up in his *Dart*, travelled as a Gall amongst the *Galles*, without any suspitions, and so came to *Cæsar*. Of whom he understood how dangerously *Cicero* and the legion was beset.

Cæsar having received those Letters about the eleventh hour of the day, dispatched presently a Messenger to *M. Cælius* the Treasurer in the country of the *Bellovac*, twenty five miles off, commanding the legion to set out at midnight, and speedily to come unto him. *Cælius* set out and came along with the Messenger. He sent another Post to *Cn. Fabius* the Legate, to bring that legion to the confines of the *Atrebat*, through which he was to passe. And wrote in like manner to *Labienus*, that if it stood with the conveniency of the State, he should bring his legion to the territories of the *Nervi*: for the rest of the Army that were further off he thought good not to expell. He drew four hundred horse, or thereabouts from the nearest wintering-Camps. And being advertised about the third hour (by the fore-runners) of *Cælius* coming, he marched that day twenty miles.

He made *Cælius* Governour of *Samarobrinas*, & gave him one legion for the defence thereof; in regard that the baggage of the whole Army, the hostages of the Province, the publick transactions and Letters, together with all the Corn which he had got for the provision of the Winter, was left in that place. *Fabius* according to his directions, without any delay met him with his legion.

Labienus understanding of the death of *Sabinus*, and the slaughter of the Cohorts, & knowing also that the whole forces of the *Treviri* were marching toward him, doubt-
ed

ed that if his setting forward out of his winter station should seem as a stealing away, he should not be able to undergo the charge of the enemy, whom a late victory had made insolent: and therefore informed *Cæsar* by his Letters, what danger it would be to draw the legion from their wintering-camp; relating what had hapned amongst the *Eburones*, & how that all the forces of the *Treviri*, both horse and foot, lay but three miles distant from his Camp.

Cæsar allowing of these reasons, howsoever his hope of three legions was fallen unto two, yet his whole trust was in celerity, as the only means of all their safeties: and so by great journeys came into the confines of the *Nervi*; where he understood by the Captives how matters passed with *Cicero*, and what danger he was in. At what time he perswaded a certain horseman of the *Galles*, by great rewards offered unto him, to carry a Letter unto *Cicero*; which he sent writ in Greek Characters, least his purposes should be discovered, if the Letter had been intercepted: advising, that if he could not come to his presence, he should tie it to the string of a Dart, and so cast it into the fortifications. He advertised them by his Letter that he was on the way with the legions, and would be there instantly to raise the siege, exhorting him to persevere in his wonted Gallantry. The Gall fearing some danger, followed the directions, and cast it into the works by a Dart, which fell by chance upon a turret, and there stuck two dayes before it was perceived: the third day a souldier finding it, took it down and brought it to *Cicero*, who read it publicly in the assembly of the souldiers, and put them all into exceeding great joy. And at the same time the smoke of their fires began a far off to be discovered; which put them out of all doubt of the approach of the legions.

The *Galles* being advertised thereof by their Discoverers, left the siege, and made towards *Cæsar* with all their power; which consisted of 60000 men or thereabouts. *Cicero* finding himself at liberty, sought out the same *Vertico* before mentioned, to carry Letters to *Cæsar*, advising him to be wary and diligent in his passage, signifying by those Letters that the enemy had left the siege, & turned all his forces towards him, which Letters being brought unto *Cæsar* about midnight, he certified his party of the contents thereof, and prepared them by incouragement to fight. The next day as soon as it began to be light, he removed his Camp; & having marched about four miles, he discovered the multitude of the enemy beyond a great Valley and a River. It was a matter of exceeding danger to give battell to so great a number in a place of disadvantage: and forasmuch as he knew that *Cicero* was freed of the siege, he thought he might the better forbear to make

such haste; and thereupon sat down, and in as indifferent a place as he could chuse fortified his Camp. Which being of it self very little, as not having scarce seven thousand men, and those without any carriages; yet he lessened it as much as he could by narrowing the usual streets thereof, to the end he might the better defend it, if happily the enemy might be drawn to engage himself seriously in an attempt upon the same. In the meantime having sent out Discoverers into all parts, he informed himself which way he might most conveniently passe over the valley.

The same day, after small encounters of the Cavalry at the waters, either party contained themselves within their fortifications: the *Galles*, as expelling greater forces, which were not yet come; and *Cæsar*, that by a counterfeit fear he might draw the Enemy to the place where he was lodged on this side the valley, and so strike the battell before his Camp; and if he could not bring it so about, then upon discovery of the wayes, to passe the valley and the river with lesse danger. As it began to be day-light the Cavalry of the enemy came near unto the Camp, and began to skirmish with our horsemen. *Cæsar* of set purpose commanded the horsemen to fall back, and to betake themselves into the Camp: and withall to fortifie their camp on all sides with a higher rampier, to stop up the Gates; and in doing of these things, to carry themselves tumultuously; and with a feigned show of great fear. With which inducements the enemy was so drawn on, that he brought over all his forces, and imbarrelled them in an unequal and disadvantageous place. Our men being drawn from the rampier (to make the matter more apparent) they were emboldened to come nearer, and to cast weapons from all parts into our works; sending Heralds round about with Proclamations, That if any Gall or Roman would come over unto them before the third hour, he should be taken into their safe protection; but after that time there was no hope of any such reception. And they did so content our party, that whereas the Ports were shut up for a shew with a single row of turfs, to the end they might appear to be made up in such manner that they could not be broken open; some of them began to break down the rampier with their hands, and others to fill up the ditches.

Which *Cæsar* perceiving, sallied out at all the Ports at once; and sending out the Cavalry, put the enemy so suddenly to flight, that not one of them resisted by way of fighting: in so much as he slew a great number of them, and put them all besides their Arms. But because he feared to follow them far, in regard of the woods and bogs that lay in their passage, (being unwilling to hazard himself upon the least oc-
casion

caſion of danger) he returned with all his forces in ſafety, and the ſelf ſame day came to Cicero. Where he admired the towers, the mantles and works which were begun and prepared by the enemy: and drawing out the legion, he found that the tenth man had not eſcaped without wounds. By all which circumſtances he underſtood, with what danger and valour the buſineſſe had been caried. He commended Cicero and the legion according to their merit; calleth out by name ſuch Centurions and Tribunes of the ſouldiers, as by teſtimony of Cicero were found to have deſerved extraordinary in that ſervice; informed himſelf by the captives of the certainty of Sabinus & Cottas miſfortune. The next day he ſpoke publicly to the ſouldiers, opened the particulars of that matter, and then ſeaſoned them with comfort and encouragement; ſhewing that the loſſe which happened through the fault and temerity of a Legate, was to be born with better patience: and the rather for as much as by the aſſiſtance of the immortal Gods, and by their own virtues, the loſſe was redeemed in ſuch a faſhion, as neither the enemy d'd long joy it, nor themſelves were long afflicted with grief for the ſame.

OBSERVATION.

THE paſſages in this Chapter are of great variety, and do give occaſion of much diſcourſe. But that which is moſt remarkable is, that to exceed in forces and troupes of men, may be a means to bring a party to an overthrow: for an extraordinary power doth always beget an opinion ſorting to their own deſires, and can hardly think of any other end, than that which ſeeth with ſecurity and victorious ſucceſſe; which being croſſed in any materiall circumſtance, and put beſides the courſe of their intentions, whereby they fail of what they expected, doth conſequently draw all the other way, and changeth hope into miſhap: as it ſared here with the Gallies upon Cæsars ſuddain falling out of the Camp.

CHAP. XXII.

The commotions of the States of Gallia, Induciomarus attempting great matters, is ſlain, and the Country quieted.

Cæſar.



IN the meantime the report of Cæsars victory was carried to Labienus with incredible ſpeed, through the country of thoſe of Rheims: in ſomuch as being fifty miles diſtant from that place where Cicero wintered, and that the overthrow was given about three of the clock in the afternoon, there was a ſhout at the Camp-gate before midnight; whereby

the men of Rheims congratulated Labienus for that victory. The ſame whereof being carried to the Treviri, Induciomarus, that purpoſed the next day to beſiege Labienus, fled in the night time, and carried all his forces back to the Treviri. Cæſar remanded Fabius with his legion into their winter ſtatious: He himſelf with three legions determined to winter about Samarobrina. And for as much as there were ſuch commotions throughout all Gallia, himſelf reſolved to abide with the Army all the winter. For upon the newes of the overthrow of Sabinus, almoſt all the States of Gallia did enter into a conſultation of war; ſent Meſſengers and Ambaſſadors into all parts, to make overtures for ſuſtained reſolutions, and to underſtand in what place the war might beſt be ſet on foot; holding their conventicles by night in ſecret and deſert places: in ſuch manner as there paſſed not a day during all that winter which brought not ſome new care or trouble to Cæſar, whiſt he was daily advertiſed of new meetings and conſpiracies amongſt the Gallies.

Amongſt others he had intelligence from L. Roſcius the Legate, whom he had ſet over the thirteenth legion, that great forces of thoſe States and Cities of the Gallies that are called Armorica were aſſembled together to fight againſt him; and were come within eight miles of his camp: but underſtanding of Cæsars victory, they ſell back in ſuch a faſhion as though they meant to fly away. But Cæſar having called unto him the Princes and chief men of every State, terrifying ſome, as ſeeming to underſtand their compliments, and perſuading others, kept a great part of Gallia in obedience. Howbeit the Senones (a ſtrong people, and of great authority amongſt the Gallies) went about by a publick decree to kill Cavarinus, whom Cæſar had ſet to be king over them; (whoſe brother Moritagus at Cæsars coming into Gallia, and whoſe anceſtors formerly were poſſeſſed of that kingdom) which he perceiving fled away, and was proſecuted to the very borders, and ſo driven as well out of his private houſe as of his kingdom. And having ſent Ambaſſadors to Cæſar to ſatiffie him herein; where-as he commanded the whole Senate to come unto him, they reſuſed to obey his warrant. So much it prevailed amongſt barbarous people, that there were ſome found that durſt avouch the undertaking of a war. Which made ſuch an alteration in the minds of all men, that beſides the Hedui and the State of Rheims, whom Cæſar had in great favour and reſpect, (the one for their ancient and perpetuall fidelity to the people of Rome, and the other for their late ſervices in the war of Gallia) there was almoſt no State free from ſuſpicion. In ſomuch as I know not well whether it may not be wondered at or no, as well for many other reaſons, as ſpecially

cially for that they greatly grieved, that they who excelled all other nations in deeds of arms, had now loſt their reputation ſo far, as they were forced to bear the yoke of the people of Rome.

The Treviri and Induciomarus loſt no time of all that winter, but ſent Commiſſioners beyond the Rhene, ſoliciting the cities, and promiſing money, with confident aſſurance that the greateſt part of our Army was already cut off, and that which was left was but a ſmall remainder of the ſame: and yet for all that no people of the Germans could be perſwaded to paſſe the Rhene. For having twice made trial to their coſt in the war of Arvovitus, and in the paſſage of the *Tenchtheri, they would tempt Fortune no further.

Franchfort.

Induciomarus caſt down from his hope, did notwithſtanding train and gather forces, got horſes from the bordering States, and with great rewards drew unto him baniſht and condemned men from all parts of Gallia; and did thereby get ſuch an opinion throughout all that Continent, that Ambaſſadors came flocking unto him from all quarters, and ſought his favour both in publick and private. When he underſtood that men made to him of their own accords, and that on the one ſide the Senones and Carnutes were iſtigated with a remembrance of their offences, and on the other ſide the Nervii and Adaatici made proviſion of war againſt the Romans, and that he ſhould not want voluntary forces, if he did but once go out of his confines; he gave order to call a Councell of Arms: which according to the manner of the Gallies, was always the beginning of a war, being ſuch as conſtrained all the men that were of years, by the common law of the lands, to aſſemble together in Arms: and he that came laſt, was in the ſight of all the reſt put to death with exquisite torture. In that Councell he took order to proclaim Cingetorix the chief of the other faction, and his ſon in law, (who, as we have before declared, had followed Cæſar, and not left him in any of thoſe ſervices) a Traitor to the State, and that his goods ſhould be conſiſcated.

That being done, he publiſhed in the Councell, that he was ſent for by the Senones and the Carnutes, and many other States of Gallia: whether he meant to go through the territories of the inhabitants of Rheims; and that he would harry and waſte their country. But firſt his purpoſe was to take the camp of Labienus, and accordingly gave order what he would have done. Labienus being in a camp exceedingly fortified, as well by Nature as by Art, did not fear any danger that might happen to himſelf or the legion; but rather ſtudied not to let paſſe any occaſion to carry the matter handſomely and to purpoſe. And there-

fore being advertiſed by Cingetorix and his allies, what ſpeech Induciomarus had delivered in the Councell, he ſent Meſſengers to all the conſtaining cities, and commanded horſemen to be ſent unto him by a certain day.

In the mean time Induciomarus rid up and down almoſt every day with all his cavalry under his camp; ſometimes to view the ſite thereof, otherwhile to parlee, or elſe to terrifie the ſouldier: and his horſemen for the moſt part would caſt their weapons within the rampier. Labienus kept all his men within the fortifications, and did what he could to make the enemy believe that he was ſore afraid. And as Induciomarus came daily with greater contempt to the campe, one night having taken in the cavalry of the bordering cities, which he had formerly ſent for, he kept all his party (by good guarding) with in his camp with ſuch diligence, that their reception could not poſſibly be bruited abroad, or carried to the Treviri. In the mean time Induciomarus, according to his wonted cuſtome, approached near the camp, and there ſpent a great part of the day: the horſemen caſt their weapons, and with words of high reproach called out our men to fight; without any word given in answer by them. And a little before the evening aſt they diſperſed themſelves and departed upon a ſuddain Labienus let out all the cavalry at two Ports, commanding them that after the Enemy was put to flight (which he ſaw would neceſſarily happen) that every one ſhould make after Induciomarus; and that no man ſhould ſo much as wound any other enemy before they ſaw him ſlain; being very unwilling to give him time to eſcape, while the ſouldiers were engaged with the reſt: and propounded great rewards to them that ſlew him. He ſent out alſo ſeveral cohorts to aſſiſt the horſe. Fortune made good that direction: for as all made after one, Induciomarus was ſurpriſed in the ſoord of a River, and ſlain; and his head was brought back into the camp. The horſemen returning, ſlew as many of the reſt as they could take. This thing being known, all the forces of the Eburones and Nervii which were met together departed home; and after that time Cæſar had Gallia better ſetled in quietneſſe.

OBSERVATION.

AS the miſfortune which befall Sabinus and Cottas put all Gallia into troubles and commotions; ſo the head of Induciomarus reduced all into peace. According as it is ſaid of the Spaniards, that in ſome caſes one man is worth a thouſand.

And thus endeth the fifth Commentary.

The sixth Commentary of the wars in
GALLIA.

The Argument.

His Summers Commentary setteth forth the malice of an enemy that refuseth open encounter, but keeping himself in the fastnesse of his holds, forceth the adverse party either to leave him untouched, or to seek him out upon disadvantage: together with such casualties annexed to the matter, as the power of fortune doth commonly intermingle with such occurrences: as also the manners and fashions of life then in use amongst the Germans and Galles.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar, fearing a greater commotion in Gallia, mustereth more forces.

Cæsar.

CÆSAR for many reasons expecting greater troubles in Gallia, appointed M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, Legates in his army, to make a new choise, and muster up more souldiers; and withall he intreated Cneius Pompeius Proconsul, forasmuch as he continued at the city about publick busineses, that he would recall to their ensignes, and send unto him such souldiers as were before discharged of the Consuls oath: for he thought it very materiall for the future time to the opinion of the Galles, when they should see Italy so mighty, that if they had received any losse by the casualties of war, they could not only in a short time make a supply thereof, but augment their army with greater forces. Which when Pompey had granted, both for the good of the commonwealth and Cæsars friendship, the choise being speedily by his ministers performed, before the winter was ended three legions were inrolled and brought unto him, whereby the number of cohorts were doubled which were lost with Q. Titurius: and withall he made experience both by the speed and by the forces, what the wealth and discipline of the people of Rome could do.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Notwithstanding any former purpose, I will begin this Commentary with the manner of

the choise which the Romans used when they mustred souldiers for an intended war: and will lay it first down as the basis and groundfil of all military architecture, and carried by them with such a ceremonious and grave respect, as might best expresse the seriousness of the action, and make the souldiers understand what consequence the sequele imported. Polybius, who only remaineth of them that have written of the ancient fashion of the Roman war, amongst other parts of their discipline, hath left unto posterity a compendious relation of their musters and enrollments, which with the help of other histories may be thus understood.

Upon the choise of their Consuls in the beginning of every year, their custome was to enroll four legions, two for either Consul. At which enrollment they first chose fourteen Tribunes out of the body of their Gentlemen, whom they called *Equites*. These fourteen were such as had served five years in the wars, whereby they became eligible of that dignity. And again, they chose ten other Tribunes out of the Commonalty, being such as had seen ten years service: grounding this custome upon another law, which commanded the *Equites* to serve ten, and the *Pedites* or Commons twenty whole years before they could be freed and discharged from the wars. And therefore according to the proportion of their stipendiary time, as the *Equites* were admitted Tribunes at five years, so were the legionary footmen at ten, as at half their compleat time of serving in the wars. The generall respect which the Romans had in the choise of every particular man, from the highest to the lowest, was included in the circumstances of their age, and of their wealth. The age which they deemed fit to endure the labours of war,

war, was from seventeen to six and forty, for so saith *Tubero* concerning the first limit of military ability, that *Servius* did inrole souldiers from the age of seventeen years, adjudging such to be fit for the service of the Common-weale. And *Censorinus* expresth the second with an etymology of the name, where he saith, that men were called *Juvenes* unto the age of forty six years, *Quod rempublicam in re militari possum juvare*, because till then they were able to help and save their country in war. In this ability of years we are to understand that the law required every man to perfect the compleat number of twenty years stipend; if there were occasion of so many wars in that space of nine and twenty years, which is comprehended between seventeen and forty six. The wealth, which is the second circumstance that made men capable of military dignity, was necessarily required to amount to the value of *Drachmas quadringentis*, as *Polybius* saith, which by the Latine phrase was termed *quaterna mill' a'ris*: such as were not worth so much, were neglected in this choise, and reserved for sea-service: neither was it lawfull for any man to attain to any office or magistracy within the city, untill he had merited ten years stipend. Upon a resolution to make an inrolement, which was almost every year, the Consuls did proclaim a day when all men of military age were to present themselves. Upon which day the Roman youth being assembled in the city, and then in the Capitol, the fourteen Tribunes elected out of the body of the *Equites*, divided themselves according as they were chosen by the people into four parts; forasmuch as in former time the whole forces of their Empire consisted of four legions or regiments, whereof I have discoursed at large in the former book. And the four Tribunes first chosen were allotted to the first legion, the three next to the second legion, the four other to the third, and the three last to the fourth. In like manner the ten Tribunes which were taken out of the common body of the people, divided themselves into four parts: and the two first chosen were inrolled in the first legion, the three next in the second legion, the two following in the third legion, and the three last in the fourth. By which ingenious and discreet allotment it came to passe that the commonalty were intermingled in the government of their Armies with the Gentlemen, in such an excellent mixture, that the *Equites* were either superiour or equal to the *Plebeii*; notwithstanding that every legion had an equall number of Tribunes. The election being thus far carried, the Tribunes of every legion fate them down by themselves: the people being divided first into their Tribes, and then into their classes and centuries, casting lots which Tribe should be taken; and out of that Tribe whereon the lot fell they drew four men, as

equall as they could both in age and habitude, who being brought forth, the Tribunes of the first legion made the first choise of one of those four; then the Tribunes of the second legion had their choise, they of the third legion took the next, and the fourth had the last man. And again out of the same Tribe were other four chosen; and then the Tribunes of the second legion began first to make their choise, and so consequently the first legion had the last man. Again four other being chosen, the Tribunes of the third legion had the first election; and in that course the second legion had the last man. And by this alternate and successive election it came to passe, that every legion was equally compounded both in quality and in number. The inrolement proceeding in this manner untill their numbers were full; the Tribunes of every legion assembled their severall troupes together, and took one out of every regiment, and gave an oath unto him that he should execute and obey according to his powers whatsoever was commanded him by his General: the rest being particularly called, were sworn to keep the same oath which their fore-man had taken. And thus we see both who were the electors, who were eligible, and the manner of their choise. Wherein we may observe what means they used to ingage every particular man with an interest in the generall cause: for they thought it not sufficient to force men out by publick authority, and to bind them fitly to that service by the mandates of their Empire, considering the labours and difficulties of wars, which oftentimes are able to dull the edge of the greatest spirit, and to cause omissions of duty in the most honest and obedient minds; but they tyed them likewise with such particular respects, as did both concern the possessions of their fortune, and the religion of their soul. For it is observed concerning mans actions, that unless the mind do faithfully affect the execution, it may be carried with such a perfunctory service, as shal betray the true intent to no effect, and deceive the end of that which was promised by designation. And therefore they refused to inrole any man that had not a convenient proportion of wealth, to maintain a steadfast and well-resolved courage, and to settle the motions of a staggering mind, when they brought themselves that the publick duties wherein they were ingaged, were the defensive powers of their Empire, and the means whereby the publick weale continued happy: and so by consequence their private fortunes were assured from violence, and preserved only by an effectual observance of their military discipline. I grant that it is not altogether wealth that doth grace & formalize the actions of men; for in some cases penury and want makes men more valorous, according to the answer which a souldier once made to *Lucullus*:

Thirteen pounds sterling, or thereabouts.

Polyb. Lib. 2.

Lib.

Observations upon Cæsars

Ibit eo quo vis, qui zonam perdidit, inquit.
Whither you will hee'l go who's lost his purse.

Notwithstanding, so far as the publick cause is either misperited or well affected, according as it doth concern every man in particular; as who will doubt of the uttermost diligence of those Mariners, that have their vessell fraught with their own goods? or contrariwise, who will blame a mercenary Pilot for making peace with death, with the losse of other mens merchandise? for *Purior est ubique bene est*, That's a mans country where he is well, as one truly saith; and the estimation we have of this life is entertained only by the benefits we hold by our life: therefore it much importeth a State to have such Agents to negotiate the publick business, as are engaged in the same by the interest of their own particular. Neither was it sufficient in that government to chuse men of ability both in their body and in their substance, but they found it necessary to bind their conscience with a religious consecration, and to swear a faithfull obedience to their Generall, which with the reverence of the place, being the Capitoll, and other ceremonies of majesty attending the inrolement, doth manifestly shew how much the *Romans* imputed to this part of their discipline, being the foundation of the sequel of that action.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

REINFORCING Secondly, I observe the benefit which an opulent and able State may make of any losse or misfortune received by an enemy: which consisteth chiefly in the reinforcing, or, if it may be, in the redoubling of such troops as the casualties of war have consumed. For it much abateth the spirit of a people, and turneth the pride of a victory into discouragement and faintness of heart, when they see their best and most fortunate indevours achieve nothing but a reiteration of their labours, and are driven to begin again that work which with much difficulty and hazard they had once overcome. For it is the end that maketh any labour to be undertaken, being a otherwise nothing but a pain of the body & vexation of the spirit. And therefore when it shall be found either circular, or of many confrontments, before it can answer the designments of our mind, we chuse rather to forgo that contentment which the accomplishment of our desires would afford us, then to buy it with such a measure of trouble, as exceedeth that which the proportion of our means seemeth able to effect. In regard whereof the ancient sages of the world made a task of this quality to be one

of *Hercules* labours, by faining the serpent *Hydra* to be of this nature, that when one head was litten off, two other heads grew out presently from the same stump: and so his labour multiplied his travell, and his valour increased the difficulty of his work. It was *Cæsars* custom in other cases, to have such a beginning of strength at his first entrance into a war, as by continuance might be augmented, and rather increase then decay upon the resistance of an enemy. So he began the war in *Gallia* with six legions, continued it with eight, and ended it with ten: he began the civile war but with one legion; he arrived at *Brundisium* with six; he followed *Pompey* into *Greece* with fifteen thousand foot and five thousand horse; and ended that war with two and twenty thousand foot and a thousand horse. He began the war at *Alexandria* with three thousand two hundred foot, and ended it with six legions. He began the war in *Africa* with six, and ended it with eight legions. And thus he imitated naturall motion, being stronger in the end then in the beginning, and made his army as a plant like to grow great, and sprout out into many branches, rather then to die or decay for want of strength or fresh reinforcing.

CHAP. II.

The *Treviri* sollicite the *Germans* and some of the States of *Gallia*, *Cæsar* carrieth four legions into the territories of the *Nervi*.



Nducionarus being slain, as is related in the former book, the *Treviri* gave the government unto his kinfolk: who intermitted no time to sollicite their borders with the *Germans*, and to promise them money for the wars. When they could not prevail with their neighbours, they tried those that were farther off: and having found some that were bounden to their designs, they confirmed their league with a mutuall oath, giving pledges for assurance of money, and withall they drew *Ambrorix* into their society and confederation. Which things being known, *Cæsar* perceiving the preparations which in every part were made for war, the *Nervi* & *Adriatici*, and the *Menapii*, with all the *Germans* on the other side of the *Rhene* to be in arms, the *Senones* not to come being summoned, but to be in counsell with the *Carnutes* and their bordering States, the *Germans* to be sollicited by often Embassages from the *Treviri*; he held it best to think of war sooner then heretofore he was accustomed. And therefore before the winter was ended, with four legions that lay next together, he hurried suddenly upon the confines of the *Nervi*, and having taken a

Cæsar.
Part of the Diocese of Cologne.

a Toarmy.
b Treasurers.
c G. editors.

* Characters.

great number of men and cattell, before they could either make head or fly away, he distributed the booty to the souldiers, and so the country, caused the people to come in, and to give pledges unto him. That business being speedily ended, he brought the legions back again into their wintering camps.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Exemplary justice.

THis exemplary course of proceeding in punishing some one for the offences of many, hath ever been held the best means to represse rebellious and factious motions, as well amongst particular subjects which do conspire against the common Policy of a State, as also of such inferiour Cities and States as shall entertain a confederacy prejudiciall to the sovereignty of an Empire: for in all such combinations the undertakers are ever more confident in the assistance and mutuall encouragement of each others assent and forwardness, then in the strength of their own particular means. For the mind propounding a course contrary to a virtuous direction, is alwayes suspicious and mistrustfull of the issue: for as honest motions and conceptions of the heart are attended with assurance, so doth diffidence wait upon indirect and perfidious designments: And thence it happeneth that when the inward thoughts can afford no means of emboldening, they commonly rely upon each others example, and do make the action to appear honest unto themselves, so far as for many associates do approve it. For the prevention whereof in the Continent of *Gallia*, *Cæsar* first layed a heavy hand upon the *Nervi*, being well assured, that as rebellious motions are strengthened and drawn on by the mutuall example of conspiring members, so they may be weakened and extinguished by the exemplary ruine and subversion of some one or more of the said members, which is as forcible to disswade as the other to encourage: suting right with the tenour of Justice, which ought to be carried in such sort against offenders, that by the punishment of some few the fear may touch all. According as the Poet describeth the nature and effect of thunder:

Ipse Pater mediæ nimborum in nocte co-rusca
Fulmina molitur dextra, quo maxima motu
Terra tremis fugere fera, & mortalia corda
Per gentes humilis statuit pavor; ille flagrant
Aut Athon, aut Rhodopea, aut alta Ceraunia dextra
Dejicit.---

The whole earth trembled, but one hill only smoaked for it.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SSecondly, I observe the respect which *Cæsar* had to the extraordinary labour of his souldiers: for whereas they were drawn out of their wintering-camps before winter was ended, and were carried unseasonably upon a service, he rewarded them with the booty and spoil of the enemy, contrary to the ordinary course of the *Roman* warfare, which relieved either all or the most part thereof for the publick Treasury, and left the souldier to his stipendary entertainment. Which is a point very observable in the carriage of a war: wherein are required as well eminent and extraordinary attempts, as common and usuall duties, and in the judgement of a wise Commander are thought worthy their answerable rewards. At the siege of *Gergovia*, as it followeth in the seventh Commentary, *L. Fabius* a Centurion told his companions, that the booty and pillage which he had got at the taking of *Avaticum* would not suffer any man to get up upon the wall before himself. And so for the most part it falleth out, that honourable attempts being honourably rewarded, do as seed sown in good ground, multiply the increase of like virtuous actions. And this was one principall means which he used to give courage and valour to his souldiers; as when he went to get *Spain* from *Pompey* and that faction, he borrowed money of the Tribunes & Centurions, & gave it in largesse to the souldiers, whereby he gained (as he saith) two advantages, quod pignore animos Centurionum devinxit, & largitione redemit militum voluntates, for he engaged the Centurions to him whilst he had this pledge from them, and by his largesse purchased the good will of the souldiers.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar summoneth a generall Councell, and carrieth his army against the *Senones*.

AGenerall Councellor meeting of all the States of *Gallia* being summoned, according to his first resolution, in the beginning of the Spring, whereas all the rest saving the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Treviri* made their appearance; he conceived of it as the beginning of war and defection, and thereupon setting all other things aside, he transferred the Councell to the city of *Paris* in the confines of the *Senones*, which in the time of their fathers had united their State unto them, but were held clear of this confederacy. This thing being published from the Tribunnall, the same day he carried the Legions against the *Senones*, and by great journeys came into their

upon extraordinary service, the souldier extraordinarily rewarded.

lib. 1. c. 1. vil. bell.

Cæsar.

S coun-

Observations upon Cæsars

country. His coming being known, Acco the chiefest author of that rebellion commanded the multitude to go into the cities and towns of defence: but as they endeavoured, before it could be accomplished, news was brought that the Romans were already come; whereby they necessarily left off their purpose, and sent Ambassadors to Cæsar to intreat for favour. They used the mediation of the Hedui, whose State had of old time been in faith and league with the Romans. Cæsar at the suit of the Hedui did willingly afford them pardon, and accepted their excuse, forasmuch as he judged the summer time fitter to be spent in the war which was coming on him, rather than in matter of question and judgement: and having commanded an hundred pledges, he delivered them to be kept by the Hedui. The Carnutes likewise sent messengers and pledges, and by the intreaty of the men of Rhemes, whose clients they were, received the same answers. Cæsar ended the Councils, and commanded horsemen to be sent him from all the States of Gallia.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT shall not seem impertinent to the Reader, that I take occasion here to say somewhat touching the use and benefit of this Parliament or Council generally, wherein all the States of Gallia, or at the least such as did acknowledge the Roman sovereignty, presented their fealty, and were mutual witnesses of each others allegiance. Concerning which we are to understand, that as all naturall bodies have a transitory being, depending upon motion and function of parts; so specially States and Commonweals, as sympathizing with naturall causes, have no certain continuance in one and the same being, but are subject to the alteration of time and fortune, and do passe the ages of a naturall life, from infancy growing to better strength, untill it come to the best perfection which years can afford it, and then decaying again by like degrees, even to the period and death of that policy. For remedy whereof, and for the prevention of any weakening disease which might infect either the whole powers of the body, or to possesse any part thereof, as it might thereby prove either dangerous or unprofitable, amongst other helps, these councils and meetings have been thought necessary; wherein every particular State and city had some of their society present, as well to open their grievances, if any were, and to seek ease and relief by way of treaty and dispute, as also to receive such directions and mandates as the wisdom of the Prince should think meet for their government. For as this common council or generall assembly may well be termed the pulse of a politick body, whereby the true state and

temperature thereof is discerned: so is it also as a treaty or parole, and a renewing of the conditions of peace between the head and the members; where sovereignty and obedience being mutually propounded, do concur in the establishing of true and perfect government. And this is that which the Politicians of later time do in their writings call the reducing of a commonweal to the first beginning: for the noisome and superfluous humours being by this means purged and abated, the body of the publick weal is refined into such true and naturall elements, and settled in that disposition of health as may give great hope of long continuance. Besides this use and benefit of these assemblies, there were many necessary businesses concluded, and many things agreed unto, serving to the maintenance of war against parties and factions; as namely the levies and supplies of horse and foot, granted by this Council as a subsidy, which in the Roman army received stipend and pay by the name of Auxiliary or associate forces, whereof we read in many places of these Commentaries, and particularly in this book. But the Romans used specially the service of their horsemen, as the flower of their strength, and far exceeding their foot companies in execution of aims and use of war, wherein the Gallies have ever challenged a preeminence before other their neighbour nations, and have continued the same reputation even unto this time. Whether it be in regard of the nimble and quick motions of their spirits, which are better fitted with the swift and speedy execution of horse, then with any readiness which their own strength can afford them, or what other cause it hath, I know not: but this I am sure of, that as the world taketh notice of their hot phantasies, so would the French be reckoned the best horsemen of any other nation. The last saying which I observe concerning this council is, the time wherein it was summoned, which was the beginning of the Spring, rather then any other part of the year, whereof there is this reason; that if any State neglected the summons, and refused to make their appearance according to custome, the summer time coming on, gave good means to the Roman legions to punish the insolency of such a contempt: as it happened in this place to the Senones, Carnutes and Treveri, whose absence from this meeting was a sufficient argument to Cæsar of their rebellion, and deserved the reward of open revolt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE second thing which I will briefly observe in this Chapter, is the pardon which Cæsar willingly gave the Senones at the mediation of the Hedui; not so much for the respect he bare unto the Hedui, although they had of long time performed good service to the Roman Empire, and

and were found more faithfull then all the States of Gallia; (howbeit I doubt not but that he was glad of that occasion to gratify the Hedui;) but as a matter in that faculty, well knowing what best fitted with the publick profit in all times and seasons, he would not mispend the summer in questions and dispute concerning former errors, which might better be remembered upon other occasions, but rather in prosecuting war against other speciall revolters, as a matter more behovfull to the advancement of the Empire, and best fitting the time of summer. For in following a business, there is nothing more available to a fortunate issue, then to be able to distinguish of the validity of the parties, and to discern which hath most interest in the bulk of the matter, that to we may not be mistaken in our designs, but follow that course as shall most advantage our purpose. And here a Generall is to take speciall care, that no humorous respect do hinder that resolution which true judgement approveth: for oftentimes it falleth out, that either particular profit, delighting pleasures, desire of revenge, or some other unseasonable affection doth to intangle them in their proceedings, as they never attain to the main drift of the action: and this is called stumbling by the way.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar intendeth the war of the Treveri.

THIS part of Gallia being quieted, he bent his whole mind to make war against the Treveri and Ambiorix, commanding Cavarinus with the cavalry of the Senones to go along with him, lest any tumult should happen in his absence, either through his discontentment, or the malice of the State. These things being thus determined, forasmuch as he well knew, that Ambiorix would not come to blowes in open fight, he endeavoured by what means he could to understand his other purposes. The Menapii were neighbour-borders upon the confines of the Eburones, inclosed about with a defence of bogs and woods; and only they of all the States of Gallia had never sent to Cæsar touching any contract of peace: of them Ambiorix was received, and had familiar entertainment. And further he understood that by the means of the Treveri the Germans were brought to a contract of friendship with him also. These helps he thought were fit to be taken from Ambiorix, before he set upon him with open war; lest despairing of his safety, he should either hide himself amongst the Menapii, or be compelled to fly over the Rhene to the Germans. In this resolution he sent the baggage of the whole army with a convoy of two Legions to Labienus, who was then in the territories of the

Treviri, and he himself with five expedite and unburthened Legions made towards the Menapii. They having made no head, but trusting to the strength of the place, fled into the woods and bogs, and carried all they had with them. Cæsar dividing his forces to C. Fabius a legate, and M. Crassus the treasurer, having made speedy provision of bridges, did set upon them in three parts, and burnt houses and villages, and took great numbers of men and cattle, whereby the Menapii were constrained to send to Cæsar for peace. He having taken pledges of them, assured them that he would esteem them as enemies, if they did ever receive Ambiorix into their country, or any messengers from him. The matter being thus compounded, he left among them Comius of Arras with certain horse, as a garrison to that place, and he himself made towards the Treviri.

OBSERVATIONS.

Hence we may observe, that as it falleth out in other things for the most part, so specially in matter of war there is such a medley and interlacing of materiall circumstances with the body of the action, that commonly one business begets another. Cæsars chief design at this time was the war against Ambiorix and the Treveri: but considering the contract and league between them and the Menapii, he would not prosecute the war of the Treveri, untill he had taken away that assistance, and left them in the nakedness of their own strength. Wherein we may first observe what opinion Cæsar held of allies and associates, or any other that gave help or assistance to an enemy: for besides this particular, we may read in the fourth Commentary, that the chiefest cause that moved him to take the voyage into Britain was, for that the Britans had underhand given succour and assistance to the Gallies; a matter not to be neglected in his judgement, whether it were in regard of any friendship or good respect which they bare unto the Gallies, or otherwise to keep the Romans occupied there, that they in the mean time might live quietly at home, which I need not here dispute: but the matter proveth it self plainly by Cæsars own confession, that the continuall supplies sent from Britain were a sufficient cause to move him to that war. And as it followeth in this Commentary concerning the self same matter, the only cause that drew him to passe the Rhene the second time into Germany, was the succours which the Germans had formerly sent to the Treveri; according to reason in cases of other nature, that he that will extinguish a lamp, must not suffer an addition of oyle, nor admit the influence of lesser streams when he goeth about to dry up the greater river. But that which was the occasion of this business.

finesse, and might have challenged the first place in this discourse, was, for that Cæsar was almost assured that *Ambiorix* would not be brought to a tryall of battel; and therefore he laboured to understand his other projects. From whence a Commander may receive direction what course to hold in a retreat of open encounter: for as the art and sleight of war is to subdue an enemy, so are there more ways and means to effect that purpose, then by waging battel; as I have discoursed at large in the third Commentary: whereunto I may add this much, which is generally observed in the carriage of great and eminent Commanders, that such as failed in matter of negotiation, and wanted dexterity in managing the course of their businesse (notwithstanding any fortune or singularity in striking a battel,) did never attain to firm and permanent honour. If any man be desirous to defend into particulars, let him look into the lives of king *Pirrhous*, *Demetrius*, *Hannibal*, and *Cæsar Marius*, whose later ends, or shutting up of their lives, were not answerable to their excellency in deeds of armes, for want of that judicall disposition of their businesse which Cæsar might boast of, of whom it may be truly said that (notwithstanding the many battels which he fought, yet) he did *plura consilio, quam vi gerere*, do more by his head then his hand.

CHAP. V.

Labienus overthroweth the Treviri by a guile.

WHile Cæsar was about these things, the Treviri having raised great forces both of horse & foot had a purpose to assault *Labienus* wintering in their confines with one legion. And as they were within two dayes journey of him, they had intelligence of two legions more which Cæsar had sent unto him; whereupon they encamped themselves some fifteen miles distant from him, and resolved there to attend the Germans forces. *Labienus* being advertised of their resolutions, hoping through their rashness to find some good opportunity of encounter, he left five cohorts for the safety of the carriages, and with five and twenty other cohorts, besides great forces of horse, he marched towards the enemy, and encamped himself within a mile of them. Between *Labienus* and the enemy there was a river, the passage whereof by reason of the broken banks was very hard and difficult: this river, he had no purpose to pass himself, and doubted the enemy would not be drawn to do it. They had every day more hopes of fresh aid. In the meetings and counsels of war he gave out, that forasmuch as the Germans were said to be in hands, he would never

hazard himself nor the fortunes of the army, but he would rather remove his camp the next day very early in the morning. This was quickly carried to the enemy, as amongst many of the Gallies that were with him, some of them did naturally favour the proceedings of their own nation. *Labienus* having in the night time called unto him the Tribunes of the soldiers, and the Centurions of the first Orders, acquainted them with his purpose; and to the end he might give greater suspicion of fear to the enemy, he caused the camp to be dislodged with more noise and tumult than the Roman discipline had usually observed; and thereby made the retreat not unlike a flight or escape: which before day-light (the two camps being so near one to the other) was by the discovery brought to the enemy. The best troops of the Romans were scarce gone out of the camp, but the Gallies encouraging one another not to lose so hopefull a prey, thinking it long (specially the Romans being thus affrighted) to expect the German forces, and that it stood not with their dignity being so able, and so many in numbers, not to adventure upon a handfull of men flying from them, and troubled besides with baggage and burden; and therefore they durst not to passe the river, and to give them battle in a place of disadvantage. *Labienus* suspecting that which now had happened to the end he might draw them all over the river, he made as though he would go on forward. At length sending the carriages a little before, and placing them upon a hill, he gave now (said he) fellow soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired: the enemy in a cumbersome and unequal place; only afford me your Leader at this time that valour which oftentimes heretofore you have showed to your Generalls, may me him to be present, and to see this service with his own eyes. And without he commanded the Engines to be carried towards the enemy, and the army to be imbatell'd: and leaving a few troops of horse with the carriages, he did (as he did) rise in the wings of the army. The Romans taking up a cry and a shout, did speedily cast their pikes at the enemy: when when they saw the Romans ready to assault them, whom they had thought had fled from them for fear, they were so dismayed, that even in the first close they took themselves to flight towards the next woods. *Labienus* pursuing them with his horsemen, killed many of them, and took more prisoners: and within a few dayes took in the whole state of the Treviri: for the Germans which came to their succour, understanding of their overthrow, returned home again; and with them went also the kinsmen of *Induciomarus*, the authors of that defection. The sovereignty and government was given to *Cingetorix*, who from

the beginning had ever been true and loyal to the Romans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled this practice of a pretended fear, which the History doth to often recommend to our consideration, and have shewed the inconvenience of over-light credulity, leading such easy weeners to a disappointment of their hopes, and consequently to the hazard of their fortune. I will now proceed to that which is further implied in this relation, and respecteth the chiefest duty of a chief commander: and that is, what specially is required of a Generall in the carriage and direction of a battel. Concerning which point, as there is nothing more material to the effecting of any businesse then opportunity of time, convenience of place, and an orderly disposition of the means according to time and place: so in question of encounter or waging battel, the duty of a Leader may be included in these three circumstances. Concerning the quality of the place, as the chiefest and first respected in the choice of a judicall direction, the whole scope of the Roman discipline, from the time of their first Kings even to the last of their Emperours, did always aim at the advantage of place, as a necessary help for the obtaining of victory: which I have already noted in the *Helvetian* action. Yet forasmuch as the wildome and experience of those times did deem it a circumstance of such importance, give me leave once again to enforce the use thereof by these examples. *Habentis militis*, (said *Labienus* in this place) *quam peritissimam facultatem, hostem in quo aique impedito loco tenetis, præstare eundem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam sepe numero Imperatori præstistis*. Ye have, fellow soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, &c. Whereby he cleared himself of all imputation of ill direction, as having performed the uttermost duty of a Commander, and given such helps by the advantage of the place as are requisite to an easy victory, leaving the rest to the execution of the soldiers. Cæsar at the losse he received at *Dyrachium* cleared himself to his soldiers in this sort: *Quod esset acceptum detrimentis, cuius potius quam sue culpe debere tribui, locum secum ad dimicandum dedisset*, &c. the damage that was received was to be attributed to any body rather then him, he had chosen them a safe place of fighting, &c. And as it followeth in the seventh Commentary, being imbatell'd upon the side of a hill right over against the army of the Gallies, which stood likewise in a readinesse to entertain the Roman valour, he would not suffer his men to hazard themselves in the passage of a bogge of fifty foot in breadth lying between both the armies, but rather persuaded his soldiers, disdaining the confront-

ment of the enemy, to endure their contumely, rather then to buy a victory with the danger of so many worthy men, and patiently to attend some further opportunity. Which passage of Cæsar, even in the said terms as it is there related, was urged to good purpose by *Sir Francis Vere* in the year one thousand six hundred at a consultation before the battel of *Newport*. For the army of the *Netherlanders* being possit of the Downs, which are small swelling hills rising unevenly along the sea shore upon the coast of *Flanders*, and the enemy making a stand upon the sands at the foot of those hills, and so cutting off the passage to *Offendy*, it was disputed by the Commanders, whether they should leave the Downs, and go charge the enemy where he stood imbatell'd upon the sands, or attend him in the fastnesse of the Downs, whereof they were possit. The whole Council of war were earnestly bent to forsake the Downs, and to hazard the fight on equal terms, as impatient that their passage and retreat to *Offendy* should be cut off. But *Sir Francis Vere*, well knowing how much it importeth the businesse of that day to hold a place of such gain and advantage, persuaded Count *Maurice* by many reasons, and specially by this of Cæsar which I last alledged, not to forgo the help of the Downs, but to expect the enemy in that place, and so make use of that benefit upon the first encounter, rather then to adventure the successe of the battel in worse terms, in hope of clearing the passage: and shewing also many probable conjectures, that the enemy would not continue long in that gaze. Wherein as his opinion then prevailed, so all that were present were eye-witnesses both of the truth of his conjecture, and the soundnesse of his judgement. For the enemy within a while after coming on to charge the troops of the States, was received with such a counterbuffe from the hills, and were violently beaten back in such rude manner, as our men had the execution of them for the space of a quarter of a mile or more, which was no small advantage to the fortune of that day. Touching the opportunity of time, which *Pindarus* calleth the Mother of worthy exploits, and oftentimes depeendeth upon the circumstance of place, a Generall ought carefully to advise that he neither precipitate nor foresew the occasion, which is well expressed in this particular service of *Labienus*. For where his purpose was to draw the enemy over a river that had steep and uneasy banks, and thereby of a hard and difficult passage, he would not shew his resolution untill he had drawn them all over the river: for he was well assured that the Roman legions would charge the enemy upon their first encounter with the unfeittable weight of their pikes, that in their giving back they could not escape the danger of the river. And therefore to make the victory more absolute and

compleat, he suffered them all to come over the water, that all might be endangered in their passage back again. And this is the benefit which opportunity bringeth, which is the rather to be attended with all carefulnesse, forasmuch as *Non scire, se d'us eadem occasio esset* a man hath neither often nor then the same opportunity.

Concerning the last circumstance, of the apt and fit disposition of the forces according to time and place, which is necessarily required in the duty of a General; it is referred to this end only, that they may be ranged in such manner, that as one man is assitant to another in their severall files and ranks, so one troop may be in *subidiis*, assitant to another, to the end that no part may stand naked, or fall in the negligence of its own strength; but that one may second another from the first to the last. C. Sempronius a Roman Consul having fought unadvisedly, and received an overthrow, Julius the Tribune of the people caused *Tempanius* a horseman that was present at the battel to be called, and as *Livie* reported it, *Cor. in eis, Sexte Tempani, inquit, arbitris ne C. Sempronium Consulē, aut in tempore pugnam inisset, aut firmasse subsidii aciem?* he said thus before them, *Sextus Tempanius*, do you believe that C. Sempronius the Consul chose a good time to fight, or that he took order for assitant supplies to his army? for *Livie* saith he fought *incute inconsultaque, non subsidii firmata acie, non equite apte locato*, heedlesly and without good advice, neither strengthening his army with supplies, nor well placing his cavalry. And of these three circumstances consisted the duty and office of a General, touching the direction of a battel; wherein whosoever faileth, doth hazard the prerogative of his command over that army which he leadeth, according to that of *Cæsar* in the first of his Commentaries, *Se scire, quibusque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male regesta fortunam defuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperto, avaritie esse convellum*, that he knew well, whensoever an army refused to be obedient to their Commander, it was either because upon some ill successe they saw he was unfortunate, or that by the discovery of some notorious matter they found him convicted of avarice. Which *Cæsar* himself needed not to fear, if we may believe *Plutarch*, who writeth that he was indowed by nature with an excellent promptitude and aptnesse to take opportunity in any business.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

May not omit to insist a little upon this noise or shout which the souldiers took up in the instant of the charge, and is related in this place as a material point in their carriage at this service. A matter ancient and usual in the Ro-

man armies, as well in the time of their first Kings, as their first Consuls. *Fusi primo impetu & clamore hostes*, the enemies were overthrown at the first onset and shout, saith *Livie* Lib. 1. concerning *Romulus*. And not long after, Lib. 2. *Consul nec promissa aciem, nec clamorem reddi passus*, the Consul neither marched his army forward, nor suffered them at all to shout. *Cæsar* in the sentence which he gave concerning *Pompey* his direction for the battel at *Pharsalia* Lib. 3. doth expresse a double use of this clamour or shout: first the terror of the enemy, and secondly the encouragement or assurance of themselves: *Est quædam animi incitatio* (saith he) *aque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, que studio pugne incenditur; hanc non reprimere sed augere imperatores debent: neque frustra aut quis institutum est ut signa undique concinerent, clamorem universi tollerent, quibus rebus & hostes terri & suos incitari existimaverunt.* There is a certain raising and cheerfulness of the mind imbred naturally in all, which is stirred up by an eagerness to fight: this a General should not crush but cherish. So that it was not without cause that in old times they had a custome that the whole army should make a noise and raise a general shout, whereby they supposed as the enemies were affrighted, to their own men were encouraged. Two contrary effects proceeding from a cause, which to common sense carrieth no shew of any such efficacy: *Vox & præterea nihil*, a bare voice and nothing more; as one said of the Nightingale in another sense. But such as do seriously look into the reasons thereof, shall find the saying true which is ascribed to the elder and wiser *Cato*, *Verba plus quam gladius, & voces quam munus hostes terrent, & in fugam vertere*; Words will do more then Swords, and Voices sooner then Hands may affright the enemy and put him to flight. The ears, as I have already noted, will Lib. 1. sooner betray the soul to the distress of fear, then any other of the five senses. Which *Josep.* Lib. 3. Chap. 18. *phus* well understood, although peradventure he applyed not to fit a remedy, when he commanded his men to stop their ears at the acclamations of the *Roman* legions, lest they might be daunted and amazed thereat. The reason may be, for that our discourse (diligently attending upon a matter of that consequence which calleth the lives of both parties in question, and valuing every circumstance at the utmost) doth alwayes presuppose a cause answerable to such an effect of joy and assurance. For these shouts and acclamations are properly the consequences of joy, and are to be available that they deceive both parties: for such as take up the shout by way of anticipation, do seem to conclude of that which is yet in question; and the enemy thereupon apprehendeth danger when there is none

none at all, whereby it happeneth, *Hostes terreri, & suos incitari*, that the enemies are affrighted, and our own men encouraged, as *Cæsar* noteth. Besides these examples I might alledge the authority of Holy Writ, but that it might seem both unfavoury and unreasonable to make a commixture of such diversities. I will therefore content my self with a practice of our time at the battel of *Newport*, where after divers retreats and pursuits, either side chasing the other as it were by turn and mutuall appointment, and as it often falleth out in such confrontments; at last commandement was given to the *English* to make head again, and after some pause to charge the enemy with a shout: which being accordingly performed, a man might have seen the enemy startle before they came to the stroak; and being charged home, were so routed, that they made not head again that day. For the prevention of such a disadvantage, there can be no better president then that which *Plutarch* noteth, touching the battel between the *Romans* and the *Ambrons*, a part of that deluge of people which came down into Italy with the *Cimbri* and *Tentones*; for these *Ambrons* coming out to give battel, to the end they might strike fear into the *Romans*, made an often repetition of their own name with a loud founding voice, *Ambrons, Ambrons, Ambrons*. The *Italians* on the other side that first came down to fight were the *Ligurians*, inhabiting the coast of *Genoa*, who hearing this noise, and plainly understanding them, made answer with the like cry, founding out their own name, *Liguri, Liguri, Liguri*. Whereupon the Captains of both sides made their souldiers cry out altogether, contending for envy one against another who should cry it loudest; and to both sides were encouraged, and neither of them disadvantaged, *Clamore utrinque sublimo*, whilst both sides continued the cry.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

This *Labienus* was a great souldier, and well acquainted with *Cæsar's* manner in leading an army, and made many good fights while he continued under his command: but after he betook himself to *Pompey's* party, and joyned with a faction against his first master, he never achieved any thing but losse and dishonour.

----- *Dux fortis in armis*
Cæsareis Labienus erui, nunc transfuga
vilis.

Once *Labienus* was a Captain stout
On *Cæsars* side, now a base Turn-about.
And upon that occasion he is often mentioned as a memoriall of his disloyalty, to prove that good successe in matter of war doth follow the Generall rather then any inferior Captain. For it is observed of divers whose fortune hath

been great under the conduction of some commanders, and as unlucky under other leaders: like plants or trees that thrive well in some grounds, and bear store of fruit, but being transplanted do either dye or become barren. And doubtlesse there may be observed the like sympathy or contrariety in the particular courtes of mans life, wherein they are carried upon the stream of their fortunes, according to the course of their first imbarcking. And therefore such as happen in a way that leadeth to successfull ends, shall much wrong themselves either to turn back again, or to seek by-paths, whose ends are both unknown and uncertain: and herein the French saying may serve to some purpose,

Si vous estes bien, tenez vous la.

If you find your self well, hold your self there.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar carrieth his army over the *Rhene* into Germany.

Cæsar being come from the *Menapii* *Cæsar*, to the *Treviri*, did resolve to passe the *Rhene* for two causes: the one was, for that the *Germans* had sent succours and supplies to the *Treviri*; the other that *Ambiorix* might have no reception or entertainment among them. Upon this resolution, a little above that place where he carried his army over before, he commanded a bridge to be made after the known and appointed fashion, which by the great industry of the souldiers was ended in a few dayes: and leaving a sufficient strength at the bridge, least any sudden motion should rise amongst the *Treviri*, he carried over the rest of his forces both horse and foot. The *Ubii* which before time had given hostages, and were taken into obedience, sent Ambassadors unto him to clear themselves from imputation of disloyalty, and that the *Treviri* had received no supplies from their State: they pray and desire him to spare them, least the generall distrust of the *Germans* should cause him to punish the innocent for the guilty: and if he would ask more hostages, they would willingly give them. *Cæsar* upon examination of the matters, found that the supplies were sent by the *Suevi*: and thereupon he accepted the satisfaction of the *Ubii*, and inquired the way and the passages to the *Suevi*. Some few dayes after he understood by the *Ubii*, that the *Suevi* had brought all their forces to one place, and had commanded such nations as were under their dominions, that they should send them forces of horse and foot. Upon this intelligence he made provision of corn, & chose a fit place to encamp in. He commanded the *Ubii* to take their cattle, and all their other goods from abroad out of the fields into

Observations upon *Cæsars*

into their towns, hoping that the barbarous and unskillful men might through want of wit, not all be drawn to fight upon bad conditions. He gave order also that they should every day send out discoverers to the Suevi to understand what they did. The Ubii did as they were commanded, and after a few days brought word that all the Suevi, having received certain news of the approach of the Roman army, had retired themselves and all their forces to their utmost confines, where there was a wood of an infinite greatness called Bacenis, which served as a native wall or defence to keep the Chirulci from the incursions of the Suevi, and the Suevi from the injury and spoil of the Chirulci. But at the entrance of this wood the Suevi did expect the coming of the Romans.

OBSERVATIONS.

Bridges.

Brancatio lib. 5.

Whether
mens wits
be sharper
and readier
than in
former
times.

I will hold my former purpose, not to deliver any thing concerning Bridges, whereof there are so many treatises already extant: neither will I go about to describe the substantial building or ingenious workmanship of this Bridge here mentioned, which might well becom *Cæsar* and his army; for as he only could, or at the least did put in practice the making thereof, so will I leave the description to himself, as best suited with his eloquence. But forasmuch as *Brancatio* an Italian Writer taketh occasion from hence to run into ignorance and error, give me leave to set a mark upon this place, lest others not knowing the ancient course, should run their bark upon the same shallows. Amongst other advertisements (being but fourteen in all) which he hath given upon *Cæsars* Commentaries, he noteth and commendeth the use of Bridges made of Boats, which are commonly carried in an army-royall to that purpose, before this or any other invention of former times, specially in regard of the easiness and expedition which may be used both in making such a bridge, and taking it up again: for the Boats being prepared ready, as usually they are in camp-royals, such a bridge may be made in a day, which *Cæsar* could not do in ten, but with great wonderment and admiration. And therein I hold well with *Brancatio*, that for the speedy transportation of an army over a river, there is no readier means than a bridge of boats, presupposing the boats to be first in a readinesse. But that which he concludeth is, that mens wits in these times are much sharper and readier than those of former ages, forasmuch as they have found out an easy and expedite course, which former times could never reach unto. Wherein I will not go about to derogate any thing from

the condition of the time in which we live and breath, but do desire to find them better accomplished than any other foregoing ages; howsoever I may suspect a greater weakness of wit in these dayes, wherein the temperature of the body is worse conditioned than it was in the time of our Forefathers, as may appear by many arguments, & serveth not so fitly to the working powers of the mind, as it did before this multiplicity of mixture, when the state of mens bodies were compounded of those perfect elements which were in our first Parents. But for this reason which *Brancatio* alledgeth, the Reader may be pleased to understand, that the use of Boat-bridges was both known and in practice, as well before the Roman Empire, as in the time of their government. *Herodotus* relating the passage of *Xerxes* army into Greece, describeth this bridge of Boats, (which *Brancatio* would attribute to the invention of our times) in the self same manner, or rather more artificially than hath been accustomed in these later ages: for finding that no timber-work would serve the turn to make a sufficient bridge over the streights of *Hellestom*, being seven furlongs in breadth, he caused *Biremes* and *Triremes* to be placed in equall distance one from another, and fastened with anchor before and behind, and to be joyned together with planks and boards, and then covered with sand and gravel, raising a hedge or blind on each side thereof, to the end the horse and cattle might not be afraid at the working of the billow, and so made a bridge for the passage of his army. And in the time of the Roman Empire, *Tacitus* describeth the like bridge to be made over the river *Po* by *Valens* and *Cecina*, with as great skill as can be shewed at these times: for, saith he, they placed boats a crosse the river, in equall distance one from another, and joyned them together with strong planks, and fastened them with anchor; but in such sort, as *Anchorarum funes non extenui suit abant, ut, angustissime flumine inoffensus ordo navium attolleretur*, the cables of the Anchours floated loose, not being extended to their length, that upon the increase of the river the ships might be lifted up without any prejudice to them. Whereby it appeareth how much *Brancatio* was deceived in ascribing that to these later times, which was the invention of former ages; and may serve as a caveat to our out-languist humorists, that can endure no reading but that which foundeth with a strange idiom, not to trust too much upon their Authority, lest whilst they fill their memory with strange words, in the mean time they starve their understanding.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The Factions in Gallia in *Cæsar's* time.

Cæsar.

But here it shall not be amiss to deliver somewhat touching the manner and fashion of life, both of the Galles and of the Germans, and wherein those two Nations do differ. In Gallia not only in every city, village, and precinct, but almost in every particular house there are parties and factions, the heads whereof are such as they think to be of greatest authority, according to whose opinion and command the main course of their actions is directed. And this seemeth a custome instituted of old time, to the end that none of the common people, how mean soever, might at any time want means to make their party good against a greater man: for if they should suffer their parties and followers to be either oppressed or circumvented, they should never bear any rule or authority amongst them. And this is the course throughout all Gallia, for all their States are divided into two factions. When *Cæsar* came into Gallia, the *Hedui* were chief ring-leaders of the one party, and the *Sequani* of the other. These finding themselves to be the weaker side, (forasmuch as the principality and chiefest power was anciently seated in the *Hedui*, having many and great adventures and clients) drew the Germans and *Arminius* by many great promises on their party: and after many great victories all the Nobility of the *Hedui* being slain, they went so far beyond them in power and authority, that they drew the greatest part of Clients from the *Hedui* to themselves, and took the children of their Princes for pledges, and caused them to take a publick oath not to undertake any thing against the *Sequani*; besides a great part of their country which they took from them by force: and so they obtained the principality of Gallia. And thereupon *Divitiacus* went unto Rome to seek aid of the Senate, but returned without effecting anything. *Cæsar* coming into Gallia brought an alteration of these things, for the pledges were restored back again to the *Hedui*, and their old followers and clients did likewise return to their protection: besides other new followers which by *Cæsar's* means did cleave unto them; for they saw that those which ventured into frigid and ship with them, were in a better condition, and more fairly dealt with. Whereby their nobleness and dignity was so amplified and enlarged, that the *Sequani* lost their authority, whom the men of Rhemes succeeded. And forasmuch as the world took notice that they were no less favoured of *Cæsar* than the *Hedui*, such as by reason of former enmities could not endure to joyn with the *Hedui*, put themselves into the clientele of the men of Rhemes, and found respective protection from that State; which caused a new and

so daunt raised authority of the men of Rhemes. So that at that time the *Hedui* went far beyond all the other States of Gallia in power and authority, and next unto them were the men of Rhemes.

OBSERVATIONS.

Factions are generally the rent of a State, and a disjoyning of those parts which common unity hath knit together for the preservation of good government. But the Galles maintained fides and parties throughout the whole body of their Continent, and found it necessary for the upholding of their policy at home; and as it fell out in the course of these Wars, rather a help than otherwise in their general defence against a foreign enemy. The reason of the former benefit was grounded upon two causes, as *Cæsar* noteth: the one proceeding from the oppression used by the rich and mighty men towards the poorer and meaner people; and the other from the impatience of those of inferior condition, refusing to acknowledge any authority or preeminence at all, rather than to endure the wrongs and contumelies of the mighty. And therefore to prevent the licentious might of the great ones, and to give countenance and respect to the lower sort, these factions and fides were devised: wherein the foot had always a head sensible of the wrongs which were done unto it. Things of greater condition are always injurious to lesser natures, and cannot endure any competency; not so much as in comparison, or by way of relation. In things without life, the prerogative of the mountains doth swallow up the lesser rising of the downs, and the swelling of the downs, the unevenness of the mole-hills: the Stars are dimmed at the rising of the Moon, and the Moon loseth both her light and her beauty in the presence of the Sunne. So amongst brut beasts and fishes, the greater do always devour the less, and take them as their due by the appointment of nature: and men more injurious in this point, then either mountains or brute beasts, inasmuch as they do always overvalue themselves beyond their own greatness, have in all ages verified the old Proverb, *Homo homini lupus*. One man's a Wolf to another. And on the other side, as nature maketh nothing in vain, but hath given a being to the least of her creatures: so do they endeavour not to be annulled, but to keep themselves in being and continuance. *Habet & musca splenem*. The very Fly hath her spleen, saith the Poet: and the Palmire and Bees have their common-weales, though not equall to a Monarch. And therefore that the mighty and great men of Gallia might not devour the lowest of the people, but that every man might stand in his own condition, and by the help of a *Roi* live by an *Oliver*; and again, that the poorer sort might give as a tribute for their protection, that respect and obedience

to their superiors, as belongeth to such high callings, these factions and bandies were ordained: whereby the Nobles were restrained from oppressing the poor, and the poor compelled to obey the Nobility, which is the best end that may be made of any faction.

Concerning the advantage which the Galles received by these factions against forraign enemies, it was rather in regard of the multiplicitie of States and Common-weals which were in the continent of Gallia, then otherwise: for it manifestly appeareth, that their factions and contentions for soveraign authority, caused one party to bring in *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*; and the other party the *Romans*, to make good their bandy. But forasmuch as *Gallia* had many divisions, and contained many severall States, relying chiefly upon their own strengths, and esteeming the subversion of their neighbour city, as a calamity befalling their neighbour, from which the rest stood as yet free, it was not so easily conquered as it had been, all but one kingdom. The battell which *Cæsar* had with the *Nervi*, which was fought so hard, that of threescore thousand men there were left but five hundred, nor of six hundred Senators above three; nor again, the selling of three and fifty thousand *Galles* for bond-slaves at one time, did not so much advantage the conquest of *Gallia*, as the battell of *Edwards* the third, or that of *Henry* the fifth, our two English *Cæsars*: in the former whereof were slain at *Creffie* thirty thousand of the *French*, and in the latter at *Agincourt* but ten thousand. The reason was for that the former losses, though far greater, concerned but particular States; whereas these latter overthrowes extended to the members and branches of the whole kingdom.

CHAP. VIII.

Two sorts of men in Gallia, *Druides* and *Equites*.



Throughout all *Gallia* there are but two sorts of men that are of any reckoning or account: for the common people are in the nature of servants, and of no worth of themselves, nor admitted to any Parliament; but being kept under either by debts, or by great tributes, or by the oppression of the mighty, do put themselves in the service of the Nobility, and are subject to the authority which the master hath over his bond-slaves. Of these two sorts the one are *Druides*, and the other *Equites* or *Gentlemen*. The *Druides*, which are alwayes present at their Holy Duties, do give order for their publick and private sacrifices, and expound their Religion. To the *Druides* great numbers of the youth do resort for learnings sake, and have

them in great honour and reputation; for they do determine almost of all controversies both publick and private: for if any offence be committed, as murder or man-slaughter, or any controversy arise touching their lands or inheritance, they sentence it; rewarding the virtuous, and punishing the wicked. If any private man or State do not obey their decrees, they interdict him from holy duty, which is the greatest punishment that is amongst them. Such as are thus interdicted, are reputed in the number of impious and wicked men, every man leaves their company, and doth avoid to meet them, or speak with them, lest they should receive any hurt by their contagion: neither have they law or justice when they require it, nor any respect or honour that doth belong unto them. Over all the *Druides* there is one *Primus*, that hath authority of the rest. At his decease if any one do excell the rest in dignity, he succeedeth: if many equals are found, they go to election, and sometimes they contend about the primacy with force and arms. They meet at a certain time of the year in the confines of the *Carnutes*, which is the middle part of all *Gallia*, and there they sit in a sacred place: thither they resort from all parts that have controversies, and do obey their orders and judgements. The art and learning of the *Druides* was first found out in *Britany*, and from thence is thought to be brought into *Gallia*: and at this time such as will attain to the perfect knowledge of that discipline, do for the most part travell thither to learn it. The *Druides* are exempt from warfare and payments, and have an immunitie from all other duties: whereby it falleth out that many do betake themselves to that profession of their own free will, and divers others are sent to that school by their parents and friends. They are said to learn many verses, and that some do study therein twenty years. Neither is it lawfull for them to commit any thing to writing, beside that in other publick and private businesses they onely use the *Greek* tongue: and that as I take it for two causes; first for that their learning may not become common and vulgar; secondly, that scholars might not trust so much to their writings as to their memory, as it happeneth for the most parts that men rely upon the trust of books and papers, and in the mean time omit the benefit of good remembrance. They endeavour chiefly to teach men that their souls do not die, but that they do remove out of one body into another after death; and this they think to be very important to stir men up to vertues, neglecting the fear of death. They dispute further, and give many traditions to the youth touching the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the earth and the world, the nature of things, and the might and power of the Gods.

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Oxford & Cambridge.

OBSERVATIONS.

Druides.

The quality and condition of the *Druides* is in this place very particularly described by *Cæsar*, and may be reduced to these heads. First, their Office, extending both to things Divine and things temporal, whereby they executed the place both of Priests and of Judges. And for that purpose there was one known place appointed where they sat in judgement: and as I understand it, there was but one Terme in the year, which both began and ended their suits in law. The second thing is their Authority, having power to reward vertue and to punish vice. Thirdly, their privileges and immunities, being free from contributions, from warfare, and all other burthens of the State. Fourthly, their doctrine and learning, which was partly Theologically, concerning the might and power of the gods, the immortality of the Soul; and partly philosophicall, touching the stars and their motions, the earth and the magnitude thereof. And lastly, their manner of learning, which was altogether *Pythagoricall*, refusing the help of letters and books, and committing their doctrine to the tradition of their Elders. But that which is specially to be observed, is, that this learning was not onely found out here in *Brittanie*, but such as would perfectly attain to the knowledge thereof, came into *England* to study the same, contrary to the experience which heretofore hath been observed of the Northern and Southern parts of the world: for as the South giveth a temper to the body fit for the science and contemplation of Arts, whereby the mind being enlarged and purified in her faculties, doth dive into the secret depth of all learning, and censure the hidden mysteries thereof; so the Northern climats do bind in the powers of the soul, and restrain all her vertues to the use of the body, whereby they are said to have *animam in digitis*, their soul in their fingers, not affording her that delight and contentment which is usually received by speculation. And thence it happeneth that all speculative arts and sciences, and what elssoever concerneth the inward contemplation of the mind, was found out and perfected by such as border upon the South, and from them it was brought by little and little into the Northern regions: and such as would be masters in the Arts they professed, went alwayes Southward for the attaining thereof. But here the South was beholding to the North, as well for their principles of Divinity, as for their Philosophie and morall learning, being as pure, as that which any heathen people ever drank of. Which proveth an ancient singularity in the inhabitants of this Iland, touching the studie of Arts and matter of learnings, and may with like evidence be proved from age to age even to this time. In

By reason of the curious and artificall works.

witnes whereof I appeal to the two Universities of this land, as a demonstration of the love which our Nation hath ever born to learning, being two such Magazines of arts and sciences, so beautified with curious buildings, and supplied with indowments for the liberall maintenance of the Mules, enriched with Libraries of learned Works, adorned with pleasant places for the refreshing of wearied spirits, gardens, groves, walks, rivers, and arborets, as the like such *Athenes* are not to be found in any part of the world.

CHAP. IX.

The second sort of men in *Gallia*, called the *Equites* in *Cæsar's* time.



He other sort of people are *Equites* or *Gentlemen*. These when there is occasion, or when any war happeneth, as before *Cæsar's* coming was usuall every year, that either they did offer injuries, or resist injuries, are always parties therein: and as every man excelleth other in birth or wealth, so is he attended with clients and followers, and this they take to be the onely note of Nobilitie and greatness. The whole nation of the *Galles* are much addicted to religions; and for that cause, such as are either grievously diseased, or conversant continually in the dangers of warre, do either sacrifice men for an oblation, or vow the oblation of themselves, using in such sacrifices the ministry of the *Druides*, forasmuch as they are persuaded that the immortal Deity cannot be pleased, but by giving the life of one man for the life of another: and to that purpose they have publick sacrifices appointed. Others have Images of a monstrous magnitude, whose limbs and parts being made of Osiers, are filled with living men, and being set on fire, the men are burned to death. The execution of such as are taken in theft or robbery, or any other crime, they think to be best pleasing to the gods; but wanting such, they spare not the innocent. They worship chiefly the god *Mercurie*, and have many of his images amongst them; him they adore as the inventor of all Arts, the conductor and guide in all voyages and journeys, and they think him to have great power in all merchandise and gain of monies. Next unto him they prefer *Apollo*, *Mars*, *Jove* and *Minerva*, and of these they carry the same opinion as other nations do: *Apollo* to be powerfull in healing diseases, *Minerva* in finding out artificall works, *Jove* ruling the celestiall Empire, and *Mars* for warre. When they are to encounter with an enemy, they vow all the spoil unto him; and such beasts as are taken they sacrifice other things they lay up in some one place: and many such heaps of things so taken

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are to be seen in the holy places of diverse of their cities. Neither doth it often happen, that any man neglecting his religion in that point, dare either keep back any thing so taken, or take away ought laid up in their Repositories; for they incur a heave punishment and torture for that offence. The Galles do all boast themselves in the stock from whence they are descended, understanding by the Divides, but they come of the god Dis. And therefore they end the space of all their times by the number of nights rather than by the number of dayes, observing the dayes of their nativity, the beginnings of their moneths and their years, in such sort as the day doth alwayes follow the night. And herein they differ from other nations, that they suffer not their children to come openly unto them, but when they are grown fit for war: thinking it shamefull and dishonest, that a son in his childhood should in publike places stand in the sight of his father. To the portions which they have with their wives, they add as much more of their own goods; and the use of this money thus added together, is kept apart, and the longer liver hath both the principall and the interest for all the former time. The men have power of life and death, both over their wives and their children. And when a man of great place and parentage shall happen to decease, his kinsfolke assemble themselves together, to enquire of his death: if there be any occasion of suspicion, they put his wife to torture after the manner of a servant; and if it be found she dies tormented with fire and all other tortures as may be imagined. Their funerals (according to the rest of their life) are magnificall and sumptuous, burying with the dead corps all that he took delight in while he lived, not sparing living creatures: and not long out of memory, the custome was to bury with the body such clients and servants as were favoured by him in his lifetime. Such States as are carefull in the government of their common-weals, do prohibit by a speciall law, that no man shall communicate a rumour or report touching the State to any man saving a Magistrate; forasmuch as it had been often found, that rash and unskillfull men were so terrified with false reports, and moved to such desperate attempts, that they entered into resolutions touching the main points of State. The Magistrates do keep secret such things as they think fit, and that which they think expedient they publish: but it is not lawfull to speak of matter of State, but in assemblies of State.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The beginning of the day diversly observed.

Concerning the beginning of dayes and times, which Cæsar noteth in this place to be observed by the Galles after Sun-setting;

(whereby it happened that in the naturall day of four and twenty houres, the night alwayes preceded the day time, contrary to the use of Italy, where the day began at Sun-risings, and the night followed the artificiall day as the second part of the day naturall;) we are to understand, that as all time, and the distinction of the parts thereof, dependeth upon the two motions of the Sunne: the one as it moveth in its own orb from West to East, begetting the revolution of years, and the seasons of Sommer and Winter, the Spring and the Autumnes with the measure of moneths as it passeth through the signes of the Zodiack; and the other, as it is carried from East to West by the first moving sphere, making the distinction of nights and dayes, houres and minutes: so the beginnings of these times and seasons are diversly taken amongst diverse people and nations of the earth. The *Iewes* had the same computation touching the beginning of the day as the *Galles* had, but upon other grounds and reasons then could be alledged for this custome in *Gallia*: for they began their day in the evening at Sunne-setting, as appeareth by many places of the Scripture: and *Moses* in the repetition of the first seven dayes work, upon the accomplishment of a day, saith, The evening and the morning were one day, giving the evening precedency before the morning, as though the day had begun in the evening. The *Bohemians* in like manner do observe the beginning of their day in the evening, and do herein follow the use of the *Iewes*. Other nations do begin at Sun-risings, and take the computation of their day naturall from the first appearing of the Sun in the East. The *Greeks* begin and end their day at midnight, observing the certainty of that time, and the correspondance between the equall and planetary houres in the meridian Circle: whereas otherwise by reason of the inequality of the dayes and the nights, out of a right sphere there is alwayes some difference between the said houres. And this use also is observed by us in England.

This god *Dis*, whom he nameth for the father of that nation, is the same whom the heathen called *Pluto*, the god of hell and darkness; and for that cause they put darkness before light, touching the beginning of their naturall day.

But forasmuch as this circumstance giveth occasion to speak of dayes and times, give me leave to insert the reformation of the year, which Cæsar so happily established, that succeeding times have had no cause to alter the same.

And although it neither concerneth the art of war, nor happened within the compass of these seven summers: yet forasmuch as it was done by Cæsar, and deserveth as often memory as any other of his noble acts, it shall not seem impertinent to the reader to take thus much by the way concerning that matter. There is no nation

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of any civill government, but observeth a course or revolution differenced with times and seasons, in such manner as may be answerable to the motion of the Sun, in the circuit which it maketh through the signes and degrees of the Zodiack. But forasmuch as the government of a civill year doth not well admit any other composition of parts, to make it absolute and complete, then by naturall dayes; and on the other side, the Sun requireth odde houres and minutes to finish his race, and return again to the goal from whence it came; there hath alwayes been found a difference between the civill and the Solar year. Before Cæsars time, the *Romans* using the ancient computation of the year, had not onely such uncertainty and alteration in moneths and times, that the sacrifices and yearly feasts came by litle and litle to seasons contrary for the purpose they were ordained: but also in the revolution of the Sun or Solar year, no other nation agreed with them in account, and of the *Romans* themselves, onely the Priests understood it: and therefore when they pleased (no man being able to controll them) they would upon the sodain thrust in a moneth above the ordinary number, which as *Plutarch* noteth, was in old time called *Mercedonius*, or *Menfis intercalaris*. To remedy this inconvenience, Cæsar calling together the best and most expert Astronomers of that time, made a Kalender more exactly calculated then any other that was before: and yet such a one as by long continuance of time hath bred a difference, for the matter standeth thus.

It is found by certain observation of Mathematicians of all ages, that the Sun being carried from the West to the East by the motion of his own Sphere, finisheth his yearly course in the space of 365. dayes, five houres, nine and forty minutes, and some odd seconds: whereupon it was then concluded that their civill year must necessarily contain three hundred threescore and five dayes, which maketh two and fifty weeks and one day. And forasmuch as those five odd houres, nine and forty minutes, and some seconds, did in four years space amount unto a naturall day, (wanting two and forty minutes and six and fifty seconds, which was thought nothing in comparison) they devised every fourth year to add a day more then ordinary, to answer that time which is usually added to *February*: whereby it happeneth that in every fourth year *February* hath nine and twenty dayes. And so they made an order to reform their year without any sensible error for a long time. But since that time, being one thousand six hundred years and more, those two and forty minutes and six and fifty seconds, which as I said do want of the naturall day of four and twenty hours which is inserted in every fourth year, have bred a manifest and an apparant error: for whereas the civil year is by that means made greater then the so-

lar years, the Sun ending his task before we can end our times, it happeneth that such feasts as have relation to seasonable times, do as it were foreflow the opportunity, and fall out further in the year, as though they had a motion towards the former solstice. And as these go forward, so doth the Equinoctiall return backwards towards the beginning of the moneth. For Cæsar by the help of the Astronomers observed the *Equinoctium* the five and twentieth of *March*. *Ptolemy* in his time observed the *Equinoctium* the two and twentieth of *March*. And it was observed the one and twentieth of *March* in the year from the incarnation 322. what time was holden the first generall Council at *Nice* a city of *Pontus*, in respect whereof the Paschall tables and other rules were established for the celebration of Easter. But since that time there are passed 1281. years, and the *Equinoctium* cometh before the one and twentieth of *March* ten dayes.

As this error is reformed among other nations, and reduced to that state as it was at the *Nicene* Council: so there might many reasons be alledged to prove the reformation convenient of a greater number of dayes then ten. For if the Kalender were so ordered, that every moneth might begin when the Sun entrencheth into that Sign which is for the moneth, and end when the Sun goeth out of that signe, it would avoid much confusion, and be very easy to all sorts of people as have occasion to observe the same: which doubtlesse was the purport of the first institution of moneths; and was observed (as it seemeth) by the old *Romans*, who began the year at the winter solstice, as *Ovid* noteth:

Bruma novi primaefest, veterisque novissima solis:

Principium capiunt Phœbus & annus idem.

And therefore they called that moneth *January* of *Ianus* that had two faces, and saw both the old and the new year. Such therefore as would go about to reform the year to this course, must not cut off ten dayes onely, but one and twenty; and for one year make *December* to continue but ten dayes, and then *January* to begin, and so successively to the rest of the moneths. But it may be said, that although we help our selves, and put off the inconvenience which is fallen upon us, yet in tract of time the like error will fall again upon succeeding ages, and put their yearly Feasts besides the dayes appointed for them. For remedy whereof it may be answered; That whereas this error hath happened by adding every fourth year a naturall day, which in true calculation wanted two and forty minutes and six and fifty seconds of four and twenty hours, and in every 136. years hath accrued within one minute to a day more then needed: the onely way is every 136. years, to omit the

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addition

addition of that days, and to make that year to contain but 365. dayes, which by the order of *Cæsars* Kalender, is a leap year, and hath one day more, which hath brought this error. And so there would not happen the error of a day in the space of 111086. years, if the world should continue so long.

But least we should seem more curious in reforming the course of our civill year, then the manners of our civill life, I will proceed to that which followeth.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The second thing which I observe in their manner of life, is the respect they had to matter of State, and the care which they took that no man should dispute of the Common-weal, but in assemblies appointed for the service of the common-weal. Whereby they gained two speciall points for the maintenance of good government. The first, that no man might speak of points of State, but the governors of State: for such I understand to be admitted to their Councils and Parliaments. Secondly, that such matters of consequence as touched them so nearly, might not be handled, but in such places and at such times as might best advantage the State. Concerning the former we are to note, that Government is defined, to be an establishing of order best fitting the maintenance of a peoples in a peaceable and happy life. Order requireth degrees and distinctions in vesting severall parts in severall functions and duties: to these duties there belongeth a due observance, according to the motion and place which every part holdeth in the generall order. Of these degrees and distinctions, Sovereignty and Obedience are two main relatives, the one invested in the Prince or Magistrate, the other in the people and subjects, incommunicable in regard of their terms and subjects, and yet concurring in the main drift of government, intending the benefit of a happy life. And therefore the *Galles* did carefully provide, that no man should exceed the limits of his own rank, but that such as late at the helm might shapethe course: and for the rest whole lot it was to be directed, they would have them take notice of their mandates by obedience, and not by dispute.

Touching the second points, we are to consider the danger which may happen to a State, by common and ordinary discourse of the Principles of that Government, or of such circumstances as are incident to the same, (without respect of time or place, or any other due regard) which the wisdom of a well-ordered policy doth hold requisite thereunto: for whatsoever is delivered by speech, without such helpfull attendance, is both unseasonable and unprofitable, and the Common-weal is alwaies a sufferer when

it falleth into such rash considerations; for our most serious cogitations afflited with the best circumstances, can but speak to purpose. And as the execution falleth short of the purport intended by discourse, so is our speech and discourse lame and wanting to our inward conceit. And therefore as religious actions stand in need of *hoc ages*, so may politick consultations use the help of the same remembrancer.

CHAP. X.

The manner and life of the Germans.



He Germans do much differ from the *Galles* in their course of life, for they have neither Priests nor sacrifices. They worship no gods, but such as are subject to sense, and from whom they daily receive profits and helps, as the Sun, the Fire, and the Moon; for the rest they have not so much as beawd of. Their life is onely spent in hunting, or in use and practise of war. They invne themselves to labour and hardnesse even from their childhood, and such as continue longest bearded are most commended amongst them: for this some think to be very available to their stature, others to their strength and sinews. They hold it a most dishonest part for one to touch a woman before he be twenty years of age: neither can any such matter be hid or dissembled, forasmuch as they bathe themselves together in rivers, and use skins and other small coverings on the reins of their backs, the rest of their body being all naked. They use no tillage, the greatest part of their food is milke, or cheese, or flesh: neither hath any man any certain quantity of land to his own use; but their Magistrates and Princes do every year allot a certain portion of land to kindreds and tribes that inhabit together, as much and in such places as they think fit, and the next year appoint them in anew place. Hereof they give many reasons: lest they should be led away by continuall custome from the practise of war to the use of husbandry, or lest they should endeavour to get themselves great possessions, and so the weaker should be thrust out and dispossess of their livings by the mighty, or lest they should build too delicately for the avoiding of cold or heat, or lest they should wax covetous and thirst after money, which is the beginning of all factions and dissensions; and lastly, that they might keep the parity between their revenues and the possessions of the great ones. It is the greatest honour to their States to have their confines lie waste and desolate far and near about them: for thus they take to be an advantage of valour, when their borderers are driven to forsake

for sake their country, and dare not abide near them; and withall they think themselves by that means much safer from any sodain incursion. When a State maketh war, either by way of attempt or defence, they chuse Magistrates to command that war, having power of life and death: but in time of peace they have no common Magistrates, but the chiefest men in the country and the villages, do interpret the Law and determine of Controversies. Theft committed out of the confines of their State is not infamous or dishonest, but commended as an exercise of the youth, and a keeping them from sloth. When any one of their Princes and chief men shall in an assembly or council publish himself for a leader upon some exploit, and desire to know who will follow him upon the same, they that have a good opinion of the man and the matter, and do promise him their help and assistance, are commended by the multitude: the rest that refuse to accompany him, are held in the number of traitors, and never have any credit afterwards. They hold it not lawfull to hurt a stranger that shall come unto them upon any occasions, but do protect him from injuries; to such every mans house is open, and his table common. The time was when the *Galles* excelled the Germans in prowess and valour, and made war upon them of their own accord, and by reason of the multitude of their people and want of ground for habitations, they sent many colonies over the Rhene into Germany. And so those fertile places of Germ, which are near unto the wood Hercynia, (which Eratosthenes and other Grecians took notice of by the name of Orcynia) were possessed by the Volce Teutoles, who dwelt there at this time, and keep their ancient opinion of justice and warlike praise. Now the Germans still continue in the same poverty, want, and patience, as in former time; do use the same diet and apparell for their bodies: but the neighbourhood and knowledge of other nations hath made the *Galles* live in a more plentifull manner, who by little and little have been weakened and overthrown in divers battels, so that now they stand not in comparison with the Germans. The breadth of the wood Hercynia is nine dayes journey over, for they have no other differences of space but by means of dayes journeyes. It beginneth at the confines of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and runs along the river Danubius to the territories of the Daci; thence it declineth to the left side from the said river, and by reason of the large extension thereof, it bordereth the confines of many other countries. Neither is there any German that can say, that either he durst adventure, or did go to, or had heard of the beginning of the same, although he had travelled therein three score dayes journey. In this wood are many sorts of wild beasts,

which are not to be seen in any other place: amongst the rest, the most unusual and remarkable are, An Oxe like unto a Hart, that in the middle of his forehead between his ears carrieth a horn longer and straighter then usually, divided at the end into many large branches, the female is in all respects like unto the male, and beareth a horn of the same magnitude and fashion. There is likewise another sort of beasts called Alces, not unlike unto a Goat, but somewhat bigger, and without horns: their legs are without joints, that when they take their rest they neither sit nor lie upon the ground, and if they chance to fall they cannot rise again. When they take their rest in the night, they lean against trees. The Hunters having found out their footsteps and their haunts, do either undermine the roots of such trees, or so cut them asunder that a small matter will overthrow them; so that when they come according unto their use to rest themselves against those trees, they overthrow them with their weight, and fall withall themselves, and so are taken. The 3. kind of beasts are those which are called Uris, somewhat lesser then an Elephant, and in colour, kind and shape, not unlike unto a Bull. They are both strong and swift, and spare neither man nor beast that cometh in their sight: these they catch with greater labour and diligence in pits and ditches, and so kill them. The youth do invne and exercise themselves in this kind of huntings, and such as kill many of these beasts, and shew most horns, are highly commended: but to make them tame, or any their little ones, was never yet seen. The largeness of their horns, as also the fashion and kind thereof, doth much differ from the horns of the Oxen, and are much sought after for cups to be used in their greatest banquets, being first bound about the brim and trimmed with silver.

OBSERVATIONS.

Cæsar in this Chapter describeth the course of life which the Germans in his time held throughout the whole policy of their government, the scope whereof was to make them warlike: to which he saith, That in times past the *Galles* were as valiant and as warlike people as the Germans; but the neighbourhood and knowledge of other nations had taught them a more plentifull manner of life, which by little and little had weakened their strength, and made them far inferiour to the Germans. Which bringeth to our consideration that which is often attributed to a civill life, that such as taste of the sweetness of ease, and are qualified with the complements of civilities, have alwaies an indisposition to civill warlike practices. The reason is grounded upon a wishke on life and custome: for discontinuance doth disposicion
alwaies

Their respect to matter of State.

Tibi summan rerum di dedere, nobis obsequi gloria relata est: Tacitus.

Observations upon Cæsars

always cause a strangeness and alienation, benumbing the softest parts with unready and painfull gestures; and is so powerfull, that it doth not only steal away naturall affection, and make parents forget to love their children; but like a tyrant it is able to force us to those things which naturally we are unfit for, as though the decrees of nature were subject to the controulment of custome. Much more then, the things got by use and practice, are as easily forgot by discontinuance, as they were obtained by studious exercise. On the other side, there is nothing so horrible or dreadful, but use maketh easy. The first time the Foxlaw the Lion, he swooned for fear, the next time he trembled, but the third time he was so far from fear, that he was ready to put a trick of craft upon him: whereby it appeareth, that the Germans had no further interest in deeds of arms above the Gallies, then what the use of war had gained them: for as usage continueth the property of a tenure, so non-usage implieth a forfeiture. Cato was wont to say, that the Romans would loose their Empire, when they suffered the Greek tongue to be taught amongst them: for by that means they would easily be drawn from the study and practice of war, to the bewitching delight of speculative thoughts. And Marcellus was blamed for being the first that corrupted Rome with the delicate and curious works of Greece: for before that he brought from the sacking of Syracuse the well-wrought tables of pictures and inagery, Rome never knew any such delicacy, but stood full fraught with armour and weapons of barbarous peoples, of the bloody spoils and monuments of victories and triumphs; which were rather fearfull shews to inure their eyes to the horror of war, then pleasant sights to allure their minds to affections of peace. Whereby it appeareth, that such as suffer themselves to be guided by the easy rain of civile government, or take a disposition to that course of life, can hardly endure the yoke of war, or undergo the tediousness of martiall labours.

CHAP. XI.

Basilus his surprize upon Ambiorix.

Cæsar finding by the discoveries which the Ubiis sent out, that the Suevi had all beaken themselves to the woods, and doubting want of corn, forasmuch as the Germans of all other nations do least care for tillage; he determined to go no further. But that his return might not altogether free the barbarous people from fear, but hinder the helps and succours which they were wont to send into Gallia, having brought back his army, he cut off so much of the furthest part of the bridge next

unto the Ubiis, as came in measure to two hundred foot, and in the end of that which remained he built a tower of four stories, making other works for the strengthening of that place, wherein he left a garrison of twelve cohorts under the command of young C. Volcanus Tullus: he himself as coy warden, went forward to the war of Ambiorix by the way of the wood of Arduenna, which is the greatest in all Gallia, and extendeth it self from the banks of Rhene, and the confines of the Treviri, to the seat of the Nervii, carrying a breadth of five hundred miles. He sent L. Minucius Basilus before with all the horses to see if he could effect anything either by prevention and speedy arrivall, or by opportunity, commanding him not to suffer any fires to be made in his camp, lest his coming might be discovered, promising to follow him at his heels. Basilus followeth his directions, and coming upon them contrary to their expectation, took many of the enemy abroad in the fields, and by their conviction made towards Ambiorix, where he remained in a place with a few horsemen. As fortune is very powerfull in all things, so he challengeth a speciall interest in matter of war: for as it happened by great luck, that he should light upon him unawares and unprovoked, and that his coming should sooner be seen then he and of; so was it great hap, that all the arms which he had about him should be surprised by his horses and his chariots taken, and that he himself should escape death. But this happened by reason of the wood that was about his horses, according to the manner of the Gallies, who for avoiding of heats do commonly build near unto woods and rivers: his followers and friends sustaining awhile the charge of the horsemen in a narrow place, while he himself escaped in the mean time on horseback, and in flying was protected and sheltered by the woods: whereby Fortune seemed very powerfull both in drawing on a danger, and in avoiding it.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The prerogative which Fortune hath always challenged in the accidents of wars, and the speciall interest which she hath in that course of life more then in other mens actions, hath made the best souldiers oftentimes to sing a song of complaint, the burthen whereof yet remaineth, and serveth as a reason of all such misadventures, *Fortune de la guerre*. The Fortune of the war, such as have observed the course of things, and have found one and the same man continuing the same means, this day happy, and the next day unfortunate; and again, two other men, the one advised and respective, and the other violent and rash, and yet both attain the like good fortune by two contrary courses, or otherwise, as often-

Lib. VI.

Commentaries.

Plutarch in the life of Sylla.

In the life of Alexander.

Plutarch in the life of Sylla.

oftentimes it falleth out, the more heedless, the more happy; have been persuaded that all things are to governed by fortune, that the wisdom of man can neither alter nor amend them: and therefore to spend much time or tedious labour, either in careful circumspection, or heedfull prevention of that which is unchangeable, they hold as vain as the washing of an *Æthiopian* to make him white. Of this opinion Sylla seemed to be; professing himself better born to fortune then to the wars, and acknowledging his happiest victories to have proceeded from his most heedless and unadvised resolutions. And the great Alexander to carried himself, as though he had been of the same opinion, of whom Curtius saith; *Quoties illum fortuna à morte revocavit! quoties temere in pericula ventum perpetua felicitate praecevit!* How many a time did Fortune call him back from the brink of death! how often did she happily defend and save him, when he had by his rashness brought himself into dangers! And Plutarch saith, that he had power of time and place.

Others are not willing to ascribe so much to Fortune, as to make themselves the Tennis-ball to her Racket; and yet they are content to allow her half of every thing they go about, reserving the other moiety to their own directions. And so like partners in an adventure, they labour to improve their share for their best advantage.

Some other there are that will allow Fortune no part at all in their actions, but do confront her with a goddess of greater power, and make industry the means to annul her Deitie. Of this opinion was *Timotheus the Athenian*, who having achieved many notable victories, would not allow of the concept of the painter, that had made a table wherein Fortune was taking in those cities, (which he had won) with a net whilst he himself slept: but protested against her in that behalf, and would not give her any part in that business.

And thus the heathen world varied as much in their opinions touching Fortune, as Fortune her self did in her events to themward: which were so divers and changeable, as were able to enthrall the deepest wits, and confound the wisdom of the greatest judgements: whereby the word Fortune usurped a Deity, and got an opinion of extraordinary power in the regiment of humane actions. But our Christian times have a readier lesson, wherein is taught a soveraign Providence, guiding and directing the thoughts of mens hearts, with the faculties and powers of the Soul, together with their externall actions, to such ends as shall seem best to that omnipotent wisdom, to whom all our abilities serve as instruments and means to effect his purposes, notwithstanding our particular intendments, or what the heart of man may otherwise determine. And therefore such as will make their

wayes prosperous unto themselves, and receive that contentment which their hope expecteth, or their labours would deserve, must use those helps which the rules of Christianity do teach in that behalf, and may better be learned from a Divine, then from him that writeth Treatises of War.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Quintus Curtius speaking of Alexander, saith, *Nullam virtutem Regis istius magis quam celeritatem laudaverim*, I can commend no vertue in this King before his speed & celerity: whereof this might be a ground, that he followed *Darius* with such speed after the second battell he gave him, that in eleven dayes he marched with his army six hundred miles, which was a chafe well fitting Alexander the Great, and might rest unexampled: notwithstanding Suetonius giveth this generall report of Cæsar, that in matter military, *aut equavit praestantissimorum gloriam, aut excessit*, he either equalled or exceeded the glory of the best: and for this particular he saith, *quod persæpe nuntius de se prævenit*, that he was very often the messenger of his own success. And to speak truly, he seemeth to challenge to himself expedition and speed as his peculiar commendation, grounding himself upon the danger which lingering and trespasing of time doth usually bring to well advised resolutions: according to that of *Lucan* the Poet,

Noctis semper differre paratis.
Delay did always hurt those that were ready.

For by this speedy execution of well-digested directions, he gained two main advantages. First, the prevention of such helps and means as the enemy would otherwise have had, to make the war dangerous and the event doubtful. And secondly, the confusion and fear, which doth consequently follow such main disappointments, being the most dangerous accidents that can happen to any party, and the chiefest points to be endeavoured to be cast upon an enemy by him that would make an easie conquest.

For proof whereof, amongst many other examples, I will onely alledge his expedition to Rome, when he first came against Pompey, according to Plutarch's relation. In the mean time (saith he) news came to Rome, that Cæsar had won *Ariminum*, a great city in Italy, and that he came directly to Rome with a great power, which was not true: for he came but with 3000. horse and 5000. foot, and would not tarry for the rest of his army, being on the other side of the *Alpes* in Gallia, but made hast rather to surprize his enemies upon the sudden, being afraid and in garboile, not looking for him so soon, then to give them time to be provided, and so to fight with them in the best of their strength, which

Plutarch in the life of Pompey.

Catvulus poisoneth himself, Cæsar divideth his army into three parts.

NOW whether Ambiorix did not make head and assemble his forces of purpose, for that he determined not to fight, or whether he were hindered by the shortness of the time, and the sudden coming of the horsemen, thinking the rest of the army had followed after; it remaineth doubtful: but certain it is, that he sent privie messengers about the country, commanding every man to shift for himself; and so some fled into the Forrest Arduenna, others into fens and bogs, and such as were near the Ocean, did bite themselves in such Islands as the tides do commonly make: many forsook their Country, and committed themselves to their fortunes, to more strangers and unknown people. Catvulus the King of the one half of the Eburones, who was a party with Ambiorix in this matter, being now grown old and unable to undergo the labours of war, or of flying, detesting Ambiorix with all manner of execrations, as the author of this matter, drank the juice of Yew, (whereof there is great store in Gallia and Germany,) and so died. The Segni and Condrusi, of the nation and number of the Germans, that dwell between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat him not to take them in the number of the enemy, and thus he would not adjudge all the Germans dwelling on this side of the Rhene to have one and the same cause: for their part, they never so much as thought of warre, nor gave any aid to Ambiorix. Cæsar having examined the matter by the torture of the captives, commanded them, that if any of the Eburones should flee unto them, to bring them unto him, and in so doing he would spare their country. Then dividing his forces into three parts, he left the baggage of the whole army at Vatuca, a castle in the midst of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius were lodged. He made choice of this place the rather, for that the fortifications made the year before continued perfect and good to the end he might ease the souldier of some labour; and there left the fourteenth legion for a guard to the cariages, being one of the three which he had last enrolled in Italy, making Q. Tullius Cicero their Commander, and with him he left two hundred horse.

The army being thus divided, he commanded Titus Labienus to carry three legions towards that part of the sea coast which bordereth upon the Menapii, and sent Trebonius with the like number

number of Legions to wait and harry that country which confineth the Aduatici: he himself with the other three determined to go to the river Scaldis, which runneth into the Maes, and to the furthest parts of the wood Arduenna; for that he understood that Ambiorix with a few horsemen was fled to those parts. At his departure he assured them that he would return after the seventh dayes absence: for at that day he knew that corn was to be given to that legion which he had there left in garrison. He counselled Labienus and Trebonius to return likewise by that day, if they conveniently could; to the end that after communication of their discoveries, and intelligence of the projects of the enemy, they might think upon a new beginning of war.

OBSERVATIONS.

THIS sudden surpris upon Ambiorix and the Treviri, prevented (as I have already noted) their making head together, and put the enemy to such shifts for their safety, as occasion or opportunity would afford them in particular. And albeit the Treviri were by this means dispersed, yet they were not overthrown, nor utterly vanquished, but continued still in the nature and quality of an enemy, although they were by this occasion defeated of their chiefest means. And therefore the better to prosecute them in their particular flights, and to keep them disjointed, he divided his army into three parts, and made three severall roads upon their country, hoping thereby to meet with some new occasion, which might give an overture of a more absolute conquest: for diversity of motions do breed diversity of occasions, whereof some may happily be such, as being well managed, may bring a man to the end of his desires. But herein let us not forget to observe the manner he used in this service: for first he left a Rendez-vous where all the cariages of the army were bestowed, with a competent garrison for the safe keeping thereof, to the end the souldiers might be assured of a retreat, what difficulty soever might befall them in that action, according to that of Sertorius, that a good captain should rather look behind him then before him; and appointed withall a certain day when all the troops should meet there again; *Iturusus* (as he saith) *communicatio consilio, exploratiisque hostium rationibus, aliud in summum bellum capere possint*. That after communication of their discoveries, &c.

CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar sendeth messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the Eburones.

HERE was (as I have already declared) no certain band or troupe of the enemy, no garrison or town to stand out in armes; but the multitude was dispersed into all

parts, and every man lay hid either in some secret and unknown valley, or in some rough and woody place, or in some bog, or in such other places as gave them hope of shelter or safety: which places were well known to the States of that country. And the matter required great diligence and circumspection, not so much in regard of the generall safety of the army, (for there could no danger happen unto them, the enemy being all terrified and fled,) as in preserving every particular souldier; which notwithstanding did in part concern the safety of the whole army: for hope of booty did draw many far off out of their ranks, and the woods through uncertain and unknown passages would not suffer the souldiers to go in troops. If he would have the business take an end, and the very race of those wicked people rooted out, the army must be divided, and many small bands must be made for that purpose: but to keep the Maniples at their ensignes, according to the custome and use of the Roman army, the place it self was a sufficient guard for the barbarous people, who'd not want courage in particular, both to lie in wait for them, and circumvent them as they were severed from their companies. Yet in extremities of that nature what diligence could attain unto was provided, but in such manner, that somewhat was omitted in the offensive part, though the souldiers minds were bent upon revenge, rather then it should be done with any detriment or losse to the souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the next bordering States, calling them out to sack the Eburones, in hope of booty and pillage, to the end the Galles should rather hazard their lives in the wood, then the legionary souldiers; as also that there might be many spoilers and destroyers, to the end that both the name and race of that State might be taken away. Hereupon a great multitude speedily assembled from all quarters. These things were acted in all parts and quarters of the Eburones, and the seventh day drew near which he had appointed for his return to the cariages.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT is a commoditie which a Generall hath, when the enemy doth not refuse open encounter, for so he may be sure that the weight of the business will rest upon military virtue and prowess of armes, as ready way-makes to a speedy victory: but when it shall happen that the country doth afford covert and protection to him that is more malicious then valorous, and through the fastnesse of the place refuse to shew himself unless it be upon advantage, the war doubtlesse is like to prove tedious, and the victory lesse honourable. In such cases there is

Veni,
Vidi,
Vici.

Lib. i. bell.
civil.

Plator. h. in
the life of
Sertorius.

Cæsar.

Lib. i. bell.
civil.

The benefit
of open
encounter.

Observations upon *Cæsars*

no other way, then so to harry and waste a country; that the enemy may be famished out of his holds, and brought to subjection by scarcity and necessity. Which is a means so powerfull, as well to supplant the greatest strength, as to meet with subterfuge and delay, that of it felt it subdueth all opposition, and needeth no other help for achieving of victory, as may appear by the sequel of this summers action. And herein let us further observe the particular care which *Cæsar* had of his souldiers, adjudging the whole army to be interested in every private mans safety. A matter strange in these times, and of small consequence in the judgement of our commanders, to whom particular fortunes are esteemed necessities, and men in severall of no value; forasmuch as conquests are made with multitudes. Concerning which point, I grant it to be as true, as it is often spoken in places besieged, that the losse of one man is not the losse of a town; nor the defeating of twenty the overthrow of a thousand: and yet it cannot be denied but the lesser is payd for the lawrell wreath, the more precious is the victory: and it sitteth then at a hard rate, when it maketh the buyer bankrupt, or enforceeth him to conteste that such another victory would overthrow him. And therefore he that will buy much honour with little blood, must endeavour by diligent and careful labour to provide for the particular safety of his souldiers. Wherein albeit he cannot value an unity at an equal rate with a number; yet he must consider that without a unity there can be no multitude: and not so only, but the life and strength of a multitude consisteth in unities; for otherwise, neither had *Nero* needed to have witheld the people of *Rome* to have had but one head, that he might have cut it off at a stroke, nor *Sertorius* device had carried any grace, making a lusty fellow fall in plucking off the thin tail of an old lean jades, and a little wearish man leave the stump bare of a great-tailed horse, and that in a short time, by plucking hair by hair.

CHAP. XIII.

The *Sicambri* send out two thousand horse against the *Eburones*, and by fortune they fall upon *Cicero* at *Vatua*.

Cicero.

Here you shall perceive the power that fortune hath, and what changes happen in the carriage of a war. There was (as I have already said) the enemy being scattered and terrified, no troop or band which might give the least cause of fear: the report came to the *Germanus* on the other side of the *Rhenes*, that the *Eburones* were to be sacked, and that all men had liberty to make spoil of them. The *Sicambri* dwelling next to the *Rhenes*, who

formerly received the *Tenchthari* and *Uspites* in their flight, set out two thousand horse, and sent them over the river some thirty miles below that place where *Cæsar* had left the half bridge with a garrison. These horse made directly towards the confines of the *Eburones*, took many prisoners and much cattell, neither bog nor wood hindered their passage, being bred and born in war and theft. They inquire of the prisoners in what part *Cæsar* was, and found him to be gone far off, and thus all the army was departed from thence. But one of the prisoners speaking to them said, Why do yee seek after so poor and so slender a booty, when otherwise you may make your selves most fortunate? in three hours space you may go to *Vatua*, where the *Roman* army hath left all their fortunes; the garrison in that place is no greater then can hardly furnish the walls about, neither dare any man go out of the trenches. The *Germanus* in this hope did hide the pillage which they had already taken, and went directly to *Vatua*, taking him for their guide that gave them first notice thereof.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT were as great a madness to believe that a man were able to give directions to meet with all chances, as to think no foresight can prevent any casualty. For as the soul of man is endued with a power of discourse, whereby it concludeth either according to the certainty of reason, or the learning of experience, bringing these directions as faulty and inconvenient, and approving others as safe and to be followed: so we are to understand, that this power of discourse is limited to a certain measure or proportion of strength, and inscribed in a circle of lesser capacity then the compass of possibility, or the large extension of what may happen; for otherwise the course of destiny were subject to our contrivance, and our knowledge were equal to universall entities, whereas the infinite of accidents do far exceed the reach of our shallow senses, and our greatest apprehension is a small and unperfect experience. And therefore as such as through the occasion of publick employment, are driven to forsake the shore of minute and particular courses, and to float in the Ocean of casualties and adventures, may doubtlesse receive strong directions, both from the loadstone of reason, and tramontane of experience, to shape an easy and successful course: to notwithstanding they shall find themselves subject to the contrariety of winds and extremity of tempests, besides many other lets and impediments beyond the compass of their direction to interrupt their course and divert them from their haven, which made the *Carthaginian* that was more

Lib. VI.

Commentaries.

Hannibal.

more happy in conquering then in keeping to cry out; *Nusquam minus quam in bello eveniunt verum respondent*, the event of things doth no where answer expectation lesse then in war, as it happened in this accident.

CHAP. XV.

The *Sicambri* come to *Vatua*, and offer to take the camp.

Cæsar.

Cicero having all the dayes before observed *Cæsars* direction with great diligence, and kept the souldiers within the camp, not suffering so much as a boy to go out of the trenches; the seventh day distrusting of *Cæsars* return according to his promises, for that he understood he was gone further into the country, and heard nothing of his return; and withall being moved with the speeches of the souldiers, who termed their patient abiding within their trenches, a siege, forasmuch as no man was suffered to go out of them, and expecting no such chance within the compass of three miles: which was the furthest; he purposed to send them for corn: especially considering that nine legions were abroad, besides great forces of horse, the enemy being already dispersed and almost extinguished. Accordingly he sent five cohorts to gather corn in the next fields, which were separated from the garrison only with a little hill lying between the camp and the corn. There were many left in the camp of the other legions that were sick, of whom such as were recovered to the number of three hundred, were sent with them all under one ensign: besides a great company of souldiers boyes, and great store of cattell which they had in the camp. In the mean time came these *German* Ritters, and with the same gallop as they came thither, they sought to enter in at the *Decumane* gate; neither were they discovered by reason of a wood which kept them out of sight, untill they were almost at the trenches; inasmuch as such trades-men and merchants as kept their booths and shops under the rampiers, had no time to be received into the camp. Our men were much troubled at the unexpectedness of the thing; and the cohort that kept watch did hardly sustain the first assault. The enemy was quickly spread about the works, to see if they could find entrance in any other part. Our men did hardly keep the gates: the rest was defended by the fortification and the place itself. The whole camp was in a great fear, and one inquired of another the reason of the tumult: neither could they tell which way to carry their ensign, or how any man should dispose of himself. One gave out that the

camp was taken; and another that the army and General was overthrown, and that the *Barbarous* people came thither as conquerors: many took occasion from the place to imagine new and superstitious Religions, recalling to mind the fallall calamity of *Cotta* and *Turcius* that died in that place. Through this fear and confusion that had possessed the whole camp, the *Germanus* were confirmed in their opinion which they had received from the prisoners, that there was no garrison at all in the works. They endeavoured to break in, and encouraged one another not to suffer so great a fortune to escape them. *Publius Sextius Baculus*, that had been *Primipilus* under *Cæsar* (of whom mention hath been made in the former battels) was there left sick, and had taken no sustenance of five dayes before. He hearing the danger they were in, went unarmed out of his cabin, and seeing the enemy ready to force the gates, and the matter to be in great hazards taking arms from one that stood next him, he went and stood in the port. The Centurions of the Cohort that kept watch followed him, and they for a while engaged the enemy. *Sextius* having received many great wounds, fainted at length, and was hardly saved by those that stood next him. Upon this respite the rest did so far assure themselves, that they durst stand upon the works, and make a shew of defence.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN the former observation I disputed the interest which the whole army hath in one particular man, which out of *Cæsars* opinion I concluded to be such as was not to be neglected: but if we suppose a party extraordinary, and tie him to such singular worth as was in *Sextius*, I then doubt by this example, whether I may not equall him to the multitude, or put him alone in the ballance to counterpoise the rest of his fellows. For doubtlesse if his valour had not exceeded any height of courage, elsewhere then to be found within those walls the whole garrison had been utterly slaughtered; and the place had been made fatal to the *Romans* by two disastrous calamities. In consideration whereof I will refer my self to the judgement of the wise, how much it importeth a great Commander, not only in honour as a rewarder of vertue, but in wisdom and good discretion, to make much of so gallant a spirit, and to give that respect unto him, as may both witness his valiant carriage, and the thankfull acceptance thereof on the behalf of the Commonweal, wherein we need not doubt of *Cæsars* requestall to this *Sextius*, having by divers honourable relations in these wars, touching his valiantnesse and prowess in

Observations upon Cæsars

arms, made him partaker of his own glory, and recommended him to posterity for an example of true valour.

CHAP. XVI.

The Sicambri continue their purpose in taking the camp.

IN the mean time the souldiers, having made an end of reaping and gathering corn, heard the cry, *Libri* horsemen hastened before, and found in what danger the matter stood. There was in that place no fortifications to receive the affrighted souldiers: such as were lately inrolled and had no experience in matters of war, set their faces towards the Tribunes of the souldiers, and to the Centurions, and expected directions from them. There was none so assured or valiant, but were troubled thereat. The barbarous people having spied the ensignes afar off, lest off their assault: and first they thought it had been the legions that had returned, which the prisoners had told them to be gone a great way off; afterward contemning the smallness of their number, they set upon them on all sides. The souldiers boyes betook themselves unto the next hill, and being quickly put from thence, they cast themselves headlong amongst the Maniples and ensignes, and so put the souldiers in a worse fear than they were before. Some were of opinion to put themselves into the form of battell which resembleth a wedge, and so (forasmuch as the camp was at hand) to break speedily through the enemy: in which course if any part should be circumvented and cut a piece, yet they hoped the rest might save themselves. Others thought it better to make good the hill, and all of them to attend one and the same fortune. This advice the old souldiers did not like of, who (as I said before) went out with the others that were sent a harvesting all under one ensign by themselves: and therefore encouraging one another, Caius Trebonius a Roman horseman being their captain, and commanding them at that time, brake through the thickest of the enemy, and came all safe into the camp. The boyes and horsemen following hard after them, were likewise saved by the valour of the souldiers. But those that took the hill, having never had any use of service, had neither the courage to continue in that resolution which they had before chosen to defend themselves from that place of advantage, nor to imitate that force and speed which they had seen to have helped their fellows; but endeavouring to be received into the camp, fell into places of disadvantage: where indeed some of their Centurions, who had lately been taken from the lowest companies of other

legions, and for their valours sake preferred to the highest and chiefest companies of this legion, least they should lose the honour which they had before gotten fighting valiantly died in the place. Part of the souldiers by the provokes of these men that had removed the enemy, beyond all hope, got safe into the camp; the rest were defeated and slain by the Germans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THIS circumstance doth afford us two observable points. The one, how much an old experienced souldier, hath the use and knowledge of service, exceedeth the rawness of such as are newly inrolled. The second, which dependeth upon the former, that valour and military virtue is a consequent of use and practise, rather than any inherent gift of nature. Camillus being sent with an army against the Thuscans, the Roman souldier was much affrighted at the greatness of the host which the enemy had put on foot: which Camillus perceiving, he used no other motives of persuasion to strengthen their weakened minds, and to assure them of a happy day, but this; *Quod quisque dicit aut consuevit, faciat*. Let every man do that which he hath been taught, and used to; as well knowing where to rouse their valours, and in what part their greatest strength rested. For as men cannot prevail in that wherein they are unexperienced, but will be wanting in the supplies of their own particular, and miscarry even under the directions of another Annibal: so a known and beaten track is quickly taken, and the difficulties of a business are made easy by acquaintance. Use maketh Masteries, teach our English Proverb, and Practice and Art do far exceed Nature. Which continuall exercise and use of arms amongst the Romans attained to such perfection, as made *militum sine rectore stabilem virtutem*, the valour of the souldier firm without their Commander: as Livie witnesseth: And as Antiochus confessed to Scipio; *Quod si vincuntur, non minus animis tamen*, though they were overcome, yet their courage abated not. Cæsar in all his battels had a special respect to the inexperience of the new inrolled bands, placing them either behind the army for a guard to their carriages, as he did in the Helvetian action, or leaving them as a defence to the camp, or shewing them aloof off; signifying thereby, as Livie saith of the Sidicini; *Quod magis nomen quam vires ad præsidium adferrebant*, that they made more noise of an army, than they did good. Whereby it consequently followeth, that military virtue proceedeth not so much from nature, or any original habit, as it doth from exercise and practise of arms. I grant there is a disposition in nature, and a particular inclination to this or that

Art;

Lib. VI.

Commentaries.

Art; according to that line of the Poet; *Fortes creantur fortibus & bonis*.

Stout men are got by stout and good.

But this disposition must be perfected by use, and falsest sort of valour or military virtue, which consisteth of two parts. The first, in knowledge of the discipline of warre, and the rules of service: whereby they may understand the course of things, and be able to judge of particular resolutions. The second is the faithfull endeavour in executing such projects, as the rules of warre do propound for their safety. Both which parts are gotten onely by use. For as the knowledge of Military discipline is best learned by practise; so the often repetition thereof begetteth assurance in action, which is nothing else but that which we call Valour. In which two parts these new enrolled bands had small understanding; for they were as ignorant what course to take in that extremity, as they were unassured in their warre resolutions.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

A Cuneus described.

THIS Cuneus, or troupe of souldiers disposed into a Triangle, was the best and safest way to break through an enemy. For an Angle hath a renting and dividing property, and is so sharp in the meeting of the two side lines, that the point thereof resembleth indivisibility, and therefore is apt and proper to divide and sunder, and to make a separation of any quantity. Which form Nature hath also observed in the fashion of such creatures as have a piercing and dividing motion; as in Fishes, that have all heads for the most part sharp, and thence Angle-wise are enlarged into the grossness of their body. And Birds likewise, the better to divide the aire, have sharp bills and little heads, with a body annexed of a larger proportion. The manner of the Romans was (as I have already shewed) to strengthen the piercing Angle with thick compacted targets; and then enlarging the sides as occasion served, either to the quantity of an acute, or a right, or an obtuse Angle, they gave the charge in such sort, *ut quæcunque parte percuteremur, suo vellemus sustineri nequeant*; that where-soever they fell on, they were not long to be endured, as Livie saith.

CHAP. XVII.

The Sicambri give over their purpose and depart.

Cæsar.

THE Germans being out of hope of taking the Camp, forasmuch as they saw our men to stand upon the works, they returned over the Rhene with the booty which they had in the woods. And such was the fear of the Roman souldiers, even after the enemy was gone, that Caius Volusenus being sent that

night to the camp with the horsemen, they would not believe that Cæsar and the army were returned in safety. Fear had so possessed their minds, that they did not let to say, that all the legions were overthrow, and the horse had escaped by flight, and desired there to be received: for they could not be persuaded the army being safe, that the Germans would have attempted to surprise their camp. Of which fear they were delivered by Cæsar's arrivall. He being returned, not ignorant of the events of war, complained of one thing onely, that the cohorts that kept the watch were sent from their Stations, forasmuch as no place ought to be given to the least casualtie. And there he saw how much Fortune was able to do by the sudden coming of the enemy, and how much more in that he was put off from the rampier and the gates which he had so nearly taken. But of all the rest this seemed the strangest, that the Germans coming over the Rhene, to depopulate and spoil Ambiorix and his countrey, had like to have taken the Roman camp, which would have been as acceptable to Ambiorix as any thing that could happen.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT is an old saying, avouched by Plutarch, *Fortuna id unum hominibus non aufert, quod bene fuerit consultum*. What a man hath once well advised, that and onely that fortune can never despoile him of: which Tiberius the Roman Emperour well understood; of whom Suetonius reporteth, *Quod minimum fortune, casibusque permittebat*. That he trusted very little to fortune or casualties: and is the same which Cæsar countelleth in this place, *Ne minimo quidem casui locum relinqui debuisset*. That no place is to be given to the least casualty. It were a hard condition to expose a naked party to the malice of an enemy, or to disadvantage him with the loss of his fight. An army without a guard at any time is merely naked, and more subject to slaughter, then those that never took arms: and the rather where the watch is wanting, for there sudden chances can hardly be prevented: and if they happen to avoid any such unexpected casualties, they have greater cause to thank Fortune for her favour, then to be angry with her for her malice; for prevention at such times is out of the way, and they are wholly at her mercy; as Cæsar hath rightly delivered touching this accident. And therefore, whether an army march forward or continue in a place, sleep or wakes, play or work, go in hazards, or rest secure, let not so great a body be at any time without a competent strength, to answer the spite of such misadventures.

CHAP.

Nothing ought to be left to the hazard of fortune.

Observations upon *Cæsar*

CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar returneth to spoil the enemy: and punisheth *Acco*.

Cæsar.

Cæsar returning again to trouble and vex the enemy, having called a great number of people from the bordering cities, he sent them out into all parts. All the villages and houses which were any where to be seen, were burned to the ground; pillage and booty was taken in every place; the corn was not onely consumed by so great a multitude of men and cattell, but beaten down also by the unseasonableness of the year and continuall rain: insomuch that albeit divers did hide themselves for the present, yet the army being withdrawn, they must necessarily perish through want and scarcity. And oftentimes they happened of the place (the horsemen being divided into many quarters,) where they did not onely see *Ambiorix*, but kept him for the most part in sight: and in hoping still to take him, some that thought to demerit *Cæsar*'s highest favour, took such infinite pains, as were almost beyond the power of nature: and ever there seemed but a little between them and the thing they most desired. But he conveyed himself away through dens and woods and dales, and in the night time sought other countreys and quarters, with no greater a guard of horse then four, to whom only he durst commit the safety of his life. The countrey being in this manner harried and depopulated, *Cæsar*, with the loss of two Cohorts, brought back his army to *Durocortorum* in the State of the men of *Rhemes*; where a Parliament being summoned, he determined to call in question the conspiracy of the *Senones*

and *Carnutes*, and especially *Acco* the principall Author of that Concell: who being condemned, was put to death more *majorum*. Some others fearing the like judgement, saved themselves by flight: these he interdicted fire and water. So leaving two legions to winter in the confines of the *Treviri*, and two other amongst the *Langones*, and the other six at *Agendicum* in the borders of the *Senones*, having made provision of corn for the Army, he went into Italy, ad conventus *agendos*.

OBSERVATIONS.

THe conclusion of this Sommers work was shut up with the sack and depopulation of the *Eburones*, as the extremity of hostile fury, when the enemy lieth in the fastness of the countrey, and refuseth to make open warre. That being done, *Cæsar* proceeded in a course of civill judgement with such principall offenders as were of the conspiracy: and namely with *Acco*, whom he punished in such manner as the old *Romans* were accustomed to do with such offenders as had forfeited their loyalty to their countrey; a kind of death which *Nero* knew not, although he had been Emperor of *Rome* thirteen years, and put to death many thousand people. The party condemned was to have his neck locked in a fork, and to be whipped naked to death: and he that was put to death after that manner, was punished more *majorum*. Such others as feared to undergo the judgement, and fled before they came to triall, were banished out of the countrey, and made incapable of the benefit of fire and water in that Empire.

And thus endeth the sixth Commentary.

The

The seventh Commentarie, of the warres in
GALLIA.

The Argument.

THis last Commentarie containeth the specialities of the war which *Cæsar* made against all the States of *Gallia* united into one confederacy, for the expelling of the *Roman* government out of that Continent, whom *Cæsar* overthrew in the end, *Horribili vigilantia*, & *prodigiosis operibus*, by his horrible vigilancy and prodigious actions.

CHAP. I.

The *Gallies* enter into new deliberations of revolt.

Cæsar.

Gallia being in quiet, *Cæsar*, according to his determination, went into Italy to keep Courts and Sessions. There he understood that *P. Clodius* was slain, and of a Decree which the Senate had made, touching the assembly of all the youth of Italy: and thereupon he purposed to invole new bands throughout the whole Province. These newes were quickly carried over the Alpes into *Gallia*, & the *Gallies* themselves added such rumours to it, as the matter seemed well to to bear; that *Cæsar* was now detained by the troubles at *Rome*, and in such dissensions could not return to his army. Being stirred up by this occasions, such as before were inwardly grieved, that they were subject to the Empire of the people of *Rome*, did now more freely and boldly enter into the consideration of warre. The Princes and chiefe men of *Gallia* having appointed councils and meetings in remote and woody places, complained of the death of *Acco*, and shewed it to be a fortune which might concern themselves. They pity the common misery of *Gallia*, and do propound all manner of promises and rewards to such as will begin the warre, and with the danger of their lives redeem the liberty of their countrey: wherein they are to be very careful not to foreflow any time, to the end that *Cæsar* may be stoppt from coming to his army before their secret conferences be discovered. Which might easily be done, forasmuch as neither the Legions durst go out of their wintering camps in the absence of their Generall, nor the Generall come to the Legions without a convoy. To conclude, they held it better to die in fight, then to lose their ancient honour in matter of war, and the liberty left them by their predecessors.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis Chapter discovereth such sparkles of revolt, rising from the discontentment of the conquered *Gallies*, as were like to break out into an universall burning; and within a while proved such a fire, as the like hath not been seen in the continent of *Gallia*. For this sommers work verified the saying of the *Samnites*, *Quod* Liv. lib. 3. *pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum esset*, That peace is more grievous to those that are in vassalage, then warre is to free men: and was carried on either part with such a resolution, as in respect of this service, neither the *Gallies* did before that time ingage themselves seriously in their countries cause, nor did the *Romans* know the difficulty of their task. But as *Epaminondas* called the fields of *Bœotia*, *Mars* Plutarch in the life of Marcellus. his scaffold where he kept his games; or as *Xenophon* nameth the city of *Ephesus* the Armours shop: so might *Gallia* for this year be called the Theatre of war. The chiefeft encouragement of the *Gallies* at this time, was the trouble and dissension at *Rome* about the death of *Clodius*, and the accusation of *Milo* for killing *Clodius*.

This *Clodius* (as *Plutarch* reporteth) was a young man of a noble house, but wild and insolent, and much condemned for profaning a secret sacrifice, which the Ladies of *Rome* did celebrate in *Cæsar*'s house, by coming amongst them disguised in the habit of a young finging wench, which he did for the love of *Pompeia*, *Cæsar*'s wife: whereof being openly accused, he was quitted by secret means (which he made to the Judges; and afterwards obtained the Tribuneship of the people, and caused *Cicero* to be banished, and did many outrages and insolencies in his Tribuneship: which caused *Milo* to kill him, for which he was also accused. And the Senate fearing that this accusation of *Milo*, being

being a bold-spirited man and of good quality, would move some uproar or sedition in the city, they gave commission to Pompey to see justice executed, as well in this cause, as for other offences, that the city might be quiet, and the commonwealth suffer no detriment. Whereupon Pompey possessed the market-place, where the cause was to be heard with bands of soldiers and troops of armed men. And these were the troubles in Rome upon the death of *Clodius*, which the *Gallies* did take as an occasion of revolt, hoping thereby that *Cæsar* (being in *Gallia Cisalpine*, which province was allotted to his governments as well as that *Gallia Northward the Alps*) would have been detained from his army.

CHAP. II.

The men of *Chartres* take upon them the beginning of a revolt, under the conduct of *Cotnatius* and *Coatodunus*.

Cæsar.

THese things being thus disputed, the men of *Chartres* did make themselves the chief of that war, refusing no danger for the common safety of their country. And forasmuch as at that present they could not give caution by hostages, lest the matter should be discovered; they desire to have their covenants strengthened by oaths, and by mutual collation of their military ensignes, which was the most religious ceremony they could use to bind the rest not to forsake them, having made an entrance and beginning to that war. The men of *Chartres* being commended by the rest, and the oaths of all them that were present being taken, and a time appointed to begin, they brake up the assembly. When the day came, they of *Chartres* under the conduct of *Cotnatius* and *Coatodunus*, two desperate fellows, upon a watchword given, ran speedily to *Genabum*; and such Roman citizens as were there upon business, namely *C. Fulius Cotta*, a knight of Rome, whom *Cæsar* had left overseer of the provision of corn, they slew and took their goods. The report thereof was quickly spread over all the *States* of *Gallia*. For when any such great or extraordinary matter happeneth, they signify it through the country by an out-cry and shout, which is taken by others, and delivered to the next, and so goeth from hand to hand, as it happened at this time: for that which was done at *Genabum* at Sun-rising, was before the first watch of the night was ended heard in the confines of the *Arverni*, which is above a hundred and threescore miles distant.

OBSERVATIONS.

This manner of out-cry here mentioned to be usual in *Gallia* was the same which re-

maineth in use at this present in *Wales*, although not so frequent as in former times. For the custome is there, as often as any robbery happeneth to be committed, or any man to be slain, or what other outrage or riot is done, the next at hand do go to some eminent place where they may be best heard, and there they make an out-cry or howling, which they call a *Hooboub*, signifying the fact to the next inhabitants, who take it as passionately, and deliver it further, and so from hand to hand it quickly spreadeth over all the country. It is a very ready way to put the country in arms, and was first devised (as it seemeth) for the *Itay* and apprehension of robbers and outlaws, who kept in strong holds, and lived upon the spoil of the bordering inhabitants: but otherwise it savoureth of Barbarisme, rather than of any civile government.

CHAP. III.

Vercingetorix stirreth up the *Arverni* to the like commotion and revolt.

LIke manner *Vercingetorix* the son of *Cetillus*, of the nation of the *Arverni*, a young man of great power and authority, (whose father was the Commander of all *Gallia*, and because he sought a kingdom, was slain by those of his own *States*) calling together his followers and clients, did easily incense them to rebellion. His purpose being known, every man took arms; and so he was driven out of the town of *Gerogvia* by *Gobanitus* his uncle & other Princes, who thought it not safe to make trial of that fortune. And yet he desisted not, but enrolled needy and desperate people; and with such troops, whomsoever he met withall of the *States*, he did easily draw them to his party, persuading them to take arms for the defence of common liberty. And having at length got great forces together, he expelled his adversaries out of the towns by whom he was himself before thrust out. He was called by his men by the title of King, and sent Embassages into all parts, advising them to continue constant and faithful. The *Senones*, the *Parisii*, the *Pictones*, the *Cadurci*, the *Turones*, the *Aulerci*, the *Lemovici*, the *Andes*, and all the rest that border upon the Ocean were quickly made of his party: and by all their consents the chief command was conferred upon him. Which authority being offered him, he commanded hostages to be brought in unto him from all those *States*, and a certain number of soldiers to be sent him with all speed. He ruled every city what proportion of arms they should have ready, and specially he laboured to raise great store of horse. To extraordinary diligence he added extraordinary severity, compelling

such as stood doubtful by hard and severe punishment: for such as had committed a great offence, he put to death by fire and torture; lesser faults he punished with the loss of their nose or their ears, and so sent them home, that by their example others might be terrified. By these practices and severity having speedily raised a great army, he sent *Lucernus* of *Cahors*, a man of great spirit and boldness, with part of the forces, towards the *Bituriges*. Upon his coming the *Bituriges* sent to the *Hedui*, in whose protection they were, to require aid against *Vercingetorix*. The *Hedui*, by the advice of the Legates which *Cæsar* had left with the army, sent forces of horse and foot to the aid of the *Bituriges*: who coming to the river *Loire*, which divideth the *Bituriges* from the *Hedui*, after a few dayes stay, not daring to passe over the river, returned home again, bringing word to our Legates, that they durst not commit themselves to the *Bituriges*, and so returned. For they knew that if they had passed over the river, the *Bituriges* had incited them in on the one side, and the *Arverni* on the other. But whether they did return upon that occasion, or through perfidious treachery, it remaineth doubtful. The *Bituriges* upon their departure did presently join themselves with the *Arverni*.

OBSERVATIONS.

There ought to be a proportion of quality between a Commander and his soldiers. Mult. Mistr. ant. Such a matter, such a servant.

It is observed by such as are acquainted with matter of Government, that there ought to be alwayes a proportion of quality between him that commandeth and them that obey: for if a man of *Sardanapalus* condition should take upon him the charge of *Marius* army, it were like to take no better effect, then if *Manlius* had the leading of lascivious *Cinades*. And as we may observe in unconcomely policy, a dissonant matter may as soon command hair to grow on the palm of his hands, as to make a virtuous servant; but the respect of duty between such relatives doth likewise inferre the like respect of quality: so in all sorts and conditions of commands, there must be sympathizing means, to unite the diversity of the parts in the happy end of perfect Government. In this new Empire which befell *Vercingetorix*, we may observe a double proportion between him and his people. The first, of strength and ability; and the other, of quality and resemblance of affection: upon the assurance of which proportion he grounded the austeritie of his command. For it appeareth that his first beginning was by perswasion and intreaty, and would indure no direction, but that which was guided by a loose and easy reime; hold-

ing it neither safe nor seemly, but rather a strain of extreme madness, first to punish or threaten, and then to want power to make good his judgements: but being strengthened by authority from themselves, and backed with an army able to controll their disobedience, he then added punishment as the ensign of Magistracy, and confirmed his power by rigorous commands; which is as necessary a demonstration of a well-settled government, as any circumstance belonging thereunto.

Touching the resemblance and proportion of their qualities, it is manifestly shewed by the sequel of this history, that every man desired to redeem the common liberty of their country, in that measure of endeavour as was fitting to great a cause. Amongst whom *Vercingetorix* being their chief Commander, summe diligentia (as the story saith) added summam severitatem, to great diligence great severity; as well assured, that the greater part would approve his justice, and condemn the uncertainty of doubtful resolutions, desiring no further service at their hands, then that wherein himself would be the formost. In imitation of *Valerius Corvinus*: *Fatima mea, non dila, vos milites sequi volo; nec disciplinam modo, sed exemplum etiam à me petere*; I would have you O my Soldiers, do as I do, and not to much mind what I say; and to take not your discipline only, but your pattern also from me. And therefore the party was like to be well upheld; forasmuch as both the Prince and the people were so far engaged in the matter intended, as by the resemblance of an earnest desire might answer the measure of due proportion.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar cometh into *Gallia*, and by a device getteth to his army.

THese things being told *Cæsar* in Italy; as soon as he understood that the matters in the city were by the wisdom of Pompey brought into better state, he took his journey into *Gallia*, and being come thither he was much troubled how to get to his army. For if he should send for the Legions into the Province, he understood that they should be certainly fought withall by the way in his absence. If he himself should go unto them, he doubted how he might safely commit his person to any, although they were such as were yet in peace. In the mean time *Lucernus* of *Cahors* being sent against the *Rutheni*, did easily unite that State to the *Arverni*; and proceeding further against the *Nitiobriges* and the *Gabali*, he received hostages of both of them, and having raised a great power, he laboured

to break into the Province, and to make towards Narbo, which being known, Cæsar resolved by all means to put him by that purpose, and went himself to Narbo. At his coming he encouraged such as stood doubtful or timorous, and placed garrisons amongst the Ruteni, the Volci, and about Narbo, which were frontier places and near unto the enemy, and commanded part of the forces which were in the Province, together with those supplies which he had brought out of Italy, to go against the Helvii, which are adjoining upon the Arverni. Things being thus ordered, Lucetius being now suppressed and removed holding it to be dangerous to enter among the garrisons, he himself went towards the Helvii. And albeit the hill Gebenna, which divideth the Arverni from the Helvii, by reason of the hard time of winter and the depth of the snow, did hinder their passage; yet by the industry of the souldier making way through snow of six foot deep, they came into the confines of the Arverni: who being suddenly and unawares suppressed, little mistrusting an invasion over the hill Gebenna, which incloseth them in as a wall, and at that time of the year doth not afford a path to a single man alone, he commanded the horsemen to scatter themselves far and near to make the enemy the more afraid. These things being speedily carried to Vercingetorix, all the Arverni full of fear and amazement flockt about him, beseeching him to have a care of their State, and not to suffer themselves to be sacked by the enemy, especially now at this time when as all the war was transferred upon them. Upon their instant intreaty he removed his camp out of the territories of the Bituriges, and marched towards the country of the Arverni. But Cæsar having continued two dayes in those places, forasmuch as he understood both by use and opinion, what course Vercingetorix was like to take; he left the army, pretending some supplies of horse, which he went to raise, and appointed young Brutus to command those forces, admonishing him to send out the horsemen into all quarters, and that he himself would not be absent from the camp above three dayes. These things being thus settled, some of his followers knowing his determination, by great journeys he came to Vienna; where taking fresh horse, which he had layd there many dayes before, he ceased neither night nor day, untill he came through the confines of the Hedui to the Lingones, where two legions wintered; to the end if the Hedui should undertake any thing against him, he might with speed prevent it. Being there, he sent to the rest of the Legions, and brought them all to one place, before the Arverni could possibly have notice of it.

OBSERVATIONS.

Cæsar upon his first entrance into Gallia, was perplexed how to get to his army: and the matter stood in such terms, as brought either the legions or his own person into hazard. For (as he saith) if he should send for the legions to come unto him, they should doubtlesse be fought withall by the way, which he was loath to adventure, unlessse himself had been present: or otherwise if he himself had gone unto them, he doubted of the entertainment of the revolting Galles, and might have overthrowen his army, by the losse of his own person. In this extremity of choice, he resolved upon his own passage to the army, as lesse dangerous and more honourable, rather then to call the legions out of their wintering camps, where they stood as a check to bridle the intolency of the mutinous Galles, and so to bring them to the hazard of battel in fetching their Generall into the field: whereby he might have lost the victory before he had begun the wars. And for his better safety in this passage, he used this cunning. Having assured the Roman Province by strong and frequent garrisons on the frontiers, and removed Lucetius from those parts; gathering together such supplies as he had brought with him out of Italy, with other forces which he found in the Province, he went speedily into the territories of the Arverni, making a way over the hill Gebenna, at such a time of the year as made it unpassable for any forces, had they not been led by Cæsar; only for this purpose, to have it noised abroad, that whereas Vercingetorix and the Arverni had principally undertook the quarrell against the Romans, and made the beginning of a new war, Cæsar would first deal with them, and lay the weight thereof upon their shoulders, by calling their fortunes first in questions, to the end he might possesse the world with an opinion of his presence in that country, and draw Vercingetorix back again to defend his state, whilst he in the mean time did slip to his army without suspicion or fear of perill: for slaying there no longer then might serve to give a sufficient colour to that pretence, and leaving those forces to execute the rest, and to make good the secret of the project, he conveyed himself to his army with such speed and celerity, as doth verify the saying of Suetonius; quod per sepe nuncios de se prevent, that he often outwent the ordinary messengers.

These blinds and false intendments are of speciall use in matter of war, and serve as well to get advantages upon an enemy, as to clear a difficulty by cleanly evasion: neither is a Commander the lesse valued for fine conveyance in military projects, but deserveth rather greater honour

To abuse an enemy by way of stratagemme, commendable in a Commander.

* Avergne, * Li. moit. * Li. moit. de Geneve.

Vici Cæsar.

honour for adding art unto valour, and supplanting the strength of opposition with the sleight of wit.

—*Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit?*
Who looks at fraud or valour in a foe? hath always been held a principle amongst men of warre. And Lysander his counsell is the same in effect, that where the Lions skin will not serve the turn, there take the Foxes. Carbo spake it to the commendation of Sylla, that he had to do both with a Lion and a Fox, but he feared more his Foxes pate then his Lions skin. It is reported that Anniball excelled all other of his time for abusing the enemy in matter of stratagemme, for he never made fight but with an addition of assistants, supporting force with art, and the fury of armes with the subtiltie of wit.

Of late time amongst other practises of this nature, the treaty at Ostend is most memorable, entertained onely to gain time: that while speech of parlee was continued, and pledges delivered to the Archduke Albertus, for the safety of such as were sent into the town to capitulate with the Generall, there might be time gained for the sending in of such supplies of men and munition as were wanting, to make good the defence thereof: which were no sooner taken in, but the Treaty proved a stratagemme of warre.

In these foiles and tricks of wit, which at all times and in all ages have been highly esteemed in men of warre, as speciall vertues befeeming the condition of a great Commander, if it be demanded how far a Generall may proceed in abusing an enemy by deeds or words; I cannot speak distinctly to the question: but sure I am, that Surenas, Lieutenant generall of the Partisan army, did his master good service, in abusing Crassus the Roman Generall by fair promises; or as Plutarch saith, by foul perjury, till in the end he brought his head to be an actor in a Tragedy: albeit Surenas never deserved well of good report since that time. Howsoever, men of civill society ought not to draw this into use from the example of souldiers, forasmuch as it is a part of the profession of cutting of throats, and hath no prescription but in extremities of warre.

CHAP. V.

Vercingetorix besieged Gergovia, Cæsar taketh in Vellaunodunum and Genabum.

Cæsar.



His being known, Vercingetorix brought back his army again into the countrey of the Bituriges, and thence marched to besiege Gergovia, a town held by the Boii, whom Cæsar had left there after the Helvetian warre, and given the jurisdiction of the

town to the Hedui, which brought Cæsar into great perplexities, whether he should keep the Legions in one place for that time of winter which remained, and so suffer the stipendiaries of the Hedui to be taken and spoiled, whereby all Gallia might take occasion to revolt, forasmuch as the Romans should seem to afford no protection or countenance to their friends; or otherwise draw his army out of their wintering-camps sooner then was usual, and thereby become subject to the difficulties of provision and carriage of corn. Notwithstanding it seemed better, and so he resolved, rather to undergo all difficulties, then by taking such a scorn to loose the good wits of all his followers. And therefore perswading the Hedui diligently to make supply of necessary provisions, he sent to the Boii, to advertise them of his coming, to encourage them to continue loyal, and nobly to resist the assaults of the enemy: and leaving two Legions with the carriages of the whole army at Agendicum, he marched towards the Boii. The next day coming to a Town of the Senones called Vellaunodunum, he determined to take it in, to the end he might leave no enemy behind him, which might hinder a speedy supply of victuals: and in two dayes he inclosed it about with a ditch and a rampier. The third day some being sent out touching the giving up of the town, he commanded all their arms and their cattell to be brought out, and six hundred pledges to be delivered. Leaving C. Trebonius a Legate to see it performed, he himself made all speed towards Genabum in the territories of the men of Chartres; who as soon as they heard of the taking in of Vellaunodunum, perswading themselves the matter would not rest so, they resolved to put a strong garrison into Genabum. Thither came Cæsar within two dayes, and incamping himself before the Town, the evening drawing on, he put off the assault unto the next day, commanding the souldiers to prepare in a readinesse such things as should be necessary for that service. And forasmuch as the town of Genabum had a bridge leading over the river Loire, he feared least they of the town would steal away in the night: for prevention whereof he commanded two Legions to watch all night in arms. The townsmen a little before midnight went out quietly, and began to pass over the river. Which being discovered by the Scouts, Cæsar with the Legions which he had ready in armes, burnt the gates, and entering the Town took it; the greatest number of the enemy being taken, and a very few escaping, by reason of the narrowness of the bridge and the way which shut in the multitude. The town being sacked and burned, and given for a booty to the souldiers, he carried his army over the river Loire, into the territories of the Bituriges.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is a known and an approved saying, *Malis minimum est eligendum*, of evils the least is to be chosen: but in a prevention of evils to be able to discern the difference, and to chuse the least, *Hic labor, hoc opus*, here's all the skill and work. *Vercingetorix* besieging *Gergovia* (a stipendary town belonging to the *Helui*, that of long time had served the *Roman* Empire) at such a time of the year as would not afford provision of victuall for the maintenance of an army, but with great difficulty and inconvenience of carriage and convoy; *Cæsar* was much perplexed, whether he should forbear to succour the town and raise the siege, or undergo the hazard of long and tedious convoys. A matter often falling into dispute, although it be in other terms, whether honesty or honourable respect ought to be preferred before private ease and particular commodity. *Cæsar* hath declared himself touching this point, preferring the honour of the people of *Rome*, as the majesty of their Empire, and the reputation which they desired to hold, touching assistance and protection of their friends, before any inconvenience which might happen to their army. And not without good reasons, which may be drawn as well from the worthiness of the cause, as from the danger of the effect: for duties of virtue and respects of honesty, as the noblest parts of the mind, do not onely challenge the service of the inferior faculties of the soul; but do also command the body and the casualties thereof, in such sort as is fitting the excellency of their prerogative: for otherwise virtue would find but bare attendance, and might leave her scepter for want of lawfull authority. And therefore *Cæsar* chose rather to adventure the army upon the casualties of hard provision, then to blemish the *Roman* name with the infamy of disloyalty. Which was less dangerous also in regard of the effect: for where the bond is of value, there the forfeiture is great: and if that tie had been broken, and their opinion deceived touching the expectation of assistance and help, all *Gallia* might have had just cause of revolts, and disclaimed the *Roman* government for non-protection. To conclude then, let no man deceive himself in the present benefit, which private respect may bring upon the refusal of honest regard, for the end will be a witness of the errors, and prove honesty to be best policie.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT is observed by some writers, that *Cæsar* never undertook any action, or at the least brought it not to trial, but he first assured himself of these four things.

The first was provision of victuals, as the very foundation of warlike expeditions, whereof I have already treated in the first Commentary: the difficulty whereof made him to doubtfull to undertake the relief of *Gergovia*. And doubtless whosoever goeth about any enterprise of warre, without certain means of victuall and provision, must either carry an army of Camellions that may live by the aire, or intend nothing but to build castles in the aire, or otherwise shall be sure to find his enemy either in his bowels, or as the Proverb is in *Plutarch*, to leap on his belly with both his feet.

The second thing was provision of all necessities, which might be of use in that service: wherewith he always so abounded, that there might rather want occasion to use them, then he be wanting to answer occasion. And these were the instruments whereby he made such admirable works, such bridges, such mounts, such trenches, such huge armadoes, as appeared by the sea-fight with the maritime cities of *Gallia*: according to which his former custom, forasmuch as the day was far spent before he came to *Genabum*, he commanded such things to be fitted and had in a readines, as might serve for the siege the next day.

The third thing was an army for the most part of old souldiers, whom the *Romans* called *Veterani*, whereof he was likewise at this time provided; for the two legions which were fresh and lately inrolled, he left at *Agendunum* with the carriages, taking onely the old souldiers for this service, as knowing that in *pugna usum amplius prodesse quam virescuntulnis* is more serviceable in warre then numbers.

The fourth thing was the skill and experience of the enemies forces, which the former victories assured him to be inferior to the *Romans*; it being alwayes a rule in the *Roman* discipline, (as I have already noted,) by light and easie skirmishes, to acquaint the souldiers with the manner of the enemies fight; *Ne eos novum bellum, novus hostis terret*, least a new kinde of fight, or enemy might affright them; as *Livy* saith.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar taketh in *Noviodunum*, and beatech the enemy coming to rescue the Town.



*V*ercingetorix understanding of *Cæsar*'s coming, lest the siege, and went to meet him. *Cæsar* resolved to take a town lying in his way in the territories of the *Bituriges*, called *Noviodunum*. Which they of the town perceiving, sent out unto him to beseech him to spare them, and to give order for their safety. To the end therefore that he might speed this business

business with as much celerity as he had accomplished former services, he commanded them to bring out their arms, their horse, and to deliver pledges. Part of the hostages being given, while the rest were in delivering over, divers Centurions and a few souldiers being admitted into the town, to seek out their weapons and their horses; the horsemen of the enemy, which marched before *Vercingetorix*'s army, were discovered a farre off: which the townsmen had no sooner perceived, and thereby conceived some hope of relief, but they presently took up a shout, and betook themselves to their arms, shut the gates, and began to make good the walls. The Centurions that were in the town perceiving some new resolution of the Gallies, with their swords drawn possessed themselves of the gates, and saved both themselves and their men that were in the town. *Cæsar* commanded the horsemen to be drawn out of the camp, and to begin the charge. And as they began to give ground, he sent four hundred German horsemen to second them, whom he had resolved to keep with him from the first: who charged the enemy with such fury, that the Gallies could no way endure the assault, but were presently put to flight; and many of them being slain, the rest retired back to the army. Upon their overthrow, the townsmen were worse affrighted then they were before; and having apprehended such as were thought to have stirred up the people, they brought them to *Cæsar*, and yielded themselves unto him. Which being ended, *Cæsar* marched towards the town of *Avaricum*, which was the greatest and best fortified of all the towns in the territories of the *Bituriges*, and situate in the most fertile part of the country; for that being taken in, he doubted not to bring the whole State of the *Bituriges* easily into his subjection.

OBSERVATIONS.

Forasmuch as nothing is more changeable then the mind of man, which (notwithstanding the low degree of balencels wherein it often fixeth,) will as occasion giveth way to revenge, readily amount to the height of tyranny, and spare no labour to erie quittance with an enemy: it hath been thought expedient in the wisdom of foregoing ages, to pluck the wings of such means, as may give hope of liberty by mutinie and revolt.

The practice of the *Romans* in taking in any town, was to leave them forceless, that howsoever they might stand affected, their nails should be surely pared for scratching, and their power confined to the circuit of their mind. For as it appeareth by this and many other places of *Cæ-*

sar, no rendry of any town was accepted, until they had delivered all their arms, both offensive and defensive, with such engines and instruments of warre as might any way make for the defence of the same. Neither that onely, but such beasts also, whether Horle or Elephant, or any other whatsoever, as might any way advantage the use of those weapons. Which as it was a great dismay and weakening to the enemy; so was it short of the third condition, commanding the delivery of so many hostages or pledges as were thought convenient, being the prime of their youth, and the flower of their manhood, and were as the marrow to their bones, and the sinewes to that body. Wherby it came to pass, that the remnant was much disabled in strength, concerning their number of fighting men; and such as were left had neither arms nor means to make resistance.

The *Turke* observeth the same course with the *Christians*, but in a more cruell and barbarous manner: for he cometh duly at a certain time, not regarding any former demeanour, and leadech away the flower of their youth, to be invested in impiety and infidelity, and to be made vassalls of heathenish impurity.

Ofentimes we read, that a conquered people were not onely interdicted armes, but the matter also and the art wherby such armes were made and wrought: for where the people are great, and metall and matter plenty, it is a chance if artificers be wanting to repair their loss, and to refurnish their armoury. At the siege of *Carthage* the *Romans* having taken away their armes, they notwithstanding, finding store of metall within the town, caused workmen to make every day a hundred targets and three hundred swords, besides arrows and casting slings, using womens hair for want of hemp, and pulling down their houses for timber to build shipping. Wherby we may perceive, that a Generall cannot be too careful to deprive an enemy of all such helps as may any way strengthen his hand, or make way to resistance.

CHAP. VII.

Vercingetorix perswadeth the Gallies to a new course of warre.



*V*ercingetorix having received so *Cæsar* many losses one in the neck of *Velle* another, *Vellaunodunum*, *Genabum* & *Noviodunum* being taken, he calleth his men to counsell, and telleth them that the war must be carried in another course then it hath been heretofore; for they must endeavour by all means to keep the *Romans* from forrage and convoy of victuall: which would easily be brought to pass, forasmuch as they themselves did abound in horse-

horsemen: and for that time of the year did not yet serve to get forrage in the fields, the enemy must necessarily seek it in houses and barns, whereby the forragers would daily be cut off by their horsemen. Moreover, for their safety and defence they were to neglect their private commoditie: their houses and their villages were to be burnt up round about as far as Boia, wheresoever the Romans might go to fetch their forrage. For themselves they thought it reason that they should make supply of victuall and provisions in whose possessions they were, and for whom they fought. By this means the Rom. would never be able to endure that want as would befall them, or at the least be constrained to fetch their provisions farre off, with great danger and perill to themselves: neither did it make any matter whether they killed them or put them besides their carriages; for without necessary supplies they were never able to hold war. And to conclude, such towns were likewise to be set on fire, as by the strength of the r situation were not safe from danger, lest they should prove receptacles to linger and detain the warre, and serve the Romans for booty and supplies of provision. And albeit these things might seem heave and bitter; yet they ought to esteem it more grievous to have their wives and their children led away into servitudes, and themselves to be slain by the sword of the enemy: which doth necessarily fall upon a conquered people. This opinion was generally approved by the consent of all men, and more then twenty cities of the Bituriges were burnt in one day: the like was done in other States, great fires were to be seen in all parts. And although all men took it very grievously, yet they propounded this comfort unto themselves, that the enemy being by this means defeated, they should quickly recover their losses. Touching Avaricum they disputed it in common counells, whether it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges do prostrate themselves at the feet of all the Gallies, that they might not be forced to set on fire with their own hands, the fairest citie in all Gallia, being both an ornament and a strength to their State; they would easily defend it by the site of the place, being incircled round about with a river and a bog, and being accessible by one narrow passage onely. At length leave being granted them to keep it, Vercingetorix at first dissuading them from it, and afterwards yielding unto it, moved by the inreaty of the Gallies, and the commiseration of the common multitude; and so a fit gar-rison was chosen to defend the town.

OBSERVATIONS.

I Have seen an Impelle with a circle, and a hand with a sharp stile pointing towards the

centre with this motto, *Ille labor, hoc opus*, following a this is a thing of work and labour; signifying thereby, that albeit the Area thereof were plain-ly and distinctly bounded, and the Diameter of no great length, yet it was not an easie matter to find the Centre, which is the heart and chiefe part of that figure. In like manner, there is no business or other course so easie or plain, but the centre may be mistaken, and the difficulty commonly resteth in hitting that point, which giveth the circumference an equall and regular motion.

The Gallies were resolved to undertake the defence of their countrey, and to redeem their liberty with the hazard of their lives: but it seemeth they were mistaken in the means, and ran a course farre short of the centre. For Vercingetorix perceiving the Romans daily to get upon the Gallies, first by taking in one town, secondly another, and lastly of a third, he advised them to set on fire all the countrey houses, villages and towns for a great circuit round about, and to force the Romans to fetch their forrage and provisions farre off, and undergo the difficulties of long convoyes, whereby the Gallies might make use of their multitude of horse, and keep the Romans without supplies of necessary provisions: and so they doubted not but to give a speedy end to that warre. And this he took to be the centre of that business, and the true use of their advantage.

Polybius writeth, that M. Regulus having divers times overthrowen the Carthaginians in battell, one Xanthippus a Lacedemonian, clearly perceiving the cause of their often routs, began openly to say, that the Carthaginians were not overthrowen by the valour of the Romans, but by their own ignorance: for they exceeding the Romans in horse and Elephants, had neglected to fight in the champain, where their Cavalry might shew it self, but in hills and woody places, where the foot troupes were of more force, and so the Romans had the advantage. Whereby the manner of the war being changed, and by the counsell of the pregnant Greek, brought from the hills into the level of the plain, the Carthaginians recovered all their former losses by one absolute victory. In like manner Avaricum finding himself to exceed the Romans in strength of cavalerie, did always endeavour to affront them in open and champain countries; and as often as the Romans durst meet him, he put them to the worke: but Fabius perceiving the disadvantage, kept himself always upon the hills, and in covert and uneven places, and so made the advantage of the place equal the multitude of the enemies horsemen.

There is no greater scorn can touch a man of reputation and place, then to be thought not to understand his own business. For as wisdom is the excellency of humane nature, so doth want of judgement deject men to the condition

Servus a
n. e. i. a.
Polit. 1.

lib. 10.

diction of such as Aristotle calleth servants by nature: whose wit being too weak to support any weight, do recompence that want with the service of their body, and are wholly employed in a Porters occupation. Which Homer layeth upon Diomedes shoulders, with as fine conveyance as he doth the rest of his inventions. For Ulysses and he going out on a partye to do some exploit upon the Trojans, they carried themselves so gallantly, that they fell to share King Rhesus chariot and horses. Ulysses presently seized upon the horses, being of a delicate Thracian breed, and Diomedes seemed well contented with the chariot. But being to carry it away, Pallas advised him to let it alone, lest he might prove his strength to be greater then his wit, and yet not find to much neither as would carry it away.

But for these directions which Vercingetorix gave unto the Gallies, I referre the Reader to the sequels of the History, wherein he shall find how they prevailed.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar besiegeth Avaricum, and is distressed for want of corn.

Cæsar.

Vercingetorix followed Cæsar by small and easy journeyes, and chose a place to incamp in fortified about with bogs and woods, fifteen miles distant from Avaricum: where he understood what was done at Avaricum every hour of the day, and commanded likewise what he would have done. He observed all our foraging and harvestings, and did set upon such as went far off upon any such occasions, and incumbered them with great inconveniences: albeit they took what course they could to meet with it, as to go out at uncertain times, and by unknown and unusuall wayes. Cæsar incamping himself before that part of the town which was not shut in with the river nor the bog, and afforded but a narrow and streight passages, began to make a mount, to drive vines, and to raise two towers: (for the nature of the place would not suffer him to inclose it round about with a ditch and a rampier;) and never rested to admonish the Hedui and the Boii to bring in supplies of corn: of whom the one, by reason of the small cure and pains they took, did little help him; the other, of no great ability, being a small and a weak State, did quickly consume all that they had. The army was distressed for want of corn, by reason of the poverty of the Boii, and the indigence of the Hedui, together with the burning of the houses in the country, in such manner as they wanted corn for many dayes together, and sustained their lives with beasts and cattell which they had seised a great way off: and yet no

one voice at all was heard to come from them, unworthy the majesty of the Roman Empire, and their former victories. And whereas Cæsar did speak unto the legions severally as they were in the works, that if their wants were heavy and bitter unto them, he would leave off the siege; all of them with one voice desired him not to do so, for since they had so served many years under his commands, as they never had received any dishonour, neither had they at any time departed and left the business undone; it would be imputed unto them as an ignominy and disgrace to leave this siege; and that they had rather undergo all difficulties, then not to revenge the death of the citizens of Rome that by treachery were slain at Genabum. The same speeches they delivered to the Centurions and Tribunes, to be told Cæsar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The worth of a Souldier consisteth in a disposition of mind and body, which maketh him apt to suffer and to undergo the difficulties of war. For let his resolution otherwise be never so great, and his courage invincible in the day of battel; yet if he faint under the burthen of such tediousness as usually attendeth upon warlike designments, he is no way fit for any great enterprise. Pindarus saith, that he understandeth not the war, that knoweth not that the achieving of one piece of service, is always accompanied with the sufferance of another difficulty as great as that which was first intended. Et facere, & pati fortia, Romanum est. It was the peculiar commendation of the Roman people, patiently to endure the extremities of warfare: which made the Volsci to cry out, That either they must forswear arms, and forget to make war, and receive the yoke of thraldome and bondage; or it is quibuscum de imperio certetur, nec virtute, nec patientia, nec disciplina rei militaris cedendum; or else they must shew themselves no waies inferior to their antagonists either in valour, or sufferance, or military discipline. Appian forgetteth not to say, that the Roman Empire was raised to such greatness, not by fortune or good lucks, but by mere valour, and patient enduring, of hardnesse and want. Which is the self-same which Crassus in his sorrow uttered to his souldiers, who neither did nor spake many things well: for as Plutarch rightly censureth him out of the Comickall Poet, he was

A good man, any way else but in wars.

The Empire of Rome (saith he) came not to that greatness which it now possesseth by good fortune only, but by patient and constant suffering of trouble and adversity; never yielding or giving place to any danger.

Some

Observations upon Cæsars

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar leaveth the siege, and goeth to take the enemy upon advantage; but returneth again without fighting.

When the towers began to approach near unto the walls, Cæsar understood by the captives, that Vercingetorix having consumed all his provision of forrage, had removed his camp nearer to Avaricum, and that he himself was gone with the cavalry, and such ready footmen as were accustomed to fight among the horsemen, to lie in ambush in that place where he thought our men would come a forraging the next day. Which being known, setting forward about midnight in silence, in the morning he came to the enemies camp. They having speedy advertisement by their scouts of Cæsar's coming, did divide their carriages in the woods, and imbrutled all their forces in an eminent and open place. Which being told Cæsar, he commanded the baggage to be speedily laid together, and their arms to be made ready. There was a hill of a gentle rising from the bottom to the top, encompassed round about with a difficult and troublesome bog of sifry foot in breadth. Upon this hill, the bridge being broken, the Galles kept themselves, trusting to the strength of the place, and being distributed into companies according to their severall States, they kept all the fords and passages of the bog with watches, with this resolution, that if the Romans did passe over the bog, they might easily from the higher ground keep them under, as they stuck in the mire, who little reckoning of so small a distance, would deem the sight to be upon equal terms, where as they themselves well knowing the inequality of the conditions, did make but a vain and idle ostentation. The souldiers disdainning that the enemy could endure their presence so near at hand, and requiring the sign of battle, Cæsar acquainted them with what detriment and losse of many valiant men, the victory must at that time be bought, who being so resolute that they refused no danger to purchase him honour, he might well be condemned of great ingratitude and villany, if their lives were not dearer unto him then his own safety: and so comforting the souldiers, he brought them back again the same day into the camp, and gave order for such things as were requisite for the siege of the town.

OBSERVATIONS.

This Chapter hath divers speciall particulars worthy observation. The first is, the opportu-

Some Italian writers are of an opinion, that the two chiefest parts of a souldier, Valour and Sufferance, are in these times divided unto two nations, the French and the Spaniard: the Spaniard making war rather by sufferance then by violence of assaults; and the French impatient of delay, and furious in assaults: so that according to his opinion, a Spaniard & a Frenchman will make one good souldier. Touching the Spaniards, I cannot deny but that he hath the name of one of the best souldiers in Christendome, and I do gladly allow all that virtue can challenge, for truth will prevail against all affection: yet I may say thus much on the behalf of our own people, that we have seldom lost honour in confronting any nation. Concerning the sufferance, and patient induring of hardnesse, which is said to bein the Spaniards, being able to live long with a little, it may peradventure not unjustly be attributed to the property of their country, and the nature of their climate, which will not bear nor digest such plenty of food, as is required in colder countries: and thereupon being born to so weak a digestion, they are as well satisfied with a rootor a fallet, as others with better plenty of food; and therein they goe beyond other Nations. Of the French I say nothing, but leave them to make good the opinion of the Italian Writer.

Suetonius witnesseth of Cæsar, that he himself was laboris ultra fidem patiens, one that endured toil beyond belief, whereby he might the better move his army to endure with patience the difficulties of the siege: and yet so artificially, as he seemed rather willing to leave it un-effected, then to impose any burthen upon them, which they themselves should be unwilling to bear; the rather to draw the Legions to engage themselves therein, by denying to forsake it, then to call that upon them, which their unwillingnesse might easily have put off.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

WE may further observe, the means the souldiers used to acquaint Cæsar with their desires, which was by the Tribunes and Centurions. For as these were mediate Officers between the Generall and them, and delivered the mandates and directions of the Emperour to the souldier; so did the souldiers use their help to make known unto him their requests: as besides this place may appear in the first Commentary, where they desired to give him satisfaction touching the fear they had conceived of Ariovistus and the Germans, which they likewise did by the Centurions and Tribunes.

Lib. VII.

Commentaries.

tunity which Cæsar took to visite the army of the Galles, when Vercingetorix was absent and gone to lie in ambush for the Roman forragers: which was a caveat to Vercingetorix, not to be too bufile with the Roman convoyes, lest his absence might draw on such an inconvenience, as might make him repent for going a birding.

The second is, the inequality which the advantage of the place giveth to a party: which I have already so often spoken of, as I am almost weary to repeat it; and the rather, for that I have produced this passage in the former book, to signify the benefit of such an advantage. Yet forasmuch as it is so pregnant to that effect, as may well deserve a double consideration, and was also produced by Cæsar himself upon occasion at Gergovia, give me leave to note how much it swayeth to counterpoise the want of the adverse party. Wherein as it cannot be denied, but that it may give such help as may make a small number equall a farre greater proportion of men; so in Cæsar's judgement it countervaileth the absence of the Generall, and maketh the body perfect without the head. Neither were they weakened onely with the absence of their Generall; but their cavalry wherein they so much trusted was absent likewise; and yet more then that too, by how much the Roman legions excelled the Galles in valour and prowess of arms: which being all put together is no small advantage. For doubtless if the matter had stood upon equal terms touching the place, neither the presence of Vercingetorix, nor the addition of their cavalry to assist them, had hindered the battell, or turned the Romans back to their camp.

The third thing is, the moderation which he shewed, forbearing to fight, the Galles insolently vaunting, and the Roman souldiers fretting and disdaining the enemies pride: whereby he settled such a confidence of his directions in the minds of his men, by shunning the perill of apparent danger which might fall upon them in particular, as afterwards they would make no question of his commands, but take them as the onely means of their safety, being never better assured then in performing what he commanded. The practice of later times hath not so well deserved of that virtue, but hath often shewed it self more prodigall of blood, as though men were made onely to fill up ditches, and to be the wofull executioners of other mens rashness.

The last thing is, the making ready of their weapons, arma expediri iussit. Concerning which points we must understand that the Romans always carried their targets in cases, and did hang their helmets at their backs, and fitted their piles as might be most convenient with the rest of their carriages. And therefore whenever they were to give battel, they were first to put on their helmets, to uncover their targets,

to fit their piles, and to make them ready for the charge: and this was called Arma expedire.

CHAP. X.

Vercingetorix excuseth himself to the Galles for his absence.

Vercingetorix returning back to the Cæsar's army, was accused of treason: in that he had removed his camp near unto the Romans; and further that he had gone away from it, and took all the cavalry with him; that he had left so great an army without any one to command it; that upon his departure the Romans should come so opportunely and so speedily: for all these things could not fall out by chance without counsell and direction: it seemed he had rather have the kingdom of Gallia by a grant from Cæsar, then by their means and gift. Being thus charged, he answereth, That he removed the camp for want of forrage, they themselves desiring it. He came near unto the Romans, being led thereunto by the opportunity of the place, which was such as might defend it self by its own strength; the cavalry was of no use in a boggy place, but might do good service there where it went. He left no man to command the army of purpose, lest by the persuasion of the multitude he should be forced to fight, which he knew they all desired, as not able long to endure any labour. If the Romans came by chance, they were to thank fortune; if by any mans direction, they were beholding unto him that had brought them, where they might from the higher ground both see how small a number they were, and condemn their valour; who not daring to fight, did shamefully return into their camp. He desired to receive no imperiall dignity by treachery from Cæsar, which he might otherwise have by lawfull victory, which was now most certain and sure, both to himself and the rest of the Galles. And for that authority which he had received from them, he was ready to give it up into their hands again, if they thought the honour which they gave him to be greater then the help and safety which they received from him. And to the end you may understand these things to be truly delivered by me, (saith he) hear the Roman souldiers. And thereunto shall he brought forth servants which were taken forraging a few dayes before, miserably tormented with famine and irons. They being taught beforehand what to answer, said they were legionary souldiers, and had stole out of the camp to see if they could meet with any corn or cattell in the fields: the whole army suffered the like penury, and mens strength began to fail them, insomuch

The advantage of the place doth countervail the absence of the Generall.

much that they were not able to undergo any labour: and therefore their Generall had resolved, that if he prevailed not against the Town, he would withdraw his army within three dayes. These benefits (saith Vercingetorix) you have of me, whom you accuse of treason: for by my means without shedding of your blood, you see so great a conquering army almost consumed with hunger; and by me it is provided, that when they fly from hence, no State shall receive them into their territories. The whole multitude applauded his speech, by shaking and striking their hands together, as their manner is in such cases, commending Vercingetorix for a great soldier, whose loyalty as it was not to be distrusted, so the war could not have been carried with better directions. They agreed further to send 10000 chiefe men out of all their forces into the town, as not thinking it fit to commit the common safety of Gallia only to the Bituriges, for they were persuaded that the summe of all the victory consisted in making good that town against the Romans.

OBSERVATIONS.

Horac.

A Multitude is *Bellua multorum capitum* (as one saith) an unreasonable beast of many heads, apt to receive froward and perverse incitements, and hard to be drawn to better understanding, jealous, impatient, treacherous, unconstant, an instrument for a wicked spirits and sooner moved to mischief by *Thersites*, then reclaimed to virtue by the authority of *Agamemnon*, or the eloquence of *Ulysses*, or the wisdom of *Nestor*, more turbulent then the raging either of the sea, or of a devouring fire. And therefore they may well go together to make a triplicity of evils, according to the saying, *Ignis, mare, populus, tria mala*; Fire, the Sea, and the rabble multitude are three evils.

Vercingetorix had both his hands full in this service, for his care was no less to keep the *Gallies* from being distastied, then to make his party good against *Cæsar*. It is disputed touching the government of a multitude, whether it be fitter to be severe or obsequious. *Iacius* saith peremptorily, that *In multitudine regendi plus parva quam obsequium valet*; foul means does more then fair to the governing of a multitude. But he understandeth such a multitude as are subject to their Commanders, either by ancient service, or the interest of regall authority, whereby they are tied to obedience by hereditary duty, and cannot refuse that which custom prescribeth. For otherwise where the people stand free from such bonds, and have submitted themselves to government for some speciall service, there, clemency or obsequious smoothing prevaileth more then the severity of command: according to

Whether severity or clemency do more prevail in governing a multitude.

the saying, *Homines duci vultum, non cogi*; Men will be led by fair means, not compelled. Upon a diffension which happened at Rome between the people and the Senate, the people were presently sent into the field under the leading of two Senators, *Quintius* and *Appius Claudius*. *Appius* by reason of his cruelty and severity, was not obeyed by his soldiery, but forsok his Province and returned non proficent, they will do nothing: *Quintius* being courteous and benigne, had an obedient army, and came home a Conquerour. In the like terms did Vercingetorix stand with the *Gallies*, who not long before were all of equall authority, and for the defence of the common cause had submitted themselves to order and government: and therefore he carried himself accordingly, but with some cunning too, for he made no scruple to abuse the beast, and to present them with a lesson of deceit, taught to servants and Roman slaves, as the confession of legionarie soldiery, which is a liberty that hath ever been allowed to such as had the managing of an unruly multitude, who have made as much use of the false reins, as the bit or the spur, or any other help belonging to that art.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar continueth the siege at *Avaricum*, and describeth the walls of the town in Gallia.

BY the singular valour of our soldiers all the counsels and devices of the *Gallies* were made void and of none effect. For they are a Nation of great dexterity, apt to imitate and make any thing which they see other men do before them: for they turned aside the hooks with ropes, and drew them into the town with engines: they withdrew the earth from the Mount with Mines with their great skills, by reason of their iron mines wherein they are much practised: they set up towers upon every part of the walls, and covered them with raw hides: they sallied out of the town night and day, and either set fire to the Mount, or assaulted the soldiers as they were at work: they did every day make their towers equal to that height of our towers, which the daily increase of the Mount had added to their height: they hindered the open trenches, and kept them from approaching the walls with sharp burned stakes, cast into them with hot pitch, and with great stones. All their walls were almost of this fashion: Long straight beams are placed upon the ground, with an equal distance of two foot one from another, and bound together on the inside of the walls, and fastned with great store of earth: the distances between the beams are filled and filled with great

great stones in the front of the wall. These being thus placed and fastned with mortar, another such a course is laid upon that, keeping always the same distance, so as one beam be not laid upon another, but in the second rank placing them upon the distances filled up with stones, and so forward untill the wall be raised to the due height. This fashion as it is a work not deformed either in shew or variety, observing alternate courses of beams and stones which keep their order by even lines; so is it profitable also and very much advantaging the defence of the town: for as the stone keeps it from burning, so doth the wood from the violence of the ammo, forasmuch as the beams are for the most part fourty foot long, and can neither be broken nor pull'd out.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The use and practice of ancient time in besieging and defending towns.

THis Chapter doth in some part express the manner of their siege in ancient time, and the means which the defendant had to frustrate the assaults and approaches of the enemy. Besides the Ram which the Romans used to shake and overthrow the walls (whereof I have already spoken) they had commonly great hooks of iron to catch hold of a turret, and to pull it over the wall, or to pull down the parapet, or to disturb any work which was to be made upon the wall. These hooks were used by the legionary soldiery, being covered with vines in the same manner as they handled the Ram: and were averted and put off by the ingenious practices of the *Gallies*, with ropes cast and insnared about them, and then by force of engines drawn into the town. In like manner the open trenches, by which the Romans made their approaches to the wall, were answered from the town with stakes or piles sharded at the end with fire, and then cast into them to hinder such as were at work, together with seething pitch and great stones. Furthermore, as the Romans raised their Mount, and brought matter unto it to enlarge it in breadth and height, so did the *Gallies* undermine it, and drew the earth away, or set it on fire to burn it: for as I have already noted in the description of a mount, it was made as well with wood and timber, as with earth and stones. They strengthened their walls with turrets and towers, and covered them with raw hides to keep them from burning: and as the Romans mounted in height with their turrets and engines, so the *Gallies* raised their towers answerable unto them, that in the defence of the town they might fight with equall advantage.

And thus they proceeded both in the offensive and defensive part, as farre as either valour or wit could improve those means which were then in use in besieging a town.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT was the use of all nations, to fortify their strong towns with such walls as might make best defence against the practice of those times wherein they lived, touching the taking and besieging of townes. So the *Gallies*, as it appeareth by *Cæsar*, raised their walls of wood and stone, laid in mutuall courses one with another, that the wood might make void the violence of the Ram, and the stone keep it from burning with fire, which in those dayes were the means to assault and overthrow a wall. In these times the walls of strong and fortified townes, are only made and raised of earth, as the best defence against the fury of the artillery. But forasmuch as the old manner of fortification is here in part delivered by *Cæsar*, give me leave to have a word or two touching the fortifications of these times.

And first touching the art itself, in respect of the matter and the manner, it is a member of architecture, but the end is military: for to fortify is nothing else but to make a building answerable to necessity and the occurrences of war. Neither is it the end of fortification to make a place inexpugnable, or unpossible to be taken, for so it were *Ars arrium*, but to reduce it to a good and reasonable defence.

Wheresoever then any such defence is required, the mystery of fortification is to raise such a fort, and to apply such a figure, answering the quality and site of that place, as may give greatest strength thereunto: for as all places are not capable in the disposition of their best strength of all sorts of figures, so there is a difference of strength between this and that figure. And as the place wanteth the advantage of motion and agility for its own defence, so is it requisite it should be furnished with the best means and commodities both to annoy the enemy, and to defend its own people. And in that respect all circular forms, as compounded of parts of one fort, and the same nature, are unfit for fortification: for where a fort ought so to be disposed, that it may have many hands to strike as *Briareus*, and as a *Hydra* never to want a head, it is necessary that the figure thereof be of different and unlike parts, as apt to work divers effects. For unless it be able to discover a far off, to command the country about as far as the artillery will play, to stop the passages, to hinder approaches and assaults, to damnify the enemy at hand and far off, sometimes with the artillery, sometimes with small shot, sometimes with fireworks, and other times by sallies, it hath not that perfection as is requisite.

Admitting therefore composition of parts, next unto the circle the triangular fortresse is most unperfect; first in regard it is a figure of

Y 3 lets

CHAP. XII.

The siege of *Avaticum* continued.

lesse capacity than any other of equall bounds, which is a great inconvenience in a hold, when the souldiers shall be pinn'd up for want of room, and through the straightness of the place, not to be able to avoid confusion. Secondly, the bulwarks of all such triangular fortresses, have always such sharp cantons as are easily subject to breaking, which giveth the enemy means to approach them without disturbance from the fort.

Quadrangle The quadrangle fortresse hath almost the same imperfection of angles as the triangle hath, but is more spacious within, and of greater capacity.

Five-sided and six-sided fortresses. And therefore Pentagons or Hexagons, or any other that hath more angles, is fittest for fortification, (understanding the place to be capable of them,) as being of a greater content, and having their angles more obtuse, and by consequence more solid and strong.

Forts in a plain level. A plain champaign level doth admit all sorts of figures, and may take the best; having these advantages: it easily hindereth an enemy from approaching near unto it, or incamping before it, and is not subject to mines, by reason of the water rising in such levels. But on the other side, a small troupe will besiege it, and battery may be laid to divers places of it: it is always subject to mounts of earth, and needeth many bulwarks, ditches, and much cost to keep it.

Disadvantages. A fortresse upon a hill hath these advantages: an enemy can hardly lodge near unto it, or lay battery against it; it requireth more men to besiege it, and is not subject to mounts. The disadvantages are, that it is not in our choice to make it in the best form of strength, but must give it such a figure as may best fit the place, being sometimes too large and spacious, and sometimes, too strait.

Forts upon a hill. The enemies artillery hath greater force against it playing upward, and the artillery of the fort playeth not so sure downward.

The hands of all forts. The hands of all forts are the bulwarks from whence the artillery playeth; the supplements to the bulwarks are the ravelins, the platforms, the casemates, and the cavaleros. The walls are made in scarp canting inward, the better to bear the weight of the earth, with this proportion, that to every five foot and half, or six foot in height, there be one foot allowed in scarp. The counterescarp is another wall outward to the first, and slopes inward in the same manner as the former.

And thus much touching the generall view of fortification, which is as much as may well be comprehended in these short observations, reserving the further consideration thereof to a particular treatise by it self.



He siege being hindered by so many *Cæsar*. disturbances, and the souldiers distressed all the time with cold and continuall rains, yet they overcame all these lets with continuall labour, and in five and twenty dayes they raised a mount of three hundred and thirty foot in breadth, and four score in height. When it came almost to touch the wall, *Cæsar* himself attending the work, as his custome was, and encouraging the souldiers to omit no time from the same: a little before the third watch of the night, the mount was seen to smother the enemy having set it on fire with a mine. And at the same instant of time, a shout being taken up by them that stood upon the wall, they made a sally out at two gates on both sides the towers. Some cast firebrands and dry matter from the wall unto the mount, pouring pitch and other things to nourish the fire; that no man knew whither to run first, or where to give help. Notwithstanding forasmuch as *Cæsar* had appointed two legions by turn to watch before the camp, and two other to follow the works, it happened, and that quickly, that some were ready to confront the sallies, and others to draw back the towers from the front of the mount, and to cut the mount asunder, the whole multitude coming out of the camp to quench the fire. The rest of the night being now spent, the fight continued every where, and ever the enemy took new spirits, and had hope of victory, the rather because they saw the sheds or hovels belonging to the towers burnt, and that the souldiers could not come near the said towers to manage them as was fitting, without shelter and covert, and that they ever sent fresh men to take the rooms of such as were weary and over-laboured: supposing the safety of all Gallia to consist in that instant of time. There happened, our selves beholding it, an accident worthy memory, which I think not fit to omit. A certain Gall before the gate of the town, casting with his hands balls of tallow and pitch to increase the fire, right over against the tower, was shot through the right side with a cross-bow, and fell down dead. One that stood next him step over him, and began to do the like service: he likewise was slain with a shot out of a cross-bow. Him a third man succeeded; and the third, a fourth. Neither was the place forsaken, untill the mount was quenched, the enemy removed, and the fight ceased.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Whether there need not as many men to defend a town, as to besiege it.

The defence of a town consisteth in four points.

IT were a matter worthy observation to consider, whether there need not as many men to defend a town, as to besiege it. Which at the first sight may peradventure seem frivolous: forasmuch as the defendants are but to make good the place which they hold, and to stand only upon their defensive guard, having the advantage of the place, the shelter of the walls, the strength of the ditch, and many other like helps for their defence and safety; whereas the assailant is to strive against all these advantages, and to oppose himself to the danger of so many difficulties. But if we look a little nearer into the matter, and consider the service to be performed on either part, we shall find, that to say, As many men are necessary to defend a town as to besiege it, is no Paradox.

For the better understanding thereof, we are to know, that the defence of a town touching matter of fight, consisteth chiefly in these four points. First, in manning and making good all parts of the wall. For if the defendant be not able to strengthen all parts with a competent force, then he hath not men enough to defend the town; forasmuch as all parts are subject to assault, and what part soever is not made good, that lieth open to an enemy: or otherwise if the assault be only to be made at a breach, the rest of the wall being strong enough to defend it self, there is required a competent strength within the town to defend that breach. In this point there is little difference touching a competent number of men between the assailant and the defendant: for if he that layeth siege to a town hath men enough to assault all parts at one instant, the enemy must have an answerable proportion to defend all; or if he have no use of more men then may serve to give an assault at a breach, the defendant must have the like proportion for the defence of the breach.

The second point is, in relieving wearied men, either fighting or working, with fresh supplies to continue that business, as oftentimes it falleth out in the siege of a town. Wherein likewise there is little or no difference touching an equality between both parties. For if the defendant be not as well able to relieve his wearied souldiers with fresh supplies, as the enemy is to continue the assault, the town may quickly have a new master.

The third point is, in defeating and making void such works as the enemy shall make against the town, as mounts, mines, approaches, and such like inconveniences; which being suffered to go on without opposition and prevention, the town cannot hold out long. In this point the defendant hath the disadvantages, having need of more men to overthrow and pre-

vent the works, then the assailant hath to make them good. For there he that besiegeth the place fighteth with the advantage, and hath the same helps as the defendant hath in the fastness of his hold; which caused this extraordinary accident, which *Cæsar* noteth, touching the successive slaughter of so many *Gallies*, who labouring to burn the *Roman* works with balls of tallow and pitch, were all slain with the blow of one mans bow.

The last point is in sallies, which is as necessary for the defence of a town as any thing else whatsoever. For if the defendant be not able to sally out, the enemy will quickly coop him up, and tread upon his belly. And herein the defendant needeth more men then the assailant. For he that is in the field, lyeth in the strength of his trenches; whereas the other cometh out naked upon him.

And thus much touching this question in particular. Concerning the generall, if it be demanded whether there have been more men lost in the defence of *Offends*, then in besieging it; I answer, That neither side can much vaunt of a small losse.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN the second place there are two observable points. The one, *Cæsars* continuall attendance upon the works, being present night and day, without any long intermission, which did much advantage their proceeding at that time, and was as important to a fortunate issue, as any other thing whatsoever. For while an enemy is extraordinary, either in valour or diligence, there must needs be extraordinary means to countervail the height of so great a resolution: which *Cæsar* overtopped with monstrous and huge works, and speeded those works with his continuall attendance.

The second point is the successive task of the *Roman* army, being eight legions present at that siege; (for the other two were left at *Agendicum* with the carriages of the army;) in such sort, as half the army was always at rest, and the other half employed: two legions at work, and two legions in the watch: and thus they eased each other, and still continued the work. For otherwise they had not been able to have undergone the burthen, as the saying is; *Quod caret æterna regni durabile non est.* It cannot hold that rests not now and then.

CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar by an assault taketh *Avaticum*.

He *Gallies* having tried all means, *Cæsar*. and none taking effect, the next day they consulted touching their laying of the town, *Vercingetorix* both commanding and perswading them unto it: which they hoped they might do in the night.

night time without any great loss unto themselves, forasmuch as Vercingetorix was not far off from his camp, and all the way thither was a continual bog, which would hinder the Romans from following after them. And for that purpose they prepared themselves against the next night. Which the women perceiving, did run suddenly out into the streets and other publick places, and cast themselves at the feet of their Husbands; and by all means intreated them, not to leave them and their children to the cruelty of the enemy, whose nature and infirmity of body would not suffer to flie away. But finding them to continue resolute in their purposes, forasmuch as in extreme perill, fear for the most part hath no commiseration, they cried out, and signified their sight unto the Romans. Wherewith the Gallies being feared, they desisted from their purpose, lest the wayes should be forfeitall and hind by the Roman horsemen. The next day Cæsar having advanced forward the towers, and perfected those works which he had determined to make, there happened to fall a great rains which he thought to be a fit occasion for his purpose. And forasmuch as he saw the guard upon the wall to be somewhat negligently disposed, he commanded his men to work fair and softly, and shewed them what he would have done. And incouraging the Legions which were hid in a vault next under the Vint, at length to enjoy the sweetness of victory for their manifold labours; he provided a reward for such as were seen first upon the walls, and gave them the signe to begin. The souldiers flying suddenly out of all parts, did quickly possess themselves of the walls. The enemy being frighted with so sudden an accident, and put from the towers and walls, imbuttelled themselves angle-wise in the market-place, and in other spacious streets of the citie, with this resort, not that if they were assaulted in any part, they would resist in form of battell. But when they saw no man to descend on even grounds, but to inclose them round about upon the walls, fearing lest there would be no way to escape, they cast their armes away, and fled all to the furthest part of the town. Part of them sticking in a throng at the gate, were there slain by the souldiers; and part being got out of the gates, were slain by the horsemen. Neither was there any man that looked after pillage, but being moved to anger with the slaughter of our men at Genabum, and with the travell and labour of those great works, they neither spared old men, women nor children. In the end of all that number, which was about forty thousand, scarce eight hundred (that upon the first no man forsook the town) came safe to Vercingetorix. These he received with

great silence, being now furre in the night left any sedition should have grown in the camp, through the pity and commiseration of the vulgar people, and sent out his familiar friends and chiefest men of each State to meet such as had escaped away, and to bring them to their own people as they lay quartered in the camp.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

WE may see here the saying verified touching the disposition of the *Galles* for matter of valour: which in the beginning seemed for great, that it needed no further strain to countervail the worth of *Cæsars* army, and was expressed with such industry and resolution, both in spoiling and disappointing the *Roman* works, as also by ingenious fortifying and making good their own labours; that a man would have deemed them *virtute pares*, equal in valour. But being a little spent in the actions, like a pot that hath a mouth as big as the belly, and powreth out all the liquor at an instant, they fell at length to that baseness, as shewed less spirit then the women did, who chose rather to betray their husbands purposes to the enemy, then to hazard their lives by escaping to *Vercingetorix*. And this is that which is so often noted by Historiographers; *Quod multa bella impetu validè peracta & moras evanuerunt*: That many wars which are hot at the first slacken and vanish upon a tedious continuance. The first thing that I observe, is, that which *Cæsar* himself noteth: *Quod plerumque in summo periculo timor miser cordium non recipit*: That usually in case of extreme dangers, fear hath no mercy. Which was true on either side. For the *Galles* were loth upon flying to *Vercingetorix*; that they regarded not the wofull laments of the women and children, whom they were well content to hazard, whilst they themselves might escape in safety. And on the other side, the women did forget to be pitifull to their husbands, whom they would not suffer to escape, and leave them in their weakness behind as a prey to appease the wrath of the bloody souldier, which would consequently follow in that escape. Which shewed, that there is note comparable to the bond of nature, specially when it concerneth the preservation of life. For as in other things, respect and affection may easily work a communication of good things unto others, as also a participation of their evils for their relief: so herein we are altogether senseless, and the love we owe to our lives is so great, that it admitteth no respect. *Agellanus* his friend was without respect a friend: and yet notwithstanding being driven one day to remove upon the sudden, and to leave one sick behind him whom he loved dearly; the sick man calling him by his name as he was going away, beclought him that he

The *Galles* in the beginning are more then men, and in the end less then women.

would

would not forsake him. *Agessilaus* turning back again, answered; O how hard it is both to love and to be wife! according to the saying, *Sapere & amare vix Deo conceditur*. To be wife and to love, God himself can scarce do it.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

A Generall
must not
put necessi-
tie upon an
enemy.

IT is a principle among men of warre, not to put necessity upon an enemy, nor make him valiant whether he will or no; (as I have already noted in the former Commentaries;) which the *Romans* well observed in this particular service at *Avaricum*; for being possit of the walls, they did not suddenly assault them in the market-place, where they had made head for their defence, but gave them a breathing time, the better to understand what they did, and respite, to bechink themselves of a starting hole for the safety of their lives. Which as it was quickly apprehended by the *Gallies*, so it made an easie execution to the *Roman* souldier.

And as it seemeth it was the more carefully handled in respect of the condition of the enemy being revolvers : for such Provinces as have rebelled, are harder to be recovered after their revolt then they were at first to be subdued. For at the first, they have no occasion to fear any hard conditions, but yielding to subjection do look for favour : whereas rebels and revolvers, besides the condition of an enemy, are in the nature of offenders, and stand in fear of the extremities of warre, which maketh them more obstinate then otherwise they would be. And therefore it behoveth a General not to impose any further necessity upon an enemy, then the quality of the warre doth lay upon him : which oftentimes is more then can be well avoided.

CHAP. XIII.

Vercingetorix doth comfort the *Galles* for the loss
of *Avaricum*.

Cæsar.



He next day calling a Councell, he comforted the Gallies, and exhorted them not to be utterly dismayed with that loss: for the Romans had not overthrowen them with valour, nor in a set battell, but with a kind of Art, and skill in besieging a town, whereof they themselves were ignorant. He erred much that looked for all the events of warre to fall out prosperously. It was never his opinion, that *Avanicum* should be kept; whereof they themselves were witnesses. But it fell out by the imprudence of the Bituriges, & over great indulgence of the rest, that this loss happened unto them: which notwithstanding he would speedily heal with greater helps. For by his diligence he would unite such States unto them,

as were not yet of the confederacy, and make one purpose of all Gallia, which the whole world was not able to resist; and that he had almost effected it already. In the mean time he thought it fit that they should yield unto one thing for their safeties sake, which was to fortifie their camp; to the end they might better sustain the sudden assaults of the enemy. This speech was not unpleasant to the Gallies; and the rather, that he himself was not dejected in spirit upon so great a loss, nor did hide himself, or flee the presence of the multitude: being the more esteemed forasmuch as when the matter was in question, he first thought it fit that Avaricum should be burned, and afterwards he perswaded them to forsaake it: wherein as misfortune and adversity do impair the authority of other Commanders; so contrariwise his honour daily increased by the loss which he received. And withall they were in great hope upon his affirmation, to winne the rest of the States unto them. And that was the first time that the Gallies began to fortifie their camp, being so appalled in spirit that where they ever were unaccustomed to labour, yet they thought it their part to suffer and undergo all that was commanded them.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

NExt to the knowledge and experience of warre, there is nothing more requisite in a great Commander, then greatnes of spirit: for whereas his employment consisteth in managing the great businesse of the world, such as are the slaughter of many thousands in an hour, the sacking of cities, the fighting of battels, the alteration of Commonweals, victories, triumphs, and the conquest of kingdoms, which like the constellations in the eighth sphere, are left to succeeding ages in such characters as cannot be defaced and make an impression of the greatest measure of joy, or the greatest heap of sorrow; it is necessary that his courage be answerable to such a fortune, neither to be crushed with the weight of adversity, nor puffed up with the pride of victory; but in all times to shew the same constancy of mind, and to temper extremities with a sedd resolution.

Of this metall and temper, is the Philosopher *homo quadratus* made of, such as *Camillus* was in *Rome*. For never speech did better become a great personage than that of his, having known both the favour and the disgrace of fortune: *Nec mihi diffidat a animos fecit, nec exitum ademit*, Neither did my Dictatorship puff me up, nor my banishment sink my spirits, saith he. Whereas weak spirits do either vanish away in the smoke of folly, being drunk with the joys of pleasing fortune; or otherwise upon a change of good times, do become more base and abject,

A great
Commander
must have
a great
courage.

— Homo qui
S dratus.

Plutarch.
Paulus
milia

Observations upon Cæsars

then the thief that is taken in the fact: such as *Perseus* the last *Macedonian* king was, who besides his ill fortune for losing his kingdom in the space of one hour, hath ever since stood attained of a base and abject mind, unworthy the throne of *Alexander* the Great.

Plutarch.

The wife *Romans* used all means to give courage and spirit to their leaders, and to free their minds from such external respects, which losse or dishonour might cast upon them. And therefore when *Varro* had fought so rashly at *Cannæ*, that he had like to have lost the *Roman* Empire to *Annibal*, upon his return to *Rome* the whole Senate went out to meet him: and although they could not thank him for the battell, yet they gave him thanks that he was returned home again, whereby he feared not to despair of the State of *Rome*.

In like manner did the *Galles* congratulate *Vercingetorix* that notwithstanding so great a losse, he was neither dejected in spirit, nor did hide himself from the multitude; but as a Commander of high resolution, had found out means to heal those harms, and to recompence the losse of *Avaricum*, with the uniting of all the States of *Gallia* into one confederacy.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

It is dangerous to be the author of a counsel in a State.

Secondly we may observe, how dangerous it is to be the author of a counsel touching any important or grave deliberation, or to lay down any project for the service of a State: for all men are blind in this point, that they judge of good or ill counsel by the success, and look no further then the end which it taketh, which proving disastrous or unfortunate, doth either bring the author to destruction, or into danger both of life and state.

Holinshead.

In the occurrences of this kingdom, it appeareth that *Henry* the fifth being solicited by the Commons touching the Abbeyes in *England*, and moved by *Putton* exhibited in Parliament, to that which was afterwards accomplished by *Henry* the eighth, was diverted from those thoughts by an eloquent oration made in Parliament by *Henry* *Chicheley* Archbishop of *Canterbury*, a grave and learned Prelate, perswading the King by many concluding reasons, to carry a great power into *France*, and there to make his claim for that kingdom according to the right derived unto him from his noble Progenitors. Whereupon the King was perswaded to undertake that war; which at first fell out most happily, yet the Bishop to please both the King and the people for his former counsel, whereby many men were lost, built a Colledge in *Oxford* dedicated to *All Saints*, wherein he placed forty Scholars, to make supplications for all souls, and specially for such as had been murthered in *France* in the time of that war.

Vercingetorix was happy in this point, that he perswaded the *Galles* not to keep *Avaricum*, but to suffer it to be burned as an enemy to their safety: and thereupon he did not let to put them in mind of his opinions as free from the danger which happened to a great man near unto *Perseus* whom I last spake of, who after his overthrow by *Paulus* *Emilius*, being told by that party of many errors which he had committed in the carriage of that warre, turned himself suddenly, saying, Traitor, hast thou relieved thy counsell untill now, when there is no remedie? and therewithall (as some report) slue him with his own hand. And this was it that gave *Vercingetorix* that happiness: *Ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversæ, autoritatem minuit: sic hujus ex contrario, dignitas in commodo advehitur* indies augebatur. As misfortune and adversity, &c. as before.

CHAP. XV.

Vercingetorix laboureth to unite all *Gallia* into one league for the upholding of their warre.

Either did *Vercingetorix* omit any endeavour for the accomplishment of his promise, to draw the rest of the States unto him: and to that purpose he dealt with their chiefe men both by rewards and promises, and chose out fit men, that either by subtille speeches, or friendship, or some other means, might win them unto him. He took order that such as had escaped from *Avaricum*, should be both clothed and armed: and withall, that he might reinforce his troops which were weakened, he commanded every State to furnish out certain supplies, and to be brought by a day to the camp. He commanded likewise all the Archers, of whom there is great store in *Gallia*, to be sought out and sent unto him. And by this means he speedily repaired his losses at *Avaricum*. In the meantime *Teutobomatus* the son of *Ollorico* King of the *Nithobriges*, whose father had the title of a Friend from our Senate, came to him with a great number of horsemen, which he had brought out of *Aquitain*.

OBSERVATIONS.

It seemeth by this place, that *France* in those dayes did favour archery: for (as the story saith) they had great store of Archers amongst them, but of what value they were is not here delivered. The use they made of them followeth after in this Commentary, which was to interminge them amongst the horse, and to they fought as light-armed men.

In the times that our *English* nation carried a scourging hand in *France*, the matter between

ut felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus: ita res adversæ odia conciliant. Lib. 3. bel. civ.

us and them touching archery, stood in such terms as gave *England* great advantage: for I have not heard of any bow-men at all amongst them: whereas our Nation hath heretofore excelled all others, as well in number of bow-men, as in excellent good shooting, and hath made so good proof thereof against the *French*, as it needeth not any long dispute.

* Concerning Archery I finde these things considerable.

First, that every man be so fitted with bow and arrows, as he may be apt for strong and quick shooting: wherein I cannot so much commend these livery bows, being for the most part heavy flugs, and of greater weight then strength, and of more shew then service.

Secondly, that in a day of service, the bowmen endeavour to deliver their quivers, that the whole band or sleeve of shot may let go all at one instance of time: for so the shower of arrows will be more fierce and terrible, and more available against an enemy.

Thirdly, the fittest form of battelling for bow-men; which must not at any hand be deep in flank, for so such as are in the hindmost ranks, will either shot or short or to no purpose. And therefore the fittest form of battelling for Archery, hath ever been accounted a long-sided square, resembling a heart, broad in front, and narrow in flank.

Fourthly, their defence in a day of battell; which must either be a covert woody place, where the horse of the enemy cannot come at them, or a trench cast before them, or the place must be fortified with gathrops and stakes, such as were devised by *Henry* the fifth at *Agincourt* field, or some other means to avoid the cavalry.

The last thing is the effects which the bowmen worke: which are two; first the galling of the enemy, and secondly disorder. Touching the galling of the enemy, there cannot be a better description then that which *Plutarch* maketh of the overthrow of the *Romans* by the *Parthian* arrows. The *Roman* souldiers hands (saith he) were nailed to their targets, and their feet to the ground, or otherwise were fore wounded in their bodies, and died of a cruell lingering death, crying out for anguish and pain they felt, and turning & tormenting themselves upon the ground, they brake the arrows sticking in them. Again, striving by force to pluck out the barbed heads, that had pierced farre into their bodies through their veins and sinews, they opened the wounds wider, and so cast themselves away.

The disorder or routing of an enemy which is caused by the bow-men, cometh from the fearful spectacle of a drift of arrows: for a shower of arrows well delivered and well seconded, for a while is so terrible to the eye, and so dreadful in the success, that it is almost un-

possible to keep the enemy from routing.

The two great victories which our Nation had in *France* at *Cressell* and *Agincourt*, next to the valour of the *English*, are attributed to our archery: and the effect of our archery at those times, was first disorder, and consequently slaughter. In the battell of *Cressell* the King of *Bohemia* fighting for the *French*, caused his horsemen to tie the bridles of their horses together in rank, that they might keep order, notwithstanding the galling which he feared from our *English* archery: but it fell out as ill as if he had tied their heads and their tails together in file; for the drift of arrows fell so terribly amongst them, that they ran together on heaps with such confusion, as made the slaughter great, and their particular destinies most miserably fortunated. At *Agincourt* the number of prisoners which every souldier had, was admirable to speak of; for some report that many of our *English* had ten prisoners apiece: which hapned chiefly from the disorder which fell amongst the *French*, and that disorder came by our archery. And doubtless if ever we should have occasion to go against an enemy that so abounded in horse as the *French* do, there could be no better means against such horse then our *English* bowmen. I know it hath been said, that now the times are altered, and the harquebuse and musket are so generally received, and of such reputation in the course of our modern wars, that in comparison of them bow-men are not worth the naming. Wherein I will not go about to extenuate the use of either of these weapons; as knowing them to be both very serviceable upon fit and convenient occasions, nor take upon me to determine which of them is most effectual in a day of service; but onely deliver my conceit touching their effects, and leave it to the consideration of wise and discreet Commanders.

And first touching shot. A wing of muskettiers is available against an enemy, onely in such wing of shot as do hit; for such as do not hit, pass away insensibly without any further fear, and the crack is but as the lofe of the bow. Of such bullets as do hit, the greater part do not strike to death, but are oftentimes carried untill the skirmish be ended before the party do feel himself hurt: so that an enemy receiveth no further hurt by a charge of shot, then happeneth to such particular men as shall chance to be slain outright or fore hurt. But a sleeve of Archers is available against an enemy, as well in such a sleeve of arrows as do not hit, as in such as do hit: for whereas the cloud of arrows is subject to our fight, and every arrow is both suspected and able to bring death sitting on the head, an enemy is as much troubled at such arrows as come fair upon him and do not hit, as at those that do hit; for no man is willing to expose his flesh to an open and eminent danger, when it lieth in his

How far a wing of shot is available against an enemy.

How sure a sleeve of Archers is available against an enemy.

power to avoid it. And therefore whilst every man seeketh to avoid hurt, they fall into such confusion, as besides the loss of particular men, the enemy doth hardly escape disorder, which is the greatest disadvantage that can befall him. Moreover, the arrows having barbed heads, although they make but a light hurt, yet they are not easily pulled out, which maketh the soldiers not to intend the fight until they be delivered of them: and the horse so to fling and chafe, that it is impossible they should either keep their rank or be otherwise managed for any service.

And thus much touching bow-men and archery, which is a weapon as ancient as the first and truest History, and is of the number of such weapons as men use to fight with afar off. The use whereof is too much neglected by the English of these times, considering the honour they have achieved by it in former ages.

CHAP. XVI.

A controversy fell out in the State of the Hedui touching the choice of their chief Magistrate.

Cæsar.

Cæsar staid many dayes at Avaricum: for finding there great store of corn and of other provisions, he refreshed his army of their former labour and wants. The winter now being almost ended, and the time of the year being fit for war, he determined to follow the enemy, to see whether he could draw him out of the woods and bogs, or besiege him in some place. Being thus resolved, divers of the principall men of the Hedui came unto him, beseeching him that he would stand to them, and assist their State in a time of great need, the matter being in extreme danger: forasmuch as their ancient usage was for one to be created their annual Magistrate, having regall authority for that year; whereas now two had taken upon them the said office, both of them affirming themselves to be lawfully created; the one was Convictolitanus, a famous and flourishing young man, the other Cottus, born of an ancient family, and he himself of great power and kindred, whose brother Vedellacus had borne the said office the year before. All their State was in arms, their Senate and their people divided, together with their clients and followers: if the controversy continued for any time, it would come to a battel; the prevention whereof consisted in his diligence and authority. Cæsar, though he knew it would be disadvantageous unto him to leave the war, and to forsake the enemy: yet knowing what inconveniences do usually arise of such disorders and dissensions, lest so great a State, and so near to the people of Rome, which he himself had always favoured, and by all means honoured, should fall to war amongst

themselves; and that faction which distrusted their own strength, should seek help of Vercingetorix: he thought it most necessary to be prevented. And forasmuch as such as were created chief Magistrates among the Hedui, were by their laws forbidden to go out of their confines: to the end he might not seem to derogate any thing from their laws, he himself determined to go unto them. At his coming he called before him to Decetia all the Senate, and those also that were in controversy for the office. And finding in an assembly almost of the whole State, that one of them was chosen by a few privily called together, in another place, and at another time than was accustomed, the brother pronouncing the brother: whereas their laws did not only forbid two of one family, both being alive, to be created Magistrates, but also to be of the Senate together: he compelled Cottus to give over his interest in the magistracy, and confirmed Convictolitanus being created by their Priests, and according to the custom of their State. This decree being ratified, he exhorted the Hedui to forget their private controversies and dissensions, and to give their best help to the war in hand, wherein they might challenge and expect (the Gauls being subdued) such rewards as they deserved; commanding all their horse, and ten thousand foot to be speedily sent unto him, which he meant to dispose into garrisons for the better provision of corn. And then dividing his army into two parts, he sent four Legions towards the Senones & the Parisians under the leading of Labienus; the other four he led himself against the Arverni, to the town of Gergovia, along the river Elaver, sending part of the horse with him, and keeping part with himself.

OBSERVATIONS.

TO loose the least jot of that which a man hath in possession, is more dishonourable, then to fail of getting what he hath not. And therefore Cæsar chose rather to forgo the advantages which a speedy pursuit of the enemy might have afforded him to the ending of that war, then to hazard the loss of so great a State, & so well affected to the people of Rome as were the Hedui, wherein he carried so equal and indifferent a hand, that he would do nothing but what the laws of that State directed him unto, as most assured that such directions were without exception.

CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar passeth his army over the river Elaver, and incampeth himself before Gergovia.

Nothing being known, Vercingetorix having broken down all the bridges of that river, took his journey on the other side of Elaver; either army being in view each of other,

hers, and incamping almost over against one another: discoverers being sent out to watch, lest the Romans should make a bridge in any place, and carry over their forces. Cæsar was much troubled, lest he should be hindered by the river the greatest part of that Summer, forasmuch as Elaver is not passable at any foord untill towards the Autumne. And therefore to prevent that, he encamped himself in a woody place, right over against one of those bridges which Vercingetorix had commanded to be broken. The next day he kept himself there secretly with two legions, and sent forward the rest of the forces, with all the carriages, as were accustomed, taking away the fourth part of each cohort, that the number of legions might appear to be the same; commanding them to go on as far as they could; and making conjecture by the time of the day, that they were come to their camping-place, upon the same piles, (the lower part whereof remained there whole) he began to reedify the bridge; and having speedily ended the work, and carried over the Legions, and chosen a fit place to encamp in, he called back the rest of his forces. Vercingetorix having notice thereof, lest he should be forced to fight against his will, went before by great journeys. Cæsar with five incampings went from that place to Gergovia, and after a light skirmish between the horse the same day he came, having taken a view of the situation of the town, which was built upon a very high hill, and had very hard and difficult approaches on all sides, he despaired of taking it by assault, neither would he determine to besiege it, until he had made provision of corn. But Vercingetorix having set his camp on a hill before the town, had placed the severall forces of the States by themselves, in small distances round about him, and having possessed himself of all the tops of that hill, made a very terrible shew in all parts where he might be seen: he commanded likewise the chief men of the States, whom he had chosen out to be of the Councell of war, to meet always together with him at the dawning of the day, to know if any thing were to be communicated unto them, or what else was to be done. Neither did he omit any day to skirmish with his horsemen, with archers intermingled amongst them: to the end he might try what courage and valour was in his people. Right over against the town at the foot of the hill, there was a knowl exceedingly fortified, and hard to be come unto on all sides, which if four men could get they were in hope to hinder the enemy, both of a great part of their water, and also from free foraging: but the place was kept with a strong garrison. Notwithstanding Cæsar went out of his camp in the silence of the night, and before any help could come out of the town, he

put by the garrison, possessed himself of the place, left two legions there to defend it, and drew a double trench of twelve foot in breadth from the greater camp to the lesse, that single men might go safe to and fro from any sudden incursion of the enemy.

OBSERVATIONS.

First we may observe his manner of passing the river Elaver, without any impediment from the enemy, notwithstanding the care which Vercingetorix had to hinder his passages, which was plowed with as great dexterity as Elaver. The river could be deviled in such a matter: and to shadow his purpose the better, that the number of legions marching up the river might appear to be the same, he took the fourth part of every cohort, which in the whole amounted to two legions. For as I have already delivered in my former Observations, a legion consisted of ten cohorts; and every cohort contained three maniples, and every manipule had two companies which they called orders: so that every cohort having six companies, the fourth part of a cohort was a company and a half, and in a legion came to fifteen companies, and in eight legions to one hundred and twenty companies; which being reduced make threescore maniples, which were equal to three legions: and proveth that which I have already noted, the fit and convenient disposition of their troupes to take out at all times competent forces for any service without seeming to lessen any part. Secondly, I observe the phrase which he useth in this place, *Quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit*, he came to Gergovia at five incampings; which implyeth their infallible custom of encamping every night within a ditch and a rampier: for as we usually say, that to such a place is to many dayes journey, because an ordinarie traveller maketh so many journeys before he come thither; so the Romans reckoned their journeys with their army by their incampings, which were as duly kept as their journeys, and were the most signal part of their dayes journey.

CHAP. XVIII.

Convictolitanus moveth the Hedui to a revolt.

Hall these things were a doing at Gergovia, Convictolitanus the Hedui, to whom the magistracy was adjudged by Cæsar, being wrought upon by the Arverni with money, brake the matter to certain young men, amongst whom Titavicus was chief, and his brethren, being youths of a great house: with them he treated at first, and wished them to remember, that they were not only born free men, but also to empire and government. The Hedui were

Observations upon Cæsars

the only State which kept Gallia from a most assured victory: for by their authority and example, the rest would be concluded, which being set over, there would be no place in Gallia for the Romans to abide in. Touching himself, he had received a good turn from Cæsar, but in such sort, as he had but his right; but he owed more to the common liberty. For why should the Hedui rather dispute of their customs and laws before Cæsar, than the Romans come before the Hedui? These young men were quickly persuaded, as well by the speech of the Magistrate, as by rewards; in so much as they offered themselves to be the authors of that Counsell. But now the means was to be thought on, forasmuch as they were persuaded that the State would not easily be drawn to undertake that war. They determined at last, that Litavicus should have the leading of those ten thousand men that were to be sent to Cæsar, and that his brethren should be sent before to Cæsar, and concluded likewise in what sort they would have other things carried.

Litavicus having received the army, when he was about thirty miles from Gergovia, calling the souldiers suddenly together, and weeping: Whither do we go (saith he) fellow souldiers? all our horsemen and our Nobility are slain, the Princes of our State, Eporodix and Viridomarus, being fully accused of treason, are put to death by the Romans without calling them to their answer. Understand these things from them that are escaped from the slaughter: for I my self (my brethren and kinsmen being slain) am hindered with grief from telling you what hath happened. Presently those were brought forth, whom he had taught beforehand what he would have said: who verified to the multitude those things which Litavicus had spoken: that all the horsemen of the Hedui were slain, forasmuch as they were said to have had speech with the Arverni: for themselves they were hid amongst the multitude of souldiers, and were escaped out of the midst of the slaughter. The Hedui cry out all together, and do beseech Litavicus to look to himself, and to them also. Although (saith he) the matter needeth any advice or counsell, and that it were not necessary for us to go directly to Gergovia, and to join our selves with the Arverni. For do we doubt, but that the Romans, having begun so wickedly, will run presently upon us to take away our lives? And therefore if there be any courage at all in us, let us persecute their death that have perished so undeservedly, and let us kill these thieves. He shewed them divers Roman citizens that were in the troops for safety of convoy: and forthwith he seized upon a great quantity of corn and other provisions, and tormented them cruelly to death. He sent

out messengers throughout all the State of the Hedui, continuing the same false suggestion touching the slaughter of the horsemen and the Princes; persuading them to revenge their injuries in like manner as he had done.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

His treacherous practise of *Convictiolitania*, who a little before (as we may remember) had received so great a benefit from Cæsar, proveth true the saying of Cornel. Tacitus, That men are readier to revenge an injury then to requite a good turn; forasmuch as *Gratia oneris, ultio in quaestu habetur*. A good turn is as a burthen and a debt to a man, whereas revenge is reckoned a gain. The debt of loyalty and good affection, wherein *Convictiolitania* stood engaged to Cæsar, for confirming that right unto him which civile dissension had made doubtful, together with the respect of the generall cause, made him so willing to revolt from the Romans, and in lieu of thankfull acknowledgement to requite him with hostility. A part so odious and detestable, that vertue grieveth to think that a man should be capable of any such wickedness, or be stained with the infamy of so horrible a crime. Other vices are faults in speciall, and are branded with the severall marks of ignominy: but ingratitude is equal to the body of evil, and doth countervail the whole nature of hatefull affections; according to that of the Philosophers, *Ingratum si dixeris omnia dixeris*; ingratitude is culpable of all sorts of wickedness, and deserveth the greatest measure of revenge. And the rather for that it taketh away the use of vertue, and maketh men forget to do good. For whereas the nature of goodness is specially seen in communicating, it felt to the relief of other mens wants, we ought to give all diligence not to hinder this enlargement, nor by a forward and crooked example to prejudice others that stand in need of the like favour.

I have often heard it spoken, but I know not how true it is, and am loath to believe it, that in the exchange of a good turn, the party that receiveth it hath more assurance of his benefactors, touching a faithfull and friendly disposition for the future time, then he that shewed the kindness can have of the receiver: for men are loath to loose both the fruit and the seed, and will rather bestow more cost and labour, then forgoe the hope of their fruit endeavours, expecting both in reason and nature, fruit answerable to their seed: whereas the badness of our nature is such of it self, *Ut gratia oneri, ultio in quaestu habetur*.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

There is no means so ready to abuse a multitude as false suggestion, which like a lying spirit

A multitude is easily abused by false suggestions.

spirit seduceth the minds of men from the truth conceived, and fashioneth their hearts to such purposes, as seemeth best to the abuser: and the rather when it is delivered by a man of place and authority, and such a one as pretendeth carefulness for the safety of a people; for then it fliech as fast as the lightning in the aires, and deludeth the wisest and best experienced of the multitude. A mischief that can hardly be prevented, as long as there is a tongue to speak or an ear to hear. But as *Socrates* said of pain and ease, that they are always tied together: so men must endeavour to redeem the hurts of such an evil, by the benefit which thereby is consequently implied: for it were hard if wise men could not make the like use of a multitude to good purposes, as these deceivers do for their own advantage.

Numerius Pompeianus (to whom the Roman Empire did owe as much for lawes and civil government, as to *Romulus* for their martiall discipline;) the better to establish such ordinances and decrees as he made in his kingdom, feigned familiar acquaintance with a goddesse of that time called *Egeria*, and by her he said he was assured, that the Statutes which he made were both equall and just, and good for the Romans to observe: and the people found no hurt in believing it.

In like manner *Lycurgus* having given many lawes to the *Spartians*, repaired to the cite of *Delphos*, and there he got a pleasing Oracle, which he sent to *Sparta*, assuring them that his lawes were very good, and that city keeping them, should be the most renowned of the world.

And *Sertorius* for want of other means used the service of a white Hind, as a gift sent him from *Diana*, to make the *Lusitanians* believe whatsoever might best advantage his businels. And thus a multitude lieth open to good and ill purposes, and is either happy or unfortunate in the counsell of their Leader.

CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar hindereth the revolt of the Hedui.

Eporodix the Heduan, a young man of great parentage, and of great power in his countrey, together with Viridomarus, of like age and authority, but not so nobly born, who being preferred to Cæsar by Divitiacus, was by him advanced from mean estate to great dignity, came both to Cæsar with the Heduan horsemen being called out by name to that war by him. Between these two there was always contention who should be the chieftest, and in that controversy for magnificence, the one stood for *Convictiolitania*, and the other for *Cotus*. Of these two Eporodix understanding the resolution of Litavicus, opened the matter to Cæsar.

far almost about midnight. He prayed him not to suffer their State to fall away from the friendship of the people of Rome: by the wicked counsell of young men, which would necessarily fall out, if he suffered so many thousand men to join themselves to the enemy, whose safety as neither their kinsfolks would neglect, so the State could not lightly esteem of. Cæsar being much perplexed at this message, forasmuch as he had always cherished the State of the Hedui, without any further doubt or dispute, he took four expedite and unburthened Legions and all the horse out of the camp: neither was there space at such a time to make the camp lesser, forasmuch as the matter seemed to consist in expedition. He left behind him *C. Fabius* a Legate with two legions for a garrison to the camp. And having given order for the apprehending of Litavicus brethren, he found that a little before they were fled to the enemy. Thereupon adhorting the souldiers not to think much of their labour in so necessary a time, every man being most willing, he went five and twenty miles, and then met with the forces of the Hedui. The horsemen being sent to stay their march, he commanded not to kill any one of them, and gave order to Eporodix and Viridomarus (whom they thought to be slain) to ride up and down amongst the horsemen, and to call to their countrymen. They being once known, and the fraud of Litavicus discovered, the Hedui stretched out their hands, making signs of submission, and casting away their weapons, desired to be spared from death. Litavicus, with his clients and followers, who by the custome of Gallia must not forsake their patrons in the extremest danger, fled to Gergovia. Cæsar having dispatched messengers to the State of the Hedui, to acquaint them that he had saved their people, which by the law of arms he might have slain, gave the army three hours rest that night, and then returned towards Gergovia. In the mid-way certain horsemen sent by Fabius made known unto Cæsar in what danger the matter stood: that the camp was assaulted with all the enemies forces; and forasmuch as such as were wearied were still relieved with fresh men, it came to passe that our men fought with continuall labours: for the camp was so great, that they were always to stand upon the rampier to make it good: and that many were wounded with the multitude of arrowes and other sorts of weapons; wherein their engines had served them to good purpose for their defence. Fabius when these messengers came away, had shut up two gates, and left other two open, and had made sheds and bowels for the better defence of the walls, and prepared himself for the like fortune the next day. These things being known by the exceeding ravell of the souldiers, Cæsar came into the camp before Sun-rising.

Ox-

OBSERVATIONS.

Evocati,
who they
were.

As often as the people of Rome had occasion to make war, besides the body of the army enrolled for that service, in such fort and with such ceremonies as I have formerly delivered; the Consul or Generall had authority to call out such others, either of the Communalty or the Equites, as for their long service were freed by the laws from giving in their names at a muster: and these they called *Evocati*, as a man would say, called out, being all men of speciall note and service, and such as were able to give sound advice for matter of war. These *Evocati* went all for the most part under an ensigne, and were lodged together in the camp behind the pavilion of the Generall, near unto the gate which they called *Porta Prætoris*, and were alwayes free from ordinarie duties, as watching, incamping and fighting, unless it came to such a passe, that every man would put to his helping hand: but in all services they had their place appointed them according to their former experience and worth. And thus the Romans thoughten their army with the wildome and experience of such, as for many years together had been acquainted with the difficulties and casualties of war, and oftentimes were able to afford such helps, both by example and otherwise by good directions, as the wildome of the Generall did gladly embrace. Concerning these two young nobles *Eporedix* and *Viridomarus*, whom he named in this place *Evocati*, we are to understand that they were called out to that war under the same title, but to another end: for being men of great place and authority, he feared least in his absence they might be so wrought to favour *Vercingetorix*, as neither himself nor the *Hedui* should have any cause to commend them, according as it happened to *Livoreus*.

CHAP. XX.

The *Hedui* rob and kill divers Roman Citizens.

Cæsar.

While these things were a doing at Gergovia, the *Hedui* having received the first messages from *Litavicus*, gave themselves no time to understand the truth: some being led on by covetousness, others by anger and rashness, as it is naturally ingrafted in that nation to take delight in a fray for a certain truth, spoiled the Roman citizens of their goods, and slew them besides, or drew them into bondage; Convictiolanians stirring up the common people to madness, that when they had done some wicked fall, they might be ashamed to be good again. They drew Marcus Atilius a Tribune of the soldiers, as he went to the Legion, out of the town *Cavillonium*, notwithstanding their faith

and promise before given, causing the rest to do the like, which were there for matter of trade: these they set upon forthwith as they travelled, robbed them of their carriages, and besieged such as made resistance day and night: many were slain on both sides, and a greater number were stirred up to take arms. In the meantime news being come that all their soldiers were under *Cæsar's* power, they run speedily to *Aristius*, they tell him that nothing was done by publick authority, they called such as robbed the Romans of their goods to answer the matter, they confiscate the goods of *Litavicus* and his brethren, they send Ambassadors unto *Cæsar* to clear themselves of these disorders: and thus they do for the better recovery of their people that were now with *Cæsar*. But being contaminated with a wicked fall, and taken with the shame of robbing the Roman citizens, many of them being touched in the fault, and much perplexed for fear of punishment; they privily entered into consultations of war, and solicited other States to that purpose by their Ambassadors. Which although *Cæsar* understood, yet he entertained them as courteously as he could, telling them that for the ignorance and levity of the common people he would not think hardly of the State, nor about anything of his good will and favour to the *Hedui*.

OBSERVATIONS.

A Wicked act is not onely hurtfull in it self and of its own condition, but is like that box of evil, which the Poets feign to have been given to *Pandora* to be kept alwayes shut: for when the way is once made, and the gap opened, one mischief draweth on another, and the tail that followeth is more viperous then the head. There was never any one that stained himself with any detestable crime, but was moved to commit a second evil that had relation to the first: for wicked deeds are justified by themselves, and one crime is upheld by another. When the hand is dipt in bloud, it seemeth no great matter to inbrue the arm: and the loyalty of a people being once shaken by the indirect practices of a few, it is no strange matter if the whole body of that State do immediately enter into treasonable consultations, as it happened in this place with the *Hedui*, who from that time which disclosed the treachery of their heart, carried no faithfull regard to the Roman government, untill the bitterness of that war which happened shortly after had made them know their error.

It shall be necessary therefore, as much as lyeth in the possibility of our means, to keep the body of vertue safe from wounding: for albeit the wound be never so little, yet it is alwayes wide enough to let out both the bloud and the spirits,

One ill act
begeth
another.

See
the
note
on
the
text.

spirits, even to the evacuation of the vitall breath of morall honesty.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The power
of the
people do
embrace
all
means of
innovation.

Convictiolanians plebem ad ferocem impellit, stirred up the common people to madness (saith the story) as the fittest instruments to trouble the State, and to leaven the rest of the people with the fury of madness. For the poorer and meaner people, that have no interest in the Common-weal but the use of breath, nor any other substance but a Flie in the commons, are alwayes dangerous to the peace of that kingdom: for having nothing to lose, they willingly embrace all means of innovation, in hope of gaining something by other means runnes, believing altogether in the proverb, which averreth the fishing to be good which is in troubled waters.

Salust in
the conspi-
racy of
Cætiline.

Cætiline conspiring against the Roman Empire, made choice of such to accompany him whole fortune was desperate. And thereupon *Salust* saith; *Homini potentiam querenti, egentissimus quisque opportunissimus; neque sua charta, quippe que nulla sunt, et omnia cum pretio honesta videntur*: Indigent fellows are the fittest instruments for ambitious men, who regard not their own, because they have nothing, esteeming all actions honest that they gain by.

Liv writeth, that upon the rumour in Greece of warre between *Persus* and the Romans, the poorer sort did put themselves in pay under *Persus*, with this resolution, that if there happened no alteration upon this occasion, they would then cleave to the Romans, and assist them to put the State of Greece into a garboil. *Semper in civitate* (saith *Salust*) *quibus opus nulle sunt, bonis invident, malos extollunt; vetera odere, nova exoptant, ad o suarum rerum mutari omnia student*.

There are these two means left for a State to ease it self of this sort of people: either to employ them abroad in wars, or to interest them in the quiet of the Commonweale, by learning them such trades and occupations as may give them a taste of the sweetness of peace, & the benefit of a civil life.

CHAP. XXI.

Cæsar findeth an occasion to advance the service at Gergovia.

Cæsar.

Cæsar suspecting a greater revolt of the Galls, lest he might be hemmed in with the strength of all the States of Gallia, he entered into deliberation how he might leave Gergovia, and get all his army together again, that his departure might not seem to rise from the fear of their revolt, and thereby be thought

springing away. And as he thought upon these things, he seemed to spy an occasion of doing somewhat to purpose: for coming into the lesser camp to view the works, he observed a knoll which was kept by the enemy to be bare of men, which the day before could scarce be discerned by reason of the multitude of people: and wondering at it, he enquired the cause of the runnaways which came daily in great numbers unto him. They all agreed of this, which *Cæsar* had before understood by the discoverers, that the back of this hill was almost level, but narrow and woody, where it gave passage to the other part of the town. The Galls did much fear that place, for the Romans having took one knoll, if they should possess themselves of another, the Galls were almost blocked in round about, and cut off from foraging, or any other issuing out of the town: and therefore *Vercingetorix* had called them all to fortify that place.

This being known, *Cæsar* sent many troops of horse to that place about midnight, commanding them to ride up and down all thereabout somewhat tumultuously. And early in the morning he caused many horses and mules for carriage to be taken out of the camp with horsekeepers upon them, having casks upon their heads the better to resemble horsemen, and to be carried round about the hills. And to them he added a few horsemen, to the end they might spur out the more freely, and so make a better show, commanding them all to go to the same place by a long circuit about. These things were done in view of the town; for Gergovia stood, that they might from thence see into the camp; but yet in so great a distance they could not certainly perceive what was done. He sent likewise one Legion to the same hill, and appointed them to go a little way, and then to make a stand in a dale, and to hide themselves in the woods. The Galls began more to suspect that place, and all their forces were drawn thither for the strengthening of it. *Cæsar* perceiving the enemies camps to be void of men, hiding his ensigns and colours, he drew the soldiers by little and little out of the greater into the lesser camp, and acquainted the legates to whom he had given the severall legions in charge, what he would have done; warning them especially to keep in the soldiers, lest they should be carried out either with a desire of fighting, or in hope of booty. He propounded unto them the inconveniences of the disadvantage of place, which must only be avoided by expedition, the matter consisting rather in occasion and opportunity, then in fighting.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

It is an easy matter to begin a business, and to make work for many hands; but to put it off again, and to quit it without prejudice of o-

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It is an
easy matter
to begin a
work, then
to quit it
with
redit.

Livie.

thier importaint respects, is no small labour. Cæsar being engaged in the siege of *Gergovius*, and fearing a generall revolt throughout all *Gallia*, was not a little troubled how he might cleat himself of that businesse, without suspicion of fear or flight, and gather all his forces into one body again, which he had before divided into two armies: for as *Marcellus* said to *Fabius* touching the siege of *Cassellum*, *Multa magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non dimittenda esse, quia magna summa momenta in utramque partem sunt*; Many things as they are not to be attempted by great Captains; so when they are once attempted they must not be left unatched: for in either their reputation is much concerned. An enemy will conceive greater hopes from such a retreat, then from a greater advantage. And therefore a Generall ought to have as speciall a regard to the opinion which he desisteth to be held of his proceedings, as of any part belonging to his charge: for fame is the spirit of great actions, and maketh them memorable or unworthy by report. *Ceteris mortalibus in co stare consiliis quid sibi conducere putent*; *Principum* (saith *Livius*) *diversum esse forum, quibus precipua rerum ad summam dirigenda*; Other mens consultations tend only to what may most advantage themselves: Princes have more to do; to look in their management of things principally at their honour and reputation. Wherein there cannot be a better rule for the avoiding of that inconvenience, then that which *Lucretius* observed, of whom *Livie* saith; *Id prudenter in temere suscepta re Romanus fecit, quod circumspexit difficultatibus, ne frustra tempus teneret, celeriter abstulit indeptio*: He did thus far prudently in a businesse rashly undertaken; that when he saw what difficulties attended the enterprize, rather then spend time in vain, he forthwith desisted from his purpose. For the speedy leaving of any such enterprize, doth execute the rashnesse which might be imputed to the beginning; and men are not so much blamed for making triall of an ill-digested project, as they are for obstinate continuing in the same.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Some services are Res occasio nis, non praelis.

SOME services (saith *Cæsar*) are *Res occasio nis, non praelis*, businesse of opportunity, not of war: whereof I have already dispuited. Notwithstanding give me leave to add the mistake, which often falleth out in matter of opportunity. For in viewing the occurrences of the wars of these later times, we may find, that some hot-spur commanders, having asked of the good successe when occasion affords, have thought of nothing but of services affixed with opportunity, in such manner as at length they forgot that occasion came but seldome, and carried their men up

on such desperate attempts, as proved the businesse to be a matter scarce affording means to fight for their lives, but were often swallowed up, with devouring danger: wherein they did mistake the condition of the service, and fell short of *Cæsars* example. For albeit he sent out his men to struggle with the height of the hill, and the disadvantage of well-fortified camps; yet he knew they should find little resistance by the enemy, being drawn away upon other occasions; if they made that expedition as was requisite in this service; whereby he left them not without means to overthrow those difficulties, and so made it *Rem occasio nis, non praelis*, a businesse of opportunity, not of war.

CHAP. XXII.

The Romans make an assault upon Gergovius.



These things being delivered, he gave the souldiers the sign to begin, and at the same time he sent out the *Hedus* by another ascent on the right side. The wall of the town was distant by a right line from the plain and the foot of the hill (if it lay even without any dale or valley) a thousand and two hundred paces: what soever more was added in fetching a circuit about to climb the steep of the hill, was over and besides that distance. From the middle of the hill in length, as the nature of the place would bear it, the *Galles* had with great stones raised a wall of a foot or higher, to hinder the assault of our men; and the lower part being left void and empty, they filled the upper part of the hill even to the wall of the town with thick and frequent camps. The souldiers upon the sign given were quickly come to the works, and passing over them they passed themselves of three camps, with such speed and expedition, that *Teutomatus* the king of the *Niederbriges*, being surprised in his tent as he rested about noon time, the upper part of his body being naked and his horse wounded, did hardly escape the hands of souldiers occupied in booty. *Cæsar* having got that which he propounded to himself, commanded a retreat to be sounded; and the Ensigns of the tenth Legion staid. But the souldiers of the other Legions not hearing the sound of the trumpet, forasmuch as a great valley was between them, were staid notwithstanding at first by the Tribunes of the souldiers and the Legates, according as *Cæsar* had given in charge. But being carried away as well with a hope of speedy victory, as by the sight of the enemy, and the fortunate battels of former times, they thought nothing so difficult but they could overcome it by their valour, inasmuch as they desisted not from following, untill they came to the wall and the gates of the town. Then a great outcry being took up in all

all parts of the town, such as were further off being terrified with the suddenesse of the tumult, thinking the enemy had been within the gates, did cast themselves out of the town: and the women cast down their apparell and their silver from the walls, and holding out their naked breasts, with their hands spread abroad, advised the Romans to save them, and that they would not (as they had done at *Avaricum*) destroy both women and children: and some women slipped down by their hands from the wall, and gave themselves freely to the souldiers. *L. Fabius* a centurion of the eighth legion, who was heard to say that day, that the booty which he had got at *Avaricum* so stirred him up, that he would suffer no man to get up upon the wall before himself; having got three of his manipular souldiers, with their help he climbed up to the top of the wall, and then he himself did help up his fellows. In the mean time such as were on the other side of the town, busied in fortifying that place, (as we have already delivered) first the noise being heard, and then stirred up by often messengers, that the Romans had took the town, sending their horsemen before, they hasted thither in great numbers, and still as they came, they stood under the wall, and increased the number of such as they found fighting. A great multitude being at length come together, the women that a little before had reached out their hands from the wall to the Romans, began now to adjure their own people, and as the manner of the *Galles* is, to shew their hair loose about their ears, and to bring out their children.

OBSERVATIONS.

It is honourable for souldiers to keep their directions.

IT is both safe and honourable for Souldiers and inferior Commanders to keep their directions: for whensoever they go about to enlarge their businesse according to their own fantasy, howsoever occasion may seem to further their desires, they invert the whole course of discipline, and do arrogate more to themselves, then they do attribute to their Generall.

The Romans were strict in this point, as may appear by that of *Manlius*, who put his own son to death for making a happy fight against the enemy contrary to his directions: for although it fortun'd to fall out well at that time, yet the example was so dangerous in a well-ordered war, that he chose rather to bring a mischief upon his own son, then an inconvenience to their military government. *Injussu tuo (saith one in Livie to the Consul) nunquam pugnabo, non si certam victoriam videam*; unless thou biddest, I will never fight, no, though

I see the victory clear before me; making profession of true obedience, and ranging himself in the order of such parts, as have no other office but obsequence. For an army is as a body, and the souldiers are as particular parts, every man according to his place: the Generall is as the life and soul, and giveth motion to every part according to reason. And as in a naturall body no part can move without directions from the life; so in the body of an army, when any part moveth without the content of the head, the motion is either monstrous or exorbitant, and such with such an effect as condemneth the instruments of unadvised rashnesse.

Polybius saith, that men have two ways to come by wisdom; either by their own harms, or by other mens misadventures. Such wisdom as is got through correction happening by their own errors, is dearly bought; but sitting near them, is not easily forgotten: that which is obtained by other mens misfortunes, is well come by, and at an easy rate; but for the most part it is soon forgotten: but such as can retain it to a good use, are most happy men. This precept to souldiers touching obedience, and the precise keeping of their directions, hath by other mens harms to often been urged, as a man would think that later ages should beware of this disorder. And yet it falleth out almost in every small service. For the greatest losse which the English received at any one time at *Ostend*, was in a fall; wherein captain *Woodward* having possesst himself of some of the enemies works, when by his directions he should have staid, thinking to improve his reputation by some further service, deeming it easy peradventure to go forward, he went on beyond the compass of his command: whereby it happened, that both the enemy had greater scope to revenge their former dishonour, and the rest of our English troup that had their part in that project by way of second helps, could not proceed according to their directions; and so they all returned with losse.

That which *Xenophon* reporteth touching one *Chrysantas*, is notable to this purpose; who being in the heat of a conflict, and having his sword lift up to strike one of the adverse party, he chanced to hear a retreat sounded, whereupon he presently withdrew his hand, and did forbear to smite him. Which howsoever to some may seem ridiculous, and unfitting the temper of a souldier in time of battel; yet let them know that *Xenophon* a great Commander, and an excellent historian, did alledge that example to the eternall memory of the forenamed party, for the knowledge and instruction of *Cyrus*, whom he propoundeth to the world as an absolute pattern both of military and civile vertue.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Romans continue the assault, and are beaten off with loss.

(121.)

His contention was not indifferent to the Romans, neither in place nor in number of combatants, being wearied with battles both with the long race which they had run, and with the continuance of their fight, whereby they did not so easily bear the enemy being whole and fresh. *Cæsar* seeing the fight to be in an unequal place, and the enemy still to increase their forces, fearing his people, he sent to T. Sextius the legate, whom he had left to command the lesser camp, to bring out the cohorts speedily, and to place them at the foot of the hill on the right side of the enemy; to the end that if our men were forced to forsake their place, yet the enemy might be terrified from following them over freely, he himself removing a little out of that place where he stood with the legion, attended the event of the battle. And as they fought at hand very fiercely, the enemy trusting in the place and in the multitude, and our men in their valour, the *Hedui* suddenly appeared on the open side of our men, whom *Cæsar* had sent up by another ascent on the right hand, to keep off part of the enemy. These by the likeness of their armour did wonderfully astonish our men: who although they saw their right arms shewed or put forth, which was a sign of peace, yet they doubted lest the enemy had used that policy to deceive them. At the same instant L. Fabius the Centurion, and those that climbed up upon the wall with him, being slain, were cast down from the wall again, and M. Petreius a Centurion of the same legion, as he was about to cut down the gates, being oppressed with the multitude, and despairing of his own life, having received many wounds; Forasmuch (saith he to his souldiers that followed him) as I cannot save my self, and you too, I will certainly provide for your safety, whom I have brought into danger whilst I trusted after honour. You, while you may, shift for your selves. And withall he broke through the thickest of the enemy, and with the slaughter of a couple he removed the rest from the gate. And as his souldiers went about to help him, in vain (saith he) do you endeavour to save my life, which blood and strength have already forsaken: and therefore get you hence while you have means, and beside your selves to the legion, and so fighting fell down dead, but saved his men. Our men being overcharged on all sides, with the loss of six and forty Centurions, were beaten down from the place: but the tenth legion, which stood for a rescue in a more equal place, hindered the *Gallies* from following

over eagerly. And again, the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, which *Sextius* had brought out of the camp, seconded that legion, having got the advantage of the upper ground. The legions as soon as they came into the plain, stood still, and turned head to the enemy. *Vercingetorix* drew back his men from the foot of the hill, and brought them into their camps. That day few less than seven hundred souldiers were wanting.

OBSERVATIONS.

And this is the end of presumptuous rashness, when men are become so pregnant, as to take upon them more than is required. But as they say of fair weather, that it is pity it should do hurt: so is it great pity that valour and resolution should prove disadvantageous. For this overdoing of a service, is but the spirit of valiant carriage, and the very motion of prowess and courage, memorable in the offenders themselves; as we may see by this particular report of *Fabius* and *Petreius*: and much to be pitied, that virtue should at any time be overquelled with a greater strength.

At this service the Romans stood in these terms; they were overmatched in numbers, they had spent their strength in speedy running to the place which in itself was not favourable unto them, but almost as great an enemy as the *Gallies*, only they trusted in their valour, and thought by virtue to clear all difficulties. The *Gallies* had the favour of the place, a far greater number of fighting men, they came fresh to the battle, and were always seconded with fresh supplies. *Cæsar* seeing the two armies engaged one with another, could neither part them nor recall his souldiers, but let such forces as were free in such convenient places, as might rescue his people in the retreat, and keep the *Gallies* from following the chase, or making any great slaughter of the Roman souldier. Whereby it happened, that in so great an inequality, where there were so many swords drawn to make way to death, there were not seven hundred men lost of the Roman army. And yet it happened to be the greatest loss that ever he received in those wars in his own preference, when the issue of the conflict gave the enemy the better of the day.

CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar rebuketh the rashness of his souldiers; and maketh light, but successful skirmishes upon the enemy.

Cæsar the next day calling the army before him, rebuked the temerity and cupidit of the souldiers, forasmuch as they had took upon them to judge how far they were to go, or what they were to do; neither would they stay upon

upon the sounding of a retreat, nor hearken to the Tribunes nor the Legates that would have kept them back. He laid open unto them how available the inequality of the place was, and what he himself thought of it, when at *Avaticum* he took the enemy without a General and without cavalry, yet did forgo a most assured victory, lest in the buckling he might have received a small loss through the inequity of the place. How admirable was the greatness of their spirit, whom neither the fortifications of the camp, the height of the hill, nor the wall of the town could stop or hinder! wherein he blamed their licentious arrogancy the more, forasmuch as they had took upon them to judge better of the victory, and the success of their service, than the General himself: neither did he so much desire to find courage and virtue in his souldiers, as modesty and sobriety. This speech being delivered, and in the end confirming their minds that they might not be discouraged at the matter, nor attribute that to the worth of the enemy, which indeed was in the nature of the place; keeping his former purpose of departure, he brought the legions out of the camp, embattled them in a convenient place, and finding that *Vercingetorix* would not be drawn into an indifferent place, after a light skirmish of horse, wherein the Romans had the better, he carried his army back again into the camp; and doing the like the next day, thinking it sufficient to abate the pride of the *Gallies*, and to strengthen the courage of his souldiers, he removed his camp into the State of the *Hedui*, the enemy refusing to make after him.

OBSERVATIONS.

Reparation of honour, what it is,

Plutarch in the life of Marcellus.

Reparation of honour is a chief point in the carriage of an army: for he that leaveth an enemy upon a loss received, when his souldiers are either awed or well beaten, must look to find the same spirit and courage in them, when they shall come again to confront the enemy, as they had when they last left him with a disadvantage; which is nothing else but an unskillful continuance of his own loss, and a preparation to a second overthrow. In the warre the Romans had with *Annibals*, in all the fights they made, they continued their first loss unto the battell at *Nola*: at what time by *Marcellus* good directions, they gave him an overthrow; which was the first time that ever *Annibals* souldiers began to give place to the Romans, and repaired the Romans valour again, after so many battels as they lost. For then they were persuaded that they fought not with an enemy altogether invincible, but that he was subject to loss and overthrow. And in respect of this to happy a fortune, restoring the Roman souldiers to their ancient valour and good fortune, it is that *Livius*

saith, *Ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illi bello gesta sit.* A great piece of service was performed that day, &c. I think I may say the greatest that was done in that warre. *Cæsar* did well understand this Philosophie: and therefore he laboured to repair the breach which the enemy had made in the valour of his souldiers, by light and small skirmishes, before he would adventure to hazard the main drift of the business in any set conflict. And the rather for that he had a purpose to leave the enemy for a time, whereby he seemed to end the former services; wherein he had a special care not to depart with the last blow, having always before that time had the better: for the condition of the end doth challenge much of the former proceedings, and doth draw the opinion of men to deem of all as the conclusion importeth. According as *Claudius Nero* told his souldiers: *Semper quod postremo adjectum sit, id rem totam videri traxisse.* As the end of the service is, so the whole seems to have been.

CHAP. XXV.

The *Hedui* revolt: *Cæsar* passeth his army over the river Loire.

His third day he repaired the bridge at the river *Eleva*, and carried over his army. There he understood by *Viridomarus* and *Eporodorus*, that *Litavicus* was gone with all the enemies horse to sollicite the State of the *Hedui*, and therefore it was requisite that *Cæsar* should send them before to confirm the State, and keep them in loyalty. And although *Cæsar* did mistrust the State of the *Hedui* for many causes, and did think that the departure of these two Nobles would hasten their revolt; yet he did not think it fit to detain them, lest he should either seem to do them wrong, or to give any suspicion of distrust. At their departure he propounded unto them briefly, how well he had deserved of their State, how low and weak they were when he received them, confined within their towns, their lands extended, all their associates taken from them, a tribute laid upon them, pledges extorted from them with great contumely; and into what fortune and greatness he had brought them again, that not only they had recovered their former state, but did exceed the dignity and favour of all former times: and with these mandates he let them go. *Noviodunum* was a town of the *Hedui*, situate in a convenient place, upon the bank of the river Loire. Thither had *Cæsar* sent all the hostages of Gallia, the corn, the publick treasure, and the greatest part of the baggage of the army; and thither he had likewise sent great store of horse, which he had bought in Spain and Italy for the service of this war. *Eporodorus*

rix and Viridomarus coming thither, and understanding touching the affairs of their State, that Livavius was received into Bibract by the Hedui, which is the Metropolitane of their State, and that Convictolitanis their chief Magistrate, and a great part of the Senate were come unto him, and that publick messengers were sent to Vercingetorix touching a league of peace and amitie; they did not think it fit to omit so great an opportunity. And thereupon having slain the Guard at Noviodunum, with such others as were there either by way of trade or travel, they divided the money and the horses between them, and took order that the hostages of the other States should safely be conveyed to Bibract. For the towns, forasmuch as they thought they were not able to keep it, lest the Romans might make any use of it, they burned it: such corn as they could carry on the sleds, they conveyed away in boats, the rest they either burned or cast it into the river. They began to raise forces in the countries, next adjoining; to dispose of watches and garrisons on the bank of the river Loire; to shew their Cavalry in all places, to strike fear into the Romans, to the end they might exclude them from provision of corn; or drive them through necessity of want to forsake the Province. Whereof they were the rather assured, forasmuch as the Loire was much swelled by a fall of snow, whereby it was unpassable at any foard. These things being known, Cæsar thought it necessary for him to make haste (especially if he must make up the bridges) to the end he might give them battle before they had gathered a greater head: for touching his purpose for returning into the Provinces he did not think it fit by any means, both in respect of the shame and infamy thereof, as also forasmuch as the opposition of the hill Gebennas, and the difficulty of the passage did hinder him; but especially for that he did exceedingly desire to joyn himself with Labienus and the Legions that were with him. And therefore making great journeys both by day and night beyond all mens expectation, he came to the river Loire, where the horsemen having found a convenient foard for the necessity of the time, that the souldiers might pass over with their arms and shouldiers above the water, to hold up their weapons, disposing the horse in the river to break the force of the stream, and the enemy being affrighted upon their first shew, he carried over his Army in safety. And having satisfied his souldiers with corn which he found in the fields, and good store of cattell, he determined to march towards the Senones.

OBSERVATIONS.

The change which the revolt of

The greatest difficulty that ever Cæsar found in the course of these warres, was at this

instant upon the revolt of the Hedui. For whereas that State after Cæsars coming into Gallia, was ever reputed the favourite of the Roman Empire, having received such speciall privileges and prerogatives above the rest, as might tie them with an inviolable bond of amity to the people of Rome: it was not to be expected that they should forsake to great a stay, or favour any thing that might tend to the weakening of that authority, which preferred them in dignity before all other States of that Continent: and was as a Remora to divers other Nations of Gallia, from shewing that defection by plain and open revolt, which they had so long before conceived in their minds.

But when it appeared (notwithstanding any precedent benefit, or the merit of imperiall favours) that the Hedui did affect the common cause of their Countries liberty, and were content to ingage themselves therein, as far as their lives or fortunes could any way be valued: it was not to be doubted, but that such other Commonwealths, as before that time had remained neutrall, and had less cause then the Hedui to keep back their hands from a work of that piety, would apprehend the matter as a business importing the safety of their Countries liberty, whereunto Cæsar and the Legions were common enemies. The consideration whereof made Cæsar to think of returning back into the Province, had not the dishonour of such a retreat, and the desire he had to joyn with Labienus, hindered that purpose.

CHAP. XXVI.

Labienus cometh to Lutetia with four Legions.

While these things were done by Cæsar, Labienus having left those supplies which came last out of Italy, at Agendicum, for the safety of the carriages, went himself with four Legions towards Lutetia, a town of the Parisians, built in an Island in the river Sequana. The enemy understanding of his coming, great forces were speedily brought together out of the countries near about. The chiefest command was given to Camulogenus of the nation of the Aulerci, who notwithstanding his great age, was called to that honour for his singular knowledge in matter of warre. He finding it to be a continued bog that ran into Sequana, and much hindered all that place, did stay there with his army, and purposed to hinder the passage of the Romans. Labienus did first endeavor to drive the vines, to fill up the bog with hurdles and earth, and so to make the passage firm: but after that he perceived it to be very hard to effect, in the third watch of the night he went out of the camp with silence, and the same way that he came, he went to Melodunum, a town of the Senones, situate in an Island of Sequana, as

the Hedui made in Gallia.

Lutetia is: and having surprised some fistic ships and boats, and manned them with souldiers, the townspeople being affrighted with the novelty of the matter, of whom a great part were called out to that warre, he possessed himself of the town without any resistance. The bridge being repaired which the enemy had cut down a few dayes before, he transported over the army, and went down along the river towards Lutetia. The enemy having notice thereof by such as escaped from Melodunum, commanded Lutetia to be burned, and the bridges of the town to be broken: they themselves forsaking the bog, sat down upon the banks of Sequana, right over against the camp of Labienus. By this time Cæsars departure from Gergovia was known abroad, with the revolt of the Hedui: and rumours were brought of a second rising and motion in Gallia. It was certainly confirmed, that the Galles were in consultation, that Cæsar was kept back both by the difficulties of the passage and the river Loire, and for want of corn was constrained to return into the Province. The Bellovaci also understanding of the revolt of the Hedui, whereas they were before treacherous and disloyal of themselves, did now begin to raise forces and prepare for open warre. Labienus upon so great a change of things, understood that it was necessary for him to take another manner of course then was before intended. For now he thought not of making any conquest, or urging the enemy to battell, but to bring the army back in safety to Agendicum. For on the one side, the Bellovaci stood ready to charge him, being a people that had the name for deeds of arms of all the nations in Gallia; the other side was kept by Camulogenus with an army ready in the field: and last of all, the Legions were kept from their garrison and their carriages with a great river that ran between them and it.

OBSERVATIONS.

He that will do things well, must vary with the time.

The great alteration which the revolt of the Hedui made in Gallia, caused Labienus to let fall his former resolutions, and to shape such a course as might best answer the extremity of the tempest. For he that will attain the end of his desires, or make peace with the affections of his mind, must not think at all times to carry away contentment with the strength of his means, or subdue resistance with force of arms, but must be well pleased to be driven with the stream, until he meet with a tide of better opportunity: for oftentimes it falleth out, that the opposition of resisting power is more available then the Legions commanded by Cæsar, or what the Roman Empire could add besides, to so great an army. For there is no quantitie so great, but there may be found a greater; nor none so little,

but there may be a less: which may teach a man neither to conceit himself in a matchless singularity, nor to despair of a weak condition. And this is that which is so often recommended to the consideration of discreet Governours, whether they be Magistrates in peace, or Commanders in warre, to put them in mind of the condition of times, and to carry themselves answerable thereunto: forasmuch as so fortunate and happy success, riseth for the most part from such means as have respect to the occurrences of the time, not running alwayes upon one bias, nor failing at all times with a fore-wind; but sometimes to prels forward, and sometimes to give back, according as the circumstances of the time shall make way to good fortune.

Fabius the great Roman thought it no scorn to be called coward, or to undergo the disputation of the people of Rome, while he gave place to the fury of the Carthaginian, and retuled to receive a third overthrow. And thus he altered the counsell of the Roman warre according to the times, and overthrew that enemy by shunning to encounter him, which in a battell would have hazarded the conquest of Rome. In like manner Cn. Sulpitius the Dictator did imitate this wisdom of Fabius against the Galles, by lingering out the warre: Nolens se fortuna committere adversus hostem (as Livy saith) quem tempus deteriorum indies & locus alienus faceret; Not willing to put the trial to Fortune, whenas he dealt with an enemy, which time and ignorance of the place rendered every day weaker and weaker. And to conclude this point, Cæsar upon the loss which he received at Dyrrachium, Omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit, thought it his best way to alter the whole course of the warre, as the Story saith: which was nothing else but varying with the times, and helping a bad Fortune with new directions.

Plutarch in the life of Fabius.

CHAP. XXVII.

Labienus passeth the river Sequana, and fighteth with the Galles.

Or the avoiding of these great difficulties which came so suddenly upon him, he knew there was no help to be had, but that which the virtue of his mind would afford him: and therefore calling a counsell a little before the evening, he adhorred them to execute such things as he commanded both with diligence and industry; and so taking the ships which he had brought from Melodunum, he divided them amongst the Roman horsemen, and after the first watch he commanded them to go four miles down the river in silence, and there to attend him. He left five cohorts, which he brought

Cæsar.

to be too weak for any fight, as a garrison to the camp, and sent the other five cohorts of the same legion about midnight with all the carriages up the river, commanding them to make a great noise and tumult as they went. He sought out all barges and boats, and sent them up the river with much noise and beating of oars; and a little while after he himself went quietly with three legions to the place where he had commanded the ships to abide him. At his coming thither, the enemies discovered which were disposed on all parts of the river, were suddenly and at unawares surprised by our men by reason of a sudden tempest that did rise in the mean time: and the army and the horse were by the diligence of the Roman Knights (to whom he had committed that business) carried over. At the same time a little before day-light, the enemy had intelligence that there was an extraordinary noise and tumult in the Roman camp, and a great troop went up the river, and the beating of oars was heard that way, and a little below the soldiers were carried over. Which being known, forasmuch as they judged that the legions were carried over in three places, and that they were so perplexed at the revolt of the Hedui, that they fled away; they divided their forces also into three parts, for a garrison being left right over against the Roman camp, and a small band sent towards Glottendium, which was to go so far as the boats went, they carried the rest of their army to meet Labienus. By the dawning of the day all our men were carried over, and the enemy was discovered ranged in battle. Labienus adorning the soldiers to be-think themselves of their ancient virtue, and to recall the memory of their fortunate battles, and to suppose that Cæsar himself was present, under whose leading they had oftentimes overthrown the enemy; he gave the sign of battle. Upon the first assault, on the right wing, where the seventh legion stood, the enemy was beaten back and put to flight; in the left corner, where the twelfth legion was, the former ranks of the enemy being pierced through and beaten dead down with the pikes, the rest notwithstanding did stoutly resist, neither did any man give suspicion of flying. Camulogenus the General was present with his men, and encouraged them to fight, the victory being uncertain. When the Tribunes of the seventh legion understood what was done in the left wing, they showed the legion behind on the back of the enemy, and there began to charge them: and yet none of them forsook his place, but were all inclosed and slain, Camulogenus ending his dayes by the same fortune. Such of the enemy as were left over against the Roman camp, understanding that the battle was begun, came to second their fellows, and took a hill, but were not able so abide

our conquering soldiers; but joining themselves to the rest that fled, were neither protected by the woods nor the mountains, but were all slain by the horsemen. This business being ended, Labienus returned to Agendicum, where the carriages of the whole army were left: and from thence came to Cæsar with all the forces.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Labienus being to passe the river of Seine, which was strongly guarded by the Galles, was forced to seek a means out of the virtue of his mind, (as Cæsar saith) and to lay such a project as might amuse the enemy, and keep him in suspense what way to take to prevent his passage, until he had effected that which he desired. Which bringing to our consideration the saying of Epaminondas the Theban, that there is nothing more necessary or behovefull for a General, then to understand the purposes of the enemy. A point so much the more commendable, by how much it is in itself difficult, and hard to be discovered; for it were hard to understand their secret deliberations, which for the most part are only known to the Generall, or to such chief Commanders as are near about him, when then very actions which every man knoweth, and such things as are done in the open view of the world, are oftentimes doubtfull to an enemy.

There hath a notable story to this purpose. Sempronius the Roman Consul giving battle to the Æqui, the fight continued until the night parted them, not without alteration of fortune, sometimes the Romans prevailing, and sometimes the Æqui: the night coming on, both sides being weary and half out of, they forsook their camps, and for their better safety took each of them a hill. The Roman army divided it self into two parts: the one part followed the Consul, and the other a Centurion, named Tempinus, a fellow of great spirit, and had shewed much worth in the battle. The next morning the Consul without further inquiry, made towards Rome; and so did the Æqui withdraw their army back into their country: either of them deeming themselves overthrown, and casting victorie upon each others shoulders. It happened that Tempinus with that part of the army that kept with him, inquiring after the enemy, found him to be overthrown and fled: whereupon he first went to the Roman camp and made that good, and then marched to the camp of the Æqui, which he took and rifled, and so returned victor to Rome.

The morning following, the battell of Agincourt, Monjoy the French Herald coming to enquire for prisoners, King Henry asked him who had won the field: To which he answered, That the French had lost it: which was unknown

Necessary for a General to understand the purposes of the enemy

The fittest age of life for a General.

known to that worthy Conquerour. Plutarch writeth, that Cæsius killed himself upon the like error, not knowing the fortune of the right wing of his army. And therefore it must needs be a commendable matter, to understand the deliberations of an enemy, when the issue of a battell is oftentimes so uncertain.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Camulogenus hath the report in this place of singular knowledge and experience in matter of war, and being of a great age he fought as resolutely as the youngest gallant of them all, which may bring to our consideration the fittest age of life to be wished in a General, for the achieving of noble and worthy exploits. Wherein we are to consider, that the youth and former years of a mans age, are plentifully stored with hot blood and nimble spirits, which quickly apprehend the conceptions of the mind, and carry them with such violence to execution, that they bereave the judgement of her prerogative, and give it no respite to censure them; whereby it cometh to pass, that young men are for the most part heedless, inconsiderate, rash and resolute, putting more upon hazard then upon good advice.

On the other side, old age is cold in blood, and not so quick of spirit, but being beaten with the rod of long experience, it learneth to be slow and lingering, full of doubts and consideration, inclining rather to a feminine fear, then to a forward resolution.

Neither of these attributes are simply in themselves the best attendants of noble enterprises: for a hot, hasty gallant may run apace, but not go sure; and what young man soever is advanced to command, had need of an old mans wit to discharge it. And if authority did at any time fall into the hands of youth in the Roman government, which was very seldom, it was *Premium virtutis, non ætatis*; for his virtues sake, not his age. Pompey was extraordinary happy in that behalf, for he attained the surname of great, because he had deserved the honour of triumph before his beard was grown. And yet Sertorius took such advantage at Pompeys youth, coming against him in Spain, that he said he would have whipped the young boy to Rome again with rods, had not that old woman (meaning Metellus) come to help him.


Again, where old age heapech doubt upon doubt, and falleth into the danger of unprofitable lingering, *Nec ausus est satis nec providit*, it wanteth boldness to steel the enterprise, & falleth also short of good providence, as Tacitus speaketh of V. Valens. Augustus Cæsar purposing to commend Tiberius his successor with an extraordinary praise, said he was a man that never put one thing to be twice consulted of.

And it is said of Marius, that being come to the age of threecore and five years or thereabouts, he shewed himself very cold and slow in all his enterprises, forasmuch as age had mortified his active heat, and killed that ready disposition of body that was wont to be in him. The Romans finding Fabius Maximus to be full of doubts and delay, good to defend but not to offend, and Marcellus of a stirring spirit, neither quiet with good nor ill fortune, (as Annibal truly said of him) they thought to joyn Marcellus youthfull courage with Fabius fear and wisdom, and so make a temperate fit for a General; whereupon they called Marcellus the sword, and Fabius the buckler: wherein Cæsar of himself was excellent, of whom Suetonius reporteth, *Dubium cautior, an audentior*; It is uncertain whether he was more wary or daring.

The best state of years then for this business, is that which tempereth the heat of youth with the coldness of age, and quickneth the slow and dull proceedings of double advices, with the rashness of youthfull resolution: and falleth out between the years of five and thirty and five and fifty. Scipio Africanus commanded the Roman army in Spain at four and twenty years of age, and died at four and fifty. Annibal was chosen General to Asdrubal at six and twenty years, and poisoned himself at threecore and ten. Pompey was slain at nine and fifty, and Cæsar at fixe and fifty. Marcellus kept his youthfull resolution to his old dayes: for being threecore years of age, he never longed for any thing more then to fight with Annibal hand to hand.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Galles consult of the carriage of that war.

 He revolt of the Hedui being known, Gallia the warre waxed greater. Ambassadors were sent out into all parts, and they laboured to draw the rest of the States to their party, as farre as either favour, authority, or money could prevail: having got the pledges into their hands which Cæsar had left with them, they terrified such as stood doubtfull, by threatening to kill them. The Hedui do desire Vercingetorix to come unto them, and to acquaint them with the course of that war, which being yielded unto, they labour to have the chief command transferred upon them. The matter growing unto a controversy, a generall Councell of all Gallia was summoned at Bibract. Thither they repaired in great multitudes: and the matter being put to voices, they all with one consent made allowance of Vercingetorix for their General. The men of Rhemes, with the Lingones and Trevis were absent from this Councell: the two first continuing their affection to the Roman party: the Trevis were

Plutarch in the life of Marius.

Plutarch in the life of Sertorius.

Hist. 1.

Holinshed 1. Henry 4. c. 5.

survive off, and were annoyed by the Germans; in respect they were absent from that warre, and remained neutral. The Hedui were much grieved that they were put by the principallities, they complained of the change of their fortune, and wished for Cæsar's former indulgence; neither yet durst they disjoin themselves again from the rest, the warre being already undertaken; but Eporedorix and Vindomarus, two young men of great hope, were constrained, though unwilling, to obey Vercingetorix. He commanded pledges to be delivered by the rest of the States, and appointed a day for that business. He commanded fifteen thousand horse to be speedily brought together: touching foot forces, he would content himself with those which he had; for his purpose was not to wage battell, but whereas he was very strong in horse, he made no doubt to keep the Romans from corn and forrage: only they must patiently endure to have their corn spoiled, and their houses burnt; which particular losse would quickly be recompensed with liberty and perpetuall sovereignty. These things being ordered, he commanded ten thousand foot to be raised by the Hedui and Segusiavi bordering upon the Province; and to them he added eight hundred horse, and sent them under the command of Eporedorix his brother, to make warre against the Allobroges. And on the other side he cursed the Gabali and the nearest villages of the Arverni to set upon the Helvii, the Rutheni, and the Cadurci, and to depopulate their country. Notwithstanding by secret messages he dealt with the Allobroges, whose minds he thought to be scarce settled from the former warre: he promised money to their chiefe men, and to give the government of all the Roman Province to their State. To answer all these chances, there were provided but two and twenty cohorts, which being raised out of the Provinces, were disposed by L. Cæsar a Legate to prevent these mischiefs. The Hedui of their own accord giving battell to their borderers, were beaten out of the field, and were driven into their towns with the slaughter of C. Valerius Donotaurus, the sonne of Cæbarus the chief man of their State, and of many other. The Allobroges having set many watches and garrisons upon the river Rhene, did with great care and diligence defend their borders. Cæsar understanding the enemy to be stronger in horse than he himself was, and the passages being shut that he could not send either into the Province or into Italy for any supplies, he sent over the Rhene into Germany, and got horse from such States as he had quieted the year before, with such light-armed footmen as were accustomed to fight amongst the horse. At their arrivall, forasmuch as they were not well fitted with horse, he took the horses from the Tribunes, the Roman Knights,

and the Evocati, and distributed them amongst the Germans.

OBSERVATIONS.

There are three principall means to draw a State into a partie which of it self standeth neutrall, or to win the minds of men, when they carrie equal or indifferent affections. The first is, by favour or friendship; the second, by authority; and the third, by money.

Friendship relieth upon former respects, and the exchange of precedent countesses. Authority concludeth from future dangers, and the inconveniences which may follow the refusal. Money doth govern the present occasion, and is more generall then either favour or authority. The Gallies were not wanting to make their partie good in any of these three perswading motives: but as Cæsar saith, *Quantum gratia, auctoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas civitates nuntur*: they solicited the neighbour States, as farre as friendship, authority, and money would go.

Wherein as they went about to lay the stock upon us, so they left themselves but one triall for the right of their cause, and joynd issue for all upon the fortune of that action: for when they should see their best possibilities too weak, and their utmost endeavours profit nothing against a mighty prevailing enemy, the greater their hopes were which they had in the means, the greater would be their despair when such means were spent; for it is a shrewd thing for men to be out of means, and not to drive a hope before them.

It is usuall upon such main occasions to imploy the chiefe man in a State, in whom the souldiers may have most assurance, and to accompany him with such means as the strength of the Commonweal may afford him: but if their greatest hopes die in his ill successe, or wax faint through cold fortune, the kingdome receiveth losse, and the enemy getteth advantage, as may appear by the issue of this great preparation.

CHAP. XXIX.

The Cavalrie of the Gallies do set upon the Roman army, and are beaten.



While these things were a doing, the enemies forces and the horsemen that were commanded to be levied in all Gallia, met together, and came out of the territories of the Arverni. A great number of these being gathered together, as Cæsar marched against the Sequani by the borders of the Lingones, to the end he might the easier relieve the Province, Vercingetorix sat down about ten miles from the Romans in three severall camps, and calling the Captains and Colonels of horse to counsell, he told them that

Three chiefe means to win men to favour a matter.
1. Favour or friendship.
2. Authority.
3. Money.

Cæsar.

that the time of victory was now come; for the Romans left Gallia, and fled into the Province: which was sufficient for the obtaining of their present liberties, but availed little for the peace and quiet of future times, forasmuch as the Romans did not purpose to make an end of the warre, but to return again with greater forces. And therefore it was necessary to set upon them in their march laden with carriages. If the foot did assist their horse, then they were not able to make any way or proceed in their journey. But if (which he hoped would rather happen) forsaking their carriages every man fitted for himself, they would depart both robbed of their necessities and of their honour: for they need not doubt of the enemies horse, of whom he was most assured that they durst not go out from amongst the foot forces. And to the end they might be the better encouraged, he would draw all the forces in a readinesse out of the camp, and place them so as they might be a terror to the enemy. The horsemen cried out all together, that this resolution might be strengthened with an holy oath: Let him never be received under any roof, or have access to his wife, children, or parents, that did not twice run through the army of the enemy. The thing being well liked of, and every man forced to take that oath, the next day he divided his cavalrie into three parts: two armies showed themselves on each side, and the third began to make stay of the warward. Which being known, Cæsar divided his horses likewise into three parts, and sent them to make head against the enemy. At the same time they fought in all parts, the army stood still, the carriages were received within the Legions: if our men were overcharged any where, Cæsar bent the Legions that way, which did both hinder the enemy from following them, and assure our men of hope of rescue. At length the Germans having possessed themselves of a hill on the right side, did put the enemy from their places, and followed them as they fled even to the river, where Vercingetorix stayed with the foot companies, and slew many of them. Whereupon the rest fearing lest they should be encompassed about, betook themselves to flight: execution was done in all places. Three of the Nobilitie of the Hedui were taken and brought to Cæsar: Cotus the General of the horse, who at the last election of Magistratus stood in controversy with Convictorianus; and Cavarillus, who after the revolt of Litavicus, commanded the foot troops; and Eporedorix, under whose command, before Cæsar's coming into Gallia, the Hedui made warre with the Sequani. All the cavalrie being put to flight, Vercingetorix drew in his forces which he had imbarcelled before his camp, and immediately after began to march towards Alesia a town of the Mandubii com-

manding the baggage to be speedily brought out of the camp and to follow him. Cæsar having conveyed his carriages to the next hill, under the custody of two Legions, he followed the enemy as long as the day would give him leave: and having slain some three thousand of the vanguard, the next day following he encompassed at Alesia.

OBSERVATIONS.

The Gallies were much stronger then the Romans in Cavalry, both according to quantitie and qualitie: but the Roman Infanterie was greater in vertue and worth then any foot forces of the Gallies, notwithstanding their inequality in number. Which sheweth that the Romans did more rely upon their legionary souldiers, then upon their Equites: and may serve for an argument in the handling of that question, which is so much debated amongst men of warre, whether the horse or the foot companies be of greater importance in the carriage of a warre. Which indeed is a question a male deviser: being both so necessary for the perfect execution of martiall purposes, as they cannot well be disjoyned. And if we look particularly in the nature of their severall services, we shall easily discern the differences, and be able to judge of the validitie of their parts.

Wherein first it cannot be denied, but that foot companies are serviceable to more purposes then troops of horse: for the horsemen are of no use, but in open and champaign places; whereas footmen are not only of importance in fielden countries, but are necessary also in mountainous or woodie places, in valleys, in ditches, in sieges, and in all other parts of what site or nature soever, where the horsemen cannot shew themselves. Whereby it appeareth, that the infanterie extendeth its service to more purposes then the cavalrie, and maketh the warre compleat, which otherwise would prove lame and uneffectuall.

Touching the weight of the business when it cometh to a day of battell, it resteth for the most part upon the foot troops: for the horsemen are profitable to the army wherein they serve, by making discoveries, by harrying the enemies countries, by giving succour or rescue upon a suddain, by doing execution upon an overthrow, and by confronting the enemies horse; but these are but as second services, and fall short of the main stroke, which for the most part is given by the footmen. Neither doth a rout given to the cavalrie serving an army royall, concern the body of that army further then the services before mentioned; but the armies doth oftentimes go on notwithstanding, and may well achieve a happy victory: whereas upon the overthrow of the infanterie, the horsemen have nothing to do, but to shift for themselves, and get away to their own homes.

Whether the cavalrie be or infanterie be of greater importance in a warre.

Footmen fitter for more services then horsemen.

The main stroke in a day of battell is given by the footmen. The use of horsemen.

home. So that it appeareth that the foot companies are the bulk and bodie of the armie, and the horse as the armes and outward parts, having expedient and necessary offices, but alwayes subordinate to the main stroke given by the foot.

If any man look for proof hereof by example, he shall not need to seek further then the Romans, being masters of the art military, who by an ancient law interdicting the Dictator to have the use of a horse in the warres for his private ease, intimated, as *Plutarch* saith, the strength of their army to consist in their footmen, which the General in a day of battell should assist with his presence, and in no wise forsake them if he would. But touching the use of warre amongst them, their *Equites* were to farre short of the service performed by their foot troupes, that when they would stand to it indeed, they forsook their horses and fought on foot: as in the battell with the *Latines* at the lake *Regillus*, which I have already mentioned in my former observations. Neither were the *Romans* good horsemen, as it seemeth by *Cæsar*: for he took the horses from the *Tribunes* and the *Roman Equites*, and gave them to the *Germans*, as better Ruters then any *Romans*. But howsoever a State that aboundeth in horse, and trusteth more in them then in foot companies, may harrie a champaign countrey, but shall never be able to follow a warre with that strength, as is requisite to make it fortunate.

CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar besiegeth *Alesia*, and fighteth with the enemies cavallry.

Cæsar.

Cæsar having viewed the site of the town, and knowing the enemy to be much troubled for the overthrow of their horse, in whom they put all their hopes, exhorting the souldiers to take a little pains, he determined to inclose the town round about with a ditch and a rampier. *Alesia* was sited on the top of a hill, in a very eminent place, and not to be taken but by a continued siege. At the foot of the hill ran two rivers on each side of the town: before the town there lay a plain of three miles in length: the other sides were inclosed round about in a reasonable distance with hills of equall height with the town. Under the wall on the East side lay all the forces of the *Galles*, having drawn a ditch and a drie wall on that part of eight foot in height: the whole circuit of the works which the *Romans* made to inclose the town about, contained eleven miles. Their camp was sited in a convenient place, where there were made three and twenty castles, which in the day time were kept by garisons, to prevent any suddain attempts of the enemy, and in the night by strong watches. The work being begun, there happened a skirmish between the ca-

vallry of both sides in that plain which lay before the town of three miles in length. They fought eagerly on both sides. Our men being overcharged, *Cæsar* sent the *Germans* to second them, and set the *Legions* before the camp, lest there might happen any suddain fall by the foot of the enemy. Upon the safeguard of the *Legions* our men took courage. The enemy was put to flight, and being many in number one hundred another, and stuck in heaps in the straight passage of their gates. The *Germans* followed them close to their fortifications, and made a great execution amongst them. Many of them forsaking their horses attempted to leap the ditch, and to climb over the drie wall. *Cæsar* commanded the *legions* imbatteled before the camp to advance a little for ward. The *Galles* that were within the fortification were no little troubled: for thinking the enemy would presently have come unto them, they made an alarme: some were so frightened that they brake into the town. *Vercingetorix* commanded the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be left naked of defendants. Many of the enemy being slain, and very many horses taken, the *Germans* fell off and returned to *Cæsar*.

OBSERVATIONS.

FORASMUCH as casualtie and chance have oftentimes the prerogative of a service, and in misdeeming opinions do carrie away the honour from vertue and valour: the first triall of a fortune is not of that assurance, nor so much to be trusted, as when it is seconded again with the like effect: for when a matter by often triall falleth out to be of one and the same qualities, it sheweth a certainty of a cause, producing ends of like condition. The *Galles* (as it seemeth) were much discouraged upon the first overthrow of their horse, in whom they so much believed, and altered the course of their high resolutions to farre, as where before they sware the overthrow of the *Romans*, they were now content to take the protection of a strong town: but this second foil which they received, did so assure them of a harder confrontation and stronger opposition then they were able to bear, that they never thought of any further triall, but were content to go away losers, rather then to hazard their lives in a third combat. And thus, when a second event backeth a former fortune, it taketh away the suspicion of casualtie, and maketh the winner bold, and the loser desperate. *Pompey* was so transported with joy for the blow which he gave *Cæsar* at *Dyrachinum*, that he sent letters of that daies victory into all parts of the world, and made his souldiers to secure touching the issue of that warre, ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse iam sibi viderentur, that they never thought how the warre was to be carried on, esteeming themselves

One event is not so certain for the approbation of a cause, as when it is seconded with another of like condition.

selves already absolute victors: not remembering, as *Cæsar* saith, the ordinary changes of warre; wherein oftentimes a small matter, either of a false suspicion, or of a suddain fright, or some other accident, doth indanger an army, which the enemy taketh to himself, perinde ac si virtute vicissent, as if he had overcome by his valour.

CHAP. XXXI.

Vercingetorix sendeth away the horse: *Cæsar* incloseth *Alesia* with a strong wall.

Cæsar.

Vercingetorix thought it best to dis-misse all the horse, and send them away in the night, before the fortifications were perfected by the *Romans*. At their departure he commanded them, that every man should repair unto his own State, and send all to the warre that were able to bear arms. He layeth open his desires towards them, and doth adjure them to have regard to his safety, and not to suffer him to be delivered over to the torture of the enemy, that had so well deserved of the common libertie; wherein if they should prove negligent, four score thousand chosen men would perish with him in that place. And looking into their provisions, he found that they had corn scarce for thirty dayes, but by sparing and good husbandry it might be made to serve longer. With these mandates he sent out the horsemen in silence about the second watch of the night, at that part of the town where the works were not perfected: he commanded all the corn to be brought unto him upon pain of death. The cattle he distributed to the souldiers by poles, whereof there was great store brought out from the *Mandubii*: the corn he began to measure out very sparingly. All the forces which he had placed before the town, he received within the walls; and so he purposed to attend the supplies of *Gallia*. Which being known by the running awayes and privies, *Cæsar* appointed to make these fortifications. He drew a ditch of twenty foot in breadth and depth, with straight sides, as broad at the bottom as at the top. The rest of the work he made forty foot short of that ditch, which he did for these reasons; that the whole body of the *Romans* might not easily be inclosed about with an army of souldiers, which he thought to prevent by taking in so great a circuit of ground; and secondly, lest the enemy falling out upon a suddain, should in the night come to destroy the works, or in the day-time trouble the souldiers with darts and casting weapons as they were busied about the works. This space of forty foot being left, he made two ditches of fifteen foot in breadth and depth, the innermost whereof being carried through the fields and the lower ground, he filled with water

drawn out of the river. Behind them he made a ditch and a rampier of twelve foot, and strengthened it with a parapet and pinacles, and with great boughes of trees cut in cags like unto a *Harts horn*, which he set where the bowels were joynted to the rampier, to hinder the enemy from climbing up; and made towers round about the whole work, in the distance of four score foot one from another. At the same time the *Roman* souldiers were both to get stuffe for the fortification, to go a harvesting for provision of corn, and to make such great works. Our forces being much weakened, and being to seek corn and stuffe farre off from the camp; the *Galles* also oftentimes attempting to destroy the works, and to fill out of the town at divers ports: therefore *Cæsar* thought it fit to adde thus much more to the foresaid work, that the fortifications might be made good with the lesse number of men. He made ditches round about the works of five foot deep, and in them he planted either the bodies of trees, or great firm boughs sharpened into many pikes and snags, being bound together at the bottome, that they might not be easily plucked up, and spreading themselves at the top into very sharp cags. There were of these five ranks, so combined and infolded one in another, that which way soever the enemy should enter upon them, he would necessarily runne himself upon a sharp stake. These they called *Cippi*. Before these, in oblique courses, after the manner of a quincunce, were digged holes of three foot deep, narrow at the bottome like a sugar loaf: these they set with round stakes of the boughes of a mans thigh, with a sharp hardened point, in such sort that they stuck not above four fingers out of the earth; and for the better fastening of them, they stuck all a foot within the ground: the rest of the hole for the better ordering of the matter, was hid with osters and spread. Of these were eight courses three foot distant one from another: and these they called *Lillies*, from the resemblance they had to the figure of that flower. Before these were gathrops of a foot long fastened in the earth, and headed at the top with barbed hooks of iron, sowed up and down in all places in a reasonable distance one from another: and these they called *Stimuli*. The inner fortifications being thus perfected, he followed the even and level ground as much as the nature of the place would give him leave, and took in fourteen miles in circuit, and made the like fortifications in all points against the enemy without, as he had done against the town; to the end that if he were driven upon occasion to depart and leave the works, it might be no danger for him to leave the camp; forasmuch as a few men would defend it. He commanded every man to have forrage and provision of corn for thirty dayes.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Promised in my former observation to speak somewhat touching the *Roman* works, and to shew the use they made of them in their greatest occasions: but this description of the works at *Alesia*, doth so far exceed the enlargement of commenting words, that it hath drowned the eloquence of great Historians, and in stead of explications and inforcements, hath drawn from them speeches expressing greater admiration then belief. *Circa Alesiam* (saith *Paterculus*) *tantæ res gestæ, quantus audere vix hominis, perficere nullius nisi Dei fuerit*: So great things were done at *Alesia*, that they might seem too great for any man to attempt, or any but a god to effect. To inclose a town with a ditch and a rampier of eleven miles circuit, was a matter worthy the *Roman* army: but to adde such variety of works, and to make such strange trapes and oppositions against an enemy, was admirable to the hearer; and not that only, but to make the like works without, to keep the *Gallies* from raising the siege, did double the wonder: by which works he did besiege and was besieged, took the town and overthrew the enemy in the field.

Such as since that time have imitated this industry only by a small ditch and a rampier (for I think no man ever made such works) have wrought wonders in matter of warre. *Cæsar* received the name of renewing the ancient military discipline in *Italy*, chiefly for that he besieged *Pistoia*, and with the help of a double trench, according to the example of *Cæsar*, he kept in the *Pistoians* on the one side, and kept out an army on the other side of thirtie thousand foot and threethousand horse, in such manner as in the end he took the citie and made their succours of no effect. The States army of the united Provinces under the leading of *Grave Manrice*, did the like at the town of *Grave* in the year 1602. But of this at *Alesia* may well be said that which *Livy* speaketh of the battell at *Nola*: *Ingens eodier res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*: A great piece of service was done that day, and I think I may call it the greatest in that whole warre.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT is here delivered, that the outward circuit of the works contained fourteen miles, and the circuit of the inward works eleven miles: upon which ground *Justus Lipsius* maketh an unjust conjecture of the space between the outward and the inward works where the *Romans* lay incamped. For according to the proportion between the circumference and the diameter, he maketh the diameter of the greater circle four, and of the lesser three miles: and then he taketh

the lesser diameter out of the greater, and concludeth the space to be almost a mile between the inner and the outward rampiers where the *Romans* lay incamped between the works: and least the matter might be mistaken in ciphers, he doth expresse it at large in significant words, whereby he maketh the space twice as much as indeed it was. For the two circles having one and the same center, the semidiameter of the one was to be taken out of the semidiameter of the other, and the remainder would amount almost to half a mile; which according to the ground here delivered, was the true distance between the works, if the nature of the place (whereunto they had a respect) would suffer them to keep the same distance in all parts. But *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*, *Homer* himself is sometimes false; and no disgrace neither to the excellency of his learning, deserving all honour for the great light which he hath brought to the knowledge of *Histories*, and for redeeming the truth from blots and Barbarisme.

CHAP. XXXII.

The *Gallies* raise an army of 240000. to raise the siege at *Alesia*.

While these things were a doing at *Alesia*, the *Gallies* having summoned a Council of the Princes and chiefest men of each State, they thought it not convenient to take all that were able to bear arms according to *Vercingetorix* direction; but to proportion out a certain number for every State; lest that of such a confused multitude there would be no government, being not able to know their souldiers, or to martiall them in any good order, or to make provision of vittuall for so great a bodie. The *Hedui* and their clients, the *Segusiani*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci*, *Brannovices*, and *Biannovii*, were commanded to send out five and thirty thousand: the *Arverni* with their clients, the *Helvetii*, *Cadurci*, *Gaballi*, *Velauni*, as many: the *Senones*, *Sequani*, *Bituriges*, *Santonnes*, *Rutheni*, *Carnutes*, twelve thousand: the *Bellovaci*, ten thousand: the *Le-movices* as many: the *Pictones*, *Turonnes*, *Parisi*, *Helvetii*, *Suessones*, 8000: the *Ambiani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Petrocorii*, *Nervii*, *Morini*, *Niti-obriges*, 5000: the *Aulerci*, *Cenomani*, as many: the *Atrebatæ*, 4000. the *Bello-cassi*, *Lexovii*, *Aulerci*, *Eburones*, 3000: the *Rauraci* and *Boii* 30000: the States bordering upon the Ocean, whom by the custome of *Gallia* they call *Aremorici*, such as are the *Curiosolites*, *Rhedones*, *Ambibari*, *Cadetes*, *O-sisimii*, *Lemovices*, *Veneti*, *Unelli*, six thousand. Of these the *Bellovaci* refused to give their number, saying, that they would make warre with the *Romans* in their own name, and according to their own directions, neither would they serve

serve under any mans command. Notwithstanding being intreated by *Comius*, for his sake they sent two thousand. *Cæsar* as we have heretofore delivered, had used the help of this *Comius* the years before in Britain, being both faithful and serviceable: in recompense of which service he had freed his State of all duties to the *Roman* Empire, and restored unto them their ancient laws and customes; and to himself he had given the *Morini*. Notwithstanding such was the universall consent of all *Gallias* to redeem their liberty and their ancient honour in matter of warre, as neither friendship, nor the memory of former benefits could any way move them, every man intending that warre as fayer as either the power of his mind or the possiblie of his means would reach unto: and having drawn together eight thousand horse, and two hundred and forty thousand foot, they mustered their forces in the confines of the *Hedui*, where they appointed captains; and the chief command was given to *Comius* of *Arras*, and to *Vindomarus* and *Eporodorus*, *Hedui*, and to *Vergasilaunus* of the *Arverni*, cousin-german to *Vercingetorix*. To these there were certain chosen out of every State to give assistance in counsell of warre: and all of them went joyfully and full of hope to *Alesia*. Neither was there any man that did think, that the very sight of such a multitude was able to be endured, especially when the fight would grow doubtful by sallies made out of the town, and so great forces of horse and foot should be seen without.

OBSERVATIONS.

Vercingetorix desire was to have had as many of the *Gallies* sent to his rescue as were able to bear arms, grounding himself upon that maxime; Where the whole State is in question, there the whole forces of that State are to be employed. But the other Princes of *Gallia* thought it not expedient to raise to great a number: for they would have accrewed to such a multitude of people, as could not have been contained within the rules of government, which may bring to our consideration that which the course of these times doth not often bring into dispute: What number of men well martialled and with good discipline, are a competent proportion for any service. *Xerxes* army which he carried into *Greece*, was famous for two respects: First, in regard of the multitude, which was so great, that when he himself returned back into *Asia*, he left behind him three hundred thousand of the best souldiers chosen out of the whole army, under the conduct of one *Mardonius*. Secondly, that of so many fighting men, there were two hundred and threecore thousand slain in one battell, with the losse of one thousand and three hundred *Grecians*. Whereby it appeareth, that the con-

quest of a kingdome doth not necessarily follow the multitude of souldiers in an army; for either *Xerxes* army was too few in number to conquer *Greece*, or too many to be well martialled.

Marius with fifty thousand men defeated the *Cimbri* that were so many in number, as they made a battell of thirtie furlong square, and of them he slue a hundred and twenty thousand, and took threecore thousand prisoners. And for that I do remember of that which I have read, the greatest conquests that ever were made, were achieved with armies under fifty thousand fighting men. The great *Alexander* subdued all *Asia*, and set the Monarchy from the *Persian* into *Greece* with thirty thousand men.

The *Romans* had very seldom ten legions in an army, which was about that rate, but commonly their conquering armies were farre under that proportion. *Paulus Æmilius* only had a hundred thousand in his army against *Perseus*, and wonne the battell in an hour. The condition of our times requirerh no dispute touching this point, for we seldom see an army of fifty thousand men in the field, unlesse it be the *Turke* or some such Monarch.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Critognatus his speech at *Alesia*, touching the keeping of the town.

They that were besieged in *Alesia*, the day being past by which they looked for succour, their corn being spent, and not knowing what was done abroad, entred into consultations touching the end of their fortune; and divers opinions being delivered, some of them tending to the yielding up of the town, and others perswading that as long as strength lasted there might be sallies continually made upon the enemy: I will not omit the speech of *Critognatus*, for the singular and wicked crueltie which it imported. He was a man of great birth and authority amongst the *Arverni*. I will say nothing (saith he) of their opinion, that call base servitude by the name of rendry: neither do I think them fit to be accounted citizens, or to be admitted to counsell of State. With them will I do as I doe with slaves, in whose advice and counsell, even by all your consents, the memory of ancient vertue seemeth to consist. It is no vertue, but a weaknesse of the minds not to be able to bear waim a little while. It is an easier matter to find men that will offer themselves willingly to death, then such as will endure labour with patience. For mine own parts, I could like well of that opinion, (for honour much prevaileth with me;) if I did not see a further lasse then of our lives. But in these our consultations let us look upon all *Gallia*, whom we have called together to succour us. What spirits do you think would

would our friends and kinsmen conceive, four-score thousand men being slain in one place, if they were constrained to wage battell upon their dead carcases? I would not have you to despair of your help, that do neglect all perill for your sake; nor by your foolishnesse and your rashnesse, or the weaknesse of your mind, throw down all Gallia, and cast it into perpetuall bondage. Do you doubt of their faith and constancy, because they came not by a day? What do the Romans then mean in these outward works? Do you think they make them for exercise, or to passe away the time? If you cannot then receive assurance by their messengers, all passage being stoppt, use them for witnesses that their coming is at hand, for fear whereof they labour night and day. What then? my advice is that we do as our forefathers did in a warre against the Cimbri and Teutones, not equall to this, who being shut up within their towns, and brought to the like necessity, did satisfie their hunger with the bodies of such as were found unfit for warre, neither did they yield themselves unto the enemy: whereof if we had not an example, yet I would judge it an excellent thing to be begun now for liberties sake, and to be left to posterity. For what warre was like this? Gallia being wasted and dispeopled, and the kingdom brought into great misery, the Cimbri at length forsook our countrey, and sought out other territories, and left unto us our laws, customes, lands & libertie. For the Romans, what is it they desired or what would they have? But being drawn on with malice and envy, whom they understood to be a noble and a warlike nation, their fields and cities they did desire to take from them, and to yoke them with eternall bondage; as never making warre with other condition. For if you be ignorant what they do farre off in other countreys, look at home: in that part of Gallia which is reduced into a Province, their laws and customes being changed, it is subiect to the axe and to perpetuall servitude. Their opinions being delivered, they decree, that such as through age or sickness were unfit for warre, should depart the town; and that they should prove all means, before they yielded to Critognatus opinion: and yet if the matter so required, to consent unto it, and to attend their succours rather then to yield to any rends and condition of peace.

OBSERVATIONS.

How long a Commande may hold out in a Siege.

IT is oftentimes made questionable in the extremities of a siege, how farre the Commanders may go in continuing their resistance to the danger and hazard of the people besieged, whether they may not in honour proceed as farre as

Critognatus opinion would draw them: or how they may know when to leave it, in the very point of discreet and valiant carriage. Which is to be answered according to the qualitie of the enemy that giveth siege to the place. For against a treacherous and disloyall enemy, that maketh profession of infidelity, and would not stick after a composition to infatrate them in a greater danger then the perill of death, there would be much endured rather then to undergo so hard a fortune. And yet I do no way approve the cruell resolution of this Gall, but do rather commend the example of the Hungarians at the siege of Agria. For in the year 1562. Mahomet Bassa lay before that town with an army of three-score thousand Turks, and laid batterie to it with fiftie cannons. There were within the Town two thousand Hungarians, who endured and put off thirteen most terrible assaults of the enemy: and for the better strengthening of their high resolution, they took a mutuall oath that no man upon pain of death should once speak of a treatie, or of giving up the Town, or to make any answer to the enemy but by the harquebuse or the canon: And if the siege should happen to continue long, rather to die for hunger then to put themselves in the hands of so cruell and barbarous an enemy. They determined further, that such amongst them as were not servicable with a weapon, should attend continually to reinforce the rampier and repair the ruines. And to avoid treacherie, they took order that there might be no assemblies in the citie above the number of three together. They commanded likewise that all the victuall as was either publick or private should be divided into equall portions amongst the souldiers, and the best of it should be reserved for such as were hurt in fight. It is further reported, that the Bassa having oftentimes offered a treatie, they only shewed for an answer to his summons a funerall bier covered with black, lifted up above the wall between two pikes, to signifie thereby that they would not come out but by death.

As this is a degree short of Critognatus resolution, so I do not deny but that a Generall may give up a Town before he come to these tearms with true honour and wisdom. But the matter (as I have said) consisteth altogether upon the circumstances interlaced. But that which is further to be observed in this place, is the extreme contrariety of opinions, which are usually delivered upon dispute of such difficult cases, wherein *Quantum alteri sententia deest animis, tantum alteri superesse solet*; one mans opinion speaks too much courage, and another as much too little: as Curio said upon the like occasion. *Meditio tutissimus ibi*. The mid's the safest way, was Phæbus direction to his sonne Phaeton in a matter of difficultie and great hazard, and observed in this place by the Gallies.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

The Gallies do set upon Cæsars camp, both from the town and the field side.

Cæsar.

HE Mandubii, who had received the army into the town, were themselves thrust out with their wives and children. They coming to the Roman works, did with weeping tears beseech them to receive them into bondage, and relieve them with food. Cæsar gave order they should not be received, and set a guard on the rampier to keep them out. In the mean time Comius, and the rest of the Captains, that had the chief command given them, came to Alesia with all their forces, and having taken a hill on the out-side, they sat down not above half a mile from our works. The next day bringing their cavalerie out of their camp, they filled all that plain, which, as I have already said, extended three miles in length before the town, setting their foot-forces a little distant from that place, and hiding them upon higher ground. The prospect lay open out of the town into the field: and upon the sight of these succours they ran together, and congratulated each other, and all their minds were filled with gladnesse. And thereupon the next day they brought their forces and placed them before the town, and began to cover the next ditch unto them with hurdles, and to fill it up with earth, and to provide themselves to sally out, and to endure all chances. Cæsar having disposed of all his army on each side of the works, that if there were occasion, every man might both know and keep his place, he commanded the cavalerie to be carried out of the camp, and to charge the enemy. There was a fair view out of all the camps, which were seated round about upon the ridge of the hill, and all mens minds were bent upon the expectation of the event of the fight. The Gallies had mingled amongst their horse some few archers and light-armed souldiers, which might relieve their fellows being overcharged, and sustain the force and assault of our horse. By these were many hurt upon a suddain, and forsook the fight. The Gallies being perswaded that their men had the better of the fight, perceiving our men to be overcharged with multitude on all sides, as well those that were besieged, as the other that came to relieve them, they took up a shout and a howling to encourage their people. And forasmuch as the matter was carried in the fight of all men, so that nothing could be bid whether it were well or ill done; the desire of honour and the fear of ignominie did stirre up both sides to prowesse and valour. And having fought with a doubtfull fortune from noon-tide untill almost Sun-setting, the Germans on the one side with thick-thronged troups gave a fierce

charge upon the enemy, and put them to flight whereby it happened that the archers were circumvented and slain. In like manner on the other side, our men finding them to give ground, did follow them even to their camps, and gave them no time to recover themselves. Such as were come out of Alesia, returned back sad into the town despaire of victory. One day being intermitted, in which time they made provision of great store of hurdles, ladders and hooks, about midnight they marched silently out of their camp, and came to the works on the field side; and taking up a suddain shout, to give notice of their coming to them of the town, they cast their hurdles upon the ditches, and with slings, arrows, and stones they began to put our men from the rampier, and to put in practise such things as belong to a siege. At the same time the shout being heard, Vercingetorix sounded the trumpets, and brought his men out of the town. Our men betook themselves to the fortifications, according as every mans place was allotted him the day before; and with slings and bullets which they had laid ready upon the works, they did beat down the Gallies, their fight being taken away through the darknesse of the night. Many wounds were received on both sides, and many weapons were cast out of engines. M. Antonius, and C. Trebonius, Legates, who had the charge of those parts where our men were most laid to, caused men to be taken out of the further Castles, and to be brought to second them. The Gallies being a good way distant from the works, did much hurt with multitude of weapons: but approaching nearer, either they struck themselves unwittingly upon the gathrops, or falling into the holes, were struck through the bodies with the sharp stakes, or died with murall piles, being cast from the rampier and the towers. Many wounds being received on all sides, as the day appeared, the Gallies fearing lest they should be charged on the open side by a sallie from the upper camp, retired back again to their fellows. On the inner side, whilst they brought out such things as were prepared beforehand by Vercingetorix, and were filling up the first ditches, being somewhat long in the execution of these things, they understood that the other Gallies were departed before they themselves could come near the works; and thereupon they returned into the town without doing any thing.

OBSERVATIONS.

THE Gallies committed the command of this great army to four Generalls, contrary to the practise of warlike nations, and the order which nature observeth throughout all the severall kinds of creatures: amongst whom there was never body found of many heads, but one Hydra, being

One army would have one General.

tions before the camp: thither the Captains were brought, Vercingetorix was delivered; their weapons were cast out. The Hedui and the Arverni being reserved to the end he might recover the rest of the States by them; of the rest of the captives he gave throughout all the army, to every man a prisoner, by the name of a boorie. These things being ended, he went to the Hedui, and received in the State. Thither did the Arverni send Ambassadors unto him, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded. He demanded a great number of hostages, and sent the Legions into their wintering camps. He sent home twenty thousand captives to the Hedui and the Arverni. He sent T. Labienus with two Legions and the horse into the Sequani, and gave him M. Scaurus Rutilius to assist him. He lodged C. Fabius and Lucius Minutius Basilus with two legions amongst the men of Rhemes, lest they should receive any damage by the near bordering Bellovaci. He sent C. Antistius Regulus to the Ambivari, and T. Sextius to the Bituriges, and C. Caninius Rebilus to the Rutheni, with each of them a Legion. He placed Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpitius at Cavillonis and Maticonæ of the Hedui upon the river Arar, for provision of corn: he himself determined to winter at Bibract. These years service being known at Rome, there was a feast of thanksgiving appointed for twenty dayes together.

OBSERVATIONS.

Vercingetorix notwithstanding a hard fortune, entertained a noble resolution: for having first acquainted the *Galles* that he had not undertook that warre for any respect to himself, but for the cause of *Gallias*, and the ancient libertie of that continent; he made offer to satisfy the angry *Romans* with his body dead or alive.

Plutarch in the life of Cæsar. Plutarch reciteth the manner of his deliverie to be in this sort: Being armed at all parts, & mounted on a horse furnished with a rich caparison, he came to *Cæsar*, & rode round about him as he sat in his chair of Estate; then lighting off his horse, he took off his caparison and furniture, and unarmed himself, and laid all on the ground, and went and fate down at *Cæsar's* feet, and said never a word. *Cæsar* at length committed him as a prisoner taken in the warres to be led afterwards

in his triumph at *Rome*: but the civile warres did cut off that solemnity.

If it be demanded, what became of these great Princes and personages after the triumph: It will appear that they did not stroke their heads, or make more of them then of miserable captives. For *Paulus Æmilius*, after the noble triumph for king *Perseus*, pitying his fortune and desiring to help him, could never obtain other grace for him, then onely to remove him from the common prison, which they called *Carcers*, into a more cleanly and sweeter house: where being strictly guarded, he died, either by abstinences, or being kept from sleep by the souldiers. Two of his sonnes died also, but the third became an excellent Turner or Joyner, and could write the *Roman* tongue so well, that he afterwards became Chancellor to the Magistrats of *Rome*. And thus the *Romans* dealt with their captive Princes, making them examples of Fortunes unconstancy, and turning their diadems into shackles of iron.

And thus farre did *Cæsar* comment himself upon the warres he made against the *Galles*, being a noble and a worthy people, and bred in a large and fertile Continent; the inhabitants whereof have in all ages, even to these times, challenged an eminency, both for politick government and martiall prowesse, amongst the Western kingdomes of the world: their actions and carriage from time to time deserving as honourable memory, as these warres recorded by *Cæsar's* own hand; whereof *Paulus Æmilius*, *Philip Commynes*, and of late *John de Seres* are very pregnant witnesses. They continued under the *Roman* government four hundred forty and one yeares, according to the computation made by *John Tillius*, reckoning from the last victory in *Cæsar's* Proconsulship, to the time of *Marcomerus* a Generall of the *French*, by whose prowesse and means they denied to pay that homage and tribute to the Emperour *Valentinianus*, which *Vercingetorix* had lost to *Cæsar*.

The next Sommers service compiled by *Hirius*, I have purposely omitted, as intending no further matter then what *Cæsar* hath related, who best knew the whole project of that business.

And thus endeth the seventh and last Commentarie, written by *Cæsar* of the warre he made in *Gallia*.

F I N I S.

OBSERVATIONS

Upon

CÆSARS

COMMENTARIES


of the

CIVILE VVARRES

betwixt

HIM and POMPEY.

By CLEMENT EDMUNDS Remembrancer of the
City of London.



LONDON,
Printed by ROGER DANIEL: 1655.



The first Commentarie of the Civile VVarres.

The Argument.

This Commentary containeth the Motions and Contentions at Rome, concerning *Cæsar's* giving up his government: The rent in the State, upon the disagreement of the Senate: How either side bestirred themselves, to seize upon the Provinces. *Pompey* got the East, and *Cæsar* the West part of the Empire; and defeated *Afranius* and *Petreibus* in Spain.

CHAP. I.

The Senates affection on *Cæsar's* behalf.

Cæsar.

Letters being delivered by *Fabius* to the Consuls from *C. Cæsar*, it was hardly obtained by the extreme importunitie of the Tribunes, to get them read in the Senate: but to consult thereof, or to bring the Contents in question, would not be granted. The Consuls propounded busineses concerning the state of the City. *L. Lentulus*, Consul, protested his assistance should not be wanting, neither to the Senate nor to the Commonwealth, if they would speak their minds freely and boldly: but if they respected *Cæsar*, and had an eye to his favour (as in former times they usually had) he would then take a course for himself, and not regard the authority of the Senate; neither wanted he means of entrance into *Cæsar's* friendship and good acceptance. To the same effect spake *Scipio*; That *Pompey* was resolved to be aiding to the Commonwealth, if the Senate would stand to him: but if they temporized, and dealt coldly, in vain hereafter should they seek aid from him, albeit they instantly desired it. This speech of *Scipio's* seemed to come from *Pompey's* own mouth, he himself being present, and the Senate kept within the Citie. Some others spake more temperately. As first *M. Marcellus*, who thought it not convenient that the Senate should bring these things in question, untill they had made a levie of souldiers throughout all *Italy*, and enrolled an Army; by whose protection, they might safely and freely determine what they thought fit. As also *M. Calidius*, who thought it requisite

that *Pompey* should go to his Provinces and Governments, to remove all occasions of taking Arms: For *Cæsar* having two Legions newly taken from him, feared that *Pompey* kept them near about the citie to his prejudice. And likewise *M. Rufus*, varying some few words, declared himself of *Calidius* opinion. All these were bitterly reproved by *L. Lentulus* the Consul; who utterly denied to publish what *Calidius* had sentenced. *Marcellus* feared with these menaces, retracted his opinion. And so, what with the clamor of the Consuls, the terror of the present Army, and the threatening used by *Pompey's* faction, most of the Senators were compelled against their will, to allow that which *Scipio* thought fit: which was, that by a certain day *Cæsar* should dissolve and dismisse his Army; which if he did refuse to do, that then he openly shewed himself an Enemy to the Commonwealth. *M. Antonius* and *L. Cassius*, Tribunes of the people, did oppose this decree. Their opposition was instantly spoken unto; and many sharp and hard censures were given upon the same: for according as any one spake most bitterly and cruelly, so they were most highly commended by *Cæsar's* Enemies.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS the former Commentaries do carry in their front the ensignes of honour, displaying the military valour of the Roman people in the Continent of *Gallia*, and other Kingdomes of warlike Nations: so are these Relations branded in the forehead with a note of Infamy, and titled with the dreffull name of Civile war. An odious and decried cause, ill befitting the integrity of

Observations upon Cæsars

of that State, or the excellency of the Actours, which are chief in this Tragedy; who neglecting all that might either enlarge the Empire, or repair *Rome's* honour for the losse of *Crassus*, chose rather to imbrow their ambitious swords in the blood of their own Countrey, a Eagle against Eagle, and Pile against Pile, in a war which could challenge no Triumph. If be now demanded, as formerly it was,

Quis furor, o Crues? que tanta licentia ferri?

What fury's this? what these licentious arms?

Was it *Pompey's* Ambition, or *Cæsar's* high Thoughts, that bereft the State of liberty, with the losse of so many *Romans*? It were besides the scope of these discourses, to lay an imputation upon either of those Worthies; the one being chief Assistant to the Empire, when she put off her Consular Government, and the other sitting sole at the helm, directing a course to fetch in many *Cæsars*. Only this I may truly say with *Tacitus*; b That Civile wars were never set on foot by justifiable courses. Yet for the Readers better direction, and for opening the truth of this story (which is more to be regarded then either *Socrates* or *Plato's* friendship) it shall not be impertinent to fetch the causes of this war a little higher in a word then these Commentaries do afford them.

The histories of that age do all intimate, that when *Rome* had ennobled *Pompey* with her service, and stiled him by employments with the title of Greatnesse, as a satisfaction for the injuries done unto his father; he (forgetting the rights of a State, which challenge the renown of other mens labours, and suffereth no subject to be co-partner therein, further then by approbation of service and obedience) assumed to himself the honour due to the Commonwealth, and became proud of that which was none of his: in which conceit, the ambition of his spirit kept no measure, but over-valued his merits so far, that he thought himself rather a Sovereign then a servant. So easily are men bewitched, when the favour of a State hath once made them absolute, and put it self under the awe of private command. In this height of greatnesse and authority, he made way for *Cæsar*, his father in law; who had a spirit as subject to ambition, and as capable of publick dignities, as any one amongst all the Patrician Families: and upon the ending of his first Consulship, in the year of *Rome* 695, obtained the government of *Gallia Transalpina*, and likewise of that other *Gallia* which they called *Cisalpine*, containing the Countries that lie between the *Alpes* and the little River *Rubicon*, together with *Sclavonia*, and four legions of soldiers, for the term of five years. At the expiration whereof, his charge was continued, by the like favour and mediation of *Pompey*, and the

assistance of *Crassus*, for five years longer, with a redoubling of his forces. But after that *Crassus* was slain in the *Parthian* war, and that *Julius Cæsar's* daughter, whom *Pompey* had married, was deceased (whereby *Cæsar* stood single, without any tie of alliance, or other a counterpoise of a third party, to hold them ballanced at the same weight as they stood while *Crassus* lived) *Pompey*, jealous of those victories and passages of Arms which *Cæsar* had achieved by his valour, and impatient of any b partner in point of Lordship; found means first to draw two legions from him, under colour of the *Parthian* war; and afterwards got a Decree of Senate, to send him a successour before his time was expired; and withall, to return as a private person to *Rome*, to render an account of his Actions during his employment. Which *Cæsar* taking as an assurance of his downfall, gave c huge sums of money to gain *Paulus Aemilius*, one of the Consuls, and *C. Curius*, a Tribune of the people, to resist this Decree. However, the succeeding Consuls being both his enemies, having no farther hope of repealing the same, he intreated in the end, that he might hold only *Gallia Cisalpina* and *Illyricum* with two legions, until he should obtain the Consulship; which was the effect of these Letters delivered by *Fabius*. And being denied by *Pompey's* faction, in these partial and tumultuous assemblies of the Senate, caused him to forfeit his loyalty to the State, verifying the old saying, d That oftentimes an injury maketh way to a greater fortune.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning the opposition of the Tribunes, it is to be understood, that the people eaten up with ulurie and other grievous exactions, forsook both the City and the Camp, when the State had war with the *Volsci* and the *Aequi*; and taking themselves to a Mountain near unto *Rome*, would not return from thence, until the Senate had given order for their grievances. In which transaction it was agreed, that there should be Magistrates chosen out of the body of the people, to counterpoise the power of the Senate, and to restrain the boundlesse authority of the Consuls: which office was reckoned in the number of their holiest things, never to be violated either in word or deed, but the offender should redeem it with the losse of his life. Their whole power consisted in letting and hindering. As when either the Senate, or any one Senator, went about a matter which might be prejudiciall to the people in generall, or to any one of the commonalty in particular; then did the Tribunes interpose their authority, to frustrate and avert the same: which was available, albeit the matter was gain-said but by one Tribune only. By which intervention they kept the Senate in awfull moderation, and were alwayes profitable to the State, but when they hap-

a Nam sola
futura Cras
lus erat bej
li medius
mor...

b Nulla
funda loci
cras, nec
fides regni
Ennius.

c Nec quere
quoniam jam
ferre postea
Cæsarve
priorum.

d Porcipes
Paterne
Luc. lib. 11.
c Arduas res
hæc est, o
pibus non
traderet
Martial.

e Scire ma
jori forema
locum fecit
injuria.
Seneca
Epist. 91.

f The Trib
unes of
the people

g The Trib
unes of
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Lib. I.

Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

happened upon factious and turbulent persons; howbeit, their power was bounded with the walls of *Rome*, and extended no further then the gates of the City. Their doors were never shut, but stood open night and day, for a refuge to such as should fly to them for succour: neither was it lawful for them to be absent from *Rome* a whole day together. The robes of their Magistracy were of Purple; as *Cicero* intimateth in his oration *Pro Cluentio*. This Tribunitian power began about the year of *Rome* 260; was suppressed by *Sylla*; restored by *Pompey*; and utterly taken away by the Emperour *Constantine*.

If it be demanded what kind of Commonwealth this *Roman* government was; it is to be understood, that upon the expulsion of their Kings, the sovereignty rested in their Consuls. For, as *Livie* saith, there was nothing diminished of kingly governments, save only for the better establishing of liberty, that the Consular dignity was made Annuall. But that held not long, for *Publicola* imparted this sovereignty to the Commonalty, making it lawful to appeale from the Consuls to the people. Whereby b the Consular sovereignty was dissolved, and the people took occasion to oppose themselves against the Fathers. Hence grew the reciprocall invecctives between the Senate and the Tribunes; and when the Consul sent a c Serjeant to the Tribune, the Tribune would send a d Pursivant to the Consul. And so the Commonwealth halted between an Aristocracy and a Democracy, until at length the vogue of the Commonalty drew it to a perfect Democracy, and made their Acts of Senate of no value, unless they were ratified by the people. Howbeit, the Senate afforded alwayes many famous and eminent men, such as having enlarged the bounds of their Empire, and kept on foot their ancient valour, and were the flower of that people, which *Cyneas* called a town of kings, were consequently engaged in the businesses of the State, that matters were for the most part carried as they stood affected; as appeareth by this passage of *Cæsar*.

Cyneas interrogatus a
Pyrrho
qualis Roma
esset; Re
spondit:
Regum ur
bem sibi vi
deri. Just.
lib. 8.

Factionina
Council, is
an enemy to
the publick
good.

e Nam male
cuncta mi
nistre im
petus, & si
mulat non
raro privati
edij perit.
nec in
publicum
enitum.
Tac. 1. hist.

f The Trib
unes of
the people

g The Trib
unes of
the people

h The Trib
unes of
the people

i The Trib
unes of
the people

make the common good the chiefest scope of all Atheniensis; their counsels: Implying thereby, that private respects are alwayes offensive to publick ends; and the State ever suffereth, when favour prevail-eth against the common profit.

Tully going about to direct a Councellour in this behalf, only wisheth a man to deliver sincerely what he thinketh of any matter, although he happen to stand alone in his own conceit: for the issue of a business doth not so much concern a Councellour, as to speak truly his opinion thereof. And to that end, the custome of the *Roman* Senate was, that the youngest, and such as came last in place should declare themselves first; that they might not be forestalled in their opinions, nor put besides that they would have spoken; together with the equality which it made of their voices: for things first spoken, do alwayes stick fastest in our apprehensions. And for that cause, *Theodorus* (a *Greek* Tragedian) would never shew himself on the stage after any other Actor; as holding the first passages to affect most the Spectatours. Notwithstanding which custome, it is reported that *Cæsar*, in favour of *Pompey*, after their new-made alliance, would take his voice first, thereby to anticipate the opinion of others that should follow.

The Emperours (as it seemeth) took what place they pleased: for *Tiberius*, in *Marcellus* Tacit. 1. cause, said, that he would sentence openly, and upon oath, that other men might do the like. Whereunto *Cn. Piso* replied; What place wilt thou take to declare thy self, *Cæsar*? for if thou speak first, I know how to follow; if last, I am afraid I shall dissent from thy opinion. But that which is most blameable in matter of counsell is, when they come to the Senate house as to a prize of flattery. Wherein *L. Piso* is deservedly commended, for that he never willingly shewed himself of a servile opinion; but when necessity forced him, he tempered it with wisdom. Neither is it the least mischief, that the condition of sovereignty is such as will hardly endure reproof, but must be disguised, as *Apollonius* corrected *Plutarch*; by beating Doggs before them.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

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CHAP. II.

The Senate proceed against *Cæsar* with all eagerness.

THe Senate rising a little before *Cæsar's* night, were all sent for to *Pompey*. He commended the forward for what they had done, and confirmed them for after resolutions; reprehended such as shewed themselves indifferent; and stirred them up to more forwardnesse. Many which were of *Pompey's* former Armies were sent for, upon hope of reward and advancement: Many of the two legions which lately came from *Cæsar*, were commanded to attend.

D d info.

Observations upon Cæsar

inasmuch as the City swarmed with souldiers against the election of new Magistrates. C. Cæsar called out the Tribunes of the people. All the Consuls friends the kinsfolks and allies of Pompey, and such others as had any former enmity with Cæsar, were compelled into the Senate. By the presence and votes of these men the weak-est were terrified, the doubtful confirmed, and the most part were cut off from giving absolute and free voices. L. Piso the Censor, and L. Rokensthe Prator, offered themselves to go to Cæsar to advise him of these things; requiring but six dayes space to return an answer. Others thought it fit, that Embassadors should be sent to Cæsar, to give him notice of the pleasure of the Senate. To all these was opposed what the Consul, Scipio, and Cato thought fit. Cato was incited through former enmity, and specially by the repulse of the Pratorship, Lentulus, out of a consideration of his great debts, hoping to command an Army, to govern Provinces, and to receive the liberall acknowledgements of Kings, whom he should thereby procure to be stiled with the Title of friends to the people of Rome; inasmuch as he would not stick to boast in private, that he was like to prove a second Sylla, on whom the sovereign command of the Empire would be conferred. Scipio was drawn on by the same hope of having the government of a Province, or the command of an Army, which by reason of his alliance he thought to share with Pompey; being otherwise afraid to be called into justice, as also through flattery and ostentations, both of himself, and other great friends, which were able to sway much, as well in the course of justice, as in the commonwealth.

Pompey in his particular was much provoked by Cæsar's enemies, and specially for that he could endure no man to be his equall. He was alienated altogether from Cæsar's friends; and had reconciled himself to their common enemies; the greatest part of whom were by his means gained to Cæsar, in the time of their alliance. He was also moved by the dishonour which he had gotten by taking those two legions from their journey towards Asia and Syria, and using them for the advancement of his own particular. Which things moved him to draw the matter to Arms. For these respects all things were carried importunately and confusedly; neither was there fore given to Cæsar's friends to advertise him thereof; nor yet to the Tribunes, to avoid the danger which was falling upon them, or to save their right of opposition which L. Sylla left unto them; but within seven dayes after they were entered into their offices, they were forced to quit for their safety; notwithstanding that the most turbulent and seditious Tribunes of former times were never put to lock into their affairs, or to give account of their actions, before the eighth Month. In the end, they betook

themselves to that extreme and last Act of Senate, which was never thought upon, but when the city was upon the point of burnings, or in the most desperate estate of the Commonweal: That the Consuls, Prators, Tribunes of the people, and such as had been Consuls, and were resident near about the city, should endeavour that the Commonweal might not be endangered. This Act was made the seventh of the Ides of January: so that the five first dayes, in which the Senate might sit, after that Lentulus was entered into the Consulship (excepting only two dayes for the general assembly of the people) most heavy and cruel Decrees were made against the authority of Cæsar, and against the Tribunes of the people, famous and worthy men; who thereupon fled presently out of the city, and came to Cæsar: who being then at Ravenna, attended in answer to his case and modest demands, if by any reasonable course matters might be drawn to a peaceable end.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is the condition of humane nature, to make good that which once it hath avouched, although the matter be of small consequence in particular, and tender rather to infamy then to profit; neither will it easily be reclaimed by motives of reason, but is rather incited thereby (per Antiperistasis) to persist in wilfulness, then to hearken to that which is more convenient; especially, when either jealousy or revenge do imply an advantage: for then partiality keepeth no measure; but to justify an error, runnes headlong into all extremities, and flieeth to the last refuge of desperate and deplored cases, to make disordered passions seem good discretion. Which evidently appears by Pompey's factions, in resolving of that desperate Act of Senate, which was never thought of, in most eminent danger. For as in foul weather at sea, when a ship rideth in a dangerous roade, and through the violence of the tempest, is upon the point of shipwrack, the Mariners are wont to cast out a sheet-Anchor as their last refuge: so had Rome anciently recourse to this Decree, at such times as the Commonweal was in imminent and extreme calamity; whether it were by enemies abroad, or by serpents in their bosome at home. Livie speaking of the warre of the *Agrus* faith; The Senators were to affrighted, that following the form of the Decree which was always reserved for cases of extremities, they ordained that *Posthumius* (one of the Consuls) should take care that the Commonweal might not be endangered. The like was used in civile and intestine seditions: as when *Manlius Capitolinus* aspired to a Tyranny; and as likewise in the tumults of the *Gracchus*, the conspiracy of *Catiline*, and other times of like danger. For albeit the Consuls had all

Lib. I.

Commentaries of the Civ. W.

sovereign authority, as well in warre as in peace: yet nevertheless there were certain reserved cases wherein they had no power, without expresse order from the Senate, and assent from the people; as, to levie an Army to make warre, to take moneys out of the Treasury: whereas upon such a Decree, they were enabled to dispose of all busineses of State, without further moving of the Senate or people, which *Tully* noteth in his Oration against *Antonie*. I think it fit (saith he) that the whole state of the Commonweal be left unto the Consuls, and that they be suffered to defend the same; and to take care that the Commonweal be not endangered.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I May not omit (for the better understanding of this noble History) to say somewhat of the Persons here mentioned. And first of *Fabius*, as descended of the noblest and most ancient Family of the Patrician Order; being able of themselves to maintain warre a long time against the *Veis*, a strong and warlike town, untill at length they were all unfortunately slain by an ambushment: which *Ovid* mentioneth, where he saith;

*Hæc fuit illa dies, in qua Veientibus arvis,
Tercium Fabii cecidere duo.*

This was that black day, when in *Veian* field Three hundred and six *Fabii* were kill'd.

Only there remained of that house a child then kept at *Rome*; which in tract of time multiplied into six great Families, all which had their turn in the highest charges and dignities of the Commonweal: amongst whom, he that supplanted *Hannibal* by temporizing, and got thereby the surname of *Maximus*, was most famous, as *Ennius* witnesseth;

*Unus homo nobis cuncta ando restituit rem:
Non ponebat enim rumores ante suum rem.
Ergo postquam magisq; viri nunc gloria claret.
One man by wise delay hath sav'd our State;
Who rumours after publick safety set. (great)*

For which his fame grows every day more But *C. Fabius*, here mentioned, never attained to any place of Magistracy, other then such commands as he held in the warres under *Cæsar*.

Lentulus the Consul was of the house of the *Cornelii*, from whom are said to come sixteen Consuls. He was from the beginning a mortal enemy to *Cæsar*, and so continued to his death, which fell unto him in *Egypt*, by commandment of King *Ptolemy*, after Pompey was slain.

Scipio was father in law to Pompey, after the death of *Julia Cæsar's* daughter; and by that means obtained the government of *Asia*. In the beginning of the Civile warre, he brought good succours to assist his sonne in law, as it follows in the third Commentary: and upon the over-

throw at *Pharsalia* he fled into *Africa*, where he renewed the warre, and became chief Commander of the remaining party against *Cæsar*; but being in the end defeated, he made towards *Spain*; and fearing by the way lest he should fall into his enemies hands, he slew himself.

Marcellus was of the ancient Family of the *Claudii*, which came originally from the *Sabines*: On his behalf there is an Oration extant of *Tullius*, intituled, *Pro Marcello*. He was afterwards slain by one *Chilo*.

M. Antonius is famous in all the *Roman* histories, for attaining in a small time to to great a height in that government. For in all the warres of *Gallias*, he was but a Treasurer under *Cæsar*, which was the least of all publick places of charge. In the beginning of the civile warres he was made Tribune of the people; and within lesse then eight yeares after, came to be fellow-partner with *Octavius Cæsar* in the government of the Empire. And if *Cleopatra's* beautie had not blinded him, he might have easily through the favour of the souldiers supplanted his Competitor, and seized upon the Monarchie.

The name of *Cassius* was ominous for trouble, as to the state of *Rome*, and their ends were as unfortunate. This *L. Cassius*, for his part, after the great troubles he had stirred up in *Spain*, was drowned in the mouth of the River *Ebro*.

Piso was made Censor in the Consulship of *Piso*.

L. Paulus and *Claudius Marcellus*, having himself been Consul eight yeares before, in the year of *Rome* 695, succeeding *Cæsar* and *Bibulus*; and was the man against whom *Tullie* penned that Oration which is extant in *Pisonem*.

Touching the office of Censor, it is to be understood, that about the year of *Rome* 310, the Consuls being distracted with multiplicity of foreign business, omitted the Censure or assessment of the City for some yeares together: whereupon it was afterwards thought fit, that there should be a peculiar officer appointed for that service, and to be called Censor; forasmuch as every man was to be taxed, ranked and valued, according to his opinion and censure. The first part of their office consisted in an account or valuation of the number, age, order, dignity, and possession of the *Roman* citizens: for it was very material for the State to know the number of their people, to the end they might be informed of their own strength, and to shape their counle accordingly, either in undertaking warres; transplanting Colonies, or in making provision of victuals in time of peace. It was also as requisite to know every mans age, whereby they grew capable of honour and offices, according to that of *Ovid*;

*-----finitaque certis
Legibus est ætas, unde periturus honos.
-----In certain laws*

Age is defin'd, and thence is honour had.
M. Antonius commanded that the names of the

D d 2

Marcellus.

M. Anton.

To know the number of Citizens.

Their age.

De Fast.

Italicænae, Rus, lib. 4. Ro.

Gonfrid
ad L. sta-
tem 3.
S. De Cen-

Roman children should be brought into the Treas-
ury within thirty dayes after they were born; ac-
cording to which custome, *Francis the French*
king published an Edict, Anno 1529, that every
parish should keep a Register of Burials and
Christenings: which since that time is used in
England.

Their cal-
ling.
Majorum
Primus quic-
quisque ille
tuorum, aut
Patris sui,
aut illius
quod dicere
noluit.
Their abili-
ty.
*Elorus 1.1
cap. 6.

Gell. lib.
16. cap. 10.
Æris.

Poly. lib. 6.

The distinction of conditions and states, rang-
ing every man in his proper order, is as necessa-
ry in the Commonwealth, and as worthy of the
Censors notice, as any thing besides. Neither may
the allotment of mens abilities be omitted: which
was ordained, that every man might bear a part
in the service of the State. In which respect * *Ser-
vilius Tullus* is commended, for rating men ac-
cording to their wealth; whereas before that time
every man paid alike: for men are taken to be
interested in the Commonwealth according to their
means. The last and basest sort of Citizens were
named *Capite censiti*, and were set in the Subsidie
at three hundred seventy five pieces of money.
Such as were not assessed, had no voice in the
Commonwealth.

The second and chiefest part of this office was
in reforming manners, as the ground-plot and
foundation of every Commonwealth; to which
end they had power to enquire into every mans
life. If any one had plaid the ill husband, and
neglected his Farm, or left his Vine untrimmed,
the Censors took notice of it. If a Roman
knight kept his horse lean, it was a matter for
them to look into. They depofed, or brought in,
new Senators. They reviewed all degrees and
conditions of men: advanced this man from a
mean Tribe to a more honourable, and pulled an-
other down. They had the care of buildings,
repairing of high wayes, with other publick
works; and were reputed of the best rank of
Magistrates in Rome. *L. Roscius* had formerly
been one of *Cæsar's* Legates in *Gallia*: as ap-
peareth in the fifth Commentary; *Scitum in Es-
suos*, *L. Roscio*; the third legion amongst the
Æssui, under *L. Roscius*. The Prator was
Judge in causes of controverfy, and differences
between party and party; and was as the Caddy
amongst the *Turks*.

CHAP. III.

The Senate prepareth for warre.

Pompey
having a
charge of
an Army,
could not
enter into
the City,
prohibited
by divers
laws.

He next day after the Senate assem-
bled out of the City: where Pompey
(according to such instructions as he
had formerly given to *Scipio*) extolled
their constancy and magnanimity;
acquainted them with his forces, consisting
of ten legions in Arms; and further assured them,
he knew of a certain that *Cæsar's* souldiers were
alienated from him, and would not be drawn
either to defend or follow him. And upon the
assurance of these remonstrances, other motions

were entertained. As first, that a levie should
be made throughout all Italy. That *Faustus*
Sulla should forthwith be sent as Proprietor into
Mauritania. That money should be delivered out
of the Treasury to Pompey. That *King Juba*
might have the title of friend and confederate to
the people of Rome, which *Marcellus* compradi-
lings, stop the passage thereof for that time.
Philippus, Tribune of the people, countermanded
Faustus commission. Other matters were passed
by *Att.* The two Consuls, and the other Pra-
torian Provinces, were given to private men: two con-
suls that had no office of Magistracy. Syria fell to
Scipio, and *Gallia* to *L. Domitius*. *Philippus*
and *Marcellus* were purposely omitted, and no *Q. orum*
lots cast for their employment. Into the other
Provinces were sent Prators, without any con-
sent or approbation of the peoples, as formerly
had been accustomed: who having performed
their ordinary votes, put on their Military
garments, and so took their journey. The Con-
suls (which before that time was never seen)
went out of the City, and had their Serjeants
privately within the City, and in the Capitoll,
against all order and ancient custome. A levie
was made over all Italy: Arms and furniture
was commanded: Money was required from
Municipall towns, and taken out of Temples
and religious places. All divine and humane
Rights were confounded.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The neglect of Ceremonies and forms in mat-
ter of State, is the ruine and abolishment of a
Commonweal. For if it hold generally true,
which Philosophers say, That the form giveth be-
ing to whatsoever is subsisted, and that every thing
hath his name from his fashion and making:
then it must necessarily follow, that the life and
perfection of a State dependeth wholly of the
form; which cannot be neglected but with haz-
ard of confusion. For complements and solem-
nities are neither *Nimia* nor *Minima* (as
some have imagined,) either superfluities, which
may be spared, or trifles of small consequence.
But as the flesh covereth the hollow deformity of
the bones, and beautifieth the body with naturall
graces: so are ceremonies, which ancient cus-
tome hath made reverent, the perfection and life
of any Commonwealth; and do cover the naked-
ness of publick actions, which otherwise would
not be distinguished from private businesses. And
therefore the neglect of such ceremonies, as were
usually observed to ennoble their actions, was as
injurious to the safety of the Empire, and as evi-
dent a demonstration of faction and disloyalty;
as the allotment of Provinces to private persons,
or whatsoever else they broached, contrary
to the fundamentall rights of the publick
Weal.

Con-

The manner
of disposing
of the Pro-
vinces and
govern-
ments.

Socii Pro-
vincias,
Compar-
Provincias,
Lib. 43.

Gallia and
Syria were
two con-
suls
two Pre-
torian
Provinces,
Lib. 43.

The manner
of their set-
ting for-
ward to
their go-
vernments.

Vota num-
cupa. c.
Voti reus.

Macro-
b. 3. cap.
2. Saturn.

Paludati.

ib. 6. de
digui Lat.

Concerning which it is to be understood, that
no man was capable of those governments, but
such as had born the chiefest offices and places
of charge. For their manner was, that com-
monly upon the expiration of their offices, the
Consuls and Prators did either cast lots for the
Provinces, which they called *Sortiri provinci-
as*; or did otherwise agree amongst themselves how
they should be disposed, and that they termed
Comparare Provincias. *Livie* toucheth both
the one and the other; *Principio insequentis
anni cum Consules novi de Provinciis retulif-
sent, primo quoque tempore, aut comparare in-
ter eos Italiam & Macedoniam, aut sortiri pla-
cuit*: in the entrance of the next year, when the
new Consuls had proposed the business of the
Provinces; it was forthwith embraced, that they
should either divide by agreement *Italy* and
Macedonia betwixt them, or take them as their
lots fell. Howbeit sometimes the people (whose
assent was always necessary) interposed their
authorities, and disposed the same as they thought
expedient. But such as had never born office
of charge in the State, were no way capable of
those dignities, nor thought fit to command a-
broad, having never shewed their sufficiency at
home.

For the manner of their setting forward out of
Rome, after they were assigned to employments,
it appeareth by infinite examples of histories, that
they first went into the Capitoll, and there
made publick sacrifices and solemn vows, either
to build a Temple, or to do some other work
worthy good fortune, if their designs were hap-
pily achieved; which they called *Vota nuncu-
pare*, the solemn making of vows. And he that had
made such a vow, stood *voti reus*, tied by vow,
until his business forced to an issue: and after
he had attained his desire, he was *voti damnatus*,
bound to perform his vow, until he had acquitted
himself of his promise.

Touching their habite expressed in this phrase,
Paludati exerunt, it appeareth, as well by an-
cient Sculptures, as Medals, that *Paludamentum*
was a cloak used and worn by men of war: whe-
ther they commanded in chief, or as Lieutenants
and Centurions; and was tied with a knot upon
their left shoulder. *Festus* calleth all military
garments, *Paludamenta*. And *Varro* giving a
reason of that names, saith; *Paluda à Paluda-
mentis, sunt hæc insignia & ornamenta Mili-
taria. Ideo ad bellum cum exit Imperator, ac
Littores mutant vestem, & signa incutuntur, Paluda-
mentis dicitur proficisci: quæ, præterea
quod conspiciuntur qui ea habent, & Palam
sunt, Paludamenta dicta. Paludamenta* are
military ornaments. So when the Emperour re-
moves, and the Serjeants change their garment,
he is then said to march *Paludatus*, which gar-
ments in regard they are conspicuous which wear
them, and so are taken notice of, are called thence

Paludamenta. The colour of this cloak was
either purple or white. And therefore it was
held a preiudge of ill fortune, when at *Carra*, a *Valerius*, II.
City in *Mesopotamia*, one gave *Crassus* a black i. cap. 6.
cloak in stead of a white, as he went to lose the
battel to the *Parthians*.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Romans not contented with the spacious Raptores
circuit of the sunne, bounding their Empire orbis, post-
with the East and the West, but for want of Re- quam con-
gions and Countreys searching the vastnesse and tibus v. Ban-
depth of the seas, did seldom acknowledge any tibus defuc-
other sovereignty, or leave a party worthy their re Terra, &
amity, in any remote angle of the then-known tior: quos
world. But if any Prince had been fortunate, nec orien-
as to gain the favour and estimation of a friend verit. Tac-
or a confederate to the State, it was upon speciall r. Neminem
and deserved respects, or at the instance of their esse Regem
Generals abroad, informing the worthinesse of solitum &
such Potentates, and the advantage they might amicum a
bring to the service of the Empire. Which ap- pulque
peareth by that of *Livie* concerning *Vermius*, ni- pellari, ni-
king *Syphax* son; that * no man was at any fide opti-
time acknowledged either a king or a friend by mus
the Senate and people of Rome, unless first offer, lib. 1.
he had right well deserved of the Common- decad. 4.
weal.

The manner of this acknowledgement is like-
wise particularly expressed by *Livie* in another
place, speaking of *Scipio*. The day following Sequenti
(saith he) to put king *Massinissa* out of his grief die &c. lib.
and melancholy, he ascended up to his Tribunal, 10. dec. 34
and having called an assembly of the souldiers,
presented him before them: where he first ho-
noured him with the appellation of king, accom-
panied with many fair praises; and then gave
him a crown of gold, a cup of gold, a chair of
State, a scepter of Ivory, and a long robe of Pur-
ple. To which agreeeth that of *Cæsar*: That
Ariovistus was by the Senate styled by the name
of King and Friends, and presented with great
and rich gifts; which happened but to few, and
was only given by the Romans to men of great
desert. Howbeit, such as had governments and
employments abroad did oftentimes make profit
of giving this honour: whereof *Cæsar* taxeth
Lentulus in the former chapter. And in this
sense was king *Juba* brought in question, to be
called by the Senate a Friend and Associate to the
State of Rome.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Touching the franchises and liberties of the
towns of Italy, and others in the dominions
of the Roman Empire, called *Municipia*; it is
to be noted, that according to *Gellius*, those were Municipi-
called *Municipes*, that being governed by their
own laws, and their own Magistrates, were ne-
cessary.

D d 3

ver-

vertheſſe endowed with the freedom of *Rome*. And therefore *Adrianus* marvelled, that the *Italians* and *Illyrians* did rather deſire to be *Coloni*, and to ſub to the obedience of foreign and ſtrange laws, then to live in a Municipall State under their own Rights and Cuſtomes; and as *Feflus* addeth, with the uſe of their peculiar rites for matter of Religion, ſuch as they anciently uſed, before they were privileged with the immunities of *Rome*.

For the better understanding whereof, we are to obſerve, that there were degrees and differences of Municipall towns: for ſome had voices with the *Roman* people in all their elections and ſuffrages; and ſome others had none at all. For *Gellius* in the ſame place ſaith, that the *Cerites* obtained the freedom of the City, for preſerving the holy things of *Rome* in the time of the war with the *Gallies*, but without voice in elections. And thence grew the name of *Cerites Tabule*, wherein the Cenſors inrolled ſuch as were by them for ſome juſt cauſe deprived of their voices. And the *Vulſcanis* being at firſt received into the liberties of the City according to the admiſſion of the *Cerites*, were afterwards, by the free grace of the people, made capable of giving voices.

The means of obtaining this freedom was firſt and ſpecially by Birth: wherein it was required (as may be gathered by *Appian* Oration) that both the Parents, as well the mother as the father, ſhould be free themſelves. Howbeit *Illyrian* writeth, that the ſon may challenge the freedom of the State, wherein his father lived and was free. So that the father being of *Campania*, and the mother of *Puteolis*, he judgeth the ſon to belong to *Campania*: According to that of *Canuleius*, That the children inherit the condition of the father, as the head of the Family, and the better rule to direct in this behalf. Nevertheleſſe *Adrianus* made an Act of Senate in favour of iſſue; That if the wife were a citizen of *Rome*, and the husband a *Latine*, the children ſhould be *Roman* Citizens. And the Emperour *Juſtinian* cauſed it likewiſe to be decreed, that the mother being a free-woman, and the father a bond-man, the ſon ſhould be free. Such as were thus born free were called *Cives originarii*.

The ſecond means of obtaining this freedom was by Manumiffion, or ſetting bond-men at liberty: for in *Rome*, all men freed from bondage were taken for Citizens; and yet rank in the laſt and meanest order of the people.

The third means was by gift, or cooptation: and to *Romulus* at firſt enlarged and augmented *Rome*; *Theſeus*, *Athens*; *Alexander Magnus*, *Alexander*, ſited at the out-lets of *Nilus*; and *Richard* the firſt, *London*; by taking all ſuch ſtrangers into the freedom of the City, as had inhabited there for ten years together. The

Emperours were proful in giving this honour. *Cicero* ſhouts *Cæſar*, for taking whole nations into the freedom of the City; and *Antony* gave it to all that lived in the *Roman* Empire. Whereupon, as *Illypius* witneſſeth, *Rome* was called *Communis Patria*. Popular States were more ſparing in this kind; as may be deemed by the answer of one of the *Corinthian* Embaſſadors to *Alexander*: We never gave the freedom of our City (ſaith he) to any man but to thy ſelf and *Herenus*. And untill *Hecdotus* times, the *Lacedæmonians* had never admitted any, but only *Tiſtemenus* and his brother.

The privileges of this freedom were great: for the Citizens of *Rome* were held to be *Antiquiſſimi*. Is the beſt man of *Gallia* (*Tully*) to be compared with the meanest Citizen of *Rome*? And hence came that law, requiring that the life of a Citizen ſhould not be brought in queſtion, but by the generall aſſembly of the people. *Veneris* having condemned one *Cæſſinus*, a *Roman* Citizen in *Sicilia*, *Tully* urgeth it as a matter unſufferable: *Faciunt eſt* (*inquit*) *vincti Civem Romanum, ſcelus verberari, prope parricidii necuri, quid dicam in crimem agi?* It is a great crime to bind a *Roman* Citizen, an infamous wickedneſſe to beat him, little leſſe then parricide to kill him; what then ſhall I call the hanging of him? with many the like examples. beſides the poſſibility they were in, if their ſufficiency were answerable accordingly, to become great in the State; and conſequently, Commanders of the Empire.

CHAP. IV.

Cæſar taketh the affection of the Souldiers.

Cæſar underſtanding of theſe things, called the ſouldiers together, and acquainted them with all the injuries which their Enemies from time to time had done unto him; complaining that Pompey was by their practice and means alienated from him, and drawn through envy of his good fortune to partialize againſt him; notwithstanding that he had always affected his honour, and endeavoured the advancement of his renown and dignity. Lamenting likewiſe the precedent which this time had brought into the State, that the Tribunes authority ſhould be oppoſed and ſuppreſſed by Arms, which former ages had by force of Arms re-eſta-bliſhed. For *Sylla* having ſtrip the Tribuneship naked of all rights and prerogatives, yet left it the freedom of oppoſition: But Pompey, who would ſeem to reſtore it to the dignity from which it was fallen, did take away that power which was only left unto it. The Senate never reſolved of that At, That the Magiſtrates ſhould take a courſe for the ſafety of the Commonwealth, whereby the people were neceſſarily ſummoned to Arms, but

Whereof
lex Agraria
was the
dictum.

but in times of pernicious Laws, upon the violence of the Tribunes, or the mutine and ſedition of the people, when the Temples and high places of the City were taken and held againſt the State; which diſloyalties of former ages were expanded and purged by the fortune and diſſeſſer of *Saturninus* and *the Gracchi*. But at this preſent, there was no ſuch matter attempted, ſo much as in thought; no law publiſhed; no practice with the people; no tumult; no departure out of the City. And therefore he adorted them, that ſo much as under his leading and command for nine years together they had moſt happily carried the government, fought many proſperous and victorious battles, ſettled all *Gallia* and *Germany* in peace; they would now in the end, the his honour into their protection, and defend it againſt the malice of his adverſaries. The ſouldiers of the thirteenth legion which were preſent (for them only had he called out in the beginning of the troubles, and the other legions were not as yet come) cried out inſtantly, That they were ready to undertake his defence againſt ſuch wrongs, and to keep the Tribunes of the people from injurie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS Publick-weals and Societies are chiefly ſupported and maintained by juſtice: ſo likewiſe, ſuch as live in the civile community of the ſame, and enjoy the benefit of a well-qualified government, do take themſelves intereſſed in the maintenance of juſtice, and cannot endure the tyranny of wrongs; unleſſe happily (as every man is partial in his own cauſe) they be the authours thereof themſelves. The firſt dutie of juſtice, which is, *Ne cui qu's noceat*: That no man hurt another, did *Cæſar* make the theme of his Oration to his ſouldiers; aggravating his particular injuries, by opening and enforcing the malice of his Adverſaries: and making the State a party in his ſufferings, through the oppreſſion and deſacing of the Tribuneship; which in times of liberty and juſt proceeding, was ſacred and inviolable.

Theſe remonſtrances were apprehended by the ſouldiers, as matters ſpecially concerning their duty; holding themſelves either bound to redreſſe them, or otherwiſe to be guilty of betraying their parents, country, companions and friends. Some report, that one *Lælius*, a Pimpile of *Cæſar's* Army, making answer to this ſpeech, gave aſſurance of the ſouldiers good affection; which the reſt approved with a generall acclamation. Howbeit the argument lay couched in a Sophiſme, pretending *Cæſar's* right, but concluding the ruine of the State.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may obſerve, that as diſcord and diſſenſion, rending aſunder the bonds of ci-

vile community, are the bane of flouriſhing and opulent Cities, and make the greateſt Empires examples of Mortality; ſo by the ſame rule, of diſcord, it is alſo true, that the mutual reſpects of well-qualified friendſhip, are as expedient, both for the ſtretching of the joynts of a publick State, and for keeping the particular parts in due temper and proportion, as either treaſure, or Armies, or any other thing required thereunto. Hence it is that *Cicero* ſaith, that we have as much uſe of friendſhip, as of fire and water: and that he that ſhould go about to take it from among men, did endeavour (as it were) to take the fun out of the heaven; which by heat, light, and influence, giveth life unto the world. And as men are eminent in place and authority, and have uſe of many wheels for the motion of their ſeverall occaſions; to have they the more need of amity and correſpondency, to ſecond the multiplicity of their deſires, and to put on their buſineſſes to their withed ends.

CHAP. V.

Cæſar taketh *Arminum*; receiveth and answereth *miſſus* from Pompey.

Cæſar having ſounded the minds of the ſouldiers, went directly with his legion to *Arminum*; where met with the Tribunes of the people that were ſent unto him; ſent for the reſt of the legions from their wintering Camps, and gave order they ſhould follow him. Thither came young *L. Cæſar*, whoſe father was a Legate in *L. Cæſar's* camp. And after ſome ſpeech of the occaſion of his coming, acquainted *Cæſar*, that Pompey had given him a meſſage in charge to be delivered unto him: which was, that he deſired to clear himſelf to *Cæſar*, leſt he might peradventure take thoſe things to be done in ſcorn of him, which were commanded only for the ſervice of the State; the good whereof he always preferred before any private reſpect: and that *Cæſar* likewiſe was tied in honour to lay aſide his indignation and affection for the Commonwealth ſake; and not to be ſo tranſported with anger and diſdain of his Adverſaries, as he ſeemed to be, left in hoping to be avenged of them, he ſhould hurt the publick weal of his Country. He added ſome what more of the ſame ſubject, together with excuſes on Pompey's behalf. Almost the ſelf ſame diſcourſe, and of the ſelf ſame things, *Rotius* the Prator dealt with *Cæſar*, and ſaid that he had received them in charge from Pompey. Which although they ſeemed no way to ſatisfie or remove the injuries and wrongs complained of; yet having got ſit men, by whom that which he wiſhed might be imparted to Pompey, he prayed them both, for that they had brought unto him what Pompey required, they would not think it much to re-

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turn his desires to Pompey; if happily with so little labour they might accord so great differences, and free all Italy from fear and danger. That he had ever held the dignity of the Commonwealth in high regard, and deaver then his own life. He grieved much that a benefit given him by the people of Rome, should be spitefully wrested from him by his adversaries; that six months of his government were to be cut off, and so he to be called home to the City: notwithstanding the people had commanded at the last creation of Magistrates, that there should regard be had of him, although absent. Nevertheless, for the Commonwealth's sake he could be content to undergo the loss of that honour. And having writ to the Senate that all men might quit their Armies, he was so farre from gaining the same, that contrariwise a levie was thereupon made throughout all Italy; and the two legions which were drawn from him under a pretence of the Parthian warre, were still retained about the City, which was likewise in Arms. And to what tended all this, but his destruction? And yet notwithstanding he was content to condescend to all things, and to endure all inconveniences for the cause of the Publick weal. Let Pompey go to his government and Provinces; let both the Armies be discharged; let all men in Italy lay down their Arms; let the City be freed of fear; let the assemblies of the people be left to their ancient liberty; and the whole government of the State remitted to the Senate and people of Rome. For the better accomplishment whereof, under well-advised and secure conditions, let an oath be taken for due keeping of the same; or otherwise, let Pompey approach nearer unto him, or suffer Cæsar to come nearer to him, that these controversies might happily receive an end by conference.

Rolcius having this message, went to Capua, accompanied with L. Cæsar; where finding the Consuls and Pompey, he delivered unto them Cæsar's propositions. They having consulted of the matter, made an answer in writing, and returned it by them to Cæsar, whereof this was the effect; That he should return into Gallia, quit Ariminum, and dismis his Army: which if he did, Pompey would then go into Spain: In the meantime, until assurance were given that Cæsar would perform as much as he promised, the Consuls and Pompey would not forbear to levy soldiers. The condition was too unequally to require Cæsar to leave Ariminum, and to return into his Province; and Pompey to hold Provinces and legions belonging to other men: to have Cæsar to dismis his Army, and he to raise new troops: to promise simply to go to his government, but to assigne no day for his departure: inasmuch, that if he had not gone until Cæsar's time of government had expired, he could not have been blamed for sus-

tying his promise. But forasmuch as they appointed no time for a conference, nor made any shew of coming nearer, there could no hope be conceived of peace.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Cæsar lying at Ravenna, within his government of Gallia, and understanding how matters past at Rome, according as Plutarch reporteth, commanded divers of his Centurions to go before to Ariminum, without any other armour then their swords; and to possess themselves thereof with as little tumult as they could. And then leaving the troops about him to be commanded by Hortensius, he continued a whole day together in publick sight of all men, to behold the fencing of the Sword-players. At night he bathed his body, and then kept company with such as he had bidden to supper; and after a while rose from the table, wishing every man to keep his place, for he would instantly come again. Howbeit, having secretly commanded some of his followers to attend him, in such manner as might give least suspicion, he himself took a Coach which he had hired; and making shew of going a contrary way, turned suddenly towards Ariminum. When he came to the little river Rubicon, which divided his government from the rest of Italy, he stood confounded through remorse of his desperate design, and wist not whether it were better to return or go on: but in the end, laying aside all doubtfull cogitations, he resolved upon a desperate Adage, importing as much as *Fall back, fall edge*: and passing over the River, never stayed running with his Coach, until he came within the City of Ariminum; where he met Curio and Antonius, Tribunes of the people, and shewed them to the soldiers, as they were driven to fly out of Rome, disguised like slaves in a Carriers cart.

It is said, that the night before he passed over this River, he dreamed that he lay with his Mother in an unnatural sense, but of that he himself maketh no mention. This City of Ariminum is now called Rimini, and standeth in Romania upon the Adriatick sea, in the Popes dominion. The River Rubicon was anciently the bounds of Gallia; over which Augustus caused a fair bridge to be built with this inscription;

JUSSI. MANDATU.VE. P.R. COS. IMP. MIL. TIRO. COMMILITO. MANIPULARIS.VE. CENT. TURMA.VE. LEGIONARI.VE. ARMAT. QUISQUIS. ES. HIC. SISTITO. VEXILLUM. SINITO. NEC. CITRA. HINC. AMNEM. RUBICONEM. DUCTUM. COMMEATUM. EXERCITUM. VE. TRADUCITO. SI. QUIS. HUIUSCE. JUSSIONIS. ERGO. ADVERSUS. FECIT. FECERIT.VE. ADJUDICATUS. ESTO. HOS.

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HOSTIS. P. R. AC. SI. CONTRA. PATRIAM. ARMA. TULERIT. SACROSQUE. PENATES. E. PENETRABILIS. ASPORTAVERIT. SANCIO. PLEBISCI. SENATUS.VE. CONSULT. ULTRA. HOS. FINES. ARMA. PROFERRE. LICEAT. NEMINI. S. P. Q. R.

The substance whereof is; That it should be unlawfull for any man to come over the said River armed, under penalty of being adjudged an enemy to the Commonwealth, and an invader of his own Country.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IF this manner of proceeding be brought into dispute, and the reason required why Cæsar kept not himself in the province of Gallia, where he might have held his government according to his own desire, or otherwise have drawn his adversaries to buckle with the strength of those conquering Legions, and so brought the business to a short end, with as great probability of good success, as by any hazard of undertaking: It is to be understood, that in cases of this nature, which seldom admit any treaty of accord, he that striketh first, and hath the advantage of the forehead, is well entered into the way of victory. For the rule is of old, That if an enemy hath a design in hand, it is farre more safe to begin first, and by way of prevention to give the onset on him; rather then to shew a readinesse of refitting his faults. For if blows (of necessity) must be way-makers to peace, it were a mistaking to be either wanting or behind-hand therein; besides the gain which attendeth this advantage. For he that stands affected to deny what is just, and of right due, doth nevertheless grant all things which the sword requireth; and will not stick to supply all unjust refusals, with as great an over-plus of what may be demanded. For which cause, Cæsar staid not the coming of his whole Army, but began with those forces which were ready at hand: and so preventing all intendments, he put his adversaries to such a streight, that they quitted Italy for fear, and left Rome (with whatsoever was sacred or precious therein) to the mercy of them whom they had adjudged enemies to their Country.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar taketh divers Municipall Towns.

Cæsar. Hail a Legion, being about 2500 men.

Pisaurum, Picard Ital. Fanum. An. on. Tignum.

Or which regard, he sent M. Antonius with five cohorts to Arretium: but he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, and there intended to enroll new troops; and with severall cohorts took Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona. In the mean while, being advertised that Thermus the Prator did hold Tignum with five cohorts,

and fortified the place, and that all the inhabitants were well inclined towards him; he sent Curio thither with three cohorts, which he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum. Upon notice of whose coming, Thermus (doubting of the affection of the town) drew his cohorts forth of the City, and fled. The soldiers by the way went from him, and repaired homeward. Curio was there received with the great contentment and satisfaction of all men. Upon notice whereof, Cæsar conceiving hope of the favourable affections of the Municipall towns, brought the cohorts of the thirteenth legion out of their garisons, and marched towards Auximum; a town held by Actius, with certain cohorts which he Actius Varus had brought thither with him, who having sent out divers Senators, made a levie of men throughout all the Countrey of Picenum.

Cæsar's coming being known, the Decuriones of Auximum repaired to Actius Varus, accompanied with great troupes of people; and told him that the matter concerned not him at all; for neither themselves, nor the rest of the Municipall towns, would shut their gates against such a Commander as Cæsar was, that by great and worthy service had so well deserved of the Commonwealth: and therefore advised him to consider what might ensue thereof, and the danger which might befall him in particular. Varus being thoroughly awakened at this warning, drew out the garrison which he had brought in, and so fled away: and being overtaken by a few of Cæsar's first troops, was compelled to make a stand; and there giving battle, was forsaken of his men. Some of the soldiers went home; and the rest came to Cæsar. Amongst them was taken L. Pupius, Centurion of a Primipile order, which place he had formerly held in Pompey's Army. Cæsar commended Actius soldiers; sent Pupius away; gave thanks to them of Auximum; and assured them of a mindfull acknowledgement on his behalf for this service.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Amongst other things which serveto inable our judgements, and do make men wise to good fortune, that which is gathered from similitude or likeness of quality, is not the unfurthest ground of our discourse; but oftentimes giveth more light to guide our passage through the doubtfulness of great enterprises, then any other help of reason. For he that will attend an overture from every particular, and tarry for circumstances to accomplish all his purposes, and make no use of instances to better his advantage, shall never wade farre in businesses of moment, nor achieve that which he desireth, Which Cæsar well observed: for upon the accidental discovery of the disposition of one town, he thereby took occasion to make triall how the rest stood

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flood affected; and either found them or made them answerable to his hopes.

Concerning these places taken by Cæsar, it is to be understood, that *Pisaurum* is sited on the *Adriatick* sea, and belongeth to the Dutchie of *Urbine*: a town famous of old, by reason of the prodigious opening of the earth, and swallowing up the inhabitants before the battell of *Atium*, some few yeares after it was thus taken by Cæsar.

Fanum was so called of a fair Temple which was there built to Fortune. *Tacit. Annal. 10.* *Exercitus Vespasiani ad Fanum Fortuna iter sistit*; The Army of Vespasian made a halt at the Temple of Fortune. It is a small town on the same sea, and belongeth to the Pope.

Ancona is a famous town upon the *Adriatick* sea, sited upon a bow-like promontorie, which taketh in the sea between two fore-lands; and to maketh one of the fairest Havens of all Italy, as well for largeness as for safety. From whence riseth that common saying, expressing the rareness and singularity of three things; *Ilus Petrus in Roma*, One Peter in Rome; noting the beauty of Saint Peter's Church: *Ilus Turris in Cremona*, One tower in Cremona; the excellent workmanship of a Steeple there: And *unus Portus in Ancona*, One Haven in Ancona; which is this Haven. The Emperor *Trajan*, to give it more shelter, and keep it from the fury of the wind, raised the top of the Promontorie in fashion of a half moon, with a mount made of great Marble stones; and made it Theatre-wise, with descents and degreets to go to the sea; together with an Ark triumphall in memory thereof. The town is now under the Pope.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

This word *Decurio* hath a double understanding: for *Romulus* having 3000 foot and 300 horse, divided them into three Tribes, and every Tribe into ten Curies, containing a hundred footmen and ten horsemen. Whereto *Marcellinus* concludeth, that *Decuriones* & *Centuriones* à numero cui in Militia præerant decubantur; they were called Decurions and Centurions from the number they commanded in the warres. But *Petorius* is more particular in this point. A Company of footmen (saith he) was called a Century or *Almiple*; and a Troup of horse was called *Turma*, of *Ter-denos*, containing thirty men, whereof the Captain was named *Decurio*. In which sense Cæsar speaketh; *Ex res per fugitivos L. Amili Decurionis equitum Gallorum hostibus nunciat*: This business was betrayed to the enemy by the fugitives of *L. Amilius* Decurion of the French horse. But in this place it hath another signification: for the Romans when they sent any Citizens to people and inhabit a place, chose out

every tenth man; such as were found most able, and of best sufficiency to make and establish a publick Councell; whom they called *Decuriones*; according as *Pomponius* and other Civilians understand it. So that these *Decuriones* were the Senate of that place.

CHAP. VII.

Lentulus flieth in great fear out of Rome. Cæsar cometh to Corfinium.



These things being reported at Rome, Cæsar the City was suddenly struck into such a terror, that when *Lentulus* the Consul came to open the Treasury, to deliver out money to Pompey according to the Act of Senates he fled out of the City, and left the inner chamber of the Treasury open. For it was reported (although untruly) that Cæsar was near approaching, and that his Cavalrie was hard at hand. *Marcellus*, the other Consul, together with most of the other Magistrates, followed after. Pompey departing the day before, was gone to those legions which he had taken from Cæsar, and had left in *Apulia* to winter. In the mean while the inrollment of soldiers ceased within the City. No place seemed secure between that & *Capua*. There they began first to assemble and assure themselves; impressing for soldiers such as by *Julius* law were sent thither to inhabit. And the Fencers which were there trained and exercised by Cæsar, for the entertainment of the people of Rome, were by *Lentulus* brought out, set at liberty, mounted upon horses, and commanded to follow him. But afterwards, upon advice of his friends (every mans judgement disallowing thereof) he dispersed them here and there throughout *Campania*, for their better safety and keeping.

Cæsar dislodging from *Auximum*, marched throughout all the Countrey of *Picenum*, and was most willingly received by all the Præfectures of those Regions, and relieved with all necessaries which his soldiers stood in need of. In so much as Commissioners were sent unto him from *Cingulum*, a town which *Labienus* had founded, and built from the ground at his own charges, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded, whereupon he required soldiers; and they sent them accordingly. In the mean time the twelfth legion overtook Cæsar; and with these two he marched directly to *Aesculum*, a town which *Lentulus* Spinther held with ten cohorts: who understanding of Cæsar's approach, left the place; and labouring to carry the troops with him, was forsaken by the greatest part of the soldiers; and so marching with a few, happened by chance upon *Vibullius Rufus*, sent of purpose by Pompey into the Countrey of *Picenum* to confirm and settle the people. *Vibullius* being

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advertised how matters went there, took the soldiers, and so dismissed him of his charge: gathering likewise from the confining Regions, what cohorts he could get from Pompey's former inrollments; and amongst others, entertained *Ulcilles Hirus*, flying with six cohorts out of *Camerinum*, whereof he had the keeping. These being all put together, made thirteen cohorts; with which by long marches he made towards *Domitius Enobarbus*, who was at *Corfinium*, telling him that Cæsar was at hand with two legions. *Domitius* had raised twenty cohorts out of *Albania*, *Marlia*, and *Pelignia*, adjacent Countreies. *Aesculum* being taken in, and *Lentulus* driven out, Cæsar made inquiry after the soldiers that had left *Lentulus*, and commanded them to be inrolled for him. And after one daies aboad for the provision of Corn, he marched towards *Corfinium*. Upon his approach thither, *Domitius* sent five cohorts out of the town, to break down the bridge of the River, which was about three miles off. The vanguard of Cæsar's Army encountering with *Domitius* soldiers, drove them from the bridge, and forced them to retreat into the town: whereby Cæsar past over his legions, made a stand before the town, and incamped himself under the walls.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is well observed by *Guicciardine*, That Insolency and Timidity are never found asunder, but do always accompany one another in the same subject: For the mind being the centre of all such motions, doth according to every mans nature, give the like scope to passions of contrariety, and extend them both to an equidistant circumference: as, if Courage shall happen to dilate it self to Insolency, then is Doubtfulnesse in like manner enlarged to Cowardice; and will imbase mens thoughts as low, as they did rise in height by insulting. For which cause it is advised by such as treat of Morality, that men be well warie in admitting dilatation of passions, or in suffering them to flie out beyond the compass of Reason, which containeth the measure of Equanimity, commended by *Cicero*, to be observed throughout the whole course of mans life. *Lentulus* the Consul may be an instance of this weaknesse, and learn others moderation by shunning his intemperancy. For in question of qualifying the rage of these broiles, and sorting of things to a peaceable end, his arrogancy was incompatible with terms of agreement, and overbore the Senate with heedlesse impetuosity. And again, when his authority and Consular gravity should have settled the distracted Commons, and made good his first resolution, his over-hasty flying out of the City did rather induce the people to believe, that there was no safety within those walls, not for so small a time as

might serve to have shut the Treasury at his heels; and so he became as subject, as before he shewed himself insolent.

Concerning these words (*Aperto sanctiore Arario*, rendered, the inner chamber of the Treasury left open) it is to be noted, that *Ararium* was their publick Treasury; and by the appointment of *Valerius Publicola*, was made within the Temple of *Saturn*: whereof divers men make divers conjectures. *Macrobius* saith, that as long as *Saturn* continued in Italy, there was no theft committed in all the country: and therefore his Temple was thought the safest place to keep money in. *Plutarch* thinketh rather, did allude to the integrity of the time wherein *Saturn* reigned; for avarice and deceit was not then known amongst them. *S. Cyprian* is of an opinion, that *Saturn* first taught Italy the use and coinage of money; and therefore they gave the keeping thereof to his Deity. Howsoever, it is manifest, that not only the publick Treasure was there kept, but also their Records, Charters, Ordinances and Edicts: together with such books as were, for their unmeasurable greatnesse, called *Libri Elephantini*; containing all their Acts of Senate, and deeds of Arms achieved by the Commanders abroad, as also their military Ensigns which they fetched awayes from thence when they went into the field: and there likewise did such Embassadours as came to Rome enregister their names, as *Plutarch* affirmeth.

It was called *Ararium* of *Æs*, signifying Brasse; for that the first money used by the Romans was of that metall, until the year of Rome 485, as *Pliny* witnesseth; when they began first to coin pieces of silver marked with the letter X, whereof they took the appellation of *Denarium*, as valuing ten asses of brasse, which before they used for their coin; and every of the said asses weighed 12 ounces. Touching their order observed in their Treasury, for their disposing and laying up of their moneys, we must understand, that as bodies politick require necessary and ordinary treasure to be employed in such manner, as may best concur with the publick honour and weal of the same; so there must be speciall care to provide against un usuall and extraordinary casualties, which are not removed but by speedy and effectual remedies. According to which providence the Romans disposed of their treasure, and took the twentieth part of their receipt, which they called *Aurum vicefarinarum*, and reserved it apart in an inner chamber; where it lay so privileged, that it was a capitall crime to touch it, but in extrem and desperate necessity: as in time of war with the *Galles*, or in a sedition and tumult of the people. *Livie* affirmeth as much, where he saith, *Cætera expediendis quæ ad bellum opus erant consilibus, aurum ad ultimos casus servatum*. *Lib. 24.*

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varetur, promi placuit: prompta ad quatuor millia pondo Auri. The Consuls furnishing all other things needfull for the war, it was resolved that the *vicesimary* gold should be brought forth and employed: which said gold was reserved in the inner Treasury, till such time as affairs happened to be in a desperate condition. Accordingly, there was 4000 pound of gold taken out.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SUCH as affect offices and dignities in a State, must ever have means to court *Sovereignty*, according as may best suit with her *Politics*; either as she is espoused to a Monarch, or left in trust to a Multitude. Hence it was that the *Romans*, to gain the favour of the people, and to make way for their own ends, were very sumptuous in setting forth shews and spectacles, of divers sorts and fashions; and specially of Gladiators or Fencers, as best fitting a *Roman* disposition, and more pleasing then others of any kind. *Equidem (saith Tully) existimo, nullum tempus esse frequentioris populi, quam illud Gladiatorium, neque concionis ullius, neque vero illorum Comitiarum;* I verily believe that there is at no time a greater concourse of people, then is at the fencing-plays; neither at an Oration, nor at an Assembly of the State. And in another place; *Idemque spectaculi genus erat, quod omni frequentia, atque omni hominum genere celebratur, quo multitudo maxime delectatur;* That is a kind of shew, which is celebrated with the flocking together of all sorts of people; it being a thing the multitude are extremely delighted with.

Their manner was to keep great numbers of these Fencers, in some convenient and healthfull towns of *Italy*, as at *Revenna*, and *Capua* (which were as Seminaries of these people) and there to train them up in the feat of fencing, untill they had occasion to use them in their shews; either at their triumphall entries into the City upon their victories, or at the funeral solemnity of some personage of memory, or otherwise at their feasts and jollities.

Quinetiam exhibere viris convivio cade Mos olim & miscere epulis spectacula dira. The death of men made much at feasts of old, And banquets then were grac'd with fencers bold.

They fought commonly man to man, at all advantages, and were seldom executed, untill one of the two lay dead upon the place. Neither was he then quitted that had slain his companion, but stood liable to undertake another, and so a third, untill he had foiled six or seven Combatants. And if his hap were to prevail so often, he was then honoured with a Garland wound about with ribands of wool, which they called *Lemnisci*,

and received of the Prætor a great knotted staffe, called *Rudis*; which he afterward carried about with him as an ensign of liberty. These bloody spectacles continued unto the time of *Constantine* the great, and were by him prohibited, as likewise also by *Arcadius* and *Honorius*; and utterly abolished after the reign of *Theodoric*, king of the *Goths*. Let him that would look further into the fashion of these shews, read what *Lipsius* hath written concerning the same. That which I observe herein is, the use which the State made hereof: for howsoever these fights and solemnities were set forth for the compassing of private ends; yet nevertheless the Commonwealth drew benefit from the same. For a multitude being of a fickle and mutable nature, are no way so well settled with contentment of the time, or kept from novelties and innovations, as with publick shews and entertainments; which are as staves to their affections, that they swerve not from the government by which they live in civile confociation. So we read how the *Grecians* instituted, as popular entertainments, their *Olympian*, *Nemean*, *Isthmian*, and *Pythian* Games; The *Romans*, their *Apollinary*, *Secular*, *Gladiatory*, and *Hunting* shews, with *Tragedies* and *Comedies*; and all for the satisfaction of the people. Wherein, howsoever the *Grecians* seem more judicious, for inventing such Games as might both exercise and entertain the people; yet the *Romans* failed not of the end aimed at in these spectacles, which was, to inure them to blood and slaughter, and to make them dreadingless in cases of horreur.

But to leave all shews of this nature, as either too little for earnestness, or too much for pastime; it shall suffice to note, that these publick entertainments are so far expedient as they consist of pleasure and comeliness: for as their chiefest end is to please and content the people; so their manner must be directed by lawfulness and honesty. In which respect, a Tragedy is more commendable then a Comedy; forasmuch as few comical arguments do sympathize with honesty.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

TO be great and of a large proportion, doth not take away casualties of inconvenience; nor can it give a privilegedge, to free things from distemperature: Tall men are as subject to Fevers, as others of lesser stature; and great Empires as easily disturbed, as the States of petty Princes.

O faciles dare summa Deos, eademque tueri Difficiles!—
O Gods easy to grant, but to preserve Your gifts as hard!—

It is easier to attain the end of high desires, then to keep it being got: and better is the assurance of

*Spectaculum
etiam & do-
natum jam
uide. Hor.
The Ro-
mans never
used these
Gladiators
in any ulti-
mum service,
but only in
civile
wars.*

*Ac deinde
in super au-
sultans
duo milia
Gladiato-
rum: sol
per civili
arma fecer-
is datus
usurpator.*
Tac. hist. 1.

*Lucan.
lib. 1.
Parare, &
querere ar-
dum: curi
difficile, il-
lus
facile
lib. 37.*

Lib. I. Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

of seeking, then of possessing. The *Roman* people that had over-awed the world with Armes, and left no kingdom unfoiled with the fear of their legions, were as much dismayed at a subjects disloyalty, as was possible for a mean State to be amazed upon an alarme of any danger. And that City which suffered no enemy to approach near her confines, but in the condition of a Captive, was not trusted as able to give her own people safety.

*--- sic tunc baper Hybern
Præcipiti lymphata gradu, velut unicarebus
Spes foret assilitis parvis excedere muros,
Inconsultum.*—

--- So through the streets
With headlong madnesse ran the multitude,
As if their case no other hope had left
Of safety, then to quit their native walls.
The advantage is, that kingdoms of great com-
mand have great helps in cases of disturbance;
but are otherwise as subject to apprehensions of
distrust, as those of lesser power to resist.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar goeth on with the siege of *Corfinium*, and taketh it.

Cæsar

DOMITIUS being thus engaged, sent out skilfull men of the Country, with promise of great reward, to carry Letters to Pompey, intreating and praying, that he would come and receive him; for Cæsar, by reason of the straightness of the passages, might with two Armies be easily shut up: which opportunity if he neglected, himself, with above 30 cohorts of souldiers, besides a great number of Senators and Roman Knights, were in danger of running a hard fortune. In the mean time, he exhorted his men to courage and resolution; placed his Artillery on the walls; assigned every man his quarter to be made good; promised in publick assembly of the souldiers, four acres apiece to each man out of his own lands and possessions, and the like rateable parts to the Centurions and Evocati. Mean-while it was told Cæsar, that the inhabitants of *Sulmo*, a town distant seven miles from *Corfinium*, were desirous to receive his commands; but that they were restrained by *Q. Lucretius* a Senator, and *Actius Pelignus*, that kept the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. Whereupon he sent thither *M. Antonius* with five cohorts of the seventh legion: whose Ensigns were no sooner discovered by those of the town, but the gates were opened, and the inhabitants and souldiers came all out, to gratulate and welcome *Antonius*. *Lucretius* and *Actius* conveyed themselves over the wall, *Actius* being taken and brought to *Antonius*, desired to be sent to Cæsar. *Antonius* returning the same day, brought *Actius* and the souldiers

that were found in *Sulmo*, to Cæsar; whom he took to his Army, and sent *Actius* away in safety.

Cæsar, the three first daies, made great works to fortify his Camp; caused store of corn to be brought from the towns next about him; and there determined to stay the coming of the rest of his forces. Within the space of those three daies the eighth legion came unto him, with 22 cohorts newly enrolled in *Gallia*, together with three hundred horse, which the King of *Noricum* had sent unto him. Upon the arrival of which forces, he made a second Camp on the other side of the town, and appointed *Curio* to command it. The rest of the time was spent in compassing the town with a Rampier and with Castles. The greatest part of which work being finished, it chanced at the same time, that such as were sent to Pompey returned. The Letters being read, *Domitius* dissembling the truth, gave out in the council of war, that Pompey would come speedily to succour them: and therefore wished that no man should be dismayed, but to prepare such things as were of use for the defence of the town, but he himself conferring secretly with some of his familiar friends, consulted how he might escape away. But forasmuch as his looks agreed not with his words, and that his carriage seemed more troubled and timorous then usual, and likewise his secret conferences with his friends were more then ordinary, as also by his avoiding of publick counsels and assemblies as much as he could, the matter could be no longer dissembled. For Pompey had writ back, that he would not hazard the cause, by drawing it into such terms of extremity: neither was *Domitius* engaged in the keeping of *Corfinium* by his advice or consent: and therefore, if by any means he could, he should quit the place, and bring the forces unto him. But the siege was so straight, and the works did so besiege the town, that there was no hope of effecting it. *Domitius* purpose being known abroad, the souldiers within the town, about the beginning of the evening forsook their stations, and drew themselves apart; and thereupon had conference with the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions to this effect: That they were besieged by Cæsar, whose works and fortifications were almost finished; their General *Domitius* (in hope and confidence of whom they were engaged in that place) setting aside all matters whatsoever, was bethinking himself how he might escape and fly away: and in regard thereof, they were not to neglect their own safety. The Matter at first began to differ from the rest upon that point, & possess themselves of that part of the town which seemed to be strongest: and such a dissenion thereby grew amongst them, that they had almost gone to blowes. Howbeit, understanding a while after (by messengers

Ec 3 which

*Du. es: bus
atidis bi.
lucaten de
industria
mature
Seneca ad
P. 17.*

And there-
fore they
were call-
ed, Bullu-
ri, a bullis.
Sil. Ita.

Lemnisci

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which past to and fro between them) of Domitius purpose to flee away, whereof formerly they were ignorant; they agreed together, and with one consent brought Domitius out into open publick; and sent some to Cæsar, to let him know, they were ready to open the gates, to receive his commandments, and to deliver Domitius alive into his hands. Upon advertisement whereof (albeit Cæsar found it a matter of great consequence, to gain the town with as much speed as he could, and to take the souldiers into his Camp, lest either by large promises and gifts, or by entertaining other purposes, or otherwise through false bruits or devised messages, their minds might happily be altered, as oftentimes in the course of warres, great and eminent chances and alterations do happen in a small moment of time; yet for that he feared lest the night-time might give occasion to the souldiers upon their entrance to sack and piller the town) he commending those that came unto him, sent them back again, and willed that the gates and the walls should be kept with a good guard. He himself disposed the souldiers upon the work, which he had begun; not by certain spaces and distances, as he had accustomed in former times, but by continuall watches and stations, one touching another round about all the fortifications. Moreover, he sent the Tribunes and Captains of the horse about, and willed them to have a care that there might be no eruptions or sallies, and that they should look to the private slippings out of particular men. Neither was there any man so heavy or dull, that suffered his eyes to be shut that night: for so great was the expectation of what would ensue, that no man thought of any other things, then of what would happen to the Corninians, to Domitius, to Lentulus and the rest. About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther spake from the wall to our souldiers that had the watch, and signified that he would willingly have leave to come to Cæsar. Which being granted, he was sent out of the town, attended with some of Domitius his souldiers, who left him not untill he came in sight of Cæsar. With him he dealt concerning his life, and prised him to pardon him; put him in mind of their former familiarity; acknowledged the favours received from Cæsar, which were very great; namely, that by his means, he was chosen into the Colledge of Priests, that upon the going out of his Pratorship, he obtained the province of Spain, and in his son's to be Consul, he was much assisted by him.

Cæsar, interrupting his speech, told him, that he came not from his government to hurt any man; but to defend himself from the injuries of his adversaries; to restore the Tribunes of the people to their dignities, that were thrust out and expelled the City; and to

put himself and the people of Rome into liberty, which were oppressed with the partialities of a few factious persons. Lentulus, being reassured upon this answer, prayed leave to return into the town; and the rather, that this which he had obtained touching his own safety, might give hope to the rest: amongst whom some were so affrighted, that he doubted they would fall into some desperate course. And having obtained leave, he departed. Cæsar, as soon as it was day, commanded all the Senators and Senators children, together with the Tribunes of the souldiers, and the Roman Knights, to be brought out unto him. Of Senators there were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, Vibullius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus, the Treasurer, L. Rubrius; besides Domitius his sonne, and many other young men; with a great number of Roman Knights and Decurions, whom Domitius had called out of the Municipall Towns. These being all brought forth unto him, were protected from the insolencies and injuries of the souldiers. Moreover, he spake a few words unto them, concerning the ill requitall on their behalf, for the great benefits he had done unto them: and so sent them all away in peace.

The sixty Sestertia of gold which Domitius had laid up in the publick Treasury, being brought unto him by the two chief Magistrates or Bailiffs of Continuum, he redelivered to Domitius; lest he should seem more continent in taking away mens lives, then their moneys: although he knew that this money was part of the publick treasure, and delivered out by Pompey to pay souldiers. He commanded Domitius his party to be sworn his souldiers. And that day removing his Camp, went a full dayes march (after a stay of seven dayes about Continuum) through the confines of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates, and came into Apulia.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS it is true, that a friend is not solely tied to the respects of right, but doth give more advantage by offices of good endeavour, then by that which duty requireth: so is it dangerous for a man to put his fickle further into a harvest, then haply may deserve thanks of the owner. Neither can it be cleared from imputation of folly, to care another mans businesse, with hazard and perill of our own fortune. Howbeit, the current and drift of things doth oftentimes to ingage both our persons and affections, either in the main action it self, or in some circumstances of the same, that we cannot avoid the hazard of rebuke, if our endeavours do not sort with his liking that is to approve them. Whereof Domitius may be an instance; who, taking Continuum on the behalf of the State, was nevertheless disavowed in his merit, and consequently brought unto extremity of danger,

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danger, for his over-forwardnesse in the service of his Country. Such liberty hath sovereignty, either to take or leave, when the event shall not rise answerable to a good meaning.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

When a party is fallen into an exigence, it hath no better remedy for relief then that of the Comick, *Redimas te captum quam queas minimo*; redeem your self at as cheap a rate as you can. Which is not understood, that we should clear the head, and leave the rest of the members to misfortune: for that were to draw a double mischief on the whole body. But the head is to escape with as little prejudice to the other parts, as by wisdom and veracie may be gained: and so much the rather, left in seeking to purchase safety with hazard of the other members, it draw the whole destruction upon it self; as it fell out with Domitius: who going about to fly out of the town, and to leave such forces as by his means were imbarcked in that cause, was justly made the sacrifice of their peace. Sulla deserved better to be followed by men of adventure: for, being moved to escape himself away by night, and to leave his troups to such fortune as Jugurth upon advantage should put upon them; he answered, *Etiamsi certa pestis adesset, mansurum potius quam proditis quos ducebant, turpi fugas incerte, ac forsitan paulo post morbo interitura vita parceret*: Although the plague were never so near and certain to befall him, yet he would stay by it, rather then by a base slight betray those under his command, thereby to save his fickle life for a time, which it may be some disease or other would immediately after deprive him of. And therefore, if a Commander shall at any time goe about to betray his forces, with hope of his own safety, the issue will bring out either his dishonour, or his confusion.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

SUCH as undertake great designs, do likewise project the means of achieving the same, and do propound unto themselves such principles to be observed, as they take to be special way-makers to the fortune they reach at; from which grounds they seldom or never swerve. As appeareth by this of Cæsar: who aiming at the sovereignty of that Empire, and knowing no way so direct to lead him thercunto, as to climb up by the steps of Mildnesse, and to make his Adversaries debtors to his Clemency, he left aside his Maximes of warre, to hold firm that principle; and did forbear to gain a town of great importance, with that speed which occasion and opportunity did afford him, and to take the troups into his Camp, for the prevention of such chances and changes, as do happen in a small moment of time, left his souldiers

entring into the town, after the shutting of the evening, might take leave of the night-time to make forfeiture of his mercy.

It shall therefore be well becoming the wisdom of a Leader, to have always respect to the principles of his Means, and to distinguish between that which is fit and that which is more fit, in the native carriage of his businesse.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

Concerning this *Collegium Pontificum*, the Colledge of Priests, we are to note, that Numa, the founder of the Roman Commonwealth, for the preventing of partialities and factions in that State, which at that time consisted of two Nations or Tribes, did break the whole body into many small parts and factions, making his division by Arts and Occupations; whereby he ordained, that all Minstrels or Trumpeters should be incorporated into one Brotherhood; and that in like manners, Goldsmiths, Carpenters, Diyers, Shoemakers, Coriers, Tanners, Bell-founders, Porters, and all other trades and Sciences, should have their peculiar body or Fraternity; appointing them feasts, assemblies, and services, according to the worthinesse of each mystry, as *Plutarch* hath observed in the life of Numa.

Valerius Maximus maketh mention of the Colledge of Pipers or Minstrels. And *Plinius* in like manner, mentioneth the Colledge of Copper-smiths. *Cicero* taketh notice of the college or company of Merchants, which he called *Collegium Mercatorum*; for that of old time, the nimble-tongued *Mercury* was believed in, as the Guide and Protector of Merchants. The privileges and customes wherewith these Fraternities were endowed, are set down by *Caius* the Civilian. There are certain Colledges at Rome, saith he, incorporated by Act of Senate, and established with good ordinances and constitutions, having certain things in common; in imitation of the publick weal: and as *Scævola* further noteth, with power to make laws, for the better government of such Colledges and Societies; so the same be not contrary to the fundamentall laws of the State. After the same manner, the Priests had their peculiar Colledge or corporations; and at the first institution were but four in number, and all of Patrician families, unto the year of Rome 454: at what time there were four of the Commons chosen, and added to the former number; whom *Sulla* increased to fifteen, as *Dio* witnesseth. And these were called *Collegium Pontificum*, whereof this *Pontifex Maximus* was president: one of the absolute dignities of Rome, as being for term of life, and of greatest and divine authority. Which generall distribution of the Romans into trades and mysteries, doth not unfittly bring into remembrance, that which is usuall amongst the *Turks*, who by their

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Acometum
the great
Turk.
Fuerer
Balla,
Nalier, or
pater of
nailes.
Bultangi
Balla,
Gardener.

law are all bound to be of an occupation; not excepting the Grand Signior himself. For he that now upholds the *Ottoman* family, by the name of *Sultan Acomet*, is a professed maker of Rings, which the *Turks* do wear on their thumb when they shoot, to let the string go easily without hurting them: and his father *Mahomet* was a Fletcher, and made arrows. In like manner, all his Courtiers are of trades and occupations; and every man is called by the title of his Art: as, he that was lately Visier *Balla* to the present Sultan, was called by the name of *Natash Balla*, the Visier Painter, being indeed the Sultans Painter. Neither are they ashamed to acknowledge as much: for, opening Letters which were sent into *Turky* out of Christendome, that were limned about the Margin, he said, he could paint as well as that himself.

THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

THE fifth thing which I observe out of these passages at *Corfinium*, is, the restoring back of such moneys to *Domitius*, as were brought unto *Cæsar* by the Officers of the town, and which he knew to be of the publick treasure of the State. Which howsoever it may seem admirable to the hearers of these times, wherein there is but this one rule for matter of money, *unde habeas quærit nemo, sed oportet habere*, No body asks how you come by it, but it must be had: Yet such as will lay a sure foundation of honour, and thrive in the courses which they follow, must not be ignorant, that there is nothing more requisite to gain opinion and reputation in the carriage of any publick business, then to be clear of the least suspicion of covetousness. Neither is there any means that will sooner win a multitude, to believe in those things which are set abroad by publick Authority, then those two virgin virtues, Abstinence and Continence: especially when they are found in Princes and chief Commanders, that can otherwise justify their actions with sovereignty and uncontrollment. Nor, on the other side, did ever *Apollo* give out truer Oracle then that, which said, that there was no means to ruin *Sparta* but by Avarice.

Caput autem est in omni procuratore ne negotii, de rebus publicis, ut avaritia pellat in minimam suspitionem. Nulla autem temperantia conciliat facilius benevolentiam multitudinis potius in quæritur publicæ præsentem, quam abstinentia et concientia. Cicer. lib. Offici.

In which sense, *C. Pomius* the *Samnite* wished, that the Gods had reserved him to times wherein the *Romans* would have been corrupted with gifts: for then he would soon have seen an end of their Commonwealth. And certainly that Empire could never have towered so high, nor continued firm so many ages, had not her foundation been laid by men of admirable temper in this kind: Such as was *Publius Æmilius*; who having sacked *Macedonia*, and brought as much wealth into the publick Treasury as gave an end to Tributes and Subsidies, was no way the richer (but in honour) for all that he had taken. And such also was *Scipio Africanus*; that of all the wealth

of *Carthage*, brought nothing into his private house, but a high and triumphant Name, as a merit of his virtues and deeds of Arms: leaving behind him this Oracle, as a document to following times; That covetous Captains are good to none but to the Enemy. And to conclude, such was *M. Curius*; who having triumphed of the *Samnites*, the *Sabines*, and *Pyrrhus*, refused a great mass of Gold, which was offered him by the *Samnites*: esteeming it more honourable to command them that had Gold, then to have Gold of his own. Howbeit, such is the frailty of humane nature, that for the most part, men have always suffered their desire of money to increase with their wealth, although it were to their ruine and destruction. Which *Cæsar* well discerned, as appeareth by that which he writ to *Oppius*, touching this accident: *Hæc nova sit vincendi ratio, ut misericordia & liberalitate nos muniamus*; It is a new way of conquering, to strengthen our selves by mercifulness and liberality.

Imperator res muneribus habebat sine periculis. Appian, de bell. Hispan. C. 6. Cæsar Major.

THE SIXTH OBSERVATION.

UPON occasion of *Cæsar's* calling unto him, out of the town, *Senatores senatoremque filios, Equitesque Romanos*, the Senators, sons of Senators, and *Roman Knights*, it shall not seem impertinent, to note the degrees and conditions of state whereof the *Roman* people consisted. For the better clearing whereof, it is to be understood, that by that notable transaction at *Comitium*, between *Romulus* and *Tatius*, it was agreed, That both those Nations should dwell together at *Romulus* town, which after his name, should be called *Rome*; and that the inhabitants thereof should be named *Quirites*, after the name of *Tatius* town. Howbeit, specially they were divided into three Tribes, whereof they which were of *Romulus* party, were called after his name, *Rhomulenses*; those that came with *Tatius*, *Tatienenses*; and the third Tribe *Lucerenses*, of *Lucus*, a Grove: forasmuch as they being neither of *Romulus* retainers, nor yet of the *Sabines*, were nevertheless met together at that place, from divers parts, as at a Grove, where commonly assemblies were made to offer sacrifices, and to perform their heathenish solemnities.

Plutarch in vita Romulæ.

Each of these Tribes were divided by *Romulus* into ten *Curia*; and so made the number of thirty *Curia*. And out of each of these *Curia* he chose three persons, such as by their presence and sufficiency seemed fittest, and most worthy; which amounted to ninety. To whom out of every Tribe he further added three, and one more of his own choosing, to make the number up a hundred; whom he established as his Council or Senate: by whose advice he resolved of all matters of consequence, either concerning peace or warre, as *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* noteth.

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Lib. 2.

teth. Howbeit *Plutarch* saith, they were seldom assembled but to understand the Kings pleasure; and had no other preeminence in the Commonwealth, saving they were the first that did know what was purposed. Howsoever, they were titled by the name of *Senatores, quasi seniores*, as thereby qualified to be admitted to Council: and in the same sense they were called *Patres*.

The Senate being thus established, *Romulus* selected out of every of those *Curia* ten young men, and so made up the number of three hundred, for a guard to his person; who for their readiness and nimbleness were called *Celeres*, all mounted on horseback: whence grew their *Ordo Equestris*, or band of *Roman Knights*, which were the mean between the Senate and the people, and as a Seminary to supply the Senate; for out of them were the Senators taken. The rest, that were not of these two Orders, were comprehended under the name of the Commons, or Populace. Whereby it appeareth that *Rome* consisted of three estates, Senators, Knights, and the Commons, according to that of *Ausonius*;

Martia Roma triplex; Equitatus Plebes, Senatus.

Of three sorts *Rome* consists, Knights, Commons, Senate.

Touching the number of Senators, it is further to be noted, that *Tarquinius Priscus*, to gain the favour of the people, took a hundred of the Commons, and added them to the Senate, who were called *Senatores minorum Gentium*. And *Brutus* having reduced it to a Commonwealth, made them up three hundred out of the band of Knights; and from that time they were called *Patres conscripti*. Neither were they at all times limited in that number: for the seditious *Gracchi* added three hundred more unto them; and *Julius Cæsar* admitted unto the Senate all manner of persons. In which regard *Augustus* (as *Suetonius* saith) *Senatum affluentem numerum deformi & incondita turba (erat enim super mille, & quidam indignissimi) ad modum pristinum & splendorem redegit*: Reduced the excessive number of Senators, which was become a deformed and shapeless company (for they were above a thousand, and divers of them unworthy fellows) to their ancient way and splendour.

Sueton. 35.

Sueton. 41.

Concerning a competency of wealth, to make a man capable of the place of a Senator, we may observe, that in the reign of *Servius* the King, he that was worth a thousand *asses* (which are about three hundred pound Sterling) was eligible. But the riches of the Empire increasing, a Senators wealth was rated at nine thousand pounds, according to *Suetonius*; *Senatum censum ampliorum, ac pro obtingentorum millium summa duodecies H. S. taxavit, suppleturque non habentibus*. The wealth of a *Roman Knight* was rated at three hundred three score, or thereabouts.

This *Corfinium* was the chief town of the *Pe- Corfinium.*
Ugnians, and stood in the centre of *Italy*, where all the confederate people assembled when they consulted of warre against the *Romans*, for their right of Burgeships, or freedom of the City, which was then denied them: which warre was called *Bellum sociale Mariscum*, and *Italicum*. There is now nothing remaining of that town but the ruins, as a mark of the place where it anciently stood, upon a Plain, commonly called *Pentinus*, or *Sant Peligno*.

CHAP. IX.

Pompey goeth to *Brundisium*; *Cæsar* maketh means to treat with him.

POMPEY understanding of these things which had past at *Corfinium*, departed from *Luceria*, and went to *Canusium*, and from thence to *Brundisium*; causing all the power he could be raised by new musters and involvements, arming shepherds and slaves, and mounting them on horseback; of whom he made some three hundred horse. In the mean time *L. Manlius*, the *Prætor*, fled from *Alba* with six cohorts; and *Rutilius Lupus*, *Prætor*, fled from *Tarracina* with three cohorts: who deserving as were off the Cavalry of *Cæsar*, commanded by *Bivius Curius*, forsaking the *Prætor*, turned their Ensignes towards *Curius*, and joined with him. In like manner the dayes following, divers other cohorts came in as they marched, some to the foot troops, and some to the horse. *Cn. Magius* of *Cremona*, master of the works and of the munition in *Pompey's Army*, was taken on the way, and brought back to *Cæsar*: whom he sent back again to *Pompey*, with commission to treat with him to this effect: Forasmuch as there had yet happened no opportunity of meeting or conference, he was now determined to seek him at *Brundisium*; for it much imported the Commonwealth, and every mans safety in particular, that they two might confer together. Neither could things be so well handled upon so great a distance of way, where the articles of treaty must be carried to and fro by a third party, as when they met face to face to conclude of the conditions.

This message being first given, he came to *Brundisium* with six legions; four legions of old soldiers, and the other raised by new involvements, or made up as he came along the Countrey: for he had presently dispatched *Domitius* his cohorts from *Corfinium* into *Sicily*. At his coming, he found the *Consuls* gone over to *Dyrrachium* with the greatest part of the Army, and *Pompey* remaining at *Brundisium* with twenty cohorts. Neither could he certainly be informed, whether he remained at *Brundisium* to make

F f good

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good the town, whereby he might the easier be master of the Adriatick sea, and command both the inner parts of Italy, and the Regions of Greece, and so to keep the warre on foot on the one side and on the other; or whether he staid there for want of shipping. Howsoever, he would not endure that Pompey should think he could not be forced to quit Italy; and therefore resolved to stop up the mouth of the Haven, and to take away the use thereof: which he went about in this manner.

Cæsar being at Brundisium, the 23 day of February, at no urbis cond. 704.

Where the mouth of the Haven was narrowest, he raised great mounds of earth on either side near unto the shore; for there the Sea was shallow: but going further into the deep, where no such mounds could be raised, he placed double flottes of wood, right against the same mounds, of thirty foot square; and at the corners cast out four Anchors to fasten them, that they might not be tossed up and down by the waves. These flottes being thus placed, he then added other flottes of the same scantling, and covered them with bavin and earth, to the end men might come readily upon them to defend them. He armed them in front and on each side with hardies and gabions; and on every fourth flotte made a tower of two stories high, the better to defend them from violence of shipping, and from burning.

Against this work Pompey sent out great ships of burthen, which he found in the Haven, armed with towers of three stories high, full of munitions, and all sort of weapons, to hinder and disturb the same. So that every day they fought as fierce off each with other, with slings, arrows, and other casting weapons. Which businesse Cæsar so carried, as being willing not to let fall the conditions of peace, if happily it might be effected. And albeit he greatly wondered that Magnus, whom he had sent to Pompey, did not return again; and that this Treaty so often attempted, did hinder much his designs: yet he thought it fit by all means to persevere therein; and therefore sent Caninius Rebilus, one of his Legates, an inward friend of, and near allied to Scribonius Libo, to speak with him; commanding him to persuade Libo to mediate a reconciliation, and that Cæsar himself might speak with Pompey. It might be, that thereupon both of them would yield to lay down their Arms upon equall conditions: the greatest part of which honour would redound to Libo, if by his intercession the warre might take an end.

Pompey's son married Libo's daughter.

Libo having heard Caninius, went straight to Pompey; and within a while returning, told him, That so far as the Consuls were absent, there could be nothing done touching an agreement. Whereupon Cæsar resolved to let fall the matter of Treaty, which he had so often attempted, and to prepare for warre.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.


This accident of taking *Cn. Magnus*, hath made known an officer of great place *Præfatus* and use in the Roman Army, of whom otherwise *Fabianus* their Histories make little mention. For, howsoever, there is found in these Commentaries many particular descriptions of admirable and incredible works, such as may seem to be made rather by Giants and Cyclopes, than any labour of man: yet there is no mention of any *Præfatus fabrum*, or Master of the works in any of Cæsar's Armies. Howbeit *Vegetius* expressing their singular care to have in abundance all manner of provisions requisite for an Army, saith; That to every legion did belong Carpenters, Bricklayers, Smiths, Painters, and other Artizans, skilfull and fit to build lodgings for their wintering Camps; to make Engines and devices for warre; such as were their portative, or ambulatory towers, targets, morions, cossetts, bows, arrows, darts, and piles, or whatsoever else might serve, either for offence or defence. Which Artificers were all known by the name of *Fabri*; and he that was Chief, and had the command of them, was called *Præfatus fabrum*. And in like manner *Plutarch* sheweth, that there was such an officer; as also that the place was given by the Generall; where he saith, that *Vibius* a *Sicilian* refused to lodge *Cicero*, as he passed to exile through *Lucania*; although that in his Consulship he had bestowed upon him the place of *Præfatus fabrum*. And albeit Cæsar maketh no mention of any such officer; yet *Caullus* doth it for him, in such biting Triceries as will not be forgotten:

*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,
Nisi impudicus, & vorax & Hællus,
Mamurram habere, quod Comata Gallia
Habeat & ultima Britannia?
Who can this endure to see,
But must a wanton glutton be,
That Mamurra should have all
Fetch'd from Britan and from Gall?*

Of which *Mamurra* *Plinie* thus writeth; *Cornelius Nepos* saith he, writeth that *Mamurra*, a Roman knight, born at *Formia*, and Master of the works under Cæsar in *Gallia*, was the first that covered all the wall of his house, which he built in Mount *Cælius*, with leaves of Marble. Neither let any man disdain the Authour as a mean person; for this is that *Mamurra*, whom *Caullus* doth note in his verses; whose house was farre more stately then *Caullus* did expresse, by saying he had gotten all the wealth of *Gallia Comata*. For the said *Cornelius* affirmeth, that he was the first in *Rome* that made the pillars of his house of solid Marble, even hewen out of the quarries of *Caristus*, or *Luna*. Thus farre goeth

Plutarch in the life of *Cicero*.

Lib. 36, cap. 6.



eth *Pliny*. Out of which may be noted, that exorbitancy in gaining doth produce the like count in spending; and howsoever such comings in may be close and secret, yet the issuings out will proclaim it in profuse and lavishing manner: and therefore such as command in these places, and have such means to enrich themselves, had need to be clean-fingered. *Caesar* writing to *Oppius*, mentioneth the taking of this man, as a thing of some note. *Cn. Magnus*, *Pompeii Praefectum deprehendi scilicet, meo instituto usus sum, & cum statim missum feci: jam duo Praefecti fibrum in meam potestatem venerunt, & a me missi sunt*: When I had taken *Cn. Magnus*, a master of the works to *Pompey*, according to my usuall manner, I let him go. So that there have two Masters of the works fallen into my hands, and I have let them both freely go. Concerning the use of these manuell Arts, and the prerogative they have in well-ordered States; it is to be noted, that without these, no City can conveniently be built, fortified, or furnished with Arms. And thereupon such Artizans have alwaies challenged a place of chief regard in the Commonwealth. Whence it was, that *Ulysses* scorned not *se fabrum profitemi*, to professe himself such an Artizan.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE *Maxime proprium*, or most proper part of warre is opposition; and that universall, rather then any other kind of repugnancy: for there is no sympathizing condition between two enemy Armies, otherwise then by mutuall exchange of *velle & nolle*, throughout the whole course of their intendments; as may be here observed upon *Caesar's* arrivall at *Brundisium*. For finding *Pompey* to remain there after the departure of the Consuls, and not certainly informed of the reason of his stay; lest he should think he could not be forced to quit *Italy*, *Caesar* went about to thrust him out headlong: or otherwise, if his purpose were to follow after the Consuls to *Dyrachium*, *Caesar's* design then was to shut him in, and so to have followed the rule of contradiction, by which souldiers are directed in their achievements.

Concerning the site of *Brundisium*, which hath ever been famous for the commodiounesse of the Haven, and the usuall port where the *Romans* took shipping for *Greece*, being but a hundred *Italian* miles distant from *Apollonia* in *Epirus*; we are to note, that the town standeth upon a Langet of earth, extended into the Haven Peninsule-like from the main land, resembling the neck and head of a Stagge, and in that regard is called *Brundisium*, of *βρυτιν*, which signifieth a Stagge: which Langet hath

many crooked guts, or inlets of the Seas, capable of great shipping; besides the two main Ports on either side of the town, which with the rest of the Haven, make the safest and fairest road of that part of the world. The mouth of the Haven where *Caesar* made his flottes, is very streight; and opposite thereunto, some three miles distant into the Sea, standeth a small Island, to abate the violence and rage of the waves. Now to besiege *Brundisium*, it was requisite to take away the use and benefit of the Haven: which *Caesar* attempted with such rare and artificiall works (of mounts where the Sea was shallow, and of flottes where the water was deep; and those made firm with earth, and fenced with hurdles and turrets, that the Reader may discern it, by the description, to be a Master-piece of excellent invention.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

IT is truly said of old, That peace is not dear at any rate. Which *Antiochus* well understood, when he bought it of the *Romans* for twelve thousand *Atrick* talents, and 540000 bushels of wheat: Esteeming it as the sovereign happinesse of mans fortune, and an extraordinary effect of those intelligent spirits, which guide the motions of the celestiall spheres, to keep the elements in a disagreeing concord, and the feet of men in the paths of tranquillitie. Hence it is, that such as are instruments of so great a good, and shall thereby happen to redeem a Nation from horror and confusion, have in all ages been crowned with honour and renown, as the due reward of a Mediatour of Peace. And therefore *Caesar*, periwading *Libo* to negotiate a cessation of Arms, and to work in *Pompey* a disposition to an agreement, propounded the honour which attended this service, and the merit of that endeavour which brought back peace into the Empire.

CHAP. X.

Pompey leaveth *Brundisium*, and shippeth himself for *Greece*.

THE work being half perfected, and nine dayes labour bestowed upon it; the ships that had transported the Consuls and the other part of the Army, returned from *Dyrachium* to *Brundisium*: and thereupon *Pompey* began to fit himself for a departure; being induced thereunto either by the works which *Caesar* had begun, or by a resolution formerly taken to quit *Italy*. And the better to retard *Caesar's* prosecution (lest upon his issuing out, the souldiers should enter the town) he mured

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Observations upon Cæsars

up the gates, and stopp the entrances of the streets and passages, sunk ditches and trenches crosse the waies, & therein stuck sharp piles and stakes, and covering the same with slight hurdles, levelled it with thin and light earth: leaving onely two waies free, which went unto the Haven, which he hedged in with a strong Palisado of huge sharp Piles.

These things being thus prepared, he commanded the souldiers to get a shipboard, without noise or tumult; and left upon the walles and in the towers, here and there, some of the readiest Slingers and Archers, to be called away upon a warning-signe, when the rest of the souldiers were all shipped; appointing Gallies to take them in at an easie and safe place. The inhabitants of Brundisium, oppressed with the injuries and contumelies of Pompey and his souldiers, disfavoured Cæsar's partie; and understanding of this departure, whilst they were running up and down, and busied about getting aboard, gave notice thereof from the tops of their houses. Which being perceived, Cæsar (not to omit any opportunitie of achieving his purpose) commanded ladders to be prepared, and the souldiers to take Arms. Pompey a little before night weighed Anchor: and the souldiers keeping guard on the wall, upon the watch-word given, were all called from their stations, and by known passages repaired to the ships. Cæsar's souldiers with ladders got upon the wall: but being admonished by them of Brundisium to take heed of the blinde ch, they stood still. At last they were brought a great compassse about, and so came to the Haven; and with skiffes and boates, seized two ships with souldiers, which stuck by chance upon the Mounts which Cæsar had made.

OBSERVATIONS.

Forasmuch as this manner of Pompey's departure from Brundisium, and the sleight he used to imbarke himself and his Armie without danger of Cæsar's entering the town, is commended for one of the best stratagems of warre that ever he used; let us a little consider the parts thereof, which present themselves of two sorts: the one consisting of the works he made, to hinder and retard Cæsar's entrance, if happily he should have knowledge of his departure; and the other, in the cleanly conveyance of his men aboard, without noise or tumult, and the semblance he made of keeping the town, by continuing watch upon the walls, to the end there might be no knowledge taken thereof. The works were of three sorts. For first he mured and stopp'd up the ends and entrances of streets and lanes, which might give access to a pursuing enemy. And to that end also, he sunk ditches, or trenches, crosse the waies and passages: which he stuck full of sharp stakes and galthrops, and covered them with light and thin hurdles,

that the Enemy might not espy them. And thirdly, hedged in the waies leading to the Port, with a strong Palisado of huge sharp piles. And so used both the Lions and the Foxes skin, to avoid the danger which might have fallen upon him, if Cæsar happily had found means to attack them, as they were incumbered in getting to their ships, and disposing themselves to flie away. Which being an occasion that might have given him great advantage, was in this manner carefully prevented by Pompey. Howbeit, this his quitting Brundisium is censured but for a faultie resolution handiely carried: for Cicero doth much blame him for abandoning Italie; calling it a Themistoclean policie; to periwade his partie to forsake their Countrey, and to leave the best of their pleasures, and the weakest of each sexe, to such miserie and desolation, as moved pitié in those that considered but the condition of the dogges and brute beasts; as it fell out at Athens, when Themistocles perfwaded the Athenians to leave their town and Countrey, and betake themselves wholly to sea, to fight against Xerxes.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar dispatcheth forces into Sardinia and Sicilie. Cato's endeavour to keep Sicily for Pompey.

Albeit Cæsar well knew, that it much imported a speedy end of the business, to get ships and passe the Seas after Pompey, before he could joyn himself with the forces of the transmarine parts; yet doubting the lets, and the long time before it could be effected, for that Pompey had taken with him all the shipping he could get, and thereby left him for the present no means to follow after: it remained that he attended shipping to be brought from remote parts, as out of Gallia, from Ancona and the Streights; which at that time of the year, would require a long and troublesome passage. In the meantime, he thought it no way fit that Pompey's old Army, and the two Provinces of Spain should be settled and assured; (one of them being deeply engaged to Pompey for many great and ample benefits;) or that they should have time to raise new troupes, especially of horses; or that Gallia or Italie should be solicited or wrought from him in his absence. And therefore for the present, he resolved to desist from making any further pursuit after Pompey, and to go into Spain; giving order to the Duumviri of all the Municipall townes to provide shipping, and send it to Brundisium. He sent Valerius, a Legate, into Sardinia with one legion; and Curio, the Proprætor, into Sicily with three legions; commanding him, after he had possessed Sicily, to transport his Army into Africa. Marcus Cotta governed Sardinia, and M. Cato Sicily. Tubero should by lot have held Africa.

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The Caralitani understanding that Valerius was to be sent unto them, before he had left Italy, of their own accord thrust Cotta out of the town. Cotta amused thereat, and perceiving withall that the whole Province gave consent unto it, fled presently out of Sardinia into Africa. Cato prepared and new trimmed the Gallies in Sicily, giving order to the towns to build new, and prosecuted his direction with great diligence. Moreover, by his Legats, he mustered and enrolled Citizens of Rome in Lucania and Brutia, requiring rateable numbers of horse and foot from the towns in Sicily. Which things being almost accomplished, understanding of Curio his coming, he complained in publick how he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey; who, without any providence or preparation, had engaged himself in an unnecessary warre: and yet being demanded by himself and the rest in the Senate, answered confidently, that he was provided of all necessities fit for warre. And after he had thus publicly complained, he fled out of the Province. By which means, Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio Sicily, void of government, and thither brought their Armies.

Tubero arriving in Africa, found Aëtius Varus commanding the Province: who (as we have formerly shewed) having lost his cohorts at Auximum, fled forthwith into Africa, and of his own authority possessed himself of the Provinces, which he found without a Governour. He got together by new inrollements two compleat legions, which he raised by his knowledge and experience of the people of that Countrey, by reason he had governed that Province as Prætor some few years before. Tubero arriving with his fleet at Utica, was by Varus kept out of the town and the Haven; neither would he suffer him to set his son ashore, which was sick, but compelled him to weigh Anchor and depart.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

This Chapter maketh the first period of this Warre, as it is taken from the beginning of these Civill Broiles, unto Pompey's forsaking Italie, which was begun and ended in the space of 60 daies: and also openeth the gate to second resolutions, which are prosecuted, as the sequelle of the Historie will manifest: Containing likewise the reasons, why Cæsar made not present pursuit after Pompey, as the hinges of the succeeding War, and the true causes of the sequents of the same. In the consideration whereof, albeit Cæsar understood the advantage of him that prosecuted a receding enemy, and the hopes which might be thereby conceived of a speedy end of that warre; yet having no ready means to accomplish his desire, he thought it better to prevent such inconveniences as might happily have fallen out upon the same: and so to keep his partie in a progresse

of their active thoughts, by clearing and assuring that Western part of the Empire, which Pompey had left unto him by his departure; rather then to leave an enemy on his back, or to admit a cooling and languishment of their resolutions, through expectation of shipping, to follow that course which otherwise had been without exception.

In the carriage whereof we may observe, that as upon the first breaking out of these troubles, they leamled for the towns of Italie, and sought to strengthen their parties by such as had no voice in the grand Chapter of the Senate, but onely enjoyed the benefit of Municipall rights; so now being parted asunder, and the contagion of this intestine evill spread abroad, and grown to more ripeness, they made like haste to fasten upon the remoter Provinces, wherein Cæsar had the better portion. For in his share were contained Italiæ, Gallia, Britannia, Hispania, Sicilia; which being the prime Countreys of Europe, were consequently the flour of that Empire, for that Europe hath ever been taken for the principall and chieft part of the world.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe in Cato, the effects of a Stoicall or formal spirit, which are more valuable in the easiness of peace, then in the difficulties of warre. For, howsoever he made shew of bestirring himself, in rigging and trimming up the Gallies of his Province, commanding more to be built, raising new troupes of horse and foot, and prosecuting his commands with purpose of an exact account: yet in the end, understanding of Curio's coming, he spent his furie in complaining of his friends, and laying the cause of thole garboiles upon him, whom by election and content he had formerly set up, to make head against such, as otherwise may be supposed would have contained themselves in a better measure of moderation.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar goeth to Rome; and, calling a Senate, complaineth of the injuries done unto him.

These things being ended, that the souldiers might for the residue of the time be a little eased and refreshed, Cæsar brought them back into the next Municipall towns; he himself went directly to the Citie: and having called a Senate, he laich open the injuries and wrongs offered unto him by his Adversaries; sheweth them, that he never sought honour in the State by extraordinary means, onely he looked to have enjoyed the full time of his Consulship, and therewith to have been contented: which was no more then any Citizen might stand for. The Tribunes of the people had required, that

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Observations upon Cæsars

consideration might be had of him in his absence, notwithstanding the opposition of his enemies, and Cato his bitter resistance, spending the times, after his old manner, with long and tedious speeches: which if Pompey (being Consul) had disliked, why did he suffer that to pass which was enacted? But if then he did allow and like of it, what reason had he to hinder him from enjoying a benefit which the people of Rome had bestowed upon him? From that, he fell to speak of his patience: which appeared, in that of his own accord he moved that either party might quit their forces; which might have been very prejudicial to his honour and dignity: Declared what had been the malice and bitterness of his Adversaries, who refused to do that themselves, which they required of another man; choosing rather to imbroile and confound the whole State, than to forgo the command of an Armie: Spoke at large as well of the wrong done unto him, by taking the two legions from him, as also for their hard and insolent dealing, in putting the Tribunes of the people by their place and authority.

He forgot not likewise to relate the conditions which he propounded; the conference which he desired, and would not be granted. In regard whereof, he prayed and required that they would take the charge of the Common-wealth, and give a helping hand to him for the government thereof. But if they should upon any doubt or mistrust refuse to joyn with him, he would not much importune them, but would take it into his own hands, and in the mean time, let Commissioners be sent to Pompey to treat of peace. Neither did he respect what Pompey a little before had said in the Senate, That to whomsoever Embassadors were sent, as such seemed to be ascribed Authority and Preeminence; as, on the contrary part, such as sent them, manifested an apprehension of fear: for these were arguments of pusillanimity. For his parts, as he had gone beyond him in deeds of Arms and noble acts; so would he in like manner, endeavour to excell him in justice and equity.

The Senators were well pleased that Embassadors should be sent: but there was no man found that would go: every man refusing in particular, for fear of Pompey, who upon his departure from Rome, had said in the Senate, That he would hold him that stayed at Rome, in the same condition with them that were in Cæsar's Camp. So that three daies were spent in debate and excuses; L. Metellus, Tribune of the people, being drawn by Cæsar's adversaries, to protract the time; and to hinder any matter which Cæsar should propound unto them.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe, how inkomie it is to humane nature, for him that hath tasted the

sweetness of authority, to forgo the reins of command, and again to enroll his name in the list of common duties; descending from the throne of sovereignty, to the condition of obedience; and to lose his eminence in respectless equality: especially, if the honour be Militaric, and of Martial nature. For that fasteneth on us with a stronger hold, than any other power; being less capable of moderation, and waited on with the eyes and expectation of present and future ages. Whereby men grow desperately jealous of the opinion of the world, and cannot endure to quit themselves of that care, although they have attained to the full time of their deliverance: but to be supplanted in the midst of glorious a race, or to be pulled out of the seat of Magistracie by an abortive miscarriage, is able to enrage an ambitious spirit so farre beyond the bounds of modestie, that it will not spare any endeavour to confound the greatest Empire, with irrecoverable calamities.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe the disposition of those Senators, that by their staying at Rome, became neutrall in that Faction; and thereupon refused either to take Cæsar's commands, or to present themselves to Pompey, as Mediators of peace. Plutarch hath two reasons, why the Senators would undertake no such matter of Commifion as was required by Cæsar. The first is this which is here expressed; every man fearing the displeasure of Pompey, who at his departure from Rome, had protested to hold them for enemies that went not along with him: whereas Cæsar censured their forbearance with better advantage to himself, and took their neutrality as an argument of becoming his followers. The other reason which Plutarch avoucheth, is the opinion which the Senators had of Cæsar's double dealing; as not carrying his heart in his mouth, but pretending that which he never meant. For they could not be persuaded that his end was a cessation of Armes, or such a peace with Pompey as should have kept on foot their ancient liberty; but sought rather pretexts of good meaning, to colour his designe of making Rome his servant. Howsoever, we may not omit what is reported to have happened between him and Metellus, more then he himself speaketh of. For going about to take Money out of the Treasurie, he was there stoutly resisted by this Metellus, of whom he complained; alleging the Lawes and Acts of the State, forbidding any man to touch that Money, but in such times of extremity as were therein expressed.

To which Cæsar answered; That those Lawes were onely made for time of peace: but now, Armes and warre required another course of proceeding. Nevertheless Metellus would not suffer him to break open the doors, untill Cæsar advised him to be gone if he loved his life; for it was

was easier for him to dispatch him then to speak it: and to entered and carried away the Treasurie. Whereupon growth that of *Florus, Censum & patrimonium populi Romani ante rapuit quam Imperium*; He carried away the treasure and patrimony of the people of Rome, before he got the Empire.

And Appian, deriding the scrupulositie of the ancient Romans, that would not touch that Treasurie but in extremity of warre against the Celts or Gallies, saith that Cæsar might lawfully take it, for that he had vanquished and subdued the Gallies; whereby the Romans had no further cause to fear them.

CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar leaveth the Citie, goeth into Gallia, and treateth with the Marcellians.

Cæsar.

Cæsar perceiving their resolution, after he had spent there in vain some few daies (that he might not lose any more time, and leave those things undone which he purposely intended) he left the Citie, and went into the further Gallia. Upon his arrival there he understood that Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, whom Cæsar had alittle before taken at Corfinium and dismissed him: and that Domitius likewise was gone to take Marcellus, with eight Gallies, which he set out from Sicilia and Sardinia, and manned them with slaves, men in-franchised, and his own husbandmen: sending as messengers before, certain young noble-men of Marcellus, with whom Pompey upon his departure from the Citie had earnestly dealt, that Cæsar's new favours might not put out of their remembrance the old benefits which he had done unto them. Those of Marcellus having received this message, shut their gates against Cæsar, called into the Citie the Albicans, barbarous and mountainous people (who of ancient time had held amitie with them, and dwelt upon the hills above Marcellus,) brought Corn from all the adjacent Regions and Castles into the town, set up offices and forges to make Armes, repaired both their walls, their navies, and their gates.

Cæsar called out unto him some fifteen of the chiefest men of Marcellus, & treated with them, that the beginning of the warre might not grow from that town; who should rather follow the example of all Italies, then apply themselves to the will of any one man: not omitting such other persuasions as he thought pertinent to a sound resolution. These men reported at Marcellus what Cæsar had delivered, and by the common consent of the town returned this answer; That they understood, that the people of Rome was divided into two parts; neither was it in them to judge, or could they discern which of the two was in the right. The Leaders of these two factions were

Pompey and Cæsar, both speciall Patrons and Benefactors to their Citie: of whom, one had augmented the publick revenues of the State, and endowed it with the lands and territories of the Volce Arrecomi, and the Helvi; the other, having conquered and subdued Gallias, gave it unto them, whereby their tributarie Incomes were much augmented, and therefore, as they were equally bound to both for their favours, so would they carrie to both an equal respect, not aiding either of them against the other, or receiving them within their gates.

Whilest these things were in handling, Domitius arrived at Marcellus with his shipping; and being received in, was made Governour of the Citie, and had the whole direction of the warre committed unto him. By his appointment the fleet was sent out into all Coasts; and such ships of burthen as they found, they brought in: the nailstimber, and tackling whereof, they took to mend and rigge out other ships. What Corn soever was found in the Citie, was brought in publick keeping; reserving the surplus of victuall and provision for a siege, as occasion should require.

Cæsar, provoked with these injuries, brought three legions to Marcellus, determined to make towers and mantelets ready for an assault, and to build twelve new Gallies at Arles; which were armed, rigged, finished, and brought to Marcellus, within thirty daies after the timber was cut down. Of these he made D. Brutus Admirall, and left C. Trebonius to follow the siege.

OBSERVATIONS.

From the Marcellians we may learn, that it is farre easier to say well then to do well: for howsoever they were able to discern the truth, and to give an answer to Cæsar, well-beseeming the fame and opinion of their literature and knowledge, (being an Academic little inferior to the best, and in later times more frequented by the Romans, for the studie of Oratorie and Philosophy, then Athens, or any other such chief seat of the Muses;) yet in their actions they disavowed all: taking upon them most unseasonably to arbitrate those differences, and to shew their opinion of the quarrell, by taking part with one faction. Wherein their error the more appeared, in that the party grieved was not liable to their award, but rather had occasion to gain thereby a double honour to himself; first, by forcing them, and then by pardoning their rashness. And yet some Writers do think, they did no more then they were tied unto by former treaties and leagues with the Empire (which they took to consist in Pompey's partie) whereof they were loyal and zealous confederates; as appeareth by their loves when Rome was taken by the Gallies: for having news thereof, and understanding of the composition

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& moderat
victis divi
dant Con
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Denur-
tione: Pon-
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ipse medius
& neutrius
partis, fuisse
sibi numero
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cius 75.
Cic. to 10.
Epist. ad
Atticum.
Plutarch.
Lucan.
Appian.
Florus.

* Non nisi
per nostrum
volubis pre-
cibus patre-
bus Tem-
pi latius,
nullaque
fortes, sine
fingente fa-
cro, spafas,
raptor, opes.
L. Lucan. lib. 3.
Dignam te
Cæsaris ira,
Null us h-
nor facies
idem co-
dem.

ny this
Gallias, is
understood
some place
near to
Marcellus.

Augusto
dunum ve
tustissima
post Massi-
liam bona-
rum artium
fides Tacit.
3. Annal.
Scrabo
lib. 4.
Curque
alii simz
Populi cer-
ror pavo-
rent, Pho-
cas in duo
his ausa est
servare ju-
venat
Non Graia
levitate
sidem, fig-
nitate
jues, et cau-
tis, non fasa
fregit, ...
Lucan. 1.3.

Observations upon Cæsars

tion which was to be made to raise the siege from the Capitoll, they provided all the gold and silver they could get, and sent it to Rome for that service. In regard whereof they were endowed with many Priviledges and Immunities, both in the City, and elsewhere in the Empire. Howsoever, their hap being to respect more an exact observance of what had passed, then the fatall succeeding course of things, drew upon them a sharp and bitter warre; whereof they could not be freed, but by submitting themselves to his mercy whom they had rejected. And thus we see verified that of the Poet;

Horace.

Quicquid delirant Reges pleruntur Achivi.

Kings play the fools, and the poor people suffer. Which implieth also how dangerous it is for men of authority and employment to be subject to wilfull ambition. For as their service is of great importance to government, when it is attended with well qualified affections; so are their motions as fearfull, which are carried with the violence of exorbitant passions: especially, considering the means they have, either to misemploy the power of the State, or to give way to such inconveniences as may necessarily pervert all things but the ends they aim at: besides the aptness of a high spirit, not to doubt the truth of that saying which is attributed to Cæsar, *Si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia violandum est*; If a man would violate all right and law, he would do it for a kingdom.

CHAP. XIV.

Cæsar hasteth into Spain.

Cæsar.



II. lest these things were prepared and put in order, he sent C. Fabius, one of his Legates, with three legions that had wintered about Narbone, before him into Spain; commanding him with all speed and diligence to take the passage of the Pyrenean hills, which were kept at that time with the forces of L. Afranius: and gave order for the other legions which wintered further off, to follow after. Fabius, according to his directions, made haste, put the Garriſon from the passage, and by great journeys marched towards Afranius Army.

Petreius, Varro.

Saius Cælonensis.

Tur. par.

rector, Cæ.

stus Afranius.

Luc. in. l. j.

Luc. in. l. j.

Upon the arrivall of Vibullius Rufus, who Cæsar is formerly related was sent by Pompey into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, Pompey's Legates (of whom the one governed the nearest Province of Spain with three legions; the other held the Country from the * Forrest of Callicy, to the river * Ana, with two legions; and the third * Guadiana, commanded the Vectones and Lusitanians with the like number of legions;) did so dispose and divide their charges, that Petreius was appointed to bring his legions out of Lusitanias, through the territories of the Vectones, and join himself with Afranius; and that Varro with his power, should keep the further Province of Spain, which

being so resolved and determined, Petreius having commanded the Lusitanians to levie horse-men, and other Auxiliarie forces; and Afranius likewise having made the like levie in the territories of the * Celtiberi, * Cantabri, and the rest of the barbarous Nations bordering upon the Ocean: Petreius came speedily through the Vectones to Afranius; and induced by the opportunity of the place, by mutuell consent, they resolved to keep the war on foot near about Nerda.

There were with Afranius (as formerly hath been shewed) three legions, with Petreius two, besides * Targetiers of the nearer Province, and * Buckler-bearers of the further Province, some 80 cohorts, and of both Provinces about 5000 horse. Cæsar had sent his legions into Spain, accompanied only with six thousand Auxiliary forces, and three thousand horse, which had been with him in the former wars. And the Galles at his request furnished him with the like number, besides the noblest and valiantest amongst them, of whom he had made particular choice to follow him in that war. To these were added the better sort of the Aquitanians and high-landers, borderers upon the Province in Gallia. He was advertised that Pompey was on his journey, coming through Mauritania into Spain, & that he would speedily be there with his legions. & thereupon he borrowed money of the Centurions and Tribunes of the souldiers, and gave it to his Army, whereby he gained two points; For first, he ingaged the captains by that loan to endeavour his good success; and secondly, bought the good affections of the souldiers by largesse & distribution. Fabius omitted no opportunity to get the favour of the Cities near about him; which he laboured as well by Letters as Messengers: and had already made two bridges over the river Sicoris, & sent one from another about four miles; and over these bridges sent out his men to forrage; for he had spent all that was to be found on this side the river. The same things, and upon the same occasion, did the Leaders of Pompey's Army; and oftentimes their Cavalry met and encountered together. And as it hapned, that two of Fabius legions going out to forrage according to their daily customs, and had passed the river, the carriage and the Cavalry following after, upon a sudden (by the over-pestering of horses, and swelling of the water) the bridge brake, and the rest of the Cavalry was secluded and cut off from the legions. Which Petreius and Afranius perceiving, by the hurdles and planks that came down the river, Afranius presently by the bridge which was adjoining to the town and his camp, put over 4 legions, and all his Cavalry, and went to meet with Fabius his 2 legions. Upon whose approach, L. Plancus, that commanded the legions, being constrained by necessity, took the upper ground, dividing his men into two Battalions, and making their fronts to stand 2 contrary waies, to the

Nos Celtis

genti, & ex

libris Mar-

tial. lib. 4.

A valiant

people,

descended

from L. acer

demor; of

whom Sil,

Ital. fidi,

Demnatum

vivere pui,

Scutari,

Cetrati,

Nonria,

Cetra, fce-

tum buve-

tur am

facere ce-

trani ne-

quac &

Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,

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
Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,

Evocati,



end they might not be circumvented by the horsemen. And although the number were very far unequal, yet he valiantly withstood very violent charges of the enemy. The Cavalrie being thus engaged, the Ensignes of two legions were descried as farre off, which Fabius had sent by way of the further bridge, to second these other two; suspecting that which was come to passe, that the Commanders of the adverse Army would take the occasion and benefit of this accident, to cut off our partie. Upon whose approach the battell ceased; and the legions on either side were brought back into their Camps.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE first observation may be taken from this designe of *Caesar's* upon *Spain*, being at that time under the government and command of *Pompey*; the standing or falling whereof did much import the successe of that war: for which respect it was, that when *Caesar* could not buckle with the person of his enemy, he used all means to beat down his authoritie, as the next in degree to his essence and being, and most concerning his honour and reputation. For if he took from him those Provinces, which the State had commended to his charge, and left him no interest in the obedience of such, whom he might in a sort challenge for his own people; what assurance could the other parts of the Empire have in his protection? or what could he elsewhere expect of that which these refused him?

The excellency of a General, is that perfection of judgement commended by *Aristotle*, inabling him to discern, *quid primum*, or what is most materiall in that variety of undertakings, which falleth out in following a war. And if that cannot with any conveniencie be attained, then to know the next point of importance; and so consequently to distinguish the degrees of difference, as they stand ranked in the order of judicious proceeding.

For the effectuell prosecuting of which designe, let us take a short view of their forces on each side, according as we find them mutter'd in this chapter; that by the inequality of their troupes, we may judge of the want or sufficiency of their directions. *Afranius*, as it is said in the story, had three legions, and *Petereius* two legions, together with 80 cohorts of Auxiliarie forces, supplied unto them by the two Provinces of *Spain*; which cohorts equalled the number of eight legions, and so in all made thirteen legions; and according to the usuall rate at that time of 5000 in a legion, amounted to 65000 men: together with 5000

Petereius & horse; which came to seventie thousand men, or thereabouts. To confront so great an enemy, *Caesar* had five legions, & 2000 Auxiliarie troupers thereabouts from the *Gallies*, and peradventure 1000 *Evocati*:

which according to the former rate of a legion, did rise to 35000, or 40000 men at the most. Whereby the one exceeding the other well-near in a double proportion of strength, and yet failing in correspondence of successe, calleth the verity of that proverb in question, *Ne Hercules contra duos*, *Hercules* himself cannot deal with two. Besides, the inequality of the place where the triall was to be made, being wholly devoted to the greater partie, was a matter of no small consequence. For he that maketh war in a Countrey absolutely favouring the enemy, and confronting his purposes, had need of more forces then the adverse partie, or better fortune in his proceedings. And therefore *Fabius*, to prevent such mischiefs as might grow by that advantage, sought all means to draw some of the towns to his faction, and to make himself friends for his better support and securitie; according to that which was said of old, That war cannot be made without some peace.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, we may observe the means he used to secure himself of the loyalty of his Armie, and wholly to ingage the souldier in his fortune. For the money he borrowed of the Tribunes and Centurions, was a speciall Tie of their affections to his service: forasmuch as no man wisheth ill to him, by whose welfare and prosperitie he hopeth to thrive; for so (wounding himself through another mans bodie) the hurt would fall upon his own head; but rather desireth such an accomplishment of his hopes, as may make himself partaker thereof. And on the other side, the largesse he made unto the souldiers did so oblige their indeavour to his purposes, that they were thereby ready to perform as much as warlike *Laelius* had promised in his own person, on the behalf of the rest.

Pectore si fratris gladium, juguloque Parentis Lucane l. 1.

Condere me jubeas, plenaeque in viscera partu Coniugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra.

Bid me to stab my brother, cut My father's throat, or rip the gut Of my big-bellied wife, (though loath) I'll doo't.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly, let us consider the effects of diligence and provident foresight, which do oftentimes redeem an Armie from a dishonourable overthrow; as may be learned from two circumstances in *Fabius* directions. First, in that he trusted not to one passage over the river *Sicoris*, but made two severall bridges, as well for the conveniencie as the better securitie of his people. Secondly, upon

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the occasion which the enemy might take by the breaking of the bridge, to distress the legions on the other side of the water, he presently sent out succours to prevent such a casualty: which albeit it might seem to have proceeded out of curious suspicion, or idle fear, yet it fell out to be no more then was requisite and expedient. Which may teach a Generall to be carefull even of possibilities, and to prevent contingencies, with the certainty of industrious directions; accounting always that which may happen, to be as certain as any thing we most expect.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

Spain.
Cæsar &
Tiberius.
Exterior.
Interior.
lib. 3.

Concerning Spain, we are to note that the Romans at first divided it into two Provinces, which they called the Nearer and the Further; or according to Strabo, the Utter and the Inner; and they were separated afunder by the river Iberus, now Ebro: And thence also they were called *Cis Iberum*, & *ultra Iberum*. Spain on this side Ebro, and Spain beyond. The Nearer Province, being the lesser, continued without alteration during the Roman's government, and was sometimes called *Tarracensis* Province, of *Tarraco*, the principall town of the same. But the Further, in proceesse of time was divided into two parts; the one called *Bætica*, and the other *Lusitania*: and to the whole Region of Spain came to be divided into three Provinces. It was first entered by the Romans, by occasion of the notable siege of *Saguntum*: upon which, *P. Scipio* having subdued the *Carthaginians*, reduced Spain into a Province, and left it governed by *Proconuls*, unto the time of *Cornelius Lentulus* and *Lucius Stertinius*. Afterwards it was governed by *Proprætors*, and sometimes by *Prætors*, according as the Empire came to be enlarged; and had thereby many governments, for the preferment of such as had supplied the better places of dignitie in the State. Nevertheless, in the times of trouble the Governours had always Consularie power; as, in the waire against *Scrtorius*, *Quintus Metellus* *Proconul*, and *Cn. Pompeius* *Questor*, cum *Consulari potestate missi* sunt, were sent with consular power. And at this time, *Pompey* governed it by two Deputies or Legates. Touching the form and figure of the Countrey, *Strabo* likeneth it to an Oxe hide; the neck whereof joyneth to the *Pyrenean* hills, which rise in towers from one Sea to another, as limits and bounds between *France* and *Spain*; taking their name (as some think) from *Pyrene*, the Maid that *Hercules* desflowred, whom *Sil. Ital.* mentioneth, lib. 3.

Qui quid
fieri possit
quod futurum
erit cogit
mus. Seneca.
Epist. 34.

Anno
V. C. 555.

Livie.

*Pyrene celsa nimbo si verticis arce
Divisos Celtas late prospectat Iberos;
Atque æternatenet magnis divortia terris.
Nomen Bebrycia duxere à virgine colles.
Hospitis Alcide crimen: qui forte laborum
Geronis petere cum longa tricoloris arva,
Possessus Baccho, seiva Bebrycis in aula
Lugendam formæ sine virginitate reliquit
Pyrenen ----- and a little after,
Desertumq; tenent Montes per secula nomen.*
The lofty tower of *Pyren*'s cloudy head
O'relooks th' *Iberi*, whom it parts from *Celts*,
For aye dividing those two spacious lands.
From *Bebryx* daughter first these hills took
name,
Ravish'd by *Hercules*: who as he went
The triple-bodied *Gerion*'s land to seize,
Drunk at the time, and lodg'd in *Bebryx* Courts,
Pyrene left to be bewail'd by beauty,
No more a Virgin -----
And her lamented name the Hills still keep.

But according to the opinion more generally received, they are to be called of the Greek word *Πύρε*; for that Shepherds and Herdsmen set them once on fire, as witnesseth *Diodorus Siculus*. And *Aristotle*, *In Hiberia inquit combustis aliquando pastoribus Sylvis, calenteque ignibus terram manifestum argentum defluxit: cumque postmodum terra motus supervenisset, eruptis hiantibus, magnam copiam argenti collectam; atque inde Malliensibus proventus non vulgaris obtigisse*: He saith that on a time in Spain the Shepherds having set fire on the Woods, the ground was so heated thereby, that plain rills of silver flowed from the hills; and that afterwards by reason of earthquakes, severall gapings being made in the said place, they gathered great plenty of silver; which the *Marseillians* made no small benefit of. The Countrey of Spain is commended for many things, as may appear by divers *Elogies*: amongst which, that of *Claudius* the Poet is written, as though the Author had been a Penfioner to the Kingdome.

*Quid dignum memorare tuis Hispania terris
Vix humana valet? primo lavat aquore solem
Indica: tu sessos exad a luce, jugales
Proliis, inque tuo respirant sidera fluitu.
Dives equis frugum facili, pretiosa metallis,
Principibus sacunda piis.* -----

What noted thing in Spain can man commend?
As Indian seas first drench the morning Sun,
So his tir'd steeds wash here when day is done:
In Spanish waves the wearied stars take breath.
Spain store of horse, fruits, precious metals hath;
Breeds pious Princes. -----

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Cæsar coming to his Armie, advanceth forward, and incampeth near unto the Enemy.

Cæsar.

Itbin two dayes after Cæsar came into the Camp with nine hundred horse, which he had kept with him for a convoy. The bridge broken by the tempest, was almost re-edified, and that which remained undone, he commanded to be finished in the night. And having seen the nature and situation of the place, he left six cohorts to keep the Camp and the bridge, with all the carriages of the Armie. And the next day, putting all his forces into a triple battell, he marched towards *Ilerda*: and there standing a while in Armes, offered battell, in an equal and indifferent place. *Atranius* brought out his forces, and made a stand in the midst of the hills, under his Camp. Cæsar perceiving that *Atranius* at that time was not disposed to fight, determined to incamp himself some 400 paces from the foot of the hill. And lest the souldiers should be interrupted in their works by the sudden assaults and incursions of the enemy, he forbade them to fortifie it with a rampier or wall, which must necessarily be discovered and seen at a rare off; but caused a ditch to be made of fifteen foot in breadth, in the front of the Camp next unto the Enemy. The first and second battell (according as was directed) continued in Armes; and the third battell performed the work behind them unseen, before it was understood by *Atranius* that Cæsar would incamp in that place. Which being finished, he drew his legions within the ditch, and so stood in Armes all night.

Pron. tuum
Cæsar om-
lympe, in
rode n
subit. cir-
cundedit
agmina tot-
is, dum
primæ pre-
stant acies,
host inque
fessit.
Luc. 1. 4.

The next day he kept all his Armie within the ditch. And forasmuch as the matter to make the Rampier was to be fetched farre off, he kept the like course for the finishing of the rest; allotting each side of the Camp to be fortified by a severall legion, with a ditch to be sunk about of the same scantling: and in the mean time, made the other legions to stand ready in Armes against the enemy.

Atranius and *Petencius*, to the end they might amuse the souldier, and hinder the work brought down their forces to the foot of the hills, and provoked them to fight. Howbeit Cæsar intermitted not the working of the ditch. The Enemy not making any long stay, or advancing further then the foot of the hills, led back their troops into the Camp. The third day Cæsar fortified his Camp with a Rampier; and commanded the rest of the cohorts and the carriages which were left in the other Camps, to be brought unto him.

OBSERVATION.

IT may be observed for Cæsar's custome throughout the whole course of his wars, to approach as near the enemy as conveniently he could; that so he might the better observe his passages, and be ready to take the favour of any opportunitie, which either the nature of the place, or the motions of the adversary would afford him. Which was the rather his advantage, in regard of his dexteritie, and superlative knowledge in the use of Armes, together with the experience of his old legions: whereby he was able, not onely to improve his own designs to the utmost of an honourable successe, but to return the disgrace of any attempt made upon his Armie, upon the heads of them that were authors of the same. For otherwise, his accosting so near an enemy, might have turned to his own losse; as being full of hazard, and subject to more casualties then he that standeth further off. And therefore the rule is, That he that desireth to sit near his adversary, must be exceeding circumspect, and sure of some advantage, either from the place, or the over-awing power of his forces, or else out of his own vertue, or by some other means, to over-throw the inconveniences which attend such engagements. As may appear by that which *Frontinus* observeth hence, touching the straight whereinto Cæsar was fallen; being either to give battell, which the enemy refused; or to make good that place, from whence he could not retreat but with danger. Whereupon, a little before night he stole the making of a ditch on the back of his Armie; and retiring himself within the same, stood in Armes all night, for his better safetie.

The use of such ditches are of much importance, and have oftentimes redeemed an Army from great extremities: and were so frequent upon all occasions with the Romans, that he that shall deny them to be good ditchers, shall do them wrong. And not onely they, but other Nations could tell how to make use of the Spade.

Pericles of Athens, being forced by them of *Peloponnesus* into a place that had but two outlets of escape, sunk a ditch of a great latitude thwart one of the passages (as though he meant to keep out the enemy) and let his souldiers to break out the other way. The *Peloponnesians* thinking he could no way escape by the passage where the trench was cut, applied themselves wholly to the other place, where the souldiers made shew of breaking out: whereby (through the help of bridges which he had formerly provided) he escaped over the ditch without resistance. Sometimes they added other helps to these trenches, especially when they fought handfome means to get themselves away.

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Observations upon Cæsars

way: whereof *Sertorius* may be an instance; who, having the enemy pressing him in the rear, and being to pass a River, drew a ditch and a rampier at his back, in the fashion of a half-moon: which rampier he heaped with wood and combustible matters, and so setting it on fire, kept off the enemy, and passed with ease over the water.

In like manner, *Herculeius*, one of *Sertorius*'s Legates, having rashly entered with a small power into a long and narrow passage, between two hills, and finding himself pursued by great forces of the enemy, sunk a crossie trench between the two Mountains; and piling the rampier with wood, set it on fire, and so cut off the enemy.

CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar's attempt to possess himself of a small hill: what disadvantage he ran into by missing of his purpose; what means he used to recover himself.

Cæsar.

Between the town of *Ilerda*, and the next hill where *Petereus* and *Afranius* were incamped, there was a Plain of about three hundred paces; in the midst whereof stood a little Mole, rising higher than the rest: which if *Cæsar* could get and fortify, he hoped to cut off the enemy from the town and the bridge, and from such vittuals and provisions as were brought to the town. Hereupon he took three legions out of the Camp; and having put them into order of battle, he commanded the Antesignani of one legion to run before, & possess the place. Which being perceived, the cohorts that kept watch before *Afranius*'s Camp, were presently sent a nearer way to take that Mount. The matter came to blows: but forasmuch as *Afranius* partie came first to the place, our men were beaten back; and by reason of new supplies sent against them, were constrained to turn their backs, and retire to the legions.

The manner of fight which those soldiers used, was first to run furiously upon an enemy, to seize any place boldly and with great courage; not much respecting their orders or ranks; but fighting in a scattered and dispersed fashion. If they chanced to be thoroughly charged, they thought it no shame to give way and retire; accustomed thereto by frequenting the *Lulitani*, and other barbarous peoples using that kind of fight: as it commonly falleth out, that where the soldiers have long lived, they get much of the usage and condition of those places. Notwithstanding, our men were much troubled thereat, at unaccustomed to that kind of fight: for seeing every minute his rank and run up and down, they feared least they should be circumvented, and set upon in flank, and on their bare and open

side; whereas themselves were to keep their order, and not to leave their places, but upon extraordinary occasion.

Upon the coming of the Antesignani, the legion that stood in the corner left the place, and retreated to the next Hill: almost all the Armie being affrighted, upon that which had happened beyond every mans opinion, contrary to former use.

Cæsar encouraging his men, brought out the ninth legion to second them; by that means compelling the enemy (insolent of good successes, and shrewdly pursuing our men) to turn their backs, and to retire to the town of *Ilerda*, and there to make a stand under the walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, carried on with endeavour, and going about to repair their losse, rashly followed the enemy into a place of disadvantage, and came under the Hill whereon the town stood: and as they would have made their retreat, they were charged afresh from the upper ground. The front of the place had an uneven broken ascent, and was on each side steep; extended only so much in breadth as would serve three cohorts to imbatell in: neither could the Cavalrie come to help them. The Hill declined easily from the town about four hundred paces in length: and that way our men had some convenience of retreat, from the disadvantage to which their desire had unadvisedly led them. The fight continued in this place: which was very unequal, both in regard of the straightness thereof, as also for that they stood under the foot of the Hill, whereby no weapon fell in vain amongst them. Notwithstanding, by prowess and valour they patiently endured all the wounds they received. The enemy's forces were supplied and renewed, by such cohorts as were often sent out of the Camp through the town, that fresh men might take the place of such as were wearied out. And the like was *Cæsar* faine to do, sending fresh Cohorts to that place to relieve the wearied.

After they had thus continually fought for the space of five hours together, and that our men were much over-charged with an unequal multitude: having spent all their weapons, they drew their swords, and ascended up the hill to charge and assault the enemy: and having slain a few of them, the rest were driven to make retreat. The cohorts being thus put back to the walls, and some of them for fear having taken the town, our men found an easie retreat. Our Cavalrie did from a low ground get up unto the top of the hill; and riding up and down between the two Armies, made our soldiers to retreat with better ease: and so the fight succeeded diversly.

About sevenie of our men were slain in the first onset. And amongst these was slain *Q. Fulginius*, Captain of the first Hastate Centurie of the fourteenth legion; who, for his exceeding

Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

ceeding valour, was preferred to that place from the lower orders. Six hundred at least were wounded. And of *Afranius* party were slain *T. Cæcilius*, Centurion of a *Primipile* order, and four Centurions more, besides two hundred soldiers. But such was the opinion of that dayes business, that either side believed they left with the better.

Ex videtur sublatum Marti perpendit. Lucan. lib. 4.

Afranius party was so provided, for that they long stood to handy-blows, and resisted the violence of our soldiers, although in all mens judgement they were the weaker: as also, for that they at first took and held the place which gave occasion of that fight; and in the first encounter, compelled our men to turn their backs. Our men in like manner thought they had the better, in regard they had maintained fight for five hours together, in a place of disadvantage, and with an unequal multitude; that they ascended up the hill with their swords drawn, and compelled their adversaries to turn their backs, and to retreat into the town, mangle the disadvantage of the place.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN this direction which *Cæsar* gave, to take the little Hill between *Ilerda* and *Afranius* Camp, we may observe the danger depending upon the mischieving of an action. For the failing of a purpose, in seeking to obtain that which would prove of great advantage, doth oftentimes draw men into as great inconveniences. And as the end in every design pretendeth gain, so the means thereof do give way to hazard: from whence it consequently followeth, that such as are employed in execution, had need to use all endeavour, not to falsifie the grounds of good directions, by negligent or inconsiderate carriage; but rather to make good any want or defect, by serious and wary prosecution of the same.

And the rather, for that it specially concerneth their good that have the charge and handling of commands: for they first are like to feel the smart of any error committed therein; or otherwise, to have the honour of any fortunate success, forasmuch as *Virtue* hath all her praise from Action.

Concerning the use of running, we are to understand that the *Romans* (amongst other their exercises of Armes) had speciall practise of this, as available in four respects, according as *Vegetius* hath noted. First, to the end they might charge the enemy with greater force and violence. Secondly, that they might possess themselves with speed, of places of advantage. Thirdly, that they might readily discover, as should be found expedient upon all occasions. And lastly, to prosecute a flying enemy to better purpose and ef-

fect. And this, as *Seneca* saith, they practised Miles in peace; that being accustomed to needlesse labour, they might be able to discharge necessary duties. And *Livius*, amongst the military exercises used by *Scipio*, to fit his men for those glorious exploits which he afterwards achieved, saith: That the first day, the legions ran four miles in Arms. And *Suetonius* affirmeth, that *Nero*, Cæsar having appointed a race for the *Prætorian* cohorts, carried a Target lifted up before them with his own hand. And that *Galba* did more admirably; for being forced of purpose to make himself eminent, he directed a field-race with a Target, himself running as fast as the Emperours Chariot, for twenty miles together.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe second thing to be noted in these specialties, is, the bold enterprise of *Cæsar*'s men; in charging the enemy with their swords drawn, against the Hill; whereby making them to give back, they had an easie and safe retreat from the danger wherein they were engaged. Whereby we may observe, that difficulties of extremity are never better cleared, then by adventurous and desperate undertakings: According to the condition of diseases and distemperatures of the body, which being light and easie, are cured with mild and easie potions; but being grievous and doubtful, do require sharp and strong remedies. Which doth also in like manner appear throughout the whole course of Nature, and particularly in his weights: for as ponderous and heavy bodies are not moved, but with a counterpoise of greater force; no more can extremities of hazard be avoided, but by like perilous enforcements.

And hence groweth the difference between true valour and fool-hardy rashness; being but one and the same thing, if they were not distinguished by the subject wherein they are shewed. For to run headlong into strange adventures, upon no just occasion, were to shew more levity then discretion: And again, to use the like boldness in cases of extremity, deserveth the opinion of vertuous endeavour. As is well observed by *Homer*, in the person of *Hector*, persuading the *Trojans* that fled away, to stand and make a head against the *Grecians*; This is the time, saith he, considering the danger wherein we are; to use that prowess and courage which we boast of.

And accordingly, *Diomedes* censured *Glauco* in the same place, for offering himself to the fury of the *Grecians*; Either thou art some God, saith he, or else but a lost and forlorn man. Which may serve to learn us the true use of courage; that ordinarily is never more shewed then in misemployment.

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are thereby suddenly transmitted to every particular souldier.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar brought into great extremity by overflowing of two Rivers.



The enemy fortified the Mount for which they contended, with great and strong works, and there put a Garrison. In the space of those two dayes that these things were in

doing, there fell out upon a suddain a great inconvenience: for such a tempest happened, that the like waters were never seen in those places. And further besides, the snow came down so abundantly from the Hills, that it overflowed the banks of the River; and in one day brake down both the bridges which Fabius had made: and thereby brought Cæsar into great extremity. For, as it is formerly related, the Camp lay between two Rivers, Sicoris and Cinga; and within thirty miles neither of these Rivers were passable, so that all the Army were of necessity coup'd up in that straightness: neither could the Cities which had formerly ranged themselves with Cæsar's party, furnish any supplies of victuall and provision: nor such of the Army as had gone far for forrage, being hindered by the rivers, could return to the Camp; nor yet the great convoies and reinforcements, coming to him out of Italy and Gallia, could get to the Camp.

The time of year was very hard; for there was neither old corn left of their winter provisions, nor that on the ground was as yet ripe. The cities and towns near about were all emptied: for Afranius before Cæsar's coming, had caused all the Corn to be brought into Ilerda; and that which remained, was since Cæsar's coming all spent. And for Catell (which might have relieved this necessity) by reason of the warre, they were removed by the bordering towns, and carried farther off. Such as were gone out for forrage, and to seek Corn, were by the light-armed Portugalls, and the Buckler-bearers of the hisher Spain, much troubled and molested: for these men could easily passe the river, forasmuch as none of them used to go to warre, without bladders for that purpose. On the contrary part, Afranius abounded with all necessary provisions: great quantity of Corn was formerly provided and stored up, much was brought in from all the Provinces round about: there was also great plenty of forrage in his Camp: for the bridge at Ilerda afforded means of all these things without dangers, and the Countrey beyond the river was whole and untouched, which Cæsar could not come unto by any

The parts of a legion.

I Have already, in the observations of the second Commentary of the warres of Gallia, discoursed particularly of the parts of a Legion: Where it appeareth, that in Cæsar's time a legion consisted of five thousand men, or thereabouts; and according to the sufficiency and experience of the souldiers, was divided into three parts. The first and meanest of such as followed an Ensigne, were called *Haftati*; the second, *Principes*; and the third and chief sort, *Triarii*: and according to this division, had their place and precedence in the Army.

Again, each of these three kinds was divided into ten companies, which they called *Maniples*; and every *Manipulus* was subdivided into two *Centuries* or *Orders*; and in every *Order* there was a *Centurio* or *Captain*. These *Orders* were distinguished by the numbers of the first, second, third, and so consequently unto the tenth orders, which were the last and lowest of each of these three kinds. So that this *Q. Fulginius*, here mentioned, was *Centurio* of the first and prime order of the *Haftati*: and *T. Cælius*, *Centurio* of the first order of the *Triarii*, which by excellencie was called *Primipilus*, or the Leader of the first company of a legion.

Now concerning their imbatellings, we are to note, that according to this former division of *Haftati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, upon occasion of fights, they made a triple battell, one standing in front to another; which we call the vanguard, battell, and reere-ward. Whereof the *Haftati* were called *Antesignani*: not for that they had no Ensignes of their own, for every *Manipulus* had an Ensign; but because they stood imbatelled before the Eagle, and other the chief Ensigns of the legion. To which purpose is that of *Livius*, *Pugnatio est, non illa ordinata per Hastatos, Principesque & Triarios, nec ut pro signis Antesignani, post signa alia pugnaret* *Acies*: The fight began, not a regular fight by *Haftati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, nor in that orderliness that the *Antesignani* fought before the Ensigns, and another battell behind the Ensigns. And again; *Cadunt Antesignani: & ne nudentur propugnatoribus signis sit ex secunda prima Acies*: The *Antesignani* were cut down: so that left the Ensigns should be left naked of defendants, the second battell was made the first. Whereby it appeareth that most of the chiefest Ensigns were with the *Principes*, which were called *Subsignani*, as the *Triarii* *Postsignani*.

Amongst other benefits of these so particular divisions of an Army, that is not the least which is noted by *Thucydides*, *Iti jussa imperatoris brevi spacio ad singulos milites deferri possent*; the commands of the generall

Antesignani.

Lib. 22.

Lib. 2.

Lib. 5.

Lib. I.

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any means. The waters continued for many dayes together, Cæsar used all means to re-edifie the Bridges; but neither the swelling of the River would permit him, nor yet the cohorts of the Enemy, placed on the banks of the other side, suffer him to go forwards with it: which they might easily hinder, but in regard of the nature of the river, and the greatnesse of the water, as also for that they might easily cast their weapons from along the bank, unto one place or point. Whereby it was very hard, at one and the same time (the river running so violently as it did) to do the work, and to shun the weapons.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe, that the strength of a multitude is not priviledged from such casualties as betide the weaknesses of particular persons; but doth oftentimes undergo extremities, which can neither by providence be prevented, nor removed by industry: and are such as proceed not from the endeavour of an enemy, but out of the circumstances of time and place; together with such accidents as are interlaced with the same. In respect whereof it was, that *Cambyses* told *Cyrus*, That in the course of warre he should meet with some occasions, wherein he was not to labour and contend with men; but with chances and things; which were not to be overcome with lesse difficulty then an enemy; and are the more dangerous, according as they give way to scarcity and lack of victual. For as it is said in the same place; *Scis brevissimum habiturum imperium, si commean exercitus careat*: You know that if your Army be once starved, your Empire can be but short-lived.

The remedies whereof are first, Patience: which is as requisite in a souldier, as either courage or any other ability; and in such cases keepeth an Army from discontentment and disorder, untill means of better fortune. And secondly, Good endeavour, which availeth much in such chances; the effect whereof will appear by that which Cæsar wrought to redeem his Army from these inconveniences.

Sunt quedam in quibus non ad veritas horum in certamine est, sed cum ipis rebus: quas superius perdidit. *Xenoph.* lib. 1. de Ind. Ciri.

Diligentia in omnibus rebus plurimum valet.

Souldiers used by the Spaniards, in swimming over Rivers.

private carriages, as in their magnificent and stately buildings: so on the other side, barbarous and rude Nations, that live under generall and slight lawes, are as slight and rude in their actions; as amongst other things, may appear in that the *Spaniards* thought it no scorn to use the help of bladders in passing over a River, as a device coming next to hand; which the people of a wise and potent State would not have done, but by a fine and substantiall bridge.

The use of which bladders, as it hath been ancient amongst people of that nature, so it is continued in the same manner by the Savages inhabiting *Greenland*, and the North parts of *America*; as appeareth by discoveries made of late by the *Moscovy Merchants*, about the North-west passage: from whence such as are employed in those voiajes, have brought great and large bladders or bagges, made of Seal-skins, ingeniously devised to be filled and blown with wind, and tied behind at their girdles, and at their coller, to help themselves in swimming. And after the same easy fashion, the *Indians of Peru*, as *Josephus Acosta* lib. 6. writeth (instead of wood and stone) made their bridges over great Rivers of platted Reeds, which they fastened to the banks on each side with stakes: or otherwise of bundles of straw and weeds, by which, men and beasts (if there be any credit in his story) passe over with ease. Howbeit, as when the ancient *Greeks* would note a man of extreme insufficiency, they would say, he could neither read nor swim: so Cæsar seemed of the same opinion, by commending the skill of swimming, as a thing of much consequence in the use of Arms. Whereof he made good experience in *Egypt*: where he cast himself into a small boat, for his better safety; and finding it over-charged, and ready to sink, he leapt into the sea, and swam to his Fleet, which was two hundred paces off, holding certain papers in his left hand above the water, and trailing his coat of Armes in his teeth, that it might not be left to the enemy.

CHAP. XVIII.

Afranius marcheth with three legions, to cut off a party. The scarcity of victuall in Cæsar's Army.



It was told Afranius, of great troops Cæsar, and convoies that were coming to Cæsar, but were hindered by the waters; and about there by the Rivers side: for thither were come Archers out of *Ruthenia*, and horsemen out of *Gallia*, with many carres and carriages, according to the custome of the *Gallies*. There were besides, of all sorts, about six thousand men, with their servants and attendants; but without orders, or any known command: for every man was at his own liberty, travelling

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ling the Countrey without fear, according to the former freedom and safety of the wayes. There were likewise many young men of good rank, Senators sons, and knights of Rome; besides Embassadors from sundry States, and divers of Cæsar's Legates. All these were kept back by the River.

Athanius went out in the night time with three legions, and all his horse, to cut off this party; and sending his Cavalry before, set upon them unawares. Howbeit, the Cavalry of the Gallies put themselves speedily in order, and buckled with them. And as long as it stood upon indifferent termes, they being but a few, did withstand a great number of the enemy: but as soon as they discovered the Ensignes of the legions coming towards them, some few of them being slain, the rest betook themselves to the next hills.

This small time of encounter was of great consequence for the safety of our men: for by this means they had opportunity to take the upper ground. There were lost that day two hundred Archers, a few horsemen, and no great number of the soldiers' boyes, together with the baggage. Virtually by reason of all these things waxed very dear, as well in regard of the present want, as also for fear of future penury, as commonly it happeneth in such cases: inasmuch as a bushell of Corn was worth fifty pence, whereby the soldiers grew weak for want of sustenance; and the inconveniences thereof daily more and more increased. For so great was the alteration which hapned in a few dayes, that our men were much afflicted with the extreme want of all necessary provisions: whereas they on the other side, having all things in abundance, were held for victors. Cæsar sent unto those States which were of his party, and instead of Corn, gave them order to furnish him with Cattell; dismissed soldiers' boyes, and sent them to towns further off; relieving the present scarcity by all the means he could.

Athanius and Petreius, together with their friends, intarwined these things in their letters to Rome: rumour and report added much hereunto; as that the warre was even almost at an end. These Messengers and Letters being come to Rome, there was great concourse from all parts to Athanius house, much congratulation and rejoicing for these things: and thereupon many went out of Italy to Pompey, some to be the first messengers of the news; others, that they might not seem to expect the event of the war, and so prove the last that came to that party.

When the matter was brought to these difficulties and extremities, and all the wayes were kept by Athanius soldiers and horsemen, and no bridges could be made, Cæsar gave order to the soldiers, to make such Boats and Barks as he had in former years taught them the use of

in the warre of Britain: the keels whereof were built of light staves, and small timbers, and the upper parts made with wicker, and covered with hides. Which being finished, he laded them upon Carres, and carried them in the night some twenty two miles from the Camp. And in those Barks transporting his soldiers over the river, upon a suddain he possessed himself of a little hill, which lay near unto the water side: which hill he speedily fortified before the enemy had notice thereof. Afterwards he brought over a legion to that place, and made a bridge from side to side in two dayes space: and so the convoies, which had gone forth for provisions and forrage, returned back in safety; whereby he began to settle a course for provision of Corn.

The same day he passed over the the river a great part of his Cavalry, who falling unlooked for upon the forragers (scattered here and there without fear or suspicion) cut off a great number of men and cattell. Whereupon the Enemy sending certain Spanish troops, bearing little round bucklers, to second and relieve the forragers, they divided themselves of purpose into two parts; the one to keep and defend the booty which they had got, and the other to resist and beat back the forces sent to charge them. One of our cohorts, which had easily run out before the Army, was intercepted, and cut off: the rest returned by the bridge into the Camp in safety with a great booty.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

These Rutheni inhabited that part of Provence where Rhodes now standeth: amongst whom Cæsar had ordinarily a legion or two in Garrison, for the better keeping of the Countrey in obedience, being a stout and warlike people, and using archery, as appeareth in this place. Which howsoever the course of time hath brought into utter contempt, yet let us not scorn to take notice, that anciently it hath been used by such as performed the greatest feats of Arms: For Hercules had but two sorts of weapons to achieve labours of so much variety; a Club for such monsters as would contend with his valours and Bow and Arrows for others that kept farther off. And in the old warre of Troy (if Homer may be believed) Pandarus Duke of Lycia, having a stable of gallant Couriers, left them all at home, left he should not find means at Troy to give them their ordinary keeping; and came on foot with his bow and arrows, with such reputation of his deeds of Arms, that Aeneas fought him out in a conflict, to resist the rage and extreme pressures of Diomedes. And on the contrary part, Ulysses relieved the distressed Grecians from a hot and desperate pursuit, by slaying with his bow eight valiant Trojans before he stirred his foot.

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Concerning the use of which weapon, howsoever it may seem ridiculous (to such as understand nothing but the course of the present age) to recall the long bow to the service of a batel; yet they may remember, that the Gray-goose wing gave our forefathers such advantage, that they wrought wonders amongst all Nations for deeds of Armes: which we should imitate with as much hope of success, if we could handle our bowes in any measure as they did. Of this I have already formerly treated.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT is a saying as true as it is old, that An ill hap cometh not alone, but is always attended with such consequents as will enforce other inconveniences; as may be observed by this extremity here mentioned. For the mischief was not bounded with the affliction which Cæsar suffered for want of needfull provision, notwithstanding the weight was such as could not be born by ordinary patience: but the enemy enlarged it to his further advantage, vaunting of it as a helpless remedy, and making out dispatches to send victory to Rome. Which gave him yet further prejudice in the opinion of the world; and made those his enemies, that formerly shewed no dislike of his proceedings. And thus every ill chance hath a tail of many other misfortunes; which if either providence or endeavour may prevent, it shall much import a Commander to avoid them.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

AS Necessity maketh men constant in their sufferings, so Custome giveth easinesse and means of deliverance: according as may appear by this direction of Cæsar, which was wholly drawn from former experience. For first the Boats here pretended, were such as he used in the warre of Britain; and as farre as may be gathered out of the former Commentaries, were those he commanded to be built for his second journey: which he would now imitate in regard of the flatnesse of their bottomes, and not otherwise. For it is not to be supposed, that those Barks were covered with skinnies, unless peradventure he used some such as these upon occasion in that war, not expressed in the story; Herodotus in his *Chios*, describeth the like; The boats (saith he) which come from Babylon, down the River Euphrates, are made by the Herdmen of Armenia, of light Timbers, in a round fashion, without beak or poupe, & are covered with skinnies, the hairy side inward; and in these they take their passage. Such as fill for Salmon in the River of Severn, use the like boats in all respects, which they call *Cornacles* of *Cornium*; being all covered with horse-skinnies tanned.

Secondly, the means he used to passe over without impeachment from the Enemy, by carrying those boats in the night-time up the River to a place of security, was such, the like whereof he had formerly practised in Gallia, to passe the River Loire, being then guarded on the other side by the Enemy. Whereby we see how much use and continuance doth inable men, beyond others of smaller experience: according to that, *Dies Diem docet*, One day teacheth another; or, Older and wiser.

CHAP. XIX.

The Massilians encounter with Brutus at Sea, and are beaten.

While these things were done at Ilorda, Cæsar the Massilians (by the direction of L. Domitius) rigged and set out 17 Gallies, whereof eleven were covered; besides many lesser vessels which went along with them, to make the Navy seem the greater for the astonishment of the Enemy. In these they put a great number of Archers, and many Alibicks, of whom we have formerly made mention; encouraging them both by rewards and promises. Domitius required certain ships for himself, and them he filled with Shepheards and Cowherdmen, which he had brought thither with him. The Navy being thus furnished, set forward with great confidence towards our shipping, whereof D. Brutus was Admirall, and lay at Anchor at an Island right over against Martelles. Brutus was far inferior to the enemy in shipping; but Cæsar having picked the chiefeest & valiantest men out of all the legions, as well of the Antesignani as Centurions, put them aboard the Fleet, they themselves requiring to be employed in that service. These men had prepared hooks and grapples of Iron, and had likewise furnished themselves with many Piles and Darts, and other sorts of weapons; and understanding of the Enemies coming, put to sea, and encountered with the Massilians. They fought on either side very valiantly & fiercely: neither were the Alibicks much inferior to our men in prowesse, being rough mountainous people, exercised in Arms, and having a little before fallen off from the Massilians, did now remember the late contrast and league they had made with them. The Shepheards, in like manner (a rude and untamed kind of people, stirred up with hope of liberty,) did strive to shew their valour in the presence of their Masters. The Massilians (trusting to the nimblenesse of their shipping, and in the skill and dexterity of their Pilots, did frustrate (in a delu-

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THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ding manner) the stock of our ships, when they came violently to storme them. And forasmuch as they had sea-room enough, they drew out their Navy at lengths, to compasse and inclose our men about: and sometimes they would single out one of our ships, and set upon them with divers of their's together, or wipe off a side of their oars in their passage along by them.

When they came to deal at hand (leaving aside the art & skill of the Pilots) they took themselves to the stoutness and valour of the Highlanders. Our men were faine to use worse oars-men, and more unskillfull Pilots; who being lately taken out of ships of burthen, did not well know the true names of the tackling, and were much troubled with the heaviness and sluggishness of the shipping; which being made in haste of unseasoned timber, was not so nimble or ready for use. But as the matter came to handy-blows, every single ship did willingly undertake two at once; and being grappled with either of themselves on each side, sent gallantly the enemies ships, killing a great number of the Highlanders and Shepherds. Part of the ships they sunk, some they took with the men, and therest they beat back into the Haven. This day the Massilians lost nine ships, with those that were taken. This news was brought to Cæsar at Ilerda.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Sea-fight.

I Have formerly observed the manner of their sea-fights, consisting of three parts. The first was, their nimble and skilfull managing of their ships, either forcibly to assault, or to lamine and bear off, as might fall for their best advantage: wherein the Massilians, by reason of the skilfulness of their Pilots, had great confidence. The second was, their fight before they came to grappling, as well with great engines, such as were their *Balists* and *Catapultes*, afflicting stones and logs of wood one against another, as also with slings, arrows and darts; resembling our great artillery, and small shot: for which purpose, their ships were built with fore-castles and turrets, and other advantages of height, for their casting weapons. The third was, their grappling and forcible entry; wherein, forasmuch as the matter was referred to the arbitrement of valour, the legionary souldier carried the cause. Where we may observe, that their legions were the nurseries of their valiant and worthy men, as well for the sea as the land; being fitted by the discipline of their Military exercises, to undertake any service subject to humane industry; whereof they give an account worthy the School, wherein they were instructed.

Neither is it seen at any time, but that such kingdoms as make leave to train up their men in Academies of various Actuals, do alwaies keep them honour at a high price; affording at all times men of absolute and compleat carriage, both for designment and performance.

I Have a little before shewed out of *Livies*, that the *Antesignani* were ordinarily taken for the *Hastati*; which being the easiest sort of souldiers, according to the generall division of a legion, doth seem to contradict the passage in this Chapter, *Sed delectos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros Antesignanos, Centuriones Cæsar ei classi attribuerat*; But Cæsar having pickt the valiantest of the *Antesignani* out of all the Legions, put them into this Fleet as Centurions. For the better clearing whereof, we are to note, that as the *Hastati*, or first battel of a legion, were generally taken for the *Antesignani* (as standing before the Eagle and other the chiefest Ensignes, which were alwaies amongst the *Principes*, or second battell;) to every Maniple having an Ensign in the midst of the troupe, the souldiers that stood in front before the Ensign were likewise called *Antesignani*, and were the best souldiers in the Company: for the Centurions, standing alwaies in the head of the troupe, was accompanied with the valiantest and worthiest men; the rest filling up the reere, comforted with the Lieutenants, who thereupon was called *Tergiductor*.

Whence we may admire the temperance and disposition of a Roman Army; being first generally divided into three battels; whereof the meanest were in the vanguard, to make triall of their strength, and to spend the heat of their young blood in the first affront of an enemy: The *Veterani*, or old souldiers, being left in the reeward, to repair any losse, which either force or casualty should cast upon their Leaders. And again, to counterpoise themselves in such a manner as the weakest might not alwaies go to the wall, their private Companies were so ordered, that the best men were alwaies in front. Whereby they made such an exquisite temper, as kept every part of the Army in their full strength.

CHAP. XX.

Upon the making of the Bridge at Ilerda, the Enemy resolveth to transverse the warre into Celtiberia.

Upon Cæsar's making of his Bridge, Cæsar's Fortune suddenly changed. The enemy (seeing the courage and valour of our Cavalry) did not so freely range abroad, as they had wont to do; sometimes seeking forrage within a small distance of the Camp, to the end they might find a safe and easy retreat, if occasion required; sometimes fetching a great compasse about, to avoid the guards and stations of our horsemen. And if they had received but the least check, or had but deserv'd the Cavalry to asseure off, they would have cast down their burdens, and fled away.

At last they omitted forraging for many dayes together, and (which was never used by any Nation) sent out to seek it in the night. In the

Lib. I.

Ofca.
Calaguris.

the mean time those of Ofca and Calaguris, being in league together, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, with offer of their services, in such sort as he should please to commandir. Within a few dayes the *Tarraconenses*, *Lacetani*, and *Auleceni*, together with the *Illurgavonenses*, which border upon the River *Ebrus*, followed after. Of all these he desired supplies of Corn and provision: which they promised to furnish; and accordingly got horses from all quarters, and brought grain into the Camp. In like manner, the Regiment of the *Illurgavonenses*, understanding the resolution of their State, left the Enemy, and came unto him with their Colours: and suddenly a great alteration of things appeared.

The bridge being perfected, five great Cities and States being come in unto him, a course settled for provision of Corn, and the rumour blown over of the succours and legions, which Pompey was said to come withall by the way of Mauritania; many other towns farther off revolted from *Altanius*, and cleave to Cæsar's party.

The enemy being much affrighted and abashed at these things, Cæsar (to avoid the great circuit by which he continually sent his horsemen about by the bridge) having got a convenient place, resolv'd to make many trenches of thirty foot in breadth, by which he might drain some part of the river *Scoris*, and make it passable by a forde. These trenches being almost made, *Africanus* and *Petereus* did thereupon conceive a great fear, lest they should be cut off altogether from victuall and forrage, forasmuch as Cæsar was very strong in horse; and therefore they determined to leave that place, and transverse the warre into Celtiberia, being the rather thereunto induced, for that of those two contrary Factions, which in the former warre had stood for *L. Sertorius*, such Cities as were subdued by Pompey, did yet stand in awe of his Name and Authority: and such as from the beginning had continued firm unto him, did admirely love him, for the great benefits they had received from him; amongst whom Cæsar's name was not known. There they expected great succours both of horse and foot, and made no doubt but to keep the warre on foot untill winter.

Ofca.

This advice being agreed upon, they gave order to take up all the boats that were on the river *Iberus*, and to bring them to *Ofogela*, a town situated upon *Iberus*, twenty miles from the Camp. There they commanded a bridge of boats to be made; and transporting two legions over *Scoris*, fortified their Camp with a rampier of twelve foot in height. Which being known by the Discoverers, Cæsar by the extreme labour of the souldiers, continued day and night in turning the course of the water: & at length brought the matter to that passe, that the horsemen (with some difficulty) durst adventure over; but the foot troups, having nothing above the water

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but their heads, were so hindered as well by the depth of the River, as the swiftnesse of the stream, that they could not well get over. Notwithstanding at the same instant of time, news was brought of the making of the bridge over the River *Iberus*, and a forde was found in the River *Scoris*.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First, concerning the places here mentioned, the Reader may take notice that *Ilerda* (now *Ilerda*, known by the name of *Lerida*) standeth upon the River *Scoris*, in the Province of *Catalonia*; and being sited upon a hill, is inclosed round with a wall of hewen stone, in a pleasant and fertile Country, both for corn, wine, oyl, and fruit: as it is graphically described by *Lucan*, Lib. 4.

*Colle tumet modico, levique excrevit in altum
Pingue solum tumulo, super huic fundata vetusta
Surgit Ilerda manu; placidis praelabatur undas
Hesperios inter Scoris non ultimus amnes:
Saxens ingenti quem pons amplexatur arcu,
Hybernas passurus aquas.-----
With a light rising to a pretty height
The rich ground swels, on which by ancient hand
Ilerda's plac'd: with gentle waves slides by
The Scoris, none of Spain's meanest streams,
O're it a bridge of stone with noble Arch,
Subject to suffer by the winter floods.*

It was formerly a University, and at all times famous for salt meats and pickled fish. Whereunto *Horace* alludeth, when he tells his book, That although it fell out that no man would regard it, nevertheless it might serve at *Ilerda* to wrap Salt-fish in.

*Aut fugies Illicam, aut unctus mitt'ris Ilerdum.
Either to Illicathou'll passe,
Or to Ilerda in an oily cafe.*

Ofca, now called *Huesca*, a town likewise of *Ofca*, *Catalonia*, in former time surnamed *Vitrix*, where *Sertorius* kept the fonnies of the Gracces of Spain, as pledges of their loyalty, under pretext of learning the Greek and Latine tongue, which he had there caused to be taught, in form of an Academy.

In this town his hap was to be slain by *Perpenna*, as *Paterculus* recordeth the story; *Tum M. Perpenna prætorius, è proscriptis, generis clarioris quam animi, Sertorium inter canem Atroce interemit; Romanisque certam victoriam-partibus suis excidium, sibi turpissimam mor-*

H b 2

Observations upon Cæsars

tem, pessimo auctoravit facinore; Then M. Per-
penna a pratorian, one of the proscribed party, of
a more noble stock then mind, flew Sertorius at
Ætosca as he was at supper; occasioning by this
wicked deed of his certain victory to the Romans,
ruine to his own party, and a shameful death to
himself. Which Ætosca is by all men taken for
this Oseta.

The inhabitants boast of nothing more at this
day, then that S. Lawrence was a Citizen of their
town.

Calaguris. Calaguris, now Calahorra, is seated upon a
hill on the banks of Iberus; the people whereof
are famous for their constancie and faithfulness
to their Commanders, and specially to Sertorius:

Lib. 7. cap. 6 as appeareth by that of Valerius Maximus; Quo
perseverantius interempti Sertorii cineribus
obdormi. Cui Pompeii frustrantes fidem pra-
stiterunt; quia nullum iam aliud in urbe eorum
supererat animal, uxores suas, natosque, ad-
sum nefarie dapis verterunt: quoque diutius
armata juvenis viscera sua visceribus suis
alacris infelices cadaverum reliquias salire non
dubitavit. That they might demonstrate their fide-
lity to the ashes of Sertorius, to the very last, by
defeating Pompey's siege, in regard there was no
live thing else left in the City, they most inhumane-
ly made their wives and children serve them for
food; and that those which were in armes might
so much the longer with their own bowels feed
their bowels, they stuck not to salt up the pitifull
remainders of the dead carcases.

Neve thelelle Afranius took them in the end
by continuall sieges, amongst whom that antiquity
of Fabricius is very remarkable, which is yet ex-
tant near to Logronno.

DIIS. MANIBUS.
Q. SERTORII.
ME. BEBRICIUS. CALAGURITANUS.
DEVOI.
ARBITRATUS.
RELIGIONEM. ESSE.
EO. SUBLATO.
QUI. OMNIA.
CUM. DIIS. IMMORTALIBUS.
COMMUNIA. HABEBAT.
ME. INCOLUMEM.
RETINERE. ANIMAM.
VALE. VIATOR. QUI. HEC. LEGIS.
ET. ME. DISCE. EXEMPLO.
FIDEM. SERVARE.
IPSA. FIDES.
ETIAM. MORTUIS. PLACET.
CORPORI. HUMANO. EXUITIS.

In English thus: To the Dii Manes (or divine
ghost) of Q. Sertorius, I B. brius of Calagu-
ris devote my self; supposing it a business of con-
science, he being gone, who had all things in
common with the immortall Gods, for me to seek

to save my own life. Farewell Traveller, who
readest this, and learn of me to be faithfull.
Faithfulness is a thing, pleaseth even the dead,
when they have put off their humane bodies.

In memorie of whose fidelity, Augustus Cæsar
took a band of these people for a guard to his per-
son. In this town was Quintilian the Rhetorician
born; and being brought from thence to Rome,
in Nero his time, was the first that taught a pub-
lick School for salarie: as witnesseth Saint Hier-
ome; Quintilianus ex Hispania Calaguritanus
primus Roma publicam Scholam tenuit; &
salarie honestatus publico claruit. Quintilian
a Spaniard of Calaguris first taught a publick
School at Rome, and had a stipend allowed
him.

Celtiberia was the Countrey lying along the
River Iberus, inhabited by people coming out of
Gallia Celtica: whereupon Lucan saith,

----- presingue à gente vetusta
Gallorum Celte, miscentes nomen Iberis.

Some Celtick fugitives from Gallia came,
And with the Iberi made a compound name.

Florus calleth them Hispania Robur. And
Valerius Maximus affirmeth, That they were
alwayes glad of warre, as being to end their life
in happines and honour; and lamented their ill
fortune to die in their beds, as a miserable and
shamefull end.

His pugna cecidisse deus, corpusq; cremari
Tale nefas: calo credunt, superisque referri.
Impassus carpat si membra juvenia vultus.

----- To dy in fight
They count great honour, know no funerall
Heav'ns then's they think; & the celestial seats,
Whose scattered limbs the ravenous Vulture
eats.

Their Armes and weapons were of singular ra-
rity: for besides the water of Bilbo, which gave
them an invincible temper, they had also a pecu-
liar fashion of working them, as witnesseth Dio-
dorus Siculus; hiding their plates of Iron in the
earth, untill the worst and weakest part were ea-
ten out with rust, and of that which remained, they
made very hard swords.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The suddain alterations of warre are like the
changings of mens minds upon small acci-
dents; which are so forceable to make our resolu-
tions, as made a great Philosopher to describe a
man by the propertie of mutabile Animal, or a
changeable living creature. And it is notably seen
in this; That Afranius, in the compass of a few
daies, triumphed of Cæsar's overthrow, and fled
away

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away for fear of his power. Whence we may note
the advantage coming to a party, when they shake
off any eminent distresse: for as the extremity
thereof threatneth ruine and destruction, so the al-
teration bringeth with it an opinion of victorie.
And surely, such is the condition of all sorts of
Miseric, that when the storm is over, and the bit-
ternels of the affliction alaid, good times come re-
doubled upon the Patients; as though the vicissi-
tude of things did inforce contrary effects. And
therefore a Commander, knowing the advantage
of such an opportunity, must indeavour to improve
the same, as may best serve to a speedy end.

CHAP. XXI.

The Enemy setteth forward, and is staied by Cæsar.

Cæsar.



He Enemy thereupon thought it ex-
pedient for him to make the more
haste; and therefore leaving two
Auxiliary cohorts for the safekeep-
ing of Ilerda, he transported all his
forces over the River Sicoris, and incamped him-
self with the two legions which formerly he had
carried over. There remained nothing for Cæsar
to do, but with his Cavalrie to impeach and
trouble the enemy in their march. And foras-
much as it was a great compasse about to go by
the bridge (whereby it would come to passe, that
the Enemy would get to Iberus a farre nearer
way) he passed over his horsemen by the foord.
About the third watch, as Petreus and Afranius
had raised their Camps upon a suddain the Ca-
valrie (heved themselves in the river, & swarm-
ing about them in great multitudes, began to
stay and hinder their passage. As soon as it began
to be day-light, from the upper ground where Cæ-
sar lay incamped, it was perceived, how the reve-
ward of the enemy was hard liid to by our Ca-
valrie, and how sometimes they turned head a-
gain, and were nevertheless broken and routed:
sometimes their Ensignes stood suddenly still,
and all their foot troupes charged our horse, and
forc't them to give way; and then turning
back, went on their way again. The souldiers
walking up and down the Camp, were grieved
that the enemy should so escape their hands,
whereby the matter would consequently be spun
out into a long war: and went unto the Centu-
rions and Tribunes of the souldiers, praying them
to beseech Cæsar not to spare them for any dan-
ger or labour; for they were ready and willing to
passe the River where the horse went over. Cæsar
moved through their desire and importunity, al-
beit he feared to expose his Army to a river of
that greatness, yet he thought it expedient to put
it to triall, and therefore commanded that the
weakest souldiers of all the Centuries should be

taken out, whose courage or strength shewed a
disabilitie to undertake that service: and these
he left in the Camps with one legion to defend the
same, bringing out the other legions without
carriage or burden: and having set a great
number of horses and cattell both above and be-
low in the river, he transported his Army over.
Some few of the souldiers, being carried away
with the stream, were succoured and taken up
by the horsemen; insomuch as not one man
perished.

The Army carried thus over in safety, he
ranged them in order, and marched forward
with a three-fold battell. Such was the endeav-
our of the souldier, that albeit they had set a
circuit of six miles to the foord, and had spent
much time in passing the river, yet by the ninth
houre they did overtake the enemy that rose
about the third watch of the night.

As soon as Afranius and Petreus had dis-
covered the legions as they off (being terrified
with the noveltie of that pursuit) they betook
themselves to the upper ground, and there
imbatelled their troupes. In the meantime Cæsar
refreshed his Armie in the field, and would not
suffer them (being wearie) to give battell: and as
the enemy tried again to go on in their march, he
followed after and staied them; whereby they
were forced to incamp sooner then was purposed:
for there were hills a little before them, and for
five miles together, the passages were very diffi-
cult and narrow.

By which means (being advanced between
the hills) they hoped to be free from Cæsar's Ca-
valrie, and by keeping the passages, to hinder
the Armie from following after; to the end
they themselves might without peril or fear,
put their forces over the river Iberus: which
by all means was to be effected. Neverthe-
lesse, being wearied with travelling and fight-
ing all day, they put off the business to the next
morning.

Cæsar also incamped himself on the next
hill; and about midnight, some of their party
being gone out from the Camp, somewhat far
off, to fetch water, were taken by the horsemen.
By them Cæsar was advertised, that the En-
emy with silence began to remove, and to lead
their troupes out of their Camp. Whereupon he
commanded the signe of rising to be given, and
the cry (dislodging and trussing up their bag-
gage) to be taken up, according to the discipline
and use of souldiers.

The Enemy hearing the cry, fearing lest they
should be impeached in the night, and forced to
fight with their burdens on their backs, or to be
shot up in those straight passages by Cæsar's
horsemen, staied their journey, and kept their
forces within their Camp.

OBSERVATIONS.

His passage over *Sicoris*, was in the same manner as he carried his Army over the River *Loire*, in the seventh Commentarie of the war of *Gallia*; *Vado per Equites invento, pro rei necessitate opportuno, ut Brachia modo, atque Humeri, ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu, qui vim fluminis frangerent, incolumem exercitum transduxit.* The horsemen having found a ford, indifferent convenient in regard of the necessity they were put to, to the end that the soldiery might have their arms and shouldered at liberty, and not be hindered by the water from carrying their weapons, he so disposed his horse, that he broke the force of the river with them, and so carried his Army over in safety.

The horse that stood above brake the force of the waters, and those that were below took up such as were overcome with the stream, and withall gave courage to the soldier to venture with better assurance, seeing the passage impaled in on each side, to keep them from miscarrying. His attempt upon *Sicoris*, to abate the swelling pride of that River, by dividing it into many streams, was in imitation of the first *Cyrus*, who taking displeasure at the River *Cydes*, next unto *Euphrates*, the greatest River of *Assyria*, drew it into three hundred and threecore channels.

Cæsar not finding the River *Halas* passable by a ford, and having no means to make a bridge, sunk a great trench behind the Camp from the upper part of the River, and so drew all the water behind his Army.

Petelius hath a particular discourse of passing an Army over a River, whether it be by bridge or boat, or by wading or swimming, or any other way: to which I referre the Reader.

CHAP. XXII.

Afranius seeketh to take the Straights between certain Mountains, but is prevented by *Cæsar*.



He next day following, *Petelius* went out secretly with a few horse, to discover the Countrey; and for the same purpose some went likewise out of *Cæsar's* Camp: *L. Decidius Saxa* was sent with a small troupe to view the site of the Place. And either party returned with the same report: that for five miles the way was open and champaign, and afterwards very rough and mountainous; and whosoever first took those Straights, might easily impeach the enemy from going further. The matter was disputed in the Councell of war, by *Petelius* and *Afranius*; the time of their setting forward was debated. Most of them thought it fit to take their journey in the

night; for by that means they might come to those Straights before it were perceived. Others were of opinion, that it was not possible to steal out in the night; as appeared by the cry of rising taken up the night before in *Cæsar's* Camp, upon their removing: and *Cæsar's* horsemen did so range abroad in the night, that all places and passages were kept and shut up. Neither were they to give occasion of night fights; but to avoid the same by all the means they could; for as much as in civile dissension, the ordinary soldier would rather suffer himself to be over-mastered by fear, then continue firm in the allegiance which he had sworn unto: whereas, in the day time, every man hath shame and dishonour before his eyes, together with the presence of the Centurions and Tribunes; with which respects a soldier is restrained, and kept within the bounds of duty. And therefore the attempt was by all means to be undertaken in the day time; and although it fell out to some loss yet neverthelesse the body of the Army might pass in safety, and possess that place which they sought for.

This opinion prevailing in their consultation, they determined by break of day the next morning to set forward. *Cæsar*, having diligently viewed the Countrey, as soon as day began to appear, drew all his forces out of his Camp, and marched forward in a great circuit, keeping no direct way. For the waies which led to *Iberus* and *Oetogela*, were taken up with the *Enemics* Camp; inasmuch as they were to passe over great and difficult vallies. And in many places broken Rocks and stones did so hinder them, that they were necessarily forced to give their weapons from hand to hand, the soldiers lifting up one another; and so they passed most part of the way. However, no man thought much of the labour, for that they hoped to give an end to all their travell, if they could keep the enemy from passing over the River *Iberus*, and cut off his retreat.

At the first, *Afranius* soldiers ran joyfully out of their Camp to see the Army, casting out words of derision and reproch, that for want of victuall they fled and returned to *Herda*; for the way they held was quite contrary to that they intended; whereby they seemed to go back again: and the Commanders themselves did much approve their own counsell; that they had kept their troops within the Camp. For that which confirmed them in their opinion was, that they perceived they were come out without their carriages: whereby they hoped necessity would not suffer them to continue long there. But when they saw the troups by little and little to wind to the right hand, and that they perceived, how those that were in front had fallen backward beyond their Camp, there was no man so dull, but thought it expedient presently to march out, and make head against them. Whereupon they cried

to Arme; and all their forces, excepting some few cohorts which were left to keep the Camp, went out, and marched directly towards *Iberus*.

The whole business consisted in speed and celerity, which of the two should first take the Straights, and possess the hills. *Cæsar's* Army was hindered by the difficulty of the way: and *Afranius* party was retarded by *Cæsar's* Cavalry. The matter was come to that upshot, that if *Afranius* party did first get the hills, they might haply quit themselves of danger; but the baggage of the whole Army, and the cohorts left in the Camp could not be forced: for being intercepted and secluded by *Cæsar's* Army, there was no means for their retreat.

It fell out, that *Cæsar* first attained the place; and being come out from among those great Rocks into a plain champaign, put his Army in order of battell against the enemy.

Afranius seeing the enemy in front, and his rearward hardly charged by *Cæsar's* Cavalry, got the advantage of a small hill, where made his stand: and from thence sent four cohorts bearing round bucklers unto a Mountain which in all mens fight was higher then the rest; commanding them to run as fast as they could, and possess that hill, intending to follow after with all his forces, and altering his course, to get along the ridges and tops of the Mountains to *Oetogela*.

As the cohorts were advanced forward by an oblique circuit, *Cæsar's* Cavalry perceiving their intentment, set upon them with such violence, that they were not able any time to bear their charges, but were surrounded by them, and all cut in pieces in the sight of both Armies.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Petelius and *Afranius*, in their Councell of war, resolved by all means to shun night encounters, as a thing full of hazard and uncertainty; and apt for looseness and disobedience: for the night, being neither a discoverer of errors, nor yet a distinguisher either of actions or persons, but wrapping up both the virtuous and the faultie in her Mantle of obscurity, doth not admit of directions; to follow an opportunity, or to help a mistaking; but rather giving way to impunity and licentious confusion, leaveth no hope of what is wished: Whereas the light is a witness of every mans demeanour, and hath both honour and rebuke to make dutie respected.

For which causes, *Curio* (as it followeth in the next Commentarie) in his harangue before

that untimely expedition against king *Juba*, thus rejected their advice that would have had him set forward in the night; *At etiam ut media nocte proficiscamur addunt: quo majorem credo licentiam habere qui peccare conantur: namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur, quibus rebus nos maxime adversaria est.* Further then this, they advise us to set out in the middle of the night: that is (I think) those men who have a mind to do mischief may take the greater liberty: for in the day-time they would be restrain'd either through shame or fear, to both which the darkness of the night is a great advantage.

And that the danger may appear as well by effect as by discourse, let the Reader take notice of that battell by night, between *Antonius Primus* on the behalf of *Vespasian*, and the *Vitellian* legions, near unto *Cremona*; whereof *Tacitus* hath this description; *Prelum rota nocte varium, anceps, atrox; his, rursum illis exitabile. Nihil animus aut manus, ne oculi quidem provisu juvabant, &c.* The fight was doubtfull and cloudy the whole night; now this party going to the worse, by and by that. A stout heart or a valiant hand availed little, neither could the eyes see before them either advantage or disadvantage. And thus are all night-works condemned, wherein either order or honour are of any moment.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I have already noted, in the former Commentaries, the use of exact and particular discoverie of the Countrey, where a partie is engaged: then which nothing doth more advantage a Commander to expedite the happy issue of a war. For by that means he is not onely able to judge of any motion which the enemy shall offer, and to give sure directions to frustrate and make void the same; but also to dispose himself according as shall seem expedient for his safety. Wherein, if a place of such consequence as is here mentioned shall by designe be aimed at, this historie sheweth how much it importeth either partie to obtain it: and therefore *Cæsar* had reason to make his passage through Vallies and Rocks, rather then to lose victorie, for want of labouring in an uncalfe way.

This *Lucius Decidius Saxa*, or *Didius Saxa*, employed in this discoverie was afterward advanced by *Cæsar* to be Tribune of the people; whereat *Tullie* was so much offended. How can I omit (saith he) this *Decidius Saxa*, a man brought from the furthest end of the world; whom we see Tribune of the people, before we ever saw him a Citizen?

CHAP.

Observations upon Cæsars

CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar refuseth to fight upon an advantage offered, contrary to his opinion and desire. full men.

Cæsar.



Here was an opportunity then offered of doing something to purpose; neither was Cæsar ignorant thereof. Such an overthrow given before their eyes, did consequently so discourage them, that it was thought they would not endure a charge; especially being compassed about with the Cavalry, in an indifferent and open place, where the matter was to be decided by battell, which was on all sides instantly desired at Cæsar's hands: for the Legates, Centurions, and Tribunes of the souldiers, came joyously unto him, desiring him to make no doubt of giving battell, for all the souldiers were very ready and forward thereunto; whereas the contrary party had raised many arguments of fear and discouragement. First, in that they did not succeed their fellows. Secondly, in as much as they had not long d from the Hill, which they had took for a retreat. Neither had they withstood the charge and incursion of the Cavalry, but had thronged pell-mell together, and confusedly mingled their Engages one with another, no man either keeping his place or his colours. And if he feared the inequality and disadvantage of the Place, he might take some other of more indifference; for certainly Afranius could not long stay where he was, but must depart from thence for want of water.

Cæsar was in hope to end the matter without either blow or wound of his men; for as much as he had cut off the enemy from retreat. And why then should he lose a man, although it were to gain a victory? Why should he suffer his valiant and well-deserving souldiers, to be so much as hurt or wounded? Or why should he put the matter to the hazard of Fortune? especially, when it no less concerned the honour and reputation of a Commander to vanquish an enemy by direction and advice, then to subdue them by force of Arms? being moved with all with a tender commiseration of such citizens of Rome, as were consequently to be hazarded or slain in the fight; whereas he desired to work out his own End without the safety.

This opinion of Cæsar was disallowed by most men: and the souldiers would not stick to speak plainly amongst themselves, for as much as such an occasion of victory was overslip, that when Cæsar would have them, they would not fight. He notwithstanding continued firm in his opinion; and fell a little off from the enemy, to lessen

and abate their fear and amazement. Petreius and Afranius, upon the opportunity given them, withdrew themselves into their Camp. Cæsar having possist the Hills with garrisons of souldiers, and shut up all the passages leading to Ilerus, incamped himself as near as he could to the enemy.

The Commanders of the adverse party being much afflicted that they had absolutely lost all means of provision of victuals, and of gaining the River Ilerus, consulted together of other courses. There were two waies left open; the one to return to Ilerda, and the other to Tarragon. And while they were considering of these things, it was told them, that such as went out for water were very much pressed by other Cavalry. Whereupon they placed many courts of guard, as well of horse, as Auxiliary footmen, interlacing the legions Cohorts amongst them; and began also to raise a rampier from the Camp to the watering-place, that the souldiers might safely, without fear, fetch water within the bounds of their fortification. Which work Petreius and Afranius divided between themselves; and for the perfecting of the same, had occasion to go far off from the Camp: by means of whose absence the souldiers taking libertie of free speech one with another, went out; and as any man had an acquaintance or neighbour in each others Camp, they sought him out. And first, they all gave thanks to all our party, that they had saved them when they were terrified and amazed the day before: in regard whereof they acknowledged to hold their lives by their favour: And afterwards, inquired how they might safely yield themselves to their Generalls, considering that they had not done it in the beginning, and so have joined their forces with their ancient friends and kinsmen.

And having proceeded thus far in their communication, they require assurance for the lives of Afranius and Petreius; least they should seem to conceive mischief against their Generalls, or betray them in seeking their own safety. Which things being agreed upon, they promised to come with their Engages to Cæsar's Camp; and thereupon sent to Cæsar some of the Centurions of the first Orders, as Deputies to treat of peace.

In the mean time, they invited their friends on either side into the Camps, in as much as both their lodgings seemed but one Camp. Many of the Tribunes of the souldiers, and Centurions came to Cæsar, recommending themselves to his favour: and the like did the Grandes and chief Princes of Spain, whom they had commanded out to take party in his war, and to remain with them as Hostages and Pledges. These inquired after their old acquaintances and ancient hosts by whom each man might have access

He quomvis
multo micio-
latus fine
guine miles,
Quæ possit
seculis, et
lib. 4.

Lib. I. Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

to Cæsar with some commendation. In like manner, Afranius his son dealt with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sulpicius a Legate, touching his own and his fathers life. All things founded of joy and mutuall congratulation: of them that had escaped such imminent dangers; and of us, that seemed to have effected such great matters without bloodshed. In as much as Cæsar (in all mens judgement) reaped great fruit of his accustomed clemency and mildnesse; and his counsell was generally approved of by all men.

THE OBSERVATION.

This Chapter containeth a passage of that note and eminency, as the like is not read in any story. For if we search the records of all Nations, from the very birth of Bellons, unto times of later memory, it will no where else appear that a Generall spared an advantage to purchase a victorious name, by the bloodshed and ruine of his enemy; especially contrary to the will and desire of his Army, that had undergone such difficulties and hazards, to give an end to that war; contrary to his knowledge, and late experience of the mutability and change of time and fortune; contrary to the sweet rule of war,

---Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirit?

Valour or Crafty who cares which in a Foe? and contrary to the use of Arms, which are always bent against an enemy to subdue him.

This is the trust of that other part of Military knowledge, which men do rather admire then attain unto, no less concerning the honour of a Commander, * *Consilio superare quam gladiis*, to overcome by counsell and good direction, rather then by the sword, and was a main step to raise him to the Empire. For howsoever the souldier (to prevent further labour) stood hard for blood, not respecting that of the

* *Comick, Omnia prius experiri verbis, quam armis sapientem deceat*, a wise man should try all fair words before he brings the businesse to blowes: yet if Cæsar had been so injurious to Nature, as to have left them to their own desires, and suffered their fury to have violated the law of humanity more then was requisite for victory; they would afterwards have loathed themselves, and cursed their swords for such unseasonable execution; and may be doubted, would have revenged it upon his head, before the time came to strike the fatal stroke of the execution of that State. Cæsar attempted it also a part of divine powers, to save men by troupes, according to that of Seneca; *Hæc d'vina potentia est, gregatim, ac publice servare*: It is a divine power that saves men by troupes and all at once. And therefore he chose rather to displease the souldier for the pre-

Non minus
est Imperatoris,
consequitur
gladiis.
Cæsar, Com-
ment. 6. de
Bell. Gal.
* Terentius
in Eunuch. 1.

Nature in-
juria fa-
ciunt hu-
manis legem
violat, qui
ultra victi-
tiam iracun-
dia indul-
get. Nicetas.

Pe. J. mem-
tia, lib. 1.
cap. 25.

Hostis
ille die
nom. n. vo-
cat illi pre-
cipit. Ad-
monit. hunc
studie con-
tione pacis
hib. 2. et 3.
N. Roman-
nis et equi
vera ho-
stia. Lucan.
lib. 4.

sent; then to lose that honour which attendeth the sparing of home-bred blood: whereof foreign enemies are not altogether so capable.

CHAP. XXIV.

Petreius breaketh off the Treaty, and new sweareth the Souldiers to the Party.

Afranius being advertised of these passages, lest the work which he had begun, and withdrew himself into the Camp, prepared (as it seemed) to take patiently whatsoever should befall him. But Petreius was no way dismayed thereat: for having armed his household family, he went flying with them, and a Prætorian cohort of Buckler-bearers, together with some few stipendiary horse of the barbarous people, whom he was wont to keep about him, as a guard to his person, and came suddenly and unlooked for to the Rampier; brake off the souldiers treaty; thrust our men off from the Camp, killing such as he could apprehend. The rest got together, and affrighted at the suddenness of the danger wrapt their coats about their left arms, and with their swords drawn, defended themselves from the Buckler-bearers and horsemen: and trusting to the nearness and propinquity of their Camp, they took courage and got safely thither, being protected by the Cohorts that had the guard at the Camp gates.

As this being done, Petreius went weeping about to the Centurions, calling the souldiers, and beseeching them not to leave or forsake him, nor yet Pompey their Generall, that was absent, nor to deliver them over to the cruelty of their adversaries. Presently thereupon a great concourse of souldiers was about the Prætor, requiring that every man might take an oath, not to abandon or betray the Army or their Generalls, nor yet to enter into private consultation thereof without consent of the rest. He himself first took an oath to this effect, and caused Afranius to take the same. The Tribunes of the Souldiers and Centurions followed in order: and after them, the souldiers were brought out according to their Centuries, and were sworn the same oath.

They caused it also to be proclaimed, that whosoever had any of Cæsar's souldiers, should cause them to be brought out: and being brought forth, they slew them publicly before the Prætorian Pavilion. But most men concealed such as were with them, and in the night time sent them out over the Rampier, whereby it came to passe, that the terror wherewith the Generalls had affrighted them, the cruelty they had shewed in punishment, together with the vain religion

of

Junctus
an plixibus
et se separat,
et multo dis-
turbat. Sin-
gule pas-
sem. Luc.

Teuer memo-
re loque-
re. Quid modo
complexa
pectora ce-
dunt. Luc.
lib. 4.

Observations upon Cæsars

of the new oath, had taken away all hope of yielding for the present; and quite changing the souldiers minds, had reduced the matter to the former course of war.

*110c. figuræ
dem tota ci-
vilitas crimi-
belli Dux
causa in eli-
cris eris.
Lu., lib. 4.*

Cæsar for his part, caused diligent inquiry to be made of such souldiers as came into his Camp during the time of the treaty, and sent them away in safety. But of the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions, many of their voluntary accord remained with him: whom afterwards he held in great honour; and advanced the Centurions, and such Roman Knights as were of the better rank, to the place and dignity of Tribunes.

The Afranius were sorely laid unto in their foraging, and watered likewise with great difficulty. Many of the legionary souldiers had store of Corn, being commanded to take provision with them from Ilerda for twenty two daies. But the Buckler-bearers and Auxiliary forces had none at all, having but small means to provide and furnish themselves, and their bodies not being used to carry burthens; for which cause, a great number fled daily to Cæsar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THAT every man is the maker of his own fortune, is evidently seen in the severall carriages of these two Generalls. For Afranius gave way to the souldiers treaty, and resolved to suffer whatsoever that transaction should cast upon him. But Petreius, espousing himself to their desires, raised new troubles, had further designs, and another fortune. Wherein forasmuch as the event of things riseth according as they are first directed, either by weak or strong resolutions; it better suiteth the temper of a souldier (howsoever the successe fall out with our desires) rather to be stiff in what he witheth, then to make his own easynesse the ready means of his adversities happynesse.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

VERTUE at all times hath had this privilege in the difference and degrees of state and condition, to make a Noble mans word equal to a Common mans oath: but the integrity of former ages, had a more generall prerogative, avouching every mans promise for the strictness of an oath. Hence it was that the Romans, upon their inrollment for a war, gave but their promise to the Tribune of the souldiers, to keep such ordinances as their Militia required: untill at length that the corruption of time (falsifying the simplicity and truth of words) did enforce them to give an oath, as the surest bond of faith and obedience: as is noted by Livie

*Anne lib.
cond. 512.
Nullum
vinculum ad
affirmen-
dum fidem
juramentis
artumve
potest.*

at large; The souldiers (faith he) which was never before that time practised, were sworn by the Tribunes, to appear upon summons from the Consuls, and not to depart without leave. For untill then, there was nothing required of them but a solemn promise (which the horsemen made by their Decuries, and the foot troupes by their Centuries) not to leave their Colours by flight, or through fear, nor to forsake their rank, unlesse it were either to assault an enemy, to take up an offensive weapon, or to save a Citizen; which being at first but the offer of a free mind, was now by the Tribunes required by obligation of an oath.

The form of this oath was diversely varied, as appeareth by *Ant. Gel.* and more specially in the times of the Emperours: for *Caligula* made this addition to the souldiers oath, That they should hold neither their lives nor their children dearer unto them then the Emperour *Cains* and his sisters. Concerning the respect had of this Military oath, that which *Tully* reporteth of *Cato* is of excellent note. *Popilius* having charge of the Province of *Macedonia*, had (amongst other Roman youths) *Cato's* son, a young souldier in his Army; and being occasioned to dismisse a legion, discharged likewise young *Cato*, being one of that legion. But he desirous to bear Arms in that war, continued still in the Army: whereupon *Cato* writ from Rome to *Popilius*, requiring him, that if he suffered his son to remain in that war, he would by any means swear him again; for being discharged of his first oath, he could not lawfully fight against the Enemy.

Ever since *Constantine* the great, the souldiers were sworn by a Christian oath, as *Vegetius* noteth; to obey all things the Emperour should command them, not to leave their warfare without license, nor to shun death for the service of the Publick weal. And at this day, amongst other Nations, an oath is given to the souldier upon his inrollment, to this effect; Well and lawfully to serve the King, towards all men, and against all, without exception of persons; and if they know any thing concerning his service, to reveal the same incontinently; not to leave their Colours, without leave either of the Generall or his Lieutenant.

The ancient Romans did charge their solemn and publick oaths with many ceremonies: as appeareth by that form which was used in ratifying Treaties and Transactions; Their Heralds killed a hog, and cried out withall, that the like would happen to him that first falsified his faith.

Polybius reporteth, that he that read the oath whereby the Romans and Carthaginians swore their accord, had the hair of his head tied up in an extraordinary manner: the parties invoking their *Jupiter*, to grant all prosperity to him that without fraud or deceit did enter into that agreement. But if (said he that took the oath) I shall

Lib. 22.

Lib. 16.

cap. 4.

Lib. 1. c. 10.

*M. Popi-
lius.*

Lib. 2.

cap. 5.

Lib. 3.

Histor.

Lib. I.

Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

I shall either doe, or purpose otherwise, all the rest being safe and sound, let me alone (in the midst of the laws and justice of my Countreys, in my own habitation and dwelling, and within my proper Temples and Sepulchers,) perish most unfortunately, even as this stone flieeth out of my hand. And (as he spake those words) he cast away a stone.

I do not find the use of a Military oath in our Nation, Howbeit, the common form of our oath is as ceremonious and significative as any other whatsoever: which may be observed by the 3 parts it containeth, as I have seen them allegorized in some Antiquities. For first, the book being always a part of holy writ, implieth a renunciation of all the promises therein contained. Secondly, the touching it with our hands, inferreth the like defiance of our works, never to be successful or helping unto us. Thirdly, the kissing of the book importeth a vain depending of our vows & prayers, if we falsify any thing thereby averred.

CHAP. XXV.

The endeavour which Afranius used to return to Ilerda; but failed in his design.

Cæsar.

HE matter being in this extremity, of two means which were left unto them, it was thought the readier and more expedient, to return to Ilerda. For having left there behind them a little Corn, they hoped to take some good course for the sequel. Tarraco was further off, and thereby subject to more casualties concerning their passage. In regard whereof they resolved of the former course, and so dislodged themselves.

Cæsar having sent his Cavalry before, to encounter and retard the re-re-guard, followed after himself with the legions. The hindmost troops of their Army were constrained (without any intermission of time) to fight with our horsemen. And their manner of fight was thus. Certain expedite Cohorts, free of carriages, marched in the re-re of their Army, and in open and champaign places many of these Cohorts made a stand, to confront our Cavalry. If they were to ascend up a Hill, the nature of the place did easily repell the danger wherewith they were threatened; forasmuch as such as went before, might easily from the higher ground protect them that followed after: but when they came to a valley or descent, that those that were in the former ranks could not help them in the re-re, the horsemen from the upper ground, did cast their weapons with great ease and facility upon the Enemy. And then continually they were in

great hazard & danger: and still as they approached near unto such places, they called to the legions, and willed them to make a stand with their Ensignes, and so by great force and violence repelled our Cavalry.

Who being retired back, they would suddenly take a running, and get all down into the valley. And presently again, being to ascend into higher ground, they would there make a stand, for they were so far from having help of their own Cavalry (whereof they had a great number) that they were glad to take them between their troupes, (being much affrighted with former encounters) and so to shelter and protect them: of whom if any chanced (upon occasion) to stray aside out of the rout the Army held, they were presently attacked by Cæsar's horsemen.

The fight continuing in this manner, they proceeded slowly on their way, advancing forward but by little and little; and oftentimes stood still, to succour and relieve their party, as the one fell out. For having gone but four miles on their way, being very hardly laid to, and much pressed by our Cavalry; they took to an exceeding high hill; and there putting themselves into one front of a battell, fortified their Camp, keeping their carriages laden upon their horses. As soon as they perceived that Cæsar's Camp was set, and that the tents were up, and their horses put to graze; they rose suddenly about mid-day, upon hope of some respite, by reason of our horse put out to feeding, and went on their journey.

Which Cæsar perceiving rose and followed after, leaving a few Cohorts to keep the carriages: and about the tenth hour, commanding the foragers and horsemen to be called back, & to follow after, instantly the Cavalry returned, and betook themselves to their accustomed charge.

The fight was very sharp in the re-re, inso-much as they were ready to turn their backs. Many souldiers, and some of the Centurions were slain. Cæsar's troupes pressed hard upon them, and threatened the overthrow of their whole Army; inso-much, as they had neither means to chuse a fit place to incamp in, nor to proceed forward in their march, whereby they were necessarily enforced to make a stand, and to pitch their Camp far from any water, in an unequall and disadvantageous place. But Cæsar forbore to meddle with them, for the same reasons that have been formerly declared; and for that day, would not suffer the souldiers to set up their tents; that they might be the readier to follow after, at what time soever, by night or by day, they should offer to break away.

Observations upon Cæsars

The Enemy having observed the defect of our Camp, employed all that night in advancing their works, and in casting their Camp with an opposite front to our Army. The like they did all the next day: but so it fell out, that by how much their Camp was brought farther on, and the fortification grew nearer to finishing, by so much farther off they were from water: and so remedied one evil with a worse mischief. The first night, none of them went out of their Camp to fetch water: and the next day, they led out all their troops together to water, but sent no man out to forrage. Whereby Cæsar, finding them oppressed with many inconveniences, chose rather to force them to a composition, then to fight with them.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this troublesome and confused retreat, which these Commanders undertook, to regain the advantages that formerly they had quitted at Herdus, we may observe the difficulties attending a weaker party, when they would free themselves from the pressures of a strong confronting enemy. For the frailty of humane fortune is alwayes to yoked with incumbrances, and hath so many lets from the native weaknesses of its own endeavour; that if the opposition of foreign malice shall therewithall unhappily concur, to stop the current of our desires, there is little hope of better success, then that which the ordinary condition of extremity doth afford: which is, to hazard the perill of a wound, in seeking to avoid the smart of a rod; and to fall into Scylla, upon a desire we have to shun Charybdis: according as it befell this party. Wherein let us farther note the advantage which a Commander hath, either to take or leave, when he is able to over-master the Enemy in Cavalry: for the horsemen serving an Army Royall, by making discoveries, by forraging, by giving rescue upon a suddain, by doing execution, and retarding an Enemy in his march, if (over-awed by the Cavalry of the Enemy) they cannot perform these services as is requisite; the contrary party is the stronger by so many advantages.

CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar goeth about to inclose the Enemy, and he to hinder Cæsar.

Cæsar.

Howbeit Cæsar laboured to inclose them about with a ditch and a rampier, to the end he might with better ease hinder their suddain sallies and eruptions, to which he thought the Enemy would necessarily betake themselves.

The Enemy being streightened for want of forrage, and to the end also they might be the readier to escape away, caused all their horses of carriage to be killed: and in these works and consultations were two dayes spent. The third day, a great part of Cæsar's works being already perfected, the enemy (to hinder the businesse intended concerning the fortifications) about two of the clock in the afternoon made the Alarme, brought out the legions, and imbatelled themselves under their Camp. Cæsar calleth back the legions from their work; and commanding all his horse to troup together, putteth his Army in battell. For having made such a shew of unwillingnesse to buckle with the enemy, against the will of the souldier and opinion of all men, he found himself subject thereupon to much inconvenience: howbeit he was resolved (for the reasons already specified) not to strike a battell; and the rather at this time, for that the space between his Camp and the enemies was so little, that if he had put them to fight, it could not have much availed him, for the gaining of a perfect and absolute victory. For their Camps were not above two thousand foot asunder; whereof the Armies took up two parts, and the third was left for incursion and assault. So that if he had given battell in that nearnesse of the Camps, they would have found a speedy retreat upon their overthrow. For which cause he resolved to stand upon his defences, and not to give the onset, and charge them first.

Afranius had put his Army in a double battell: the first consisting of five legions; and the Auxiliary cohorts, which usually served in the wings, were now placed for succours, and made the second battell.

Cæsar's Army was ordered in a triple battell: the first was of four cohorts, a piece of the five legions: the second of three; and the third again of three of each legion, following in order. The Archers and Slingers were in the midst, and the Cavalry on the sides. Being thus both imbatelled, they seemed to obtain their severall ends: Cæsar, not to fight unlesse he were forced to it; and the Enemy, to hinder Cæsar's fortification. But the matter being drawn out in length, they stood imbatelled untill sun-setting: and then returned both into their Camps.


THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Contra opinionem enim militum, famamque omnium, videri praelio diffugisse, magnum detrimentum assererat. Having made a shew of unwillingnesse to buckle with the enemy, against the will of the souldier, and the opinion of all men, he found himself subject to much inconvenience, saith the history. Whence we may observe two

Hora cæsar
va. signo
d. tu.

Tela tene
jam miles,
ait, ferrum
que rucni
Subtrahit,
non ulla
conlita mia
bi sanguine
bellum.
Vincitur
haud gratis
jugulo qui
provocat
hostem.
Lucan. l. 4.

Incident in
Scyllam,
cupiens vi-
tare Cha-
rybdim.



Lib. 4. d. 5.
militia Ro-
mana.

in
ve
li-
or
he
he
r-
o-
w
a-
is.
k-
i:
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two points. First, that a Commander in striking a field, must partly be directed by his Army: for he may neither fight against the liking of the souldiers, nor withhold them from fighting when they are willing to embrace it, if other circumstances do indifferently concur therewithall. For when men are commanded to do what they would do, the matter is thoroughly undertaken, and the issue is commonly answerable to the readinesse of their desires: but being restrained in their affections, and put besides their aptnesse of their voluntary disposition, there groweth such a contrariety between the Generalls order and the souldiers obedience, as will hardly sympathize to beget good fortune.

And if a Leader of that fame and opinion, and so well known to his Army, as *Caesar* was, grew into distaste with his souldiers, upon so good causes which he had to shun a batel; what hazard that Commander runneth into, who seldom or never gave argument of his resolution in this kind, may be conceived by this passage. The second thing which I note, is, that a Generall must learn especially to disguise his intentions, by making shew of that which he meaneth not. For albeit the more judicious sort of men are not so well satisfied with pretences as with deeds: yet forasmuch as the condition of Princes, contrary to the manner of Private persons, requireth such a direction of businesse, as may rather suit with fame and opinion, then with particular ends; it becometh them to use such glosses, as may take away all petulant and sinister interpretations, howsoever their courses may aim at other purposes. And certainly, the generality of people are better paid with appearances then with truth; according as *Machiavill* hath observed. But concerning *Caesar*, that which *Ephicrates* said of himself, having imbatelled his army to fight, That he feared nothing more, then that his enemy knew not his valour; may more properly be said here. For there was nothing abused the Enemy more, or made them take up so many Bravadoes, or use so much delay before they came to composition, but that they knew not *Caesar*. For as the Eagle is able to mount aloft in all seasons and temperatures of the air; so was his sword steeled to make way through all resistance.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

In the next place, the manner of their imbatelling cometh to be observed: which generally in all Editions runneth thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alaria cohortis obtinebant: Caesaris triplex, sed primam aciem quaterne cohortes ex V. legione tenebant. Hae subsidaria ternae, & rursus alia totidem, sua cuiusque legionis, subsequen-*

*bantur: sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus lusera cingebat: And needeth the help of some excellent Critick, to make it have answerable sense to the other parts of this history. For first, how shall we understand those words, Acies Afraniana duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alaria cohortis obtinebant: Afranius his army was in a double batel; the fifth legion, and the third for succours? Shall we take the meaning to be, that the first legion stood in front, and the other stood for succours behind? Or shall we take it with *Faernus*; *Acies Afraniana duplex: ex legione prima, & tertia, in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant: Afranius &c.* out of the first legion and the third, the cohorts which use to be in the wings were put in place of the succours? But neither by the one or by the other, is there found more then two legions: whereas there is expresse mention of five, besides the cohorts of the Countrey. And therefore, as not knowing other more probable, I have translated it according to *Lipsius* correction, and made the text thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legionum quinque: & in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant: Afranius* had put his army in a double batel: the first consisting of five legions; and the auxiliary cohorts, which usually served in the wings, were now placed for succours, and made the second batel. The first batel consisted of five legions; and the second, of the Spanish and Auxiliary forces.*

The like help must be lent to *Caesar*: for otherwise, the text doth afford him but few cohorts, standing thus, *Primam aciem quaterne cohortes, ex quinta legione tenebant. Hae ternae, & rursus aliae &c.* The first batel was of four cohorts out of the fifth legion: then followed three, and then as many others &c. For undoubtedly *Caesar* had five legions equall to *Afranius*; but being farre inferior unto him in Auxiliary troupes, was driven to a more artificiall division, to help his weaknesse in that point. And therefore, as the same Critick hath mended it, we are to read, *Quaterne cohortes ex quinque legionibus*, four cohorts out of the five legions: which bringeth forth this sense; In the first batel were five times four cohorts, in the second, five times three cohorts, and as many in the third batel. And by the addition of *sua cuiusque legionis*, of every one of the legions, it appeareth, that every legion was so divided unto three parts, that it had four cohorts in the first batel, three in the second, and three in the last.

Concerning the space which their Armies imbatelled, took up, it appeareth, that the whole distance between their Camps contained two thousand foot; whereof either army took up one third, being 666 foot, or a hundred and eleven paces,

It is hard
catching
hairs with
unsittling
hounds.

*Ceteris
mortalibus
in eo itane
confilia
quid sibi
conducere
putent
Principum
diversi fors
est, quibus
pericula
rerum ad
sanam di-
rigenda.
Tacit.
*L'univers
sale de gli
huomini si
passe, così
di quelli
che paies
come di
quello che
anzi molto
volte si
muovono
piu per lo
cose che
paiono, che
per quello
che sono.
Lib. 1. Sop.
Tit. Liv.
cap. 25.
Omnia ac
Aquila per
inextinguibile.

Lib. 4. d.
militia Ro-
mana.

Their man-
ner of im-
batelling.

pases, a little more then a furlong; but that altered more or lesse, as place and occasion required.

CHAP. XXVII.

The Treaty of Peace.

Caesar.



He next day, Caesar went about to finish and end the fortification which he had begun; and the Enemy to try whether they might find a foord in the River Sicoris, and so get over. Which being perceived, Caesar carried over the light-armed Germans, and part of the Cavalry, and disposed them in guard along the River bank. At length, being besieged and shut up on all sides, and having kept their horses without meat four dayes together, besides their extreme want of water, wood and corn, they required a parley, and thus (if it might be) in some place out of the presence of the souldier. Which Caesar denied, unless it were in publick, whereupon Afranius his sonne was given in hostage to Caesar, and so they presented themselves in a place of Caesar's appointing.

At non fin
la m'elli
oranda
causa tula-
rio,
Digum do-
nanda, Ca-
larie cie-
dere vita.

And in the hearing of both the Armies, Afranius spake to this effect; That he was not to be offended, neither with him nor with the souldiers, for being faithfull and obedient to the Generall Cn. Pompeius; but now, having made sufficient proof of their duty, they had also thoroughly suffered for the same, having endured the extremity of want in all necessary provisions: In so much as now they were shut up as women, kept from water, kept from going out, oppressed with a greater weight of grief in body, and of dishonour in their reputation: then they were able to bear; and therefore d'd confesse themselves to be vanquished and overcome: praying and beseeching, that if there were any mercy left, they might not undergo the extremity of Fortune. And this he delivered as humbly and demissively as was possible.

To which Caesar answered; That these terms of complaint and compassion could be used to no man more improperly then himself: for where as every man else did his duty; he only, upon fit conditions of time and place, refused to fight with them, to the end all circumstances might concur to a peace: Albeit his Army had suffered much wrong, in the death and slaughter of their fellows, yet he had kept and preserved such of their party as were in his power, and came of their own accord to move a peace, wherein they thought they went about to procure the safety of all their fellows. So that the whole course of his proceeding with them consisted of clemency. Howbeit their Commanders abhorred the name of Peace, and had not kept the laws either of treaty or truce: for they had caused many simple men to be massacred and slain, that were

deceived by a shew of treaty. And therefore it had befallen them, as it happeneth for the most part to perverse and arrogant persons, to seek and earnestly to desire that which a little before they had foolishly contemned.

Neither would he take the advantage of this their submission, or of any other opportunity of times, either to augment his power, or to strengthen his party: but he only required, that those Armies might be discharged, which for many years together had been maintained against him. For neither were those six Legions for any other cause sent into Spain, nor the seventh involved there, nor so many and so great Navies prepared, nor such experienced and skillfull Commanders selected and appointed, (for none of these needed to keep Spain in quiet,) nothing hereof was prepared for the use and behoof of the Province, which (by reason of their long continuance of peace) needed not any such assistance. All these things were long ago provided in a readinesse against him: New forms of government were made and ordained against him; That one and the same man should be resident at the gates of Rome, have the whole superintendency and direction of the City business; and yet notwithstanding, hold two warlike Provinces for so many years together, being absent from both of them.

Against him, and for his ruine, were changed the ancient Rights and Customs of Magistracy, in sending men at the end of their Priorship or Consulship, to the government of Provinces, as was formerly accustomed; but in lieu of them, were chosen some that were allowed and authorized by a few. Against him the prerogative of age d'd nothing prevail: but whosoever they were that in former wars had made good proof of their valour, were now called out to command Armies. To him only was denied that which was granted to all other Generalls; that when they had happily brought things to an end, they might dismisse their Army, and return home with honour, or at the least, without dishonour.

All which things he notwithstanding both had, and would suffer patiently: neither d'd he now go about to take their Army from them, and retain them in pay for himself, which he might easily do; but that they should not have means to make head against him. And therefore, as it was said before, they should go out of the Provinces, and discharge their Army; if they did so, he would hurt no man: But that was the only and last means of peace.

OBSERVATIONS.

There is not any one virtue that can challenge a greater measure of honour, or hath more prerogative

Malta, quæ
nollet. Ca-
si nungum
tegerimus,
facimus
causam
corum. Cice-
ro L. 1. 1. 1.

rogative either amongst friends or enemies, then fidelity. For which cause it is, that men are more strict in matters committed to their trust for the behoof of others, then they can well be, if the same things concerned themselves. And yet nevertheless there is a Quærens in all endeavours, and seemeth to be limited with such apparency, as true affection may make of a good meaning: and was the ground which Afranius took to move Caesar for a pardon; Non esse aut ipsi aut militibus succedendum, quod fidem erga Imperatorem Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint; sed satis jam fecisse officio, satique supplicii tutis, &c. That he was not to be angry, either with him or the souldiery, for being faithfull to their Generall Cn. Pompeius; but that now they had sufficiently done their duty, and as thoroughly finished for the same, &c. which he delivered in a stile suiting his fortune. For, as Cominius hath

Qui vincum
habent. Fin-
guam. Plaut.

observed, Men in fear give reverent and humble words; and the tongue is ever conditioned to be the chiefest witness of our fortune.

On the other side, Caesar produced nothing for his part, but such wrongs as might seem valuable to make good those courses which he prosecuted. As first, injuries done by them, and that in the highest degree of blame against his souldiers, that went but to seek for peace. Injuries done by their Generall, in such a fashion, as spared not to evert the fundamentall rights of the State, to bring him to ruine and confusion. Whereby he was moved to indeavour that which Nature teach every man unto, Propellere injuriam, to repell an injury from himself: and having brought it to these termes wherein it now stood, he would give assurance to the world, by the revenge he there took, that he entered into that warre for this only end, that he might live in peace: and so required no more but that the Army should be dismissed.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The execution of the Articles agreed upon.

Caesar.



He conditions propounded were most acceptable and pleasing to the souldiers, as might appear by them: for being in the condition of vanquished persons, and thereupon expecting a hard measure of Fortune, to be rewarded with liberty and exemption of Arms, was more then they could expect: in so much as where there grew a controversy of the time and place of their dismissal, they all generally standing upon the rampiers, signified both by their speeches and by their hands, that their desire was it might be done instantly; for it could not be provided by any assurance, that it would continue firm, if it were deferred untill another time. After some dispute

on each side, the matter was in the end brought to this issue; that such as had houses and possessions in Spain, should be discharged presently, and the rest at the River Varus. It was conditioned, that no man should be injured, but no man should be forced against his will to be sworn under Caesar's command.

Caesar promised to furnish them with Corn, untill they came to the river Varus: adding withall, that what soever any one had lost in the time of the warre, which should be found with any of his souldiers, should be restored to such as lost it; and to his souldiers he paid the value thereof in money. If any controversy afterward grew amongst the souldiers, of their own accord they brought the matter from time to time before Caesar. As when the souldiers grew almost into a mutiny for want of pay, the Commanders affirming the pay-day was not yet come, Perreius and Afranius required that Caesar might understand the cause: and both parties were contented with his arbitrement.

A third part of the Army being dismissed in those two dayes, he commanded two of his legions to march before their Army, and the rest to follow after, and continually to incamp themselves not farre from them; and appointed Q. Fufius Calenus, a Legate, to take the charge of that business. This course being taken, they marched out of Spain to the River Varus, and there dismissed the rest of their army.

OBSERVATIONS.

The River Varus divideth Gallia Narbonensis from Italy; and was thought an indifferent place to discharge the Army, whereby there might be an end made of that warre. Wherein if any man desire to see a parallel drawn between Caesar and the other Leaders for matter of warre, it shall suffice to take the issue for a square of their directions; being drawn to this head within forty dayes after Caesar came within sight of the Enemy, as Cæcio noeth in his speech to the souldiers.

Cæcio seeing the prosperous successe of Caesar against Pompey, said their was a great uncertainty in the government of their Gods; alluding peradventure to that of Plato in his Politicks, where he saith, that there are ages, wherein the Gods do govern the world in their own persons; and there are other times, wherein they altogether neglect the same; the world taking a course quite contrary to that which the Gods directed. But Lucan spake from a surer ground, where he saith,

Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed viستا Canon.
The conquering cause plead'd Jove, the conquered Cæso.

And thus endeth the first Commentary.

The Second Commentarie of the Civile VVarres.

The Argument.

His Commentarie hath three speciall parts. The first containeth the siege of *Marseilles*: the strange works, and extreme endeavours to take and to keep the Town. The second expresseth the vain labour which *Varro*, *Pompey's* Lieutenant, undertook, after that *Afranius* and *Petreius* were defeated, to keep the Province of *Andaluzia* out of *Cæsar's* power and command. And the third part consisteth of the expedition *Curio* made into *Africa*; and endeth with his overthrow.

CHAP. I.

The preparations for the siege, as well within as without the Town.

Cæsar.

WHilst these things were doing in Spain, C. Trebonius the Legate being left to besiege *Marseilles*, had begun in two places to raise Mounts, to make Mantelets and Towers against the Town: One next unto the Port where the Ships lay; and the other in the way leading from *Gallia* and *Spain* into the town, just upon the creek of the sea, near unto the mouth of the *Rhone*. For three parts of *Marseilles* are in a manner washed with the sea; and the fourth is that which giveth passage by land; whereof that part which belongeth to the Castle (by reason of the nature of the place, and fortified with a deep ditch) would require a long and difficult siege. For the perfecting of those works, Trebonius had commanded out of all the Provinces great store of horses for carriages, and a multitude of men; requiring them to bring rods to make Hurdles, and other materials for the work: which being prepared & brought together, he raised a Mount of fourscore foot high.

But such was the provision, which of ancient time they had stored up in the town, of all equipage and necessities for the warres, with such provision of munition and engines, that no Hurdles made of rods or Osiers were able to bear out the force thereof. For out of their great Balistes, they shot beams of twelve foot long, pointed with

Iron, with such force, as they would pierce through four courses of Hurdles, and stick in the earth. Whereby they were forced to roof their Gallery with timber of a foot square, and to bring matter that way by hand to make the Mount. A Testudo of sixty foot in length was always carried before, for the levelling of the ground, made of mighty strong timbers, covered and armed with all things which might defend it from fire and stones, or what else should be cast upon it. But the greatness of the work, the height of the wall, and towers, together with the multitude of Engines, did retard and hinder the proceeding thereof.

Moreover, the Albici did make often sallies out of the town, setting fire to the mounts and to the turrets; which were kept by our souldiers with great facility and ease, forcing such as sallied out to return with great losse.

OBSERVATIONS.

HAVING described in the former Commentaries these Engines and works here mentioned, the Reader may please (for his better satisfaction) to review those places; as also farther to note, that the word Artillery was brought down to these ages from the use of ancient Engines, which consisted of those two primitives, *Arcus* and *Telum*. And according as diversity of Art and wit found means to fit these to use and occasions, so had they severall and distinct names; whereof I find chiefly these, *Baliste*, *Catapulta*, *Tormentum*, *Scor-*

* Porticus
* Agger
* Testudo

Artillery
derived
from Arcus
and Telum

Lib. II.

Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

Scorpiones, *Onagri*. Of each of which there are divers and severall sorts; as first, of the *Baliste*, some were called *Centenariæ*, others *Talentariæ*, according to the weight of the bullet or weapon they shot. Of the rate and proportion whereof *Vitruvius*, and his learned interpreter *Daniel Barbarus*, have made accurate description. Again, some were made to shoot stones; as appeareth by that of *Tacitus*, *Magnitudine eximia, quatuordecima legionis Balista ingentibus saxis hostilem aciem proriebat*; the *Balista* of the fourteenth legion being an exceeding great one, beat down the army of the enemy with huge stones; and others, to shoot darts and piles of timber, headed with Iron; as it is manifested by this place. Moreover, the manner of bending of these Engines made a difference: some being drawn up with a winch or screw, and some with a wheel; some having long armes, and others having short; but the things were generally either all of fineness, or of womens hairs, as (strongest and surest) of any other kind. Of these *Veganius* preferreth the *Baliste*, and the *Onagri*, as unrefutable when they were skillfully handled. The word *Onagri*, as *Ammianus Marcellinus* noteth, was of a later stamp, and imposed upon those Engines which former time called *Scorpiones*; and was taken from the nature of wilde Asles, that are said to cast stones backward with their feet at the Hunters, with such violence, that oftentimes they dashed out their brains.

In the time of *Barbarissine*, all these Engines were generally called *Mangonella*: as appeareth by *Vigenerius*, in his Annotations upon *Onofander*. Which is likewise shewed by that which *Mr. Camden* hath inserted in the description of *Bedfordshire*, concerning the siege of *Bedford Castle*, in the time of *Henry the third*, out of an Author that was present: *Ex parte orientali fuit una Petraris, & duo Mangonellæ, quæ quotidie turrim infestabant; & ex parte occidentis duo Mangonellæ, quæ turrim veterem contriverunt; & unum Mangonellum ex parte Australi, &c.*

On the East side was placed one Engine to cast stones, and two Mangonels, which continually plaid upon the tower; and on the West side two Mangonels, which beat down the old tower; and one Mangonel on the South side, &c. But our powder having blown all these out of use, it were to no purpose to insist longer upon them.

CHAP. II.

The *Marseillians* prepare themselves for a Sea-fight.

Cæsar.

IN the mean time, L. Nasidius being sent by Cn. Pompeius with a Navie of sixteen ships (amongst which some few had their beak-head of Iron) to the succour and supply of L. Domitius and the *Marseillians*, he passed the

straights of *Sicilie*, before *Curio* had intelligence thereof: and putting into *Messana*, by reason of the suddain terror of the principall men, and the Senate that took themselves to flight, he surprized one Ship in the road, and carried her away, and so held on his course to *Marseilles*. And having sent a small Bark before, he certified *Domitius* and the rest of his coming; exhorting them by all means, that joining their forces with his supplies, they would once again give fight to *Brutus Navie*.

The *Marseillians* since their former overthrow, had taken the like number of ships out of their Arcenall, and new rigged and trimmed them, and with great industrie furnished and manned them for that service: for they wanted neither Oare-men, Mariners, Sailers, nor Pilots, fit for that purpose. To these they added certain Fisher-boats, and fenced them with coverings, that the Oare-men might be safe from casting weapons: and these he filled with Archers and Engines. The Navie being thus furnished and prepared, the *Marseillians* incited and stirred up with the prayers and tears of old men, women and maids, to give help and defence to their City in time of extreme danger; and to fight with no lesse courage and confidence then formerly they had accustomed went all aboard with great courage, as it cometh to passe through the common fault of Nature, whereby we put more confidence in things unseen and unknown, or otherwise are more troubled thereat: according as it then happened. For the coming of *Nasidius* had filled the City full of assured hope and courage: and hereupon, having a good wind, they left the Port, and came and found *Nasidius* at *Tarenta* (a Castle belonging to the *Marseillians*) and there fitted themselves for a fight, encouraging each other again to a valiant carriage of that service, and consulting how it might be best performed.

The right Squadron was given to the *Marseillians*, and the left to *Nasidius*. And to the place repaired *Brutus*, having increased the number of his Ships: for those six which he took from the *Marseillians*, he had added unto the other which *Cæsar* had caused to be made at *Arelate*, and had mended them since the last fight, and fitted them with all necessities for men of war. And thereupon exhorting his souldiers to condemn the Enemy, as a vanquished partie, having already foiled and overbrowen them when they were in their strength, they set forward against them with great assurance and courage.

Out of the Camp of C. Trebonius, and from all those higher places they might easily perceive and see in the City, how all the youth which remained in the town, and all the aged, with their wives and children, did from the publick places

K k

Observations upon Cæsars

places of guard, and from the town walls, stretch out their hands towards heaven or otherwise run to their Churches and Temples, and there prostrating themselves before their Images, did desire victorie of their Gods. Neither was there any of them all that did not think the event of all their fortunes to consist in that daies service: for the chiefeft of all their able men, and the best of all forts and degrees, were by name called out, and intreated to go aboard, to the end that if any disaster or mischance should happen, they might see nothing further to be endeavoured for their safety; and if they overcame, they might rest in hope to save their Citie, either by their own valour, or by forrain help.

OBSERVATIONS.

Communi sit vitio natura, ut invisis, latitantibus, atque incognitis rebus, magis confidamus, vehementiusque extereamur, ut rum accidit; It cometh to pass through the common fault of nature, &c. In cases of hazard, things brought unto us by report do more abuse our judgement, either in conceiving too great hopes, or yielding too much to distrust, then any matter present can move or enforce: for these perturbations attending upon our will, are enlarged more according to the qualitie of our desires, then as they are directed by discourse of reason; and to draw men either easily to believe what their wishes do require, or otherwise to reject all as utterly lost.

The uncertainty whereof, and the disappointment ensuing those deceivable apprehensions, hath brought the hope of this life into very slight account, being reckoned but as the dream of him that is awake; and as *Piafraus*, or a charitable delusion, to support us through the hard chances of this world, and to keep mans heart from breaking: for every mans help is hope, which never affordeth present relief, but asswageth the bitter restle of extremities, by

Virgil. lib. 3. *--- Dabit Deus his quoque finem,*
Æneid. God once will put an end to these things too.

CHAP. III.

The fight, and the *Marseillians* overthrow.

Cæsar.



He fight being begun, the Marseillians were wanting in no point of valour: but bearing in mind such exhortations as a little before had been given them by their friends, they fought so resolutely, as though they meant not to fight again; or as if any one should chance to miscarry in that battell, he should

make account that he did but anticipate, for a small moment of time, the fatal end of his fellow-Citizens, who (upon taking of the town) were to undergo the same fortune of war. Our Ships putting on by little and little, were glad to give way to the nimbleness and mobility of their shipping, which by the skill of their Pilots were well managed. And if it happened that our men had found means to grapple with any of their ships, they presently came on all sides to their rescue. Neither did the Albici shew themselves backward when the matter came to hands, or were they inferior to our men in courage or valour. Moreover, out of the lesser Ships were cast infinite numbers of darts, and other weapons, wherewith our men busied in fight were suddenly wounded.

In this conflict, two of their *Triremes* having spied *Brutus* ship (which by her flag might easily be discerned) came volently against him from two contrary parts: but the danger being foreseen, *Brutus* did so prevail through the swiftnesse of his Ship, that he a little out-stripped them; whereby they coming with their full swings, did so encounter one another, that they were both very much shaken with the blow: for the beak-head of one being broken off, the water was ready to come in on all sides. Which being observed by some of *Brutus* party that were near about, they set upon them (being thus distressed) and quickly sunk them both.

The ships that came with *Natidius* were found of no use, and therefore quickly left the fight; for there was not offered there unto them either the sight of their Countrey, or the exhortations and prayers of their kinsfolks and allies, as motives to hazard their lives in that quarrell: so that of them there was none wanting. Of the Ships that came out from *Marseilles*, five were sunk, and four taken. One escaped with *Natidius* fleet, which made towards the hither Spain. One of them that remained was sent before to *Marseilles*; who coming as a messenger before the rest, and approaching near unto the town, all the multitude ran out to hear the news: which being once known, there was such a generall mourning and desolation, as though the town were instantly to be taken by the Enemy. Notwithstanding, they left not off to make ready such necessaries as were requisite for defence of the same.

OBSERVATIONS.

This was the second fight the *Marseillians* made, to keep the sea open for the aid and relief of the Town; being otherwise straightly besieged by land, & yet that was not so tenderly cared for as their shutting up by sea; the free passage whereof brought in all their profit in time of peace, and their succours in times of war: for



for which regard it was, that they commended to their gods the successe of that enterprize, with as much devotion, as tears, vowes and prayers could expresse.

The benefit a Town besieged receiveth from an open in-let by sea, cannot be better manifested, then by the siege of *Ostend*; for by that occasion specially, it induced the most famous siege that was in Christendome these many years. This *L. Nafidius* was rather a constant friend to the cause, then a fortunate Admirall: for afterwards, he refused not to take the like overthrow for *Pompey* the son, at *Leucades*, as he did now for the father. And surely it falleth out (whether it be through the uncertainty of sea-faring matters, or that men have fairer pretences at sea, to avoid occasions of hazard, then are found at land, or that *Puncta d'gna nascuntur in Mari*, few things of value come from the Sea, according to the proverb, or for what other cause, I know not) that there are few of those which sought honour in this kind, who have attained the least part of their desires. And yet nevertheless, some there are of famous memorie: as ** Barbarossa*, a terror of the *Levant* seas; *Andreas Aurias* of *Genua*, renowned for his great exploits upon the *Turk*: together with divers of our own Nation; as namely, Sir *Francis Drake*, who for skill and fortune at sea, is held matchable with any other whatsoever; besides, Mr. *Candish*, for voyages to the South, and Sir *Martin Frobiisher*, for discoveries to the North.

Howbeit, these later times have advantage without comparison of former ages, through the invention of the Sea-compass with the Needle; which was found out little more then three hundred years ago, by one *Flavus*, born in the kingdom of *Naples*; without which, no ship can shape a course in the Ocean, and to which nothing can be added, more then to find a perfect and ready direction for longitudes.

CHAP. IIII.

The works which the legionary Souldiers made against the Town.

Castr.



It was observed by the legionary Souldiers, that had the charge of the right part of the work, that it would much advantage them against the often eruptions and sallies of the Enemy, if they built a tower of Brick under the town wall, in stead of a Hold or Receptacle: which at first they made low and little, onely for the repelling of suddain assaults. Thither they usually retreated: and from thence, if they were over-charged, they made defence, either by beating back, or prosecuting an Enemy. This tower was thirty foot

square, and the walls thereof five foot thick: but afterwards (as use and experience is the master of all things) it was found by insight and industrie of men, that this tower might be of great use, if it were raised to any height; which was accordingly performed in this fashion.

When it was raised to the height of a story, they so framed the floor, that the ends of the joists did not jittie out beyond the sides of the tower; least any thing might be thrust out, on which the fire which the enemy should cast might take hold: and then paved that floor, with as much brick as the *Mamelets* and *Gabions* would suffer to be laid. Upon this starras thus made they laid crosse beams along the sides, as a foundation to an upper story, for the top and covering of the tower. And upon these beams they raised crosse timbers, thwarting each other for the sides of the tower, and coupled them at the top with side beams.

These crosse timbers were longer, and bare further out then the square of the tower; that there might be means to fasten coverings and defences, against the blows and darts of the Enemy, whilst the workmen were finishing the walls and sides of that building. The top or upper story of this tower they likewise paved with brick and clay, that no fire might fasten on it; and laid Mutteresses on the top thereof, to the end the floor might not be broken with any weapons shot out of Engines, nor the pavement shivered in pieces with stones cast out of Catapults.

Moreover they made three nettings or mats of Hawfers, equall in length to the sides of the tower, and four foot in breadth. And upon those three sides which confronted the Enemy, they fastened them upon poles to hang before the tower: which kind of defence they had in other places tried to be of proof, and not to be pierced with any weapon or engine. And as one part of the tower came to be covered, finished, and fortified, against any violence of the enemy, they carried their *Mantelets* and defences to the rest unfinished. The top of which tower they framed upon the first story, and then raised it up with wrinches or serues, as far as the close netting would serve them for a defence. And so covered with these shelters and safeguards, they built up the sides with brick, and then again scrining up the top higher, they fitted the place to build the sides higher: and as they came to the height of a story, they laid the joists of the floor in such sort, as the ends thereof were hid and covered with the wall or sides that were of brick; and so from that story they proceeded to another, by scrining up the top, and raising their netting. By which means they built very safely six stories, without any wound or other danger at all; and left windows and loop-holes in the sides for

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for the putting out of Engines in such places as they thought convenient. When by means of that tower they were in hope to defend the works near about it, they then made a *Musculum*, or mouse of sixty foot in length, and of two foot timber square to convey them safely from this tower of Bricks to another of the Enemies, and to the town wall: whereof this was the form. They cut two side groundslits of equal length, and made the space between them to contain four foot; upon them they erected little columns of five foot high, and joyned them together putting braces of an easie sloping in such distances, as the rafters were to be placed to bear up the roof: and upon those braces they laid rafters of two foot square, fastning them both at the ridge, and at the eavngs, with plates and bolts of Iron. They lathed the roof with lath of four fingers broad: and so the building being made with a gable-ridge handfomly fashioned, the top was laid all over with clay, to keep the Mouse from burning; and then covered with tiles, which were fenced with leather so the end they might not be washed away with pipes or gutters of water, which might be laid to fall upon them. And least those sides should be spoiled, either with fire or great stones, they laid Matresses upon them.

This work being wholly finished near unto the tower, through the help and means of defensive mantelets & gabions, suddenly before the enemy was aware, with a ship-engine and rollers put under it they brought it so near a tower of the enemies, that it joyned to the wall thereof. The townsmen being upon a suddain appalled thereat, brought the greatest stones they could get, and with levers tumbled them down from the wall upon the mouse: but the strength of the work did not shrink at the blows, and what soever fell upon it, slid down the sloping of the roof. Which when they perceived, they altered their purpose, and got pots of Rosin and Pitch, and setting them on fire, threw them down upon the Mouse; which tumbling down from the roof, were removed away with long hooks and poles. In the mean time the soldiers that were within the Mouse, pulled down the lower stones that were in the foundation of the tower. This Mouse or Mantelet was defended by our men out of the brick tower, with weapons and engines: and by means thereof the Enemy was put from the wall & the turrets, so that they could not well defend the same. Many of the stones being sapped out of the foundation of the tower, part thereof suddenly fell, and the rest leaned as though it would not stand long after.

OBSERVATIONS.

Forasmuch as it requireth the labour of an industrious pen to shadow out the effects of Industry; I will onely produce the evidence of these

works, to shew the power it hath in humane actions, rather then by any maimed or shallow discourse, weaken the force of to great an Engine. Wherein first it may be noted, how in this and the like attempting endeavours, one thing draws on another, according as practise maketh overtune to maiesties: For our understanding growing by degrees, hath no intuitive faculty to discern perfection, but by little & little worketh out exactness; making every Morrow Yesterday's scholar, as reason findeth means of discourse from causes to effects, or from effects to causes.

And so this Tower, made at first but for a retreat of defence, gave occasion to let them see the like or better use thereof in the offensive part, if it were raised to a height convenient for the same: which they performed with as much Art as the wit of man could use in such a work. For having made the first story, they then made the roof, for the shelter and safety of the soldiers: and securing it up by little and little, they built the sides, having fenced the open space with netting, for avoiding of danger; arming it with brick and clay against fire, and with Matresses against stones and weights. And then again they proceeded to the making of that Mantelet or *Musculum*, which gave them passage to the wall; building it with strong, or rather strange timber, of two foot square, framed so artificially with braces, and riding rafters, and those so fitted, as neither fire, water, weapon, nor weight, could prevail against it. And thus they laboured to gain their own ends, and bought Fortune with immeasurable endeavour.

CHAP. V.

The *Marcellians* get a truce of the *Romans*, and break it deceitfully.



The Enemy being then much appalled at the suddain ruine and fall of the tower, and greatly perplexed at so unexpected a mischief, and withall struck with a fear of the wrath and indignation of the Gods, and of the sack and spoil of their City; they came all unarmed, thronging out of the gates, wearing holy attire upon their heads, and stretching out their supplicative hands to the Legates and the Army. Upon which novelty, all hostility ceased for the time, and the soldiers withdrawing themselves from the assault, were carried with a desire of hearing and understanding what would passe at that time.

When they came to the Legates and to the Army, they cast themselves all down at their feet, praying and beseeching that things might be suspended until Cæsar's arrivall. They say plainly that their town was already taken by their works were perfected, their own tower demolished; and therefore they desisted from making any further defence:

Discipulus
prioris
posicionis
dies,
Aulus Gellius.

defence: there could be no let to hinder them from present spoil and sucking, if upon Cæsar's arrivall they should refuse to obey his Mandates. They showed further, that if their tower were absolutely overthrown, the soldiers could not be kept from entering the town in hope of pillage, and would thereby bring it to a final destruction.

These and many the like things were uttered by them very movingly (as men learned and eloquent) with great lamentation and much weeping, whereby the Legates (moved with commiseration) withdrew the soldiers from the fortifications, put off the assault, and left a small guard to keep the works. A kind of truce being through pity and commiseration thus made and concluded, Cæsar's coming was expected; no weapon was cast, either from the town-walls, or from our side: inasmuch as every man left off his care and diligence, as though all had been ended. For Cæsar had by Letters given straight charge to Trebonius, not to suffer the town to be taken by assault, least the soldiers (moved through their rebellion and contempt, together with the long travail they had sustained) should put all above fourteen years of age to the sword: which they threatened to do, and were then hardly kept from breaking into the town; taking the matter very grievously, that Trebonius seemed to hinder them from effecting their purposes. But the enemy, being people without faith, did onely watch for time and opportunity, to put in practice their fraud and deceit.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Vestitus, ut
regit cor-
pus, ita de-
regit ani-
mam.

It is a saying of an ancient Writer, that As our attire doth cover the body, so it doth uncover the nakedness of the mind. Whereupon it is, that men have found means to sure themselves upon occasion, according to the disposition of their inward affections, as they are either dilated with joy, or contracted with sorrow, lifted up with wealth or humbled with affliction. And accordingly these *Marcellians*, in token of their humility and submission, came out, wearing an attire here called *Insula*; which *Servius* describeth to be a kind of Coife, made after the form of a Diadem, with two pendants on each side, called *Vinae*.

Those which the *Romans* used of this kind, were fashioned like a Pyramid: the point whereof did signifie the Elements, ascending upwards in such a pointed fashion; and by the two pendants or bands were denoted the Water and the Earth. They were made wholly of wool, as *Festus* writeth, *Insula sum filamenta lineæ, quibus Sacerdotes, hostiæ, & templi velabantur*; *Insula* are certain ornaments and tappings made of wool, wherewith the Priests use to be clad, the Sacrifices to be covered, and the Temples to be hangd: to

* The fire
and the
air.

shew humbleness and simplicitie, whereof wool is a Hieroglyphick; for no kind of beasts have more need of aide and succour then Sheep: and thereupon it was, that all Supplicants were attired with tresses of wool. Or otherwile, as some will have it, that the habit of the Penitencer might call to remembrance the flexible disposition, which is well-beseeming those that have power and means to give help and relief: according to the use of Heathen ages, wherein their Images of their Idols had their feet tied with cords of wool; to shew the mildness and easiness which upon devote supplications was found in divine Powers, whereof wool was a Symbolum.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The *Marcellians* being an ancient progeny of the Greeks, notwithstanding the long descent of time, and alteration of air, did keep a touch of the naturall disposition of that Nation, as well in such strains of eloquence, as were familiar unto them above other people, as in their duplicie of dealing. Which passage of the *Marcellians* is observed by *Tully*, as a matter enforcing the due praises of eloquence, and the use it hath upon all occasions to draw consent, with the sweetness of a well-tuned tongue, above that which may be attained either by Engines or a strong hand. Wherein, if we should go about to compare the force of Armes with the power of an Orator, there might hence be taken divers probable reasons to second that saying, which hath been thought to labour more of vain-glorie, then of true judgement,

Cedunt armatogæ, concedat laurea lingue;
Let armes to gowms, the bay-leaf yield to the tongue.

Or at least, to make a resemblance of *Plutarch's* two Wrattlers, of whom one being alwaies cast, did nevertheless persuade the other that he cast him; and so, howsoever he became foiled, yet left the place with an opinion of victorie: And is alwaies more easily effected, when it is attended with cunning and deceit, according to that of *Valerius Maximus*, *Efflicacissima vires perfidie, mentis, & fallere*. The main strength of perfidiousness is lying and deceiving. But, as it is observed by *Philip de Commines*, The example of one sole accident, is sufficient to make many men wise: so this may serve to teach succeeding times, not to trust to words, whereof there is no hold; but to ratifie such compositions with irrevocable performances.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Hardly, we may note, how far the anger of a Roman Armie was extended, upon such provocations

K k 3

Macrobius lib. I. Saturnalia 8.

* Græci
sile omnia
Oratio
pro Placido.

* Equales
est ut
dignit signifi-
cavit, ut
nec condia-
tionem non
bit rem
est. i. e.
Tum erant
is præfe-
rendus,
quoniam
fuerat magis
exiguus.

* In his cas
sola varus un
sola examp
pio, hanc
experientia
Aut.
Peregrin.

Observations upon Cæsars

vocations as are here mentioned, viz. *Ad interficiendos pueros*, to the slaying of all the males above fourteen years of age: for, from that stage of life, they accounted all in the rank of men; according to the institution of *Tarquinius Priscus*, who in his triumph of the *Sabines*, made a speciall Oration in the praise of his own sonne, that had assaulted and struck the Enemy in those warres, being then but fourteen years of age; and thereupon gave him liberty to wear mans apparell, which was that *Loga pretexta* (edged or faced with Purple) whereof their histories make so often mention.

But to define precisely heretofore, were to mistake the fury of the fouldier. For howsoever the rule is certain from the law of Nature, that no finite cause can be infinite in effects; or that a mortall hate should have a boundlesse revenge: yet occasion made it variable, and as irregular as that of *Alexander*; who for crimes saved all, and at other times (as at the taking of *Tyre*) saved none at all, but such as had taken the protection of the Temple. The inhumane cruelty of the *Turks* exceedeth all former hostilities in this kind: for they never save any out of commiseration, but for private use; and do rather chuse to destroy mankind, then suffer it to live for any other purpose than their own.

CHAP. VI.

The *Marseillians* taking advantage of the Truce, consume with fire all the Roman works: which are afterwards re-edified.

Macro. lib. 1. 5. tur. cap. 6.

After a few daies, when our men were grown remisse and carelesse, suddenly about high noon, as some were gone one way some another, and others wearied with continuall labour had given themselves to rest, the weapons being cased and laid up; they rushed out of their gates, and coming with the wind that then blew hard, they set our works on fire: which was so carried and dispersed with the wind, that the Mount, the *Mantelets*, the *Testudo*, the Tower and the Engines were all on fire at once, and were burned down and consumed, before it could be known how it came.

Our men astonished at so suddain and unthought-of an accident, caught up such weapons as were next at hand; and others running speedily from the Camp, set upon the Enemy, but were hindered from following them as they fled, by Engines and Arrows from the town wall. They, on the other side, being retired under the protection of the wall, did at their ease burn down the Mount and the brick-tower: and so many moneths labour was, through the perfidiousnesse of the Enemy, and the force of the tempest, consumed and brought to nothing in a moment of

time. The *Marseillians* attempted the like the next day after, having opportunity of the like tempest; and with greater confidence sallied out, and threw much fire upon the other mount and the tower. But as our men the day before (expecting nothing lesse than to be surprized in that sort) had neglected more then ordinary their usual guards; so being now made wiser by that which had happened, they had made all things ready for defence: by which means, having slain a great number, they drove the rest back into the town, without effecting any thing.

Trebonius began again to re-edifie such works as were ruined and consumed with fire, and that with greater alacrity of the souldier then before. For when they saw their great labours and endeavours for to no better success, and the truce broke by the treachery of the Enemy, it was a great gall unto them to have their valour thus derided. And forasmuch as there was nothing left in all the Countrey for the raising of a Mount, all the trees being already cut down, and brought far and near to make the first Mount; they began a Mount of a strange and unheard-of sort, on raised with two side-walls of brick, being six foot thick a piece, and oyned together with floors. The walls were of equal distance, to the latitude of the former Mount, which was all of solid matter: and where the space between the walls, or the weaknesse of the work did require it, there were piles driven between, and beams and plunks laid across for the strengthening thereof. The floors, made between those walls, were laid with Hurdles, and the Hurdles were covered with clay.

The souldiers being thus sheltered on both sides with a wall, and defended in front by *Mantelets* and *Gubions*, did safely, without danger, bring whatsoever was necessary for that building; whereby the work was carried on with great speed: and the losse of their former continuall labour was in a short time recovered again, through the admirable dexterity and valour of the souldier. To conclude, they left gates in the walls in such places as were fittest for sallies.

When the enemy perceived, that what they hoped could not be repaired again in a long time, was with a few daies labour re-edified and finished; whereby there was no place left to practise deceit, or to sallie out with advantage, neither was there any means left by which they could prevail, either by force of Armes to hurt our souldiers, or by fire to consume our works; and understanding likewise, that by the same manner of fortification, all that part of the town which had passage and access from the firm land, might be encompassed with a wall and with towers, that their souldiers should not be able to stand upon their works; and perceiving withall, that

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that our Army had raised a counter-mure, against the wall of their town, and that weapons might be cast by hand unto them; that the use of their Engines (wherein they much trusted) was by the nearness of space quite taken away; and lastly, that they were not able to conform our men upon equall terms) from their walls, and from their towers; they descended to the same Articles of rendry and submission as were formerly agreed upon.

hoveeth a Commander, to keep his Armie alive, waies seasoned with labour; forasmuch as *Exercitus labore proficit, otio consenescit*. An army thrives by employment, but grows old by idleness.

Vegetius.

CHAP. VII.

Varro raiseth great troups to maintain *Pompey's* partie in Spain; but to no purpose.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that a Generall cannot be too secure of an Enemy, that stands upon terms to render up a place. For the action being but voluntary by constraint, if haply the confirming force be removed, then that doth cease which is voluntary; and so it cometh by consequence to a refusal. As appeareth by this passage of the *Marseillians*; who being brought into hard terms, as well by their two overthrows at Sea, (whence they expected no further succour,) as also by the siege laid to close by land, (where they were so violently assaulted, that their towers of defence made passage for the Romans to enter upon them;) did nevertheless (upon cessation of those inforcements) alter their purpose, and entertained new hopes: which maketh good that saying;

Timeo Danaos & dona ferentes.

I fear the Greeks, even when they bring their gifts.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe that a will, forward to undergo labour, doth never stick at any difficulty, nor is at all diminished with the losse of any pains: but is rather redoubled in courage and induitue; especially being edged on with a desire of revenge. Which (if *Homer* may have credit) doth alwaies adde a third part to a mans strength; as appeared by *Diomedes*, being hurt in the shoulder with one of *Pindarus* arrows: for revenge whereof, he exceeded himself in a sesquialter proportion of valour, and slew more *Trojan* by a third part then otherwise he could.

Howsoever, as there is nothing so hard, but is subject to the endeavour of the mind: so there is nothing so easie, as to dispossess our selves of that intent care which is requisite in these employments. For these Romans, that through the greatness of their spirits had made such first and second works, as the memorie thereof will last with the world, were surprised when they lay in the *Interim*, as it were unbecome, in as great remissness and neglect (howsoever drawn unto it by deceit) as if they had been able to do no such matter as is here reported. And therefore it be-

Marcus Varro, in the further Province of Spain, having from the beginning understood how things had passed in Italy, and distrusting how matters would succeed with *Pompey*, did oftentimes give out very friendly speeches of *Cæsar*: That *Pompey* had by way of prevention gained him to his party, and honoured him with a *Licentiancie*, whereby he was obliged in due to him; howbeit, in his particular disposition he stood no less affected to *Cæsar*: neither was he ignorant of the duty of a *Legatus* whose trust and fidelity the government of the Province was left as in deposito, upon condition to be rendered up at all times and seasons, as he that commanded in chief should require it: He likewise knew very well what his own forces were, and what was the affection and disposition of all the Countrey towards *Cæsar*.

This was the subject of all his speeches, without any shew of inclining either to the one or to the other. But afterwards, when he heard that *Cæsar* was engaged at *Martilles*, that *Petereus* forces were joined with *Afranius* Armie, that great aides were come unto them, that every man was in great hope and expectation of good successe, and that all the hither Province had agreed together to undertake *Pompey's* cause; as also what had after happened concerning the want of vittuals at *Ileidas*, (all which things were writ with advantage unto him by *Afranius*;) he then upon that alteration changed his mind according to the times, and levied souldiers in all parts of the Province: and having raised two compleat legions, he added unto them some thirty cohorts of the Countrey souldiers, to serve for wings to the Army, and gathered together great quantity of Corn, as well for the supplie of the *Marseillians*, as for the provision of *Petereus* and *Afranius*.

Moreover, he commanded them of *Gades* to build and provide ten Gallies; and ordered further, that many other should be made at *Hilpanis*. He took all the money and the ornaments out of *Hercules* temple, and brought the same into the town of *Gades*, and in lieu thereof sent six Cohorts out of the Province to keep the temple. He made *Caius Gallonius* (a Roman Knight

Voluntas ad laborem propensio, cuncta vincere & superare conatur. Polyanus.

Itiad. 5.

Nihil tam arduum, quod animi fortitudine superari non possit. Appian de bello Hispanico.

Observations upon Cæsars

and a familiar friend of Domitius, and sent by him thither to recover some matter of inheritance) Governour of the town. All the Armies (as well private as publick) were brought into Gallonius house. He himself made many bitter invectives against Cæsar; affirming in publick that Cæsar had been severall times worsted, and that a great number of the soldiers were revolted from him; and were come to Afranius: which he knew to be true; by certain and approved Messengers.

The Roman Citizens residing in that Province being much perplexed and afflicted thereat, were thereupon constrained to promise him 100 thousand Sesterces in ready money for the service of the Common-wealth; besides twenty thousand weight of silver; and their whole hundred and twenty thousand batches of it. Upon those Cities and States which favoured Cæsar's party, he laid greater impositions: for such as had less fullen speeches, or declared themselves against the Common-wealth, he confiscated all their goods, and put a Garrison upon them; giving judgement himself upon private persons, and constraining all the Province to swear allegiance to him and to Pompey.

And being in the end advertised what had happened in the hither Province, he prepared for war, with a purpose to dispose thereof in this manner: His resolution was to keep two legions with him at Gades, with all the shipping and the Corn: for knowing that the whole Province did entirely affect Cæsar's Cause, he thought it best and easiest for him (having made good provision of shipping and Corn) to keep the Island.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Observe first, how dangerous it is for such a stand neutral between two parties (bearing no affection but to their own ends) to declare themselves; upon such appearances as commonly happen in the flux and reflux of a war: for if their judgement fail as Varro did, they are then forced to redeem their error with more offices of partiality, then can afterwards be excused; and to run into a further degree of enmity, then the party for whom they suffer. And certainly, whether it be that neutrality refuseth to take part with the right, (which in matter of controversy must needs stand on one side,) or whether it favourerth of an ill nature, to shew no sympathizing affections with such as otherwise have correspondence with them, or for what other cause I know not; but sure it is, that Neutrals, attending nothing but their own advantage, are of no better esteem then the bird whereof *Leo Africanus* writeth; which when the King of Birds demanded tribute, would always rank himself amongst the Fish, and when

the King of Fishes required his service, would always be with the Birds; or then the Weathercock, whereof there is no other use, then indicate regnantes, to shew what wind rules.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Island of Gades, was known to the Romans by the name of *Tartessus*:

Hic Gades urbs est dicta Tartessus prius.

Here *Gades* stands, of old *Tartessus* call'd.

The Town of *Gades* was endowed, as *Dion* writeth, by *Julius Cæsar*, with the liberties and privileges of *Rome*. To which effect *Plinie* writeth; *Oppidum habet Civium Romanorum quod appellatur Augusta urbs Julia Gaditana*. This Island hath a town of Roman Citizens, which is called *Augusta Julia Gaditana*. It was a town of great fame, as appeareth by that of *Juba* king of *Mauritania*, who made ambitious lust to have the title of *Duumviri*, or Two-men of the town; as *Festus* noteth in his Description of the Sea-coast.

*At vis in illstanta, vel tantum decus
Ætate prisca, sub fide rerum fuit;
Rex ut superbus, omnium glorie prapotent
Quos gens habebat forte tum Maurus, istis
Oliviano principi acceptissimus,
Et literarum semper in studio, Iuba,
Interfluque separatus aqore,
Illustriorem semet urbis istius
Duumvirum crederet ----*

Such was their power, such their grace
Of old, while faith was yet in place;
King *Juba*, the most powerfull Prince
The Moors had either then or since,
In favour with *Olivian*,
And every way a learned man,
Divided from this place by *Sea*,
Thought it would greater glory be
To be *Duum-vir* of the town.

In this Island stood *Hercules* Temple; to which as well *Romans*, as other noble Adventurers of all Nations, made often repair, to perform their vows upon achievements of deeds of Arms; which solemnity was not omitted by *Hannibal*, before his expedition into *Italie*.

Amongst other Altars in this Temple, there was one dedicated to *Penurie* and *Art*; signifying that *Art* driveth away *Penurie*, as *Hercules* put to flight and subdued Monsters. Those of *Asia*, and the *Mediterrane* parts, took this Island to be the furthest end of navigation: for the *Atlantick* sea admitted no further passage, for want of a load-stone to direct them in that vastness. And therefore *Pindarus* saith, that it is not lawfull for wise men nor fools to know what

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Josephus A what is beyond the streight of *Gibraltar*, the way in the Ocean being a thousand leagues abroad. In this town of *Gades* was born *L. Cornelius Balbus*, who at his death gave a legacy to the Roman people, twenty five pence per Pole; together with *Junius Brutus Cæmæla*, that writ so excellently *Dere Rustica*.

*Et mea quam generat Tartessus litore
Gades.*

And which my *Gades* yields on *Tartessus* shoar.

It is now called *Cales*, and was sacked by our English, An. 1596.

Hispalis, surnamed *Romulensis*, from the Roman Colony that was planted there, is seated upon the River *Batis*, in a very pleasant and fertile Countrey, and especially for oiles. The town is now the Staple for the West Indies, and a very Nursery of Merchants. *Arias Montanus*, that great Theologian, was born in this City.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Concerning these hundred and ninety thousand Sesterces, the learned cannot satisfie themselves with any congruent interpretation thereof. For if we take them in the Neuters for seven pound ten shillings apiece, it amounteth to 1492000 pound, which is thought too much: if in the Masculine, it will rise not to above 1400 pound, which is deemed too little. And therefore the Critics do mend the place, and read *H-S centies novagies*, a hundred times ninety *H-S*, which bringeth out 142500 pound: and is thought agreeable to the meaning of the Authour.

CHAP. VIII.

The Province and the legions revolt from Varro. Cæsar setteth Spain, and returneth to Marscilles.

Cæsar.

Albeit Cæsar was called back into Italy, for many great and important causes, yet he was resolved to leave no spark or appearance of warre remaining behind him in Spain; for that he knew Pompey's deserts to be such, as had gained him many followers and dependants in the hither Province. And therefore having sent two legions into the further Spain; under the conduct of *Q. Cassius*, Tribune of the people, he himself made forward by great journeys, with six hundred horse; sending an Edict before him, to summon the Magistrates and chief men of the Cities and Towns, to appear before him by a day at *Corduba*. Upon publication of which Edict, there was no City in all that Province, that sent not some of their Senate by the day ap-

pointed to *Corduba*: neither was there any Roman Citizen of note, that presented not himself there at that time.

The Princes and States being assembled, of their own accord they shut the gates against Varro, set watch and ward upon the walls and in the towers, and retained with them two cohorts, called by the name of *Colonicæ* (which came thither by chance) for the safe keeping of the town. At the self-same time, the Inhabitants of *Carmona* (which is the strongest town of all the Province) cast out the three cohorts that were by Varro put into their Citadels, and shut them out of their town. Whereby Varro was the rather moved to make haste to *Gades* with his legions, lest he should be hindered and cut off, either in the way, or in his passage over from the Continent: such and so favourable was the generall affection of the whole Province towards Cæsar. And being somewhat advanced on his journey, he received Letters from *Gades*. That as soon as it was known there of the Edict which Cæsar had published, the chiefe of the *Gaditans* agreed with the Tribunes of the soldiers which were in Garrison, to expell Gallonius out of the town, and to keep the City and the Island for Cæsar. Which being resolved upon, they sent him word to leave the town of his own accord, while he might do it without danger; and if he refused, they would then take such further order as they should find expedient. Gallonius moved with fear dislodged himself, and went out of *Gades*.

These things being divulged abroad, one of the two legions, known by the name of *Vernacula*, took up their Ensignes, went out of Varro's Camp (he himself standing by and looking on) and retired themselves to *Hispalis*; and there sat down in the Market-place, and in common parches, without hurting any man. Which the Roman Citizens of that Convent did so well like of, that every man was very desirous to entertain them in their houses. Whereas Varro being much astonished, altered his journey towards *Ilipa Italica*, as he gave it out; but soon after was advertised by some of his friends, that the gates were shut against him. Whereupon, being circumvented and fore-closed from all other addresses, he sent to Cæsar, to advertise him that he was ready to deliver up the legions, to whomsoever he should please to appoint. To which purpose he sent him *Sex. Cæsar*, commanding the legion to be delivered to him.

Varro having given up his charge, came to Cæsar at *Corduba*, and there gave him a true account of the carriage of his office. The money remaining in his hands he delivered up, and gave an Inventory of the Corn and shipping which were in any place provided: Cæsar, by a pub-

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lick Oration made at Corduba, gave thanks generally to all men. As first to the Roman Citizens, for the endeavour they used to be Masters of the town. Secondly, to the Spaniards, for driving out the Garrisons. To them of Gades, that they traversed and prevented the projects of the adversaries, and had restored themselves to liberty. To the Tribunes of the souldiers, and Centurions, that were come thither to keep the town, for that by their valour and magnanimity the resolution of the townsmen was assured and confirmed. He remitted such levies of money, as the Roman Citizens had promised Varro for the publick service. He restored the goods confiscated of such as had spoken more freely than was pleasing; and gave divers rewards, both publick and private: the rest he satisfied with hope of good time for the future. And having staid there two daies, he went to Gades: where he gave order that the monies and monuments, which were transferred from Hercules Temple to a private house, should be carried back again to the Temple. He made Q. Cassius Governor of the Province, and left with him four legions. He himself in a few daies space, with those ships which M. Varro, and those of Gades (by his commandment) had made, came to Tarraco; for there the Embassadors of almost all the hisher Province did attend his coming. And having received them with private and publick honour, in the same fashion as formerly he had used, he left Tarraco, and came by land to Narbone, and from thence to Marsellies: where he received first advertisement of the law made at Rome, for creating of a Dictator; and that himself was named thereunto, by M. Lepidus, Prator.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IT is one of *Cæsar's* peculiars, recorded by *Suetonius*; that he never left behind him any spark or suspicion of wars, least it might be said he did not thoroughly conquer where he came. For he that doth a business to halves, hath as much more to do before it be done: and the remainder in matter of war, groweth commonly to a greater head then that which first gave occasion of Arms; like fire, which is smothered for a time, to break out afterwards with greater fury. And therefore that he might not be thought to provoke an Enemy rather then subdue him, he neglected all occasions how important soever, which might draw him into Italy; to the end he

might settle Spain in a peace, answerable to an absolute victory. Which he easily effected, having over-mastered the chieftest of the party, and turned their troops out of the Country, as men altogether mistaken in the matter. The same whereof so prevailed with the rest, that rather then they would stand out, they forsook their Commanders. And having thus removed all occasions of force, he then proceeded to take away all doubtfulness, which might accompany a new reconciliation, by shewing such respects as well becomed ancient desert.

For first, he made a publick acknowledgement of their generall love & affection towards him: and then taking notice of particular services, engaged them further with honours and rewards; righted such as were oppressed by the adverse party; remitted all levies and taxations (to shew the difference between his & the Enemies favour) and filled all men with hope of good times: as knowing that fair words, accompanied with large promises, are powerfull instruments to work out whatsoever is desired. And so he took a little more time to settle those Provinces without further trouble; as believing in the proverb, that What is well done, is twice done.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

M. Varro here mentioned, made more profession of knowledge and Arts, then any other of his Nation, being thereupon stiled by the name of *Doctus* or Learned; & yet in the judgement of learned Philosophers, was fitter to perswade then to teach. Tully being deprived of publick offices, handled Philosophy a little in his own language: *Pliny* and *Seneca*, lesse then *Varro* or *Tully*. But what are these to *Aristotle* or *Plato*? Or rather, what hath learning to do with a Roman General? whose knowledge consisted in their Military discipline, and in the powerful means of victorious endeavour. Wherein *Varro* was as ignorant, as was *Don Raimundus*, the eleventh king of *Arragon*, in managing of Arms; who taking his sword in one hand, and his buckler in the other, held the horse bridle in his teeth. Howbeit, if *Qui minus facit, minus peccat*, he that does least, offends least, were a good excuse, it were fitting to make him blamelesse, that deserved so well of learning, above all others of that Empire. But forasmuch as his actions appear so far inferior to that which is conceived of his understanding, let that be acknowledged which is true, that *Considerate ægere plus est, quam cogitare prudenter*; considerate action is more worthy, then wise thinking. This *Slipa Italica* was the chief town of the *Turdetani* in *Andaluzia*; & is conjectured by the ruins yet remaining, to stand over against *Sevill*.

Tarraco is that which is now called *Tarragona*.

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a Colony of *Scipio* his planting, whereof the Province taketh appellation; which is extended (as *Plinie* witnesseth) from *Catalonia* to *Narvayre* and *Castile*, along the *Alpes*. *Blas de Vigenere* reporteth, that in the year 516, there was a Councell held at *Tarraco* by ten Bishops; wherein it was decreed, that Sunday should always begin presently after Evening prayer (or their Vespers) on the Saturday. From whence it is, that the Spaniards do not work at all after that time; and do eat upon Saturdays at supper, the head, the feet, and the entrails of such flesh as is killed in the Shambles (together with other pretty bits which they call *Morsillis*) without prohibition or scruple of conscience. In this town of *Tarraco* was born *Paulus Orosius*, that noble Oratour.

Corduba, is otherwise called *Colonia Patricia*, was held the next of worth and dignity to *Sevill*; but for excellent wits to be preferred above all the towns of Spain: for here first were born the two *Senecas*, the father, the Rhetorician, and the sonne, the Philosopher; together with their kinsman, *Anneus Lucanus*, the divine Poet, of whom *Martial* writeth;

*Dnosque Senecas, unicumque Lucanum
Fecunda loquitur Corduba.
One Lucan, and two Senecas
Brave Corduba doth shew.*

Besides of later times, *Avenzoar*, *Avicenna*, and *Averrois*, as excellent a Philosopher, as the other was a Physician: of whose works

— *Fama loquitur Annus.
— Fame when she's old will speak.*

And from hence come those *Cordovan* skins, so much in request.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Concerning the office of a Dictator, whereunto *Cæsar* was named by the Prator *Lepidus*, we are to observe, that the Dictatorship was the greatest place of dignity in their government, as *Polybius* noteth. The Consuls, saith he, having each of them but twelve Lictors apiece, that carried bundles of Rods before them as ensignes of Magistracy, the Dictator had always twenty four; to shew that the sovereign power divided between the two Consuls, was then reduced to one sole command. The occasions of establishing a Dictator were divers; howbeit, it was commonly to take order in some great matter of consequence, which fell out to be extraordinary, and required the command of one man. And as it is in the Fastes or Records of the Capitoll, either Reipublicand, causa, to govern the commonwealth,

as was this first Dictatorship of *Cæsar*: or otherwise, *M. Fabius Ambustus* Dict. *Seditio nis sedanda causa*, *M. Fab. Amb.* was created Dictator to quiet a sedition; and at another time, *Cn. Quinius Varus* Dictator, *clavi figendi causa*, to strike in the nail; which was one of the superstitions they used in time of pestilence, and so divers the like. Of all which there is this form expressed by *Tully*; *Si quando duellum gravius, discordie Civium crescent, unus ne amplius sex menses, nisi senatus decreverit, idem juris quod duo Consules teneto, isque aue sinistra dictus Magister Populi esto*: If at any time either a great quarrell happen, or discord arise amongst the Citizens, then let one man have the same power that the two Consuls have, for six monthes, and no longer, unless the senate shall otherwise decree; and let this man (in an ill hour) be termed the Master of the People.

But forasmuch as *Magister Populi* was a harsh and odious name to the people, they called him by a more modest name, Dictator: whereof *Varro* giveth this reason, Dictator quod a Consule dicebatur, cuius dicto audientes omnes essent; He was called Dictator because he was named to that office by the Consul, whose orders they were all to be obedient to. And as none could name a Dictator but the Consul, (for *Cæsar* was named by the Prator in an extraordinary time;) so none could be named to that place, but such as were or had been Consuls: *Consulares legere ita lex jubet*; but de Dictatore creando lata; the law for the creating a Dictator commands to chuse consular men only. To which may be added the circumstance of time, which was always in the night; *Nocte deinde silenti, ut mos est, Papirium Dictatorem dixit*, he named *Papirius* to the Dictatorship (as the custom is) in the dead of the night. The Dictator had sovereign power, but limited for time, which was commonly six Moneths; whereby they are specially distinguished from Monarchs: and thereupon *Cicero* adjudgeth *Sylla's* Dictatorship to be a mere tyranny, and so doth *Plutarch* *Cæsar's*; because both were prorogued beyond the time prescribed by the law. *Cæsar* held this Dictators place but eleven dayes, and then left it off: but afterwards had it for his life, and so came to be stiled Dictator perpetuus, perpetuall Dictator.

CHAP. IX.

The *Marsellians* give up the Town.

He *Marsellians* being much oppressed, and almost worn out with all sorts of inconveniences, brought to an extreme exigent of overthrew in two fights

Veteres
Panico.

at sea, broken and cut in pieces oftentimes in their sallies out, afflicted with a grievous pestilence through long shutting up and alteration of diet (for they lived of nothing but of old Punic and musty Barly, which was long before laid up in publick for this purpose;) their tower being overthrown, and a great part of their wall down, out of hope of any succours from the Provinces, or of other Armies, which they knew were come into the hands and power of Cæsar; they seriously determined (without fraud) to give up the town. But a few dayes before, L. Domitius understanding their resolution, having got three ships (whereof two he assigned to his familiar friends, the third he took himself, and taking the opportunity of a troublesome storm) put to sea: which being perceived by the ships that by Brutus commandment did continually guard the mouth of the Haven, they weighed their Anchours, and made after them. Notwithstanding, that whereto Domitius was held on her course, and by the help of the foul weather got out of sight. The other two being afraid of our ships, returned back into the Haven.

The Marcellians, according as was commanded, brought their Arms and Engines out of the town, drew forth their shipping, both out of their Haven and their Arsenalls, and delivered up their publick treasure, which things being accomplished and performed, Cæsar willing to save them, rather for the name and antiquity of the town, then for any merit of theirs, left two legions there for a Garrison, and sent the rest into Italy. He himself took his way towards Rome.

OBSERVATIONS.

Hence we may observe, that when men refuse to be led by reason, as the best means to guide them to convenient ends, they are commonly constrained by the commanding warrant of Necessity, to undergo the same thing upon harder conditions. As it happened to the Marcellians, who not regarding the Army then present, and ready to take a strict account of their answers (which with good excuse doth command a neutrall State) chose rather to be shut up with a siege, that of all miseries is accounted the worst; and therein so carried themselves, as they left no stone unremoved to make good their refusal: but for want of better helps, brought their Fraud to play a part to their greater disadvantage. And if the Conquerour had not took all occasions to shew his clemency, they might hap-

pily have paid dear for their contempt. But where either desert or other motives wanted, there *nomen & vetustas*, their name and antiquity was sufficient to make Cæsar constant to his own ends: which, as near as the course wherein he was engaged would afford him, were always levelled at the generall applause of his actions; taking that to be no little help to work himself into the sovereignty of the State: observing it the rather in cales of great and happy success, which are ever more restrained then lesser fortunes. Howsoever, it cannot be denied but that Clemency is a property of excellent honour: which Cæsar shewed in saving the town.

CHAP. X.

Curio transporteth two legions into Africk.

ABout the same time, C. Curio set sail from Sicily to passe into Africk: and making no account at all of Aëtius Vatus forces, he carried with him but two legions of the four which were delivered him by Cæsar, together with five hundred horse. And after he had been at Sea two dayes and three nights, he arrived at a place called Aquilaria, distant twenty two miles from Clupea; where there is a very commodious Road for ships in Sommer, sheltered on each side with two large and eminent Promontories. L. Cæsar, the son, attended his coming at Clupea with ten Gallies; which being taken from the Pirates in the late warres and laid aground at Utica, were repaired and new trimmed by Vatus: but being afraid of the great number of his ships, he forsook the sea, and ran his Gallies on shore; and leaving her there, fled by land on foot to Adrumetum, a town kept by Confidius Longus, having one legion onely in garrison.

The rest of Cæsar's Navy, seeing their Admirall flee away, put into Adrumetum. M. Rufus the Treasurer pursued him with twelve ships, which Curio had brought with him out of Sicily, to waste the ships of burthen; and finding the Gallies left upon the sands, he towed her off, and returned to Curio with his Navy. Curio sent Marcus before with the ships to Utica; and he himself set forward thither by land with the Army, and in two dayes journey came to the River Bagrada; where he left C. Caninius Rebilus, the Legate, with the legions, and went himself before with the Cavalry, to view a place called Cornelius Camp, which was held very fit and convenient to incamp in, being a direct ridge of a hill, shooting out into the Sea, steep

steep and broken on each side, and yet shelving by a little more gentle descent on that side which was next Utica, being distant from thence (if the nearest way were taken) a little more then a mile. But in that shortest cut there rose a spring, in that part which was furthest off from the sea, and so made a marsh or bogge, which whatsoever would avoid, must fetch a compass of six miles to go to the town.

A view being taken of this place, Curio beheld afarre off Vatus Camp, joyning to the town wall, at the gate called Bellica, marvellously fortified through the strong situation of the place, having the town on the one side, and a Theatre which stood before the town on the other; and by reason of the great circuit of building which it contained, made a narrow and difficult passage to the Camp. He observed further, great store of carriages, which by reason of this suddain alarme, were brought out of the Country towards the town: for the intercepting whereof he sent the Cavalry. And at the same instant, Vatus likewise had sent out of the town, 600 Numidian horse, and 400 foot, which King Juba (a few daies before) had sent to Utica, for the strengthening of that party. This Prince had acquaintance with Pompey, by reason that his father lodged with him, and bare a spleen to Curio, for the law which he preferred when he was Tribune of the people, for the confiscation of Juba his Kingdom. The Cavalry on either side met together, and the Numidians were not able to abide the charge of our men; but about an hundred and twenty being slain, the rest betook themselves back to the Camp at the town.

In the mean time, upon the arrivall of our Gallies, Curio commanded it to be proclaimed, that such Villagers and ships of burthen as were in the Bay at Utica (being in number about two hundred) and would not presently come to the Cornelian Camp, should be held and taken for enemies. At which Proclamation, upon an instant of time, they all weighed anchor, and came to the place whether they were commanded: whereby the Army abounded with all necessary provisions. This being done, he returned to the Camp at Bagrada; and by the acclamation of the whole Army, was saluted by the name of Imperator.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

This Chapter beginneth with the third part of this book, containing Curio his passage into Africk: concerning whom it is to be observed, that in the beginning of these broils, no

man was more enemy to Cæsar, nor made more bitter invectives to the people against him, then he did in his Tribune ship; but afterwards he fell off, and was gained by the voluptuous inticements of M. Antonie, together with a huge mass of money which Cæsar sent him. Whereupon he played the turn-coat, and with might and main assisted that Party; prevailing much with the Communaltie, by his eloquent and persuasive speeches; the lively force whereof is able to stir up affection in stones. For which cause it is, that *Pelleius Paternulus* novereth, That no man brought a more burning or dangerous fire-brand to the kindling of those Civile warsthen did Curio; being a man of an excellent discourse, audacious, prodigall of his own and of other men's, subtle, ingenious, extreme vicious, and alwaies well-spoken, to the ruine of the publick weal. Which sweetnesse of words came unto him by inheritance, as *Plinius* witnesseth; *Quintus Curionum in quas tres continua serie oratores extiterunt*; In the one family of the *Curiones* there were three noted Orators one after another. Of whose monstrous prodigality the same Authour hath made a very large account. And out of these overweening humours it was, that he became so unwary as to divide his Armie; neglecting the Enemy, and the var. ableness of war, which altereth as the Moon, and keepeth no constant shape whereby it may be known. Concerning the dismemb'ring of an Army lightly, and upon heedlesse rashness, *Cyrus* giveth grave advice, in the beginning of the sixth book of *Xenophon*. To which (for the present) I refer the Reader.

Clupea was a town in Africk, named by *Plinius*, *Oppidum liberum*, or a free Town, and sited upon the Promontorie of *Mercury*, in the territories of old *Carthage*. It was so called, because it carried the form of a Target retorted; and for the same cause it was called *Aspis*.

In *Clypei speciem curvatis turribus Aspis*. *sil. Ital.*

Aspis with turrets bowing like a shield. This Promontorie, which Curio chose to incamp in, was famous for three things. First, it was reputed the place where *Anteus* the Giant dwelt, which *Hercules* slew, by strangling him in his Armes, that he might not touch the Earth, from which it is said he received his strength. Secondly, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, that subdued *Africk*, made that place his chief Camp of strength: and so it came to be called *Cornelius Camp*. And lastly, for this expedition which Curio made, to lose two legions, and himself withall, as unwilling to see the morrow, after such a losse; for, *Vite est avidus, quisquis non vult, mundo secum perennare, mori*; He loves life indeed, that is not willing to dy when the world falls.

CHAP. XI.

Curio marcheth to Utica. His Cavalry put to flight great troops coming from king Juba. His Army strangely possessed with an idle fear.

Cæsar.

He next day he brought his Army to Utica, and incamped himself near unto the town. But before the fortification of his Camp was finished, the horsemen that stood Centinell gave notice of great forces of horse and foot, coming towards Utica, from king Juba: and at the same time, a great dust was seen rise in the aire, and presently the first troops began to come in sight. Curio astonished at the novelty of the thing, sent his horse before, to sustain the first shock, and to stay them: he himself, calling the legions with all speed from their work, imbatelld his Army. The Cavalry encountering with the Enemy (before the legions could be well unsaddled and put in order) did put to flight all the Kings forces, that came marching without fear or order; but the horse, making halt, got almost all safe into the town, by the way of the sea-shore. The next night after, two Centurions of the Nation of the Marfi, fled from Curio, with twenty two of their soldiers, to Aëtius Varus.

These Centurions, whether it were to please Varus, or otherwise speaking as they thought (for what men wish, they easily believe; and what they think, they hope others do think the same;) did confidently affirm, that the minds of the whole Army were altogether alienated from Curio; and that it was very expedient that the Armies should come in sight, and find means to speak together. Varus being persuaded to that opinion, the next day, early in the morning, drew his legions out of the Camp: the like did Curio; either of them putting their forces in order, upon a small Valley which lay between both their Armies.

There was in Varus Army, one Sex. Quintilius Varus, who (as it is formerly declared) was at Corninium; and being let go by Cæsar, went into Africk. It fortuned that Curio had carried over those legions, which Cæsar had formerly taken at Corninium: so that a few Centurions being slain, the Companies and Maniples remained the same. This occasion being so fitly offered, Quintilius (going about Curio his Army) began to beseech the souldiers,

that they would not forget the first oath they had taken to Domitius, and to him their Treasurer; nor bear Arms against them, that had run the same fortune, and endured the same siege; nor fight for those, who (by way of reproach) had called them fugitives. To these he added some promises, to put them in hope of a good recompence, out of his own liberality, if they would follow him and Aëtius.

Having delivered this unto them, Curio his Army stood mute, and declared not themselves by any sign, either one way or other: and so either side drew back to their Camp. Notwithstanding, Curio his Camp was afterwards possessed with a great fear, and suspicion: which was quickly augmented, by divers reports raised upon the same. For every man forged opinions and conceits; and out of his own fear, added something to that which he had heard of another. Which when it was spread from one another, it seemed there were many authors of the same thing. For Civile war is alwaies compounded of such men, as hold it lawfull to do and follow what and whom they please.

Those legions which a little before were in the service of the Enemy, did willingly embrace what was offered them; for old acquaintance had made them forget what benefits Cæsar had lately bestowed on them: being also of divers Countries and Nations, and not all of the Marfi or Peligni, as those the night before, which were their Cabin-mates, and fellow-souldiers: whereupon they took occasion, to publish abroad in worse tearms, that which others had vainly given out; and some things were coined by those that would seem most diligent in doing their duty.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Observe first, from the revolt of these Centurions, that a fellow or two of rank and fashion falling from a Party, do gain easy credit to their advertisements, by averring any thing which the Enemy desireth. Whence it is, that forasmuch as fugitives can little otherwise avail (one man being but as no many) they seek favour and reputation with the party they fly unto, by their advice and discovery, and consequently the remuneration of espiall; which according to the president made by Fabius to the Spies of Clusine, is worth a mans labour.

And herein Revolters (specially thō of judgement) are very dangerous instruments; not

Nulla fides
perique
vitiis qui
caltra fe-
quuntur,
Venaleque
matius: illi
fas, ut i
maxima
me: ces,
Lucan.

Livie
lib. 12.

CHAP. XII.

Curio disputeth the matter in a Councell of war.

Or which causes a Councell of war being called, they began to deliberate what cause was to be taken. There were some opinions which thought, that it was very expedient to assault and take Varus Camp, for that there was nothing more dangerous then idleness, for the breeding and increase of such imaginations as the souldiers had conceived. Others said, it were better to try the fortune of a battle, and to free themselves by valourous endeavour, rather then to be forsaken and abandoned of their own party, and left to undergo most grievous and extreme torments. There were others which thought it fit, to return about the third watch of the night to Cornelius Camp; that by interposing some respite of time, the souldiers might be better settled, and confirmed in their opinions; and if any mischance further happened, they might (by reason of their store of shipping) with more ease and safety return back to Sicily.

Curio mistaking both the one and the other, said, That there wanted as much good resolution in the one opinion, as abundance in the other: for these entered into a consideration of a dishonourable & unbecoming flight; and those were of an opinion to fight in an unequal and disadvantageous place. For with what hope (saith he) can we assault a Camp so fortified, both by Nature and Art? Or what have we gained, if with great lesse and damage, we shall go away and give it over? As though things well and happily achieved, did not get to the Commander great good will from the souldier; and things ill carried, as much hate. Concerning the removing of our Camp, what doth it inferre but a shamefull retreat, a despair in all men, and an alienation of the Army? For it is not fit, to give occasion to the prudent and well-advised, to imagine that they are distrustful; nor on the other side, to the ill-disposed, that they are redoubted or feared: and the rather, because fear in this kind will give them more liberty to do ill, and abate the endeavour of good men in well-servicing. And if (saith he) these things

are

not only in weakening or making frustrate such designs as may be contrived against an Adversary; but also in discovering the secrets of their own Party, and disclosing of that which is absolute and well, untill it be made known. For there is no subsisting thing so perfect, but hath alwaies some part or other open, to give an easy passage to destruction: according to that of the Poet,

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendencia filo.

All humane things hang by a slender thread.

And therefore, it is no small means of preserving each thing in being, to make shew of strength, and conceal weakness; as the registers of assured ruine. For which cause it is, that fidelity is commended, as the foundation of humane society: and perfidious treachery, divulging the secret imperfections thereof, is the plague and bane of the same.

Fides fundamētum
societatis
humanae
perfidia vero ejusdem
pellicis. Plaut.
to, l. 5. de
legibus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

As there is nothing more dangerous in an Army then fear; so there is nothing sooner bred to disturb a multitude, then this passion, which metamorphoseth a troupe of men into a heard of Deer. For hence it appeareth, that one Therites is able to leaven a whole Army; and an idle conceit bred in the weak thoughts of some Trespassers, begetteth oftentimes a main cause of distrust throughout all the Party: which, as it spreadeth abroad, is so delivered from one to another, as the Reporter (not believing what he telleth) addeth alwaies somewhat to make the hearer believe what he could not himself. And so weak minds do multiply the vain apprehension of idle humours, in such a fashion, as there is more hurt in fearing, then in the thing which is feared.

Epaminondas was more fortunate then all others in this kind: for while he led the Thebans as their Commander, they were never taken with any sudden apprehensions, nor possessed with any Panick terror, to bereave them of their senses, or falsify the truth of their understanding; being all (as it seemed) of the same mind with the General, who accounted, no death so honourable as that which came by war. However such is the frailty of humane nature, and so strange are the convulsions of the mind, that a Commander must expect to meet with things, wherein his men will stand in danger of nothing so much as their own infirmity: being troubled rather with strong apprehensions, then for any danger of the thing feared.

Turbant homines, non res: sed quas de rebus habent opiniones. Epict. Enchirid.

The Spartans called all cowards Trespassers. Plaut. h.

Plus in metuendo est mali, quam in illo ipso quod timeatur. Cic. ad Torquatum. Plutarch.

Tam boni quam mali. C. V. nus causa vulgo in Imperatoris. Dicit solent. Dicit Italia.

are well known unto us already, that are spoken of the revolt and alienation of the Army (which, for mine own part, I think either to be altogether false, or at least, less then in opinion they are thought to be) is it not better to dissemble and hide them, then that they should be strengthened and confirmed by us? Ought we not, as we do hide the wounds of our bodies, to cover the inconveniences of an Army, lest we should minister hope or courage to the Adversaries? But some there are that advise to set forward at midnight; to the end (as I imagine) that such as are desirous to offend, may perform it with more scope and licentiousness. For such disorders are repressed and reformed either with shame or fear; to both which the night is an enemy. And therefore, as I am not of that courage, to think without hope or means that the Enemies Camp is to be assaulted; so on the other side, I am not so fearful, as to be wandering in that which is sitting: but am rather of opinion, that we try all things before we yield to that; and do assure my self, that for the most part, we are all of one mind concerning this point.

OBSERVATIONS.

AS in matter of Geometry, Rectum est Index sui & obliqui, a straight line manifesteth both it self and a crooked line; being equall to all the parts of rectitude, and unequal to obliquity: so is it in reason and discourse. For a direct and well-grounded speech carrieth such a native equality with all its parts, as it doth not only approve it self to be levelled at that which is most fitting, but sheweth also what is indirect and crooked, concerning the same matter; and is of that consequence in the variety of projects and opinions, and so hardly hit upon, in the same discourse of common reason, that Plato thought it a piece of divine power, to direct a path free from the crookedness of errors, which might lead the straight and ready way to happy ends. And the rather, forasmuch as in matter of debate, there are no words so weighty, but do seem balanced with others of equal consideration: as here it happened, from those that pointing at the cause of this distemperance, convicted Idleness for the Author of their variable and unsettled minds; and as * Xenophon hath observed, very hard to be endured in one man, much worse in a whole family, but no

way sufferable in an Army; which the Romans called *Exercitium*, ab *exercitio* from exercise. For remedy whereof, they propounded labour without hope of gain, and such service as could bring forth nothing, but loss. Others, preferring security before all other courses (as believing with *Livius*, that Captains should never trust Fortune further then necessity constrained them) perswaded a retreat to a place of safety, but upon dishonourable terms. Which unevenness of opinions *Curio* made straight by an excellent Maxime in this kind; thinking it convenient to hold such a course, as might neither give honest men cause of distrust, nor wicked men to think they were feared. For so he should be sure (in good terms of honour) neither to discourage the better sort, nor give occasion to the ill-affected to do worse. And thus winding himself out of the labyrinth of words (as knowing that to be true of *Annius* the Praetor, that * it importeth occasions to do then to lay; being an easy matter to fit words to things unfolded & resolved upon;) he brake up the Council.

CHAP. XIII.

Curio calleth a generall assembly of the souldiers; and speaketh unto them, concerning their fear and distraction.

He Council being risen, he gave order for a Convocation of the Army; and there called to remembrance what they had done for Cæsar at *Corfinium*: how by their favour and furtherance, he had gained the greatest part of Italy to be on his side. For, by you (saith he) and by your endeavour, all the rest of the Municipal towns were drawn to follow Cæsar: and therefore not without just cause did he at that time repose great assurance in your affections towards him; and the adverse party conceived as great indignation & spite against you. For Pompey was not forced away by any battel; but being prejudiced by your act he quitted Italy. Cæsar hath recommended me, whom he held near unto himself, together with the Provinces of Sicily and Africk (without which he cannot defend the City and Italy) to your trust and fidelity. There are some which sollicite and perswade you to revolt from my command: for what can they wish or desire more, then to make it but one work, to bring us both to ruine and overthrow, and to engage you in a most detestable wickedness? Or what worse opinion can they conceive of you, then that you should betray those men that professe themselves wholly yours; and that you might afterwards come into their power,

power, who take themselves to be undone by your means?

Have you not understood what Cæsar hath done in Spain? two Armies beaten; two Generalls defeated; two Provinces taken; and all within forty daies, after he came in view of the Enemy? Those whose forces were not able to make resistance when they were whole and entire, how is it possible they should hold out being beaten and discomfited? You that followed Cæsar when the victory stood doubtful; now Fortune hath adjudged the Cause, and determined of the issue of the War, will you follow the vanquished Parties, when you are to receive the reward of your service? They gave out, that they were forsaken and betrayed by you, and do remember you of the former oath you took. But did you forsake *L. Domitius*, or did he forsake you? Did not he thrust you out, and expose you to all extremity of fortune? Did he not seek to save himself by flight, without your knowledge or privacy? Were you not preserved and kept alive by Cæsar's clemency, when you were abandoned and betrayed by him?

How could he tie you with the oath of allegiance, when (having cast away his sheaf of Rods, and laid down his authority) he himself was made a private person, and became captivated to the command of another mans power? It were a strange and new religion, that you should neglect that oath, wherein you stand now engaged; and respect the other, which was taken away by the rendry of your Generall, and the * losse of your liberty. But I believe you think well of Cæsar, and are offended at me that am not to preach of my merits towards you; which as yet are less then my will, and unworthy your expectation: and yet souldiers have alwaies used to seek reward upon the shutting up of a war; which what event it will have, make you no doubt. And why should I omit the diligence which I have already used, and how the business hath hitherto proceeded? Doth it offend you, that I transported the Army over in safety, without losse of any one ship? That at my coming, I beat and dispersed at the first onset the whole fleet of the Adversaries? That twice, in two daies, I overcame them only with the Cavalry? That I drew two hundred Ships of burthen out of the Road and Port of the Enemy? and have brought them to that extremity, that they can be supplied by provision neither by Sea nor by land? All this good fortune, and these Commanders rejoiced and forsaken, will you rather embrace again the ignominy you received at *Corfinium*, or your flight out of Italy, or the rendering up of Spain, or the prejudiciall suc-

cesse of the war of Africk? Truly, for mine own part, I was desirous and content to be called Cæsar's souldier: but you have styled me with the title of Imperator. Which if it repent you, I do willingly quit my self of your grace; and return it back unto you: and do you; in like manner, restore me to my name again; least you should seem to give me honour which might turn to my reproch.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the handling of this accident, the difference cometh to be observed between a Council of war, and a Concio, or convocation of the souldiers. The first was more particular, consisting of some choice men, and those the most eminent in the partie. *Is qui non universum populum, sed partem at. qu. adesse jubet;* *non comitia, sed concilium edicere debet;* he that calls together only a part of the people, and not the whole, calls a Council, not a generall assembly. Their convocation or preaching was more generall, the whole Army being convened together, to be fitted by perswasion and discourse to follow the resolution taken by a Council; and was properly called *Adlocutio*, and sometimes *Conventus*: *Cicero perlectam Epistolam Cæsaris in conventu militum recitat;* *Cicero* read the letter from Cæsar in a conventus, or generall meeting of his souldiers. The parties called to a Council, were according as the Generall valued the occasion: for sometimes the Legates and Tribunes were only consulted; and now and then the Centurions of the first Orders, together with the Captains of horse, were called to their assistance; and oftentimes, all the Centurions. But howsoever, *Curio* resolved out of his own judgement; as great Commanders commonly do; and is specially observed by *Pierre Marthieu*, of the French King; who ever loveth to hear the opinion of his Captains, but alwaies finds his own the best.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

AMongst other strains of this discourse, it is acknowledged, that Rome could not stand without *Sicily*; & the reason was, for the plenty of Corn which it brought forth: for *Sicily* was alwaies reputed as the Granary or Barn of Rome; & accordingly cared for by the Senate, as a place without which their City could not continue. The grain of that Island is hard, like horn, and cannot well be broken or ground into Meale, until it be wet with water; and then dried in the shade, rather then in the sunne; by means

M m whereof

Concilium
date, coram
que inter
homines di
vinitium.
Oratio
rationis
equalis op
ponitur.
Sext.
Philos.
Variat
semper dant
otia men
tem. Luc.
lib. 4. lib.
Cyrop.

max amicus
est pueri
& timor

Aulus Gell.
lib. 1. c. 27.
Com. 5. bell.
Gall.

Tom.
lib. 4.

Nemo ille ad
micos esse
potest, &
quibus
non aliquod
exspectat
Detest.

whereof it yieldeth so exceedingly, that it is accounted twenty in the hundred better than any Poyent Wheat; especially, for that it will keep long in their Vaults and Caves under the earth, & seldom or never take heat, being of it self so hard and dry.

The gluttonous use of flesh hath made men ignorant of the vertue and strength of Corn, which the Romans better understood; for their legions never fed on flesh, as long as they could get Corn. *Pecora, quod secundum poterat esse inopia subsidium*, they fetched in cattell, as the second way to help their want, saith Cæsar. And in another place; *Ut complures dies milites frumento caruerint, Pecore & longinquioribus vicis ad alto extremam famem sustentarent*; the souldiers having for many daies been without corn, they were faine to sustain their extreme hunger with cattell which they had fetched afar off. And in the same place, *Quod minor erat frumenti copias, Pecus imperabatur*; because there was but little corn, he gave order for cattell. And again, *Non illi hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recusabant. Pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat in Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant*. They refused neither barley nor pulse when it was offered them; but cattell, whereof there was good store in Epirus, they prized at an high rate.

By which places it appeareth, that they never fell to flesh, but when they wanted Corn. Which is doubtlesse a firmer nutriment, lesse excrementall, and of better strength, then any other food whatsoever; as containing the prime substance of Meat, and the spirit of Wine: for *Aqua vite* is as well made of Wheat, as of the lees of Wine. Flesh is good to make Wratlers of a grosse and heavy constitution; as Plutarch noteth: but the Roman souldier stood in need of an effectuall and sinewy vigour, able to undergoe carriages fitter for a Mule then a Man, together with such works, as later ages do rather hear then believe; and was attained by feeding onely upon bread.

The Rabbiners and Thalmudists do write, that the Giants of the old world first fell to the eating of flesh, making no difference between a man and a beast; but grew so execrable, that they made women cast their fruit before their times, to the end they might eat it with more tenderness and delicacy. Which is also said to be practised by the Canniballs, upon the first discovery of the Indies. *Viginere* reporteth, that he knew some great Men in France so friands, that they cauled oftentimes Does ready to foan to be killed, and the young ones took out alive, to be made meat for monstrous appetites. But there is no indifferent Parallel to be drawn, between the sobriety of the ancient Roman souldier, and the gluttony of these times; far exceeding that of *Agamem-*

non, which *Achilles* noted with words of high reproach, calling him Hogs-head of Wines, eyes like of a Dog, and hart of a Dear.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Hardly, from this elaborate & well-couched speech, we may note, that Eloquence is a very beautifull ornament to Princes, and great Commanders; besides the use it hath to lead a multitude to such ends as is wished; for smooth words prevail where force booteth not. According to that of *Cicero*, *Cum populum persuaderi posse d'fidimus, cogi fas esse non arbitramur*; If the people will not be perswaded, let us not think it fit to go about to compell them.

CHAP. XIV.

Curio bringeth out his troops, and putteth Varus Army to flight.



He souldiers moved with this Oration, did oftentimes interrupt him in his speech, signifying with what griefs they did indure the suspicion of insidelity. And as he departed from the Assembly, every man exhorted him to be of a good courage, and not to doubt of giving battell, or to make trial of their fidelity and valour. By which means the minds & disposition of all men being changed, Curio resolved (out of a generall consent) as soon as any occasion was offered, to give battell.

The next day, having brought out his forces, he made a stand, and embattelld them in the same place where he stood in Armes the day before. And Varus likewise drew out his troops; whether it were to sollicit the souldier, or not to omit the opportunity of fighting, if it might be afforded in an indifferent place. There was a valley (as we have formerly declared) between the two Armies, of no very hard or difficult ascent; and either of them expected who should first come over it, to the end they might fight in a place of more advantage: when upon a sudden, all Varus Cavalry that stood in the left Corner of the Army, together with the light-armed souldiers that stood mingled amongst them, were seen descending into the Valley. To them Curio sent his Cavalry, together with two cohorts of the Marrucini. The Enemies horsemen were not able to indure the first incommen of our men; but having lost their horses, fled back to their party. The light-armed men that came out with them, being left and forsaken, were all slain by our men, in the view and sight of Varus

Varus whole Army. Then Rebilus, Cæsar's Legate (whom Curio for his knowledge and experience in matter of war had brought with him out of Sicily) said; Curio, thou seest the Enemy affrighted: why makest thou doubt to use the opportunity of time? Curio without making any other answer, then willing the souldiers to remember what they had assured unto him the day before, commanded them to follow him, and ran foremost himself. The Valley was so cumbersome and difficult, that ingaining the ascent of the hill, the foremost could hardly get up, unless they were lifted up by their followers. Howbeit the Enemy was so possessed with fear, for the sight and slaughter of their fellows, that they did not so much as think of resisting; for they took themselves all to be already surprised by the Cavalry: so that before any weapon could be cast, or that our men could approach near unto them, all Varus Army turned their backs, and fled into their Camp.

In this flight, Fabius Pelignus (a certain souldier of one of the inferior Companies of Curio his Army) having overtaken the first troop of them that fled, sought for Varus, calling after him with a loud voice, as though he had been one of his own souldiers, and would either advise him, or say some-thing else to him. And as he, being often called, looked back, and stood still (inquiring who he was, and what he would,) he made at Varus shoulder (which was unarmed) with his sword, and was very near killing him: howbeit he avoided the danger, by receiving the blow upon his target. Fabius was instantly inclosed about by such souldiers as were near at hand, and slain.

In the mean time, the gates of the Camp were pestered and thronged with multitudes and troops of such as fled away, and the passage was so stopped, that more died in that place without blow or wound, then perished either in the battell or in the flight. Neither wanted they much of taking the Camp, for many left not running untill they came to the town. But the nature of the place and the fortification of the Camp, did hinder their access; and Curio his men coming out, prepared onely for a battell wanted such necessities as were of use for the taking of the Camp. And therefore Curio carried back his Army, with the losse of no one man but Fabius. Of the Adversaries were slain about six hundred; and many more wounded, who all upon Curio his departure, besides many other that feigned themselves hurt, left the Camp for fear, and went into the town. Which Varus perceiving, and knowing also the astonishment of the Army, leaving a Trumpeter in the Camp, & a few Tents for show, about the

third watch, he carried his Army with silence out of the Camp into the town.

OBSERVATIONS.

It is a part of wisdom, and oftentimes a main help to victorie, to attend the advantage of an Enemies rashness, and to see if his folly will not make way to his overthrow. Whereof Curio made good use: for he kept his Army in the upper ground, untill the Cavalry of the Adversarie were loofely fallen into the Valley; and then set upon them, and cut them all in pieces. The sight whereof masked the whole Army, and kept Curio in safety, upon the like disadvantage, in the cumbersome passage of the same Vale: by means whereof he put to flight the whole forces of the Enemy; and made a great slaughter in the party. Wherein I may not forget that trick of a Roman spirit, whereby the Authour becometh memorable to posterity, in calling after Varus by name, to make him the sacrifice for both the Hosts. Whence we may observe, that when a battell is joyned pell-mell, no man can be assured in his own valour, nor share out his fortune by the length of his sword; but is oftentimes subject to weaknesse of contempt, and vanquished by such as cannot be compared unto him but in scorn.

I have heard it reported, that at the battell of *Eureux*, *Maurine* (that known woman in France) took prisoner & disarmed a Cavalero of Spain: who being brought before the King, and by him demanded whole prisoner he was, or whether he knew the partie that had forced him; answered, no; but that he knew him to be a gallant man of Armes. Whereat the king smiled: and the Gentleman, understanding what fortune he had run, was as much dismayed as a man possibly could be, that considered, *Quod ferrum equat, in bello, robustioribus imbecilliores*. The sword equalleth the weakest to the strongest.

CHAP. XV.

Curio leaveth Utica to meet with King Juba. His Cavalry overthroweth the forces led by Sabura; which leadeth him on to his overthrow.



The next day Curio prepared to be- siege Utica, inclosing it about with a ditch & a rampier. There were in the town a multitude of people unacquainted with war, through the long peace they had enjoyed; and the inhabitants stood very affectionate to Cæsar, for many benefits they had received from him. The rest of the multitude consisted of divers sorts of men, much

M m 2

terri-

Lib. i. civil. bel.

Lib. i.

Mm Ma- giani.

Sobrietas, quasi sine ebrietate.

nono si- plentie est, alicam stultitiam operit.

terrified and affrighted by the former encounters: whereupon every man spake plainly of giving up the town, and dealt with Pub. Actius, that their fortunes and lives might not come in danger, through his pertinacie and wilfulness.

While these things were a doing, there came messengers from King Juba, signifying, the King was at hand with great forces, and willed them to keep and defend the town. Which news did much incourage and confirm the wavering and affrighted minds of the Enemy. The same was also reported to Curio: whereunto for awhile he gave no credit; such was his confidence in the success of things. And now with him came Letters and Messengers into Africa, of that which Cæsar had so fortunately achieved in Spain: so that being absolutely assured with all these things, he was persuaded the king durst attempt nothing against him. But when he found by assured discovery, that his forces were within twenty five miles of Utica, leaving his works already begun, he withdrew himself into Cornelius Camp; and began there to fortify his Camp, to get Corn and other provisions, and to furnish it with all necessaryes materiall for a defence: and sent presently a dispatch into Sicily, that the two legions, and the rest of the Cavalry might be sent unto him.

The Camp wherein he lay was fitly accommodated to hold out the war, as well by reason of the nature of the place, as the artificiall fortifying thereof, the nearness of the sea, and the plenty of water and salt: whereof there was great quantity brought thither, from the Salt-pits near adjoining. No stiffe could be wanting, through the great store of wood which was about the place, nor yet any Corn, for the plenty that was to be found in the confining fields: and thereupon, by the advice and approbation of all men, Curio resolved to attend his other forces, and to draw out the war in length.

These things being thus disposed by the consent and liking of all men, he heard by some that lately came out of the town, that Juba was called back, by occasion of a war happened upon the confines, and that by reason of the controversies and dissensions of the Leptanians, he was detained at home in his kingdom; but that Sabura his Lieutenant was sent with some competent forces, and was not far from Utica. To which reports growing too light and easie credit, he altered his purposes, and resolved to put the matter to trial of battell: whereunto his youthfull heart, the greatness of his courage, the success of former time, and his confidence in the managing of that war, did violently lead him. Being carried on with these induce-

ments, he sent the first night all the Cavalry to the River Bagrada, where the Enemy lay incamped under the command of Sabura: but the king followed after with all his forces, and lay continually within six miles, or thereabouts.

The horsemen sent before, and making their journey in the night, set upon the Enemy at unawares, and not thinking of their approach: for the Numidians lodge, scattered here and there in a barbarous manner, without any government or order. And surprizing them thus oppressed with sleep, and scattered upon the grounds, they slew a great number of them: the rest, in great terror and amazement, escaped by flight. Which service being thus executed, the Cavalry returned to Curio, and brought the captives unto him. Curio was gone out about the fourth watch of the night with all his forces, having left five cohorts for a garrison to his Camp: and having marched six miles, he met with the Cavalry, understood what was done, and inquired of the captives, who was Generall of the Camp at Bagrada. They answered Sabura. He omitted for haste of his way to inform himself of the rest: but turning himself to the next Ensignes, said, You see, souldiers, that the confession of the captives doth agree with that which was reported by the fugitives. For the king is not come; but hath sent some small forces, which cannot make their partie good with a few horsemen: and therefore hasten to take the spoil with honour and renown, that we may now at length begin to think of rewarding your merits.

OBSERVATIONS.

It is observed by Marcellinus, that when misfortune cometh upon a man, his spirit groweth to dull and benumbed, as his senses seem to be dimmed of their charges. Which appeared hear in Curio: who having taken a provident and sure course, such as was approved in every mans judgement, and besetmed well the wisdom of a Commander, did nevertheless, contrary to all sense and discretion, forgo the same, and cast himself upon the hazard of that which fugitives had vainly reported. Concerning which, as it is noted, that Incredulity is hurtfull onely to the unbeliever; so this passage proveth, that for a Commander to be too light of belief, is a danger to the whole Partie, and bringeth many to ruine, that had no part in that creed. Cæsar, in the relation hereof, noteth three speciall things in Curio, that carried him headlong to this disaster, and may serve as marks to avoid the like Syries.

The first was, *Invenilis ardo*, his youthfull cou-

courage and heat: which is alwaies attended with strong affections, suting the qualitie and temperature of the body, being then in the prime height of strength, & accordingly led on with violent motions; whereas age goeth slowly and coldly forward, and is alwaies surer in undertaking, then hot-spurre youth. And albeit no man in cold blood could better advise then Curio, or fore-see with better providence; yet his youthfull boldnesse over-swaied his discourte, and drew all to a mischief, in despite of his wisdom.

The second was, *Superioris temporis proventus*, the happy issue of former proceedings: which of all other conditions is to be suspected, and needeth Gods assistance more then any other fortune; for that no man sooner erreth or is more incapable of order, then such as are in prosperity. And therefore Plato refused to make lawes for them of Cyrene; as a matter of great difficulty, to give ordinances to men that were in happinesse. And doubtles, such is the exorbitance of our nature, that nothing better informeth it then crosses; which are as instructions and warnings, for the preventing of ruining calamities. Wherein Curio was not beholding to Fortune at all; that dandled him in her lap for a while, to cast him out at length headlong to his ruine. It had been much better, she had exchanged a frown with a favour, rather then to have given him much good together, and reserve an irrecoverable disgrace for the upshot.

The third was, *Fiducia rei bene gerende*: which favourereth more of folly then any of the former; it being alwaies an argument of an imprudent man, to assure himself of good fortune. For Presumption, being ever accompanied with Negligence, is subject to as many casualties, as thole that go unarmed upon extremity of danger. And these were the three things that miscarried Curio. Out of which we may observe with Xenophon, that *Ingens & arduum opus est recte imperare*, it is a weighty and difficult matter to command well.

CHAP. XVI.

Curio pursue the Enemy, with more haste then good successe.

Cæsar.



At which the Cavalry had exploited, was certainly a matter of great service; especially the small number of them, being compared with the great multitude of the Numidians: and yet notwithstanding, they spake of these things with greater ostentation then the truth would bear; as men are willing to divulge their own praises. Besides, they showed much spoil which they had taken; Cap-

tives and Horses were brought out; that whatsoever time was omitted, seemed to be a let and hinderance to the victory: by which means, the desires and endeavours of the Souldiers were no way short of the hope which Curio had conceived. Who commanding the Cavalry to follow him, marched forward with as much haste as he could; to the end he might find the Enemy distracted and astonished, as the flight and overthrow of their fellows. But the horsemen, having travelled all night, could by no means follow after. Whereby it happened, that some staid in one place, some in another: yet this did not hinder or discourage Curio in his hopes.

Juba being advertised by Sabura of the conflict in the night, sent instantly two thousand Spaniards and French horse, which he kept about him for the safety of his Person, and such of the foot-troups as he most trusted, to succour and relieve him: he himself with the rest of the forces, and forty Elephants, followed softly after. Sabura, suspecting by the horsemen coming before, that Curio himself was at hand, imbatelled all his forces; commanding them, that under a pretence of counterfeits fears, they should retreat by little and little; himself when occasion served, would give them the signe of battell, with such other directions as should be expedient.

Curio was strengthened in his former hope, with the opinion of the present occasion. For supposing the Enemy had fled, he drew his forces from the upper ground into the Plain; wherein after he had marched a good space (the Army having travelled sixteen mile) he made a stand. Sabura gave the signe to his men of beginning the battell, led on his Army, went about his troups, to exhort and encourage his souldiers. Howbeit, he used his foot-men onely for a shew a farre off, and sent the Cavalry to give the charge. Curio was not wanting to his men; but wished them to see all their confidence in their valour. The souldiers, (howsoever harried and wearied) and the horsemen (although but a very few, and those spent with travell) yet wanted no courage or desire to fight. But these being but two hundred in number (for the rest staid by the way) what part of the Army soever they charged, they forced the Enemy to give way: but they could neither follow them far as they fled, nor put their horses to any round or long career.

At length, the Cavalry of the Enemy began from both the wings to circumvent our Army, and to maul them down behind; and as our Cohorts issued out from the battell towards them, the Numidians (through their nimblenesse) did easily avoid the shock; and again,

Observations upon Cæsars

as they turned back to their ranks, inclosed them about, and cut them off from the battell: so that it neither seemed safe to keep their order and place, nor to advance themselves out, and undergo the hazard of adventure.

OBSERVATIONS.

THE Principles and Maxims of War are always to be held firm, when they are taken with their due circumstances: for every Rule hath a qualified state, and consisteth more in cautions and exceptions, then in authority of precept. It is true, that nothing doth more advantage a victorie, then the counsell of *Lamachus*, the third Duke of the *Athenians*; which was, to set upon an Enemy when he is affrighted and distracted: for to there is nothing to be expected on his behalf but despair and confusion. But either to be mistaken therein, or otherwise to make such haste to oblige this rule of war (as *Curio* did) that the best part of the Army shall lie by the way, and the rest that go on shall be so spent with labours as they are altogether unfit for service, and yet (to make the matter worse) to bring them into a place of disadvantage, to encounter a strong and fierce Enemy, is to make the circumstances overweigh the rule, and by a Maxim of Warre, to be directed to an overthrow: neglecting altogether that which is observed by *Sextus Aurelius Victor*, *Satis celeriter sit, quicquid commode geritur*, that which is well done, is done soon enough.

CHAP. XVII.

Curio defeated and slain. Some few of the Army get passage to Sicily: the rest yield themselves to *Varus*.

Cæsar.

His Enemy was oftentimes reinforced by succours from the King. our men had spent their strengths, and fainted through weariness: such as were wounded, could neither leave the battell, nor be conveyed into a place of safety. The whole Army being encompassed about with the Cavalry of the Enemy (whereby despairing of their safety, as men commonly do, when their life draws towards an end) they either lamented their own death, or recommended their friends to good fortune, if it were possible that any might escape out of that danger: all parts were filled with fear and lamentation.

Curio, when he perceived the souldiers to be so affrighted, that they gave care neither to his exhortations nor intreaties, he commanded them (as the last hope they had of safety) that

they should all flie unto the next hills, and thither he commanded the Ensignes to be carried. But the Cavalry sent by *Sabura* had also possessed that place before; whereby our men began to fall into utter despair, and partly were slain as they fled by the horsemen, or fell down without wounding. *Cn. Domitius*, General of the horse, standing with a few horsemen about him, persuaded *Curio* to save himself by flight, and to get the Camp; promising not to leave or forsake him. But *Curio* confidently replied, that he would never come in *Cæsar's* fight, having lost the Army committed unto him; and thereupon fighting valiantly was slain.

A few horsemen saved themselves from the furie of the battell; but such of the Rerewards, as staid by the way to refresh their horses, perceiving a fur off the rout and flight of the whole Army, returned safe into the Camp. The footmen were all slain to a man. *M. Rufus* the Treasurer, being left by *Curio* in the Camp, exhorted his men not to be discouraged. They praised and besought him, they might be transported into Sicily. He promised them they should; and to that end gave order to the Masters of ships, that the next evening they should bring all the Skiffes to the shore. But such was the astonishment and terror of all men, that some gave out, that *Juba* his forces were already come; others, that *Varus* was at hand with the legions, and that they saw the dust of the Army marching towards them; whereas there was no such matter at all: others suspected the Enemies Navie would speedily make to them; inasmuch as every man shifted for himself: such as were already on ship-board made haste to be gone. Their departure gave occasion to the ships of burthen to follow after.

A few small Barks were obedient to the command; but the shore being thronged with souldiers, such was the contention, which of all that multitude should get aboard, that some of the Barks were sunk with press of people, and the rest, for fear of the like casualties, durst not come near them. Whereby it happened, that a few souldiers, and Masters of families (that through favour or pity prevailed to be taken in, or could swim unto the ships) were carried back safe into Sicily. The rest of the forces, sending by night some of the Centurions as Embassadors to *Varus*, rendered themselves unto him.

The next day after, *Juba* seeing the Cohorts of these souldiers before the town, cried out presently, that they were part of his booty: and thereupon gave order that a great number of them should be slain, and selecting a few of the rest, sent them into his kingdom. *Varus*

Varus complaining in the mean while, that his faith and promise was violated, and yet durst not resist it. The King rode into the town, attended with many *Sabatians*, amongst whom was *Ser. Sulpitius*, and *Licinius Damasippus*: and remaining there a few daies, gave such order for things as he thought fit, and then returned to his kingdom, with all his forces.

OBSERVATIONS.

— *Intis*
hanc nuntius
eibus Cæsar
cordi po
tuer mo
dum
lucan.
Bodem
ubi lacerant
navigia
Gibrentur.
Seneca E.
pist. 4.
Non est in
bello his
pecare.
Plutarch.

AND this was the period which Divine power made, to the hopeful beginning of *Curio's* design upon *Africk*; and happened so suddenly, as they were lost ere they were aware. Like a tempest at Sea, that swalloweth up vessels in the same place, where a little before they swam most proudly, and in the like unrecoverable manner. For war is not capable of a second error; one fault being enough to ruin an Army, and to disabill *Curio* for ever doing the like of whom *Lucan* hath left this memoriall;

*Haud alium tanta Civem tulit indole Romam,
Aut cui plus leges deberant recta saguntæ.
Perdita nunc primis naufragent secula,
postquam
Ambitus, & luxus, & opum memenda fastidia,
Transverso, memem dabant torrente rotarum;
Momentumque fuit mutatus Curiorum,
Gallorum captis spoliis & Cæsaris Auro.*

So vertuous Citizen *Rome* never bred;
Whilst right the Laws a friend like him ne'e had;
But our bad times first took him from his hold:
Ambition, Riot, and the force of Gold
In a wrong stream soon drew his wavering mind,
Of great concern which way so'e're inclin'd,
Fetters off with Gallick spoils and Cæsar's gifts.

His body lay upburied, as a witness of *Numerian's* hate (which is always extreme, like the heat of the Country) and of *Juba's* particular revenge, for tendering an Edict to the people to confiscate his kingdom.

To conclude this Commentary, The loss either Partie sustained unto this stage of the War, was in these particulars. *Pompey* was driven out of *Italy*, lost *Marseilles*; and both the Provinces of *Spain*; *Cæsar* received this loss in *Africk*, besides that in the *Adriatick* sea, where *Antonius* miscarried, whereof he maketh no mention in these Commentaries. And, as when *Jupiter* weighed the fortune of the *Greeks* and the *Troians* in a pair of Balance, it fell out the *Greeks* had more ill luck then the *Troians*; so the fortune of these Parties being weighed by the relation made thereof, it falleth plainly out, that *Pompey* had the worse.

And thus endeth the second Commentary.

The

The Third Commentarie of the Civile WVarres.

The Argument.

THe former Books contain the drifts and designed which these famous Chiefs attempted and prosecuted, while they were asunder. And now cometh their buckling at hand to be related; together with the judgement which the Warre gave of the Cause in question, on Cæsar's behalf.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar giveth order at Rome, for matter of Credit and Usury, and other things.

Cæsar;

Cæsar the Dictator holding the assembly for election of Magistrates, Julius Cæsar and Pub. Servilius were created Consuls: for in that year he was capable by law to be chosen thereunto. These things being ended, forasmuch as he found that credit was very scant throughout all Italy, and that money lent upon trust was not paid; he gave order that Arbitrators should be appointed to make an estimation of possessions and goods, according as they were valued before the war; and that the Creditours should take them at that rate for their moneys. For this course he thought to be fittest, and most expedient, as well for the taking away of any fear of composition or new assurances, for the quitting and abolishing of all debts (which do commonly fall out upon wars and civil broils,) as also for the keeping and preserving of the Debtors credit.

In like manner, he restored the ancient course of Appeal, made by the Prators and Tribunes to the people; as also certain courses used in suing for Magistracy (which were taken away by a law made in Pompey's time, when he kept the legions about him in the City;) and likewise reformed such judgements in suits and trials of law, as were given in Cases, when the matter in controversy was heard by one Judge, and the sentence pronounced the same day by another Judge. Last of all,

whereas divers stood condemned, for offering their service unto him in the beginning of the Civill war, if he should think it fit to accept thereof; and holding himself as much obliged unto them, as if he had used it: he thought it best expedient for them, to be acquitted by the people, rather than by his commandment and authority; least he should either seem ungratefull, in not acknowledging their deserts; or arrogant, in assuming to himself that which belonged to the people.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Cæsar, as he was Dictator, holding the assembly for the choice of Magistrates, himself with P. Servilius Isauricus were made Consuls, in the year of Rome 705. which was just ten years after his first Consulship; whereby he became capable thereof, by the law published by Sylla, wherein it was provided, That no man should be chosen to an office, within ten years after he had supplied the same. In this year happened all these things which are contained in this third Commentarie; as Paterculus noteth in these words; C. Cæsar and P. Servilius being Consuls, Pompey was miserably massacred, after three Consulships, and three Triumphs; and was slain, the day before his birth-day, being aged 58 years. The Choice day was regularly the first of January: and the Assembly was called Comitium Centuriatum.

Touching the difference of these Assemblies, the parties present thereat, the manner of the choice, and other circumstances appertaining, the Reader may receive information at large

Lib. III.

Commentaries of the Civ. WVarres.

Lib. 6. de comitiis.

large by Roscius. Only it is to be remembered, that Comitium Centuriatum were never holden without consent of the Senate. And forasmuch as the chief part of them were with Pompey, Lucan taketh exception at this Creation.

Lib. 5.

Caesar habet, vacuasque domos legesque silentes, Clausaque iustitia tristi fora. Curia solos Illa videt Patres, plena quos urbe fugavit. Sad roofs and empty houses Caesar found. The laws were silent, & the Courts shut up. No Fathers met in Senate, only they, Who when the town was full were forced away.

Anno Urb. 701.

Liv. lib. 7. Liv. lib. 9.

* Four gallons and a half. Plin. l. 35. cap. 12. * Lib. 39.

The persons that were suiters for the Consulship, were called *Candidati*; who oftentimes used extraordinary means to attain the same. This moved Pompey to make a law, That no man should sue for publick offices by bribes, or other corrupt courses; and it was called *Lex de Ambitu*. which indeed was but renewed: for the same was set on foot, Anno Urb. 395. by Petilius, Tribune of the people; and renewed again by Pub. Cornelius Cethegus, Anno 572; and within a while after made capitall, as farre as banishment concerned the party. Cato was so condemned, having bought a voice with an Amphora of wine. The law which Pompey now made, was very strict, as * Dio noteth: for it was ordained, That upon producing of witnesses, the Proceffe should end in a day: giving the Accuser two hours to lay open the matter, and the Defender three to make answer; and the Judgement instantly followed. The rigour of which law Cæsar here reformed.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe second thing I observe, is the difficulty of taking up money upon credit, in time of trouble or warres: which Cæsar expresseth in these terms; *Cum fides tota Italia esset angustior*, in regard credit was very scant throughout all Italy. The word *Fides* hath ever been taken for a real performance of any promise or agreement, which Tully calleth the foundation of Justice, and the very prop of a Commonweal; taking the Etymon to grow, *quia fiat quod dictum*, because that which is spoken is done. According to that of Nonius Marcellus; *Fides nomen ipsum videtur habere, cum sit quod dicitur*, *Fides* seems to have its appellation, when that's done which was spoken. And for that men commonly are covenant-keepers, not so much by the perfection of their nature, as out of rightness of law, it falleth out, that where there are no lawes, there is no

performance; and consequently, little or no credit either given or kept in time of Warres, because *Silent leges inter arma*, Lawes are silent in time of warre.

Cæsar to provide for this inconvenience, appointed Commissioners to rate every mans lands and possessions, as they were valued before the warres, and to satisfy the Creditours with the same. Which Plutarch explaineth in this manner; That the Creditours should take yearly two parts of the revenue of their Debtours, untill such time as they had paid themselves; & that the Debtours should have the other third to live withall. Whereof it seemed he had some light, by a president in the Consulship of Valerius Publicola, which is extant in Livie; *Novi consules sanebrent quoque rem levare aggressi, solutionem aris alieni in publicam curam verterant, quinque viris creatis, quos mensarios, ab dispensatione pecunie appellarunt*: The new Consuls intending to ease the people in point of Usury, made the payment of debts a part of the publick care, and created five men to that purpose, who were called *Mensarii*, from their disposall of those monies.

This generall acquittance for debts, the Romans called *Nova Tabula*; in this respect, as Cælius Rhodiginus hath it, *Quod cum pecunia credita obierat condonantur, nova mox cooriantur Tabulae, quibus nomina continentur nova*; in regard that when the debt was remitted to the debtour, new Tables were made, wherein new names were put; and is nothing else, but what is ordinary amongst our Bankrupts, compounding for so much in the pound with their Creditours, upon new assurance, and other security, which they called *Nova Tabula*; agreeing to that of Tully; *Tabulae vero nova quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, cum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam*? What else mean these new Tables, but that you shall buy a piece of ground with my money, and keep it to your self, whilst I go without my money?

Concerning matter of Usury, which was the ground of this mischief, Tacitus noteth it, as an old and deadly disease, and the cause of many Vices, urbi seditions in that Empire; and is never better likened, then to the biting of a Serpent, called an Aspid, which, upon the infusion of her venom, putteth the Patient into a heavy slumber; and in a short time, bringeth all a mans substance to death and destruction. And thereupon it is called *Fœnus*, from the fertile and ample increase of money. For, as Basil noteth, The Labourer loseth the seed, and contenteth himself with the fruit or increase; but the Usurer will have the fruit, and yet not loose the seed. Whereby there must needs grow great increase. The law of the twelve

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Tables

Tables was, *Ne quis unciario fœnore amplius exerceat*; That no man for the future take upon life one in the hundred.

The highest rate was *Centesima usura*; when the hundredth part of the principall was paid every month to the Creditor, and was twelve per Cent. The next was *Usura denus*, when the Debtour paid eleven in the hundred for a year. The third *Dextans*, which was 10 per Cent. *Dodrans* 9. *Bes* 8. *Septunx usura*, 7. *Semis* 6. *Quincunx* 5. *Triens* 4. *Quadrans* 3. *Sextans* 2. *Unciarias* one in the hundred. Howbeit, Cato condemned all kind of usury: for, being demanded, *Quid maxime in re familiari expedit? respondit, bene pascere: quid secundum? satis bene pascere: quid tertium? bene vestire: quid quartum? arare. Et cum ille qui quaeserat dixisset, Quid fœnerari? Quid hominem inquit occidere?* what was the most expedient thing in householdry; answered, good diet: what the second; enough good diet: what the third; good cloaths: what the fourth; ploughing. And when he that question'd him thus, said, What think you of taking use? he replied, What is it to kill a man? Allowing (as it seemeth) no means of getting money, but those which *Aristotle* took to be most agreeing to Nature: which is from the fruits of the earth, and the increase of our cattell; with such other courses as are answerable therunto.

CHAP. II.

A particular view of Pompey's forces.

IN the accomplishing of these things, as also celebrating the *Latine Holy-daies*, and holding the *Assemblies* of the people, having spent eleven daies, he gave over his Dictatorship, left the City, and came to Brundisium. For he had commanded seven legions, and all his Cavalry to repair thither. Howbeit, he found no more shipping ready, then would hardly transport fifteen thousand legionary soldiers, and five hundred horse; the want of shipping seeming to hinder him from bringing the war to a speedy end. Moreover, those forces which were shipped, were but weak; in regard that many of them were lost in the ways of Gallia, and lessened likewise by their long journey out of Spain: besides that the unwholesome Autumn in Apulia, and about Brundisium, had made the whole Army ill disposed, being newly come out of the sweet air of Gallia and Spain.

Pompey having had a years space to pro-

vide himself of men and munition, and neither war nor enemy to trouble him, had got together a great Navy out of Asia, from the Cyclade Isles, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt; and had caused another as great fleet to be built in all places fit for that purpose; had raised great sums of money out of Asia, and Syria, and of all the Kings, Dynastes, Tetrarchs, and free States of Achaia; and had likewise compelled the Corporations of those Provinces to contribute the like summe. He had enrolled nine legions of Roman Citizens: five which he had transported out of Italy; one old legion out of Sicily, which being compounded and made of two, he called the *win*; one out of Cæsar and Gen. Mædonius, and besides these, who being discharged by some, he recalled at his old in those Provinces; and two out of Asia, which *Lentulus* the Consul had caused to be enrolled. Besides, he had distributed amongst those legions, under the name of a supply, a great number of Thessaly, Bœotia, Achaia, and Epirus.

Amongst these he had mingled Antonie's soldiers: and besides these, he expected to be brought by Scipio, out of Syria, two legions. Of Archers out of Crete, Lacedæmon, Pontus, and Syria, and the rest of the Cities, he had 3000; six cohorts of Slingers, two Mercenary, & 7000 horse. Whereof *Deiotarus* had brought 600 Galleys; *Ariobarzanes* 500 out of Cappadocia; *Cotus* out of Thracia had sent the like number, under the leading of his son *Sadalis*. From Macedonia came 200, commanded by *Rascepolis*, a Captain of great fame and virtue. From Alexandria came 500, part Galleys, and part Germans; which *A. Gabinius* had left there with King *Ptolemy*, to defend the Town. Pompey the son had brought with the Navy, 800 of his shepherds and servants. *Tarcondarius*, *Callor*, and *Donilaus*, had sent three hundred out of Gallogracia; of whom, one came himself, and the other sent his son. Two hundred were sent out of Syria, by *Comagenus* of Antioch, whom Pompey had presented with great gifts: most of which were *Arbalestriers* on horseback.

To these were added *Dardans*, and *Bessi*; partly for pay and entertainment, and partly got by command or favour; besides *Macedonians*, *Thessalians*, and of divers other Nations and Cities: inasmuch as he filled up the number formerly spoken of. He provided great quantity of Corn out of Thessaly, Asia, Crete, Cyrene, and the

the rest of those Regions. He determined to winter at *Dyrachium*, *Apollonia*, and all the maritime towns; to keep Cæsar from passing the Sea: and to that end, he had laid and disposed his Navy all along the Sea-coast. Pompey the son was Admirall of the Egyptian ships; *D. Lellus* and *C. Triarius*, of those that came out of Asia; *C. Cælius*, with *C. Pomponius*, the ships of Rhodes; *Scribonius Libo* and *M. Octavius* had charge of the Liburnian and Achaian Navy. Howbeit *M. Bibulus* commanded in chief in all sea causes; and to him was left the superintendency of the Admiralty.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING these *Latine Ferie*, it is to be noted, that the Romans had two sorts of Feries, or Holy-daies; the one called *Annales*, which came always to be kept on a certain day, and thereupon were called *Anniversarii*, or yearly: the others, *Conceptivæ*; which were arbitrary, and solemnized upon such daies, as the Magistrates and Priests thought most expedient, whereof these *Latine Ferie* were chief; and were kept on Mount *Albane*, to Jupiter *Latiar* or *Latiaris*, for the health and preservation of all the *Latine* people, in league and confederacy with the people of Rome, and were solemnized in remembrance of the truce between those two Nations: during which feast, the Romans held it unlawfull to make any war. The sacrifice was a white Bull, kill'd and offered by the Consuls, and the flesh distributed to the inhabitants of *Latium*; according to an ancient Treaty of alliance between them, engraven for a perpetuall memory, in a Column of brasse. The particulars whereof are expressed at large by *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE second thing coming to be noted, is the view taken of Pompey's forces: which are nine compleat legions, besides the supplies here particularly mentioned, sent from such as bare affection to that Party; and by indifferent calculation, might amount in all, to near about threescore thousand men; together with the favour of the Countreys, where the triall was to be made by the stroke of War.

In which Muster were the soldiers of *C. Antonius*; whose misfortune these Commentaries have either willingly forgot, or some other chance hath wip't it clean out. Howbeit *Florus* hath it recorded, that Cæsar having sent *Dolabella* and *Antonius* to seize upon the Straights,

and entrance of the *Adriatick* sea, the one took hold of the coast of *Sclavonia*, and the other near unto *Corfu*: when upon a sudden came *Octavius* and *Libo*, Pompey's Lieutenants, and with great forces (they had aboard their ships) surprized both the one and the other; whereby *Antonius* was constrained to yield up fifteen Companies, which were these soldiers of *Antonius* hear mentioned.

Rascepolis, or *Rascepolis*, was a Thracian of great fame, that followed Pompey; and his brother *Rasceus* betook himself to Cæsar, upon an appointment made between themselves. For finding in the Countrey where they dwelt, two great Factions in opposition, & doubting which Party to take, they divided themselves, as the best approved part of Neutrality: and held likewise the same course, in the war between *Brutus* and *Octavius*, continuing unto the battell of *Philippi*. Upon the issue whereof, *Rasceus* demanded no other reward for his service, then the life of his brother: which was easily granted.

This *Bibulus*, Pompey's high Admirall, was fellow-Consul with Cæsar, in the year of Rome 694. but Cæsar so outstript him in the managing of things, that he much suspected himself, as insufficient for the place: which made him keep his house all that year. Whereupon came this Distich;

Non Bibulo quicquam nuper, sed Cæsare sacrum:

Nam Bibulo fieri Consule nil memini.
Cæsar did all, nought *Bibulus* did do:
Of Consul *Bibulus* no act I know.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth over into Greece, and returneth his shipping to Brundisium. *Octavius* besegeth Salona.

CÆsar upon his arrivall at Brundisium, called the soldiers together, and shewed them, that forasmuch as they were almost come to an end of all their labours and dangers, they would now be content to leave willingly behind them their servants and carriages in Italy, and go aboard clear of those incumbrances, to the ends the greater number of soldiers might be taken in; and that they should expect the supply of all these things from victory, and his liberality. Every man cried out, That he should command what he would, and they would willingly obey it.

The second of the Nones of January, he weighed Anchor, having (as is formerly shew'd) shipped seven legions. The next day he came to land at the Promontory of *Ceraunium*, having got a quier road amongst the Rocks and

places of danger. For doubting how he might safely venture upon any of the known Ports of that Coast; which he suspected to be kept by the Enemy; he made choice of that place which is called Phartalus; and there arriving in safety with all his ships, he landed his soldiers.

At the same time, Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus (by order from Lalius) were at Oricum, with eighteen ships of Asia: and M. Bibulus was likewise at Corfu, with one hundred and ten ships. But neither durst those come out of the Port, although Cæsar had not in all above twelve ships of war, to wait him over; amongst which, he himself was embarked: neither could Bibulus come soon enough, his ships being unready, and his Mariners ashore; for that Cæsar was desirous near the Continent, before there was any brunt of his coming in all those Regions. The soldiers being landed, he sent back the same night the shipping to Brundisium; that the other legions, and the Cavalry might be brought over.

Fulius Calenus, the Legat, had the charge of this service, and was to use all celeritie in transporting over the legions: but setting out late, and omitting the opportunity of the night winds, they failed of their purpose in returning back. For Bibulus being certified at Corfu of Cæsar's arrivall, and hoping to meet with some of the ships of burthen, met with the empty ships going back to Brundisium: and having taken thirty of them, he wreaked his anger (conceiv'd through grief and omission) and set them all on fire, consuming therein both the Masters, and the Mariners; hoping by the rigour of that punishment, to terrifie the rest.

This being done, he possess'd all the Coast, from Salona to Oricum, with ships and men of war; appointing guards with more diligence then formerly had been used. He himself, in the depth of Winter, kept watch a ship-board, not refusing any labour or duty, nor expecting any succour, if he happened to meet with Cæsar. But after the departure of the Liburnian Gallies, M. Octavius, with such ships as he had with him, came from Illyricum to Salona; and there having incited the Dalmatians, and other barbarous people, drew thither from Cæsar's party. And finding that he could not move them of Salona, neither with promise nor threatenings, he resolved to besiege the Town. The place was strong by nature, through the advantage of a Hill; and the Roman Citizens (there inhabiting) had made towers of wood to fortifie it within; but finding themselves too weak to make resistance (being wearied out and spent with wounds) they

fell at length to the last refuge of all; which was, to enfranchise all their bond-slaves, above the age of fourteen years; and enacting their womens hair, they made Engines thereof.

Their resolution being known, Octavius encompassed the town about with five Camps: and at one instant of time began to force them by siege, and by assault. They being resolved to undergo all extremities, were much pressed through want of Corn; and thereupon sending Messengers to Cæsar, sought help of him. Other inconveniences they endured as they might.

And after a long time, when the continuance of the siege had made the Octavians remisse and negligent (taking the opportunity of the noon time, when the Enemy was retired aside, and placing their children and women on the wall, that nothing might seem emitted of that which was usually they themselves, together with such as they had lately enfranchised, brake into the next Camp unto the Town. Which being taken, with the same violence they set upon another; and then upon the third, and so upon the fourth, and in the end upon the fifth, driving the Enemy out of all the Camps: and having slain a great number, they forced Octavius, and the rest remaining, to betake them to their ships; and so the siege ended. For Octavius despairing to take the Town, the Winter approaching, and having received such losses, retired to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

It hath been generally conceived, that there is little or nought of women in times of war; but that they are a burthen to such as seek honour by deeds of Armes; and do better sute the licentiousness of peace, then the dangers of warfare. Whereof Andromache is made an instance; from that which Homer reporteth of her tears, sighs, and prayers, to withdraw Hector from those valorous exploits, which he undertook for the defence of Troy. And therefore they are by Ovid wished to handle the distaffe and the spindle, and leave the warres as fitter for men, then the weaknesse of their Sex.

----- columque
I cape cum calathis, & flamina pollice
torque:
Bella relinque viris -----
Go take thy basket on thy head,
And at the distaff twist thy thread.
Leave warres to men -----

Nevertheless it cannot be denied, that howsoever

CHAP. III.

Cæsar sendeth to Pompey, touching a Peace; taketh in Oricum, Apollonia, and other places.



It is before declared, that Vibullius Rufus (one of Pompey's Lieutenant) was twice taken by Cæsar, and dismissed; once at Confinium, and a second time in Spain. Him d'd Cæsar deem (in regard of the favours which he had shewed him) to be a fit person, to be sent with a Message to Pompey; and thereafter for that he understood, that he was in good account and credit with him.

The summe of his Commission was, to tell him, That if beseeched them both to give an end to their wilfulness, to lay down their Armes, and not to tempt Fortune any longer; either side had been sufficiently afflicted with losse and damages: which might serve for instruction and example to avoid other inconveniences. He for his part was driven out of Italy, with the losse of Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Provinces of Spain; as also of one hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman Citizens in Spain and Italy. Himself was afflicted with the death of Curio, with the losse of the African Armie, and with the rendry of the soldiers at Corfu. And therefore they should have regard of themselves, and of the Commonwealth.

They had good experience by their own losses, what Fortune could do in war. This was the onely time to treat of peace, whilst either Party stood confident in his own strength, and seemed of equal might and power. But if Fortune should chance to sway to one side, he that thought he had the better end of the staffe, would never hearken to any conditions of peace, nor content himself with a reasonable part, because his hope would give him all.

Concerning the Articles of Treaty, forasmuch as they could not agree thereof themselves, they ought to seek them from the Senate and people of Rome. In the meanwhile, it was fit that the Commonwealth and themselves should rest satisfied, if (without further delay) both of them did take an oath in the presence of their Armes, to dismisse their forces within three daies next following; to lay down Armes, and send away their Auxiliary troupes, where-in they so relied; and consequently, to depend upon the judgement and decree of the people of Rome. For assurance whereof on his behalfs, he would presently discharge as well his forces in the field, as those in garrison.

Vibullius, having received these instructions
Nn 3 from

soever the tenderneffe of women doth require a passive course of life, under the shelter of a safe roof, rather then in the bleak storms of active endeavour; yet there have been some Viragoes, that have over-topped the pride of men in points of war; amongst whom, Semiramis may lead the rest; together with Tomiris, Cyrus Mistressse by conquest. As also Zenobia, that subdued the Persians; and Helena, Queen of the Russes.

Besides other noble spirits, that could answer such as told them news of the death of their sons in battell, That they had brought them into the world for that onely purpose. Which do prove, as well a recall, as a potentiall aptnes of that Sex, to the use and practice of Armes.

And if any man (as unwilling to afford them so much worth) will know wherein they avail the torture of a War, he may take notice, that even in expeditions (wherein they are most subject to exceptions) they alwaies give acceptable assistance to their Husbands, both in their provisions, and otherwise; and are such Companions, as can hardly be left at home, without danger of greater hazard.

But in places besieged, women do not onely afford hair to make ropes, if need require (as it fell out in this siege) but are able to cast pieces of Mill-stones upon the Enemy, with better fortune sometimes then any other man; and have thereby slain the General, to the raising of the sieges, and saving of the Citie.

But to take instances of later times: It is not to be forgotten, that when the Arch-Duke Matthias (after the death of Count Mansfeld) commanded the Christian Army, at the siege of Strigonium; while the Turks, within the Cattle, were making works for a retreat, the women (in the mean time) made good the breaches; and there bestowed such store of Wild-fire, that the Italian Squadrons (commanded by Aldobrandine) being joynd poldron to poldron, to presse into the breach, seemed all of a fire at once, and were forced to fall off with great terrour and confusion.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

A Town assaulted by a wallike Enemy, is not kept or freed with Chaires or Spells; or as the Inhabitants of Tomby, in the East Indies, drave away the Portugalls, with Hives of Bees, when they were possessed of the walls: but with such valour as may overcome the Enemy, and extend it self to the taking of five Camps, if need require; which was performed by these Inhabitants of Salona.

Ind. lib. 1.
Hecudor.
lib. 2.
Tiech. II. Pol
Sigin. Ba.
ia Mute. IV.

Qued. fonce
ficus qua n
uocatum le
vamentum
Tact. 3.
Annal.
Vis p. f. f. f.
culte dia
man. re. ill.
fa conjugio
cedent.

Ind. 9.

Anno 1595.

II. ad. 4.

12 Metam.

from Cæsar (thinking it no lesse requisite to advertise Pompey of Cæsar's arrivall, that he might consult of that before he delivered what he had in charge) posted night and day, taking at every stage fresh horse; that he might certify Pompey, that Cæsar was at hand with all his forces.

Pompey was at that time in Candavia, and went out of Macedonia to Winter in Apollonia, and at Dyrrachium. But being troubled at the news, he made towards Apollonia by great journeys, lest Cæsar should possess himself of the maritime Cities.

Cæsar having landed his forces, went the next day to Oricum. Upon his approach, L. Torquatus, who commanded the town under Pompey, and had there a garrison of Parthians, shutting the gates, went about to defend the place, commanding the Græcians to take Arms, and make good the walls. But they refusing to fight against the power and authority of the people of Rome, and the townsmen endeavouring of their own accord to receive Cæsar in, he opened the gates, despairing of all other succours, gave up both himself and the town to Cæsar, and was entertained by him in safety. Oricum being taken in by Cæsar, without any further delay he went to Apollonia.

His coming being heard of, L. Straberius, the Governour, began to carry water into the Citadell, to fortifie it, and to require pledges of the inhabitants. They, on the other sides, denied to give any, or to shut their gates against the Consul, or of themselves to take a resolution contrary to that which all Italy and the people of Rome had thought convenient. Their affections being known, he secretly conveyed himself away. The Apollonians sent Commissioners to Cæsar, and received him into the town. The Bellidentis followed their example, and the Amatini, together with the rest of the confining Cities. And to conclude, all Epirus sent unto Cæsar, promising to do what he commanded. But Pompey understanding of these things, which were done at Oricum and Apollonia, fearing Dyrrachium, posted thither night and day. Howbeit, upon the report of Cæsar's approach, the Army was so astonish'd, that for haste on their way, they left almost all their Ensignes in Epirus and the confining Regions: and many of them (casting away their Armes) seemed rather to fly, then to march as soldiers.

As they came near to Dyrrachium, Pompey made a stand, and caus'd the Camp to be intrenched; whereas yet the Army was so affrighted, that Labienus stood out first, and

took a solemn oath, Never to forsake Pompey, but to undergo what chance soever Fortune had allotted him. The same oath took the Legates; being seconded by the Tribunes of the soldiers, and Centurions, and by all the Army, that took the like oath.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

U Num est tempus (saith Cæsar) de pace agendi, dum uterque sibi confidit, & paves ambo videtur; The only time to treat of peace is, whilst either party is confident of his strength, and both seem of equal might and power. Which may serve for an excellent Rule, to point out the fittest and seasonablest time for composition between two opposite Parties. For as in quantities, equality begetteth equality, and disparity a like unconvincible of nature; so in other things, as namely in Treaties of Agreement, the conditions do commonly rise to either Partie, according as they stand ballanced in the scale of Equality; or otherwise, as the difference of their means shall allot them. For if that be true in the Extremity, which *Curtius* hath, That Lawes are given by Conquerours, and accepted upon all conditions, by them that are subdued; it doth consequently follow in the Mean, that men find dealing proportionable to their fortune. To which purpose is that of *Plato*, where he saith, That Peace and quietness consist in equality; as Trouble and Motion are alwaies in inequality.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IT appeareth here by the flight and astonishment of Pompey's Army, that the course he took to abandon Italy, was out of no good advice or direction. For whereas he might with farre more honour, and no lesse hope of successe, have contested with Cæsar, in the place where the warre brake out, and kept him to a task which should have held him in the conquest of Spain, or such other achievements as he easily wrought in the absence of his Adversaries: it fell out that his departure into Greece sort'd to no other end, then by time to abate the edge of the forwardest courages, and to suffer a numerous Army to be daunted with noise and clamours of continuall victories, gotten upon a part of themselves; and then to give occasion to the Conquerour to come in the tail of Fames, and take them disarmed of expectations to their great amazement.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

(Cæsar) took up his lodging for Winter. Bibulus distressed at Sea for want of provisions, someth desirous of a Treaty: which being carried on the other side with good caution, breaketh off again.

Cæsar.

Cæsar understanding that his passage to Dyrrachium was thus intercepted, did forbear his haste, and incamped himself upon the River Aplus, in the confines of the Apollonians; that by the means of his Guards and Forts, such Cities as had well deserved of him, might be in safety: and there determined to winter, in Tents of skins, and to attend the coming of his other legions out of Italy. The like did Pompey, pitching his Camp on the other side of the River Aplus; and there assembled all his troops and foreign aids. Calenus having (according to Cæsar's direction) embarked the legions and Cavalry at Brundisium, and taken in as many as his shipping would contain, he set sail: but being gone a little out of the Port, he received Letters of advice from Cæsar, that all the Havens and the Sea-coast was kept with the Enemies fleet. Whereupon he made again into the Havens, and called back all the ships: only one, holding on her course, without regard of the command, carrying no soldiers, but belonging to private men, arrived at Oricum, and there was taken by Bibulus; who spared neither bond nor free, of as many as were of age, but put all to the sword. Whereby it happened, that in a moment of time, by great chance the whole Army was saved.

Bibulus, as is before declared, lay at Oricum with his Navy. And as he kept the Sea and the Ports from Cæsar; so was he kept from landing in any of those Countries: for all the Sea-coast was kept by Guards and Watches set along the shore, that he could neither water, get wood, nor bring his ships to land upon any occasion: Inasmuch as he was brought into great streightnesse and exigence, for want of all necessities; and was constrained (besides all other provisions) to fetch his water and wood from Corfu. And one time amongst the rest it happened, that the weather being foul, they were forced to relieve themselves with the dew which in the night time fell upon the skins, that covered the Decks of the ships. All which extremities they patiently endured; and would by no means be brought to leave the Ports, or abandon the Sea-coast.

But as they were in these difficulties; and that Libo and Bibulus were come together, they both of them spake from a shipboard to M. A-

cilius and Statius Marcus, Legates (of whom one was Governour of the Town, and the other had the charge of such Guards as were along the shore) signifying, that they would willingly talk with Cæsar of matters of great consequence, if they might have leave. For a better shew and assurance whereof, they intimated something concerning a Composition. In the meantime they earnestly desired there might be a truce: for the thing they propounded imported matter of great weight, which they knew Cæsar exceedingly affected; and it was thought that Bibulus was able to work somewhat to that purpose.

Cæsar at that time was gone with one legion to take in some towns further off, and to set a course for provision of Corn, which was brought sparingly unto him; and was then at Buthrotum, opposite to Corfu. Being certified there by Letters from Acilius and Marcus, of that which Libo and Bibulus had required, he left the legion, and returned himself to Oricum. At his arrivall thither, they were called out to treat. Libo came forth, and excused Bibulus, for that he was exceeding cholericke, and had besides conceived a great anger at Cæsar, about the Adultery and Pratorship; and in regard of that, he did shun the Conference, lest a matter of that utility and importance should be disturbed by his intemperate carriage. Pompey, he said, alwaies was desirous that matters might be accorded, and that Arms might be laid aside: but they of themselves could do nothing therein; forasmuch as by the generall resolution of a Councell, the superintendency of the warre, and the disposition of all things were referred to Pompey. Howbeit, when they understood what Cæsar required, they would send instantly a dispatch unto Pompey, and be a means that he should accomplish all things with good satisfaction. In the mean time let there be a truce; and untill an answer might be returned from him, let neither Party offend one another. To this he added somewhat concerning the Cause in question, the forces and aids. To which Cæsar did not think it fit at that time to make any answer: nor do we think there is cause now to make mention thereof.

Cæsar required, that it might be lawful for him to send Embassadors to Pompey without danger; and that they would undertake, that such as he sent, might be well treated, or take them into their charges, and bring them safely to Pompey. Concerning the Truce, the course of the warre fell out to be so carried, that they with their Navy, did keep his ships and succours from coming unto him; and he, on the other side, did prohibit them from landing.

Observations upon Cæsars

landing, or taking in fresh water: and if they would have that granted unto them, let them cease guarding of the Coast; but if they would continue that, then would be continue the other. Notwithstanding, he thought the Treaty of accord might go on, albeit these were not omitted; for he took them to be impediment thereunto. They would neither receive Cæsar's Embassadors, nor undertake for their safety; but referred the whole matter to Pompey: only they instanced, and very vehemently urged for the Truce. But Cæsar perceiving that all this speech tended only to avoid the present danger, and to supply themselves of such wants where with they were streightened; and that there was no condition of peace to be expected, he began to think of prosecuting the warre.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS in contracting with a party, it is due to be cared, that War be not shrowded under the fair name of Peace; so a Truce demanded by an Enemy, is to be handled sparingly and with suspicion: as a thing never commonly required, but when necessity doth move them thereunto; and not to be granted, but as it may inferre the like advantage. But to yield to a suspension of Arms, advantageous to an Enemy, and no way gainfull to them that consent unto it, is neither allowable by reason, nor Cæsar's example. And if occasion prove it requisite, it must be but for a little time: for a Prince armed in the field, that shall entertain a Truce for any long season, shall see his Army consumed both in courage, and in the parts thereof, which will fall asunder of themselves; and was the means, by which Lewis the eleventh put by Edward the fourth king of England, from going on with a warre that might have given him the possession of the Crown of France. Whence it is, that such as seek a Peace, desire no more then a cessation of Arms, for some reasonable time, as an introduction enforcing the same.

Concerning leagues, we are to note that there are found three differences. The first is, a league of Peace: which by the Apollies rule, should extend to all men, *Habere pacem cum omnibus*, have peace with all men; and by example of holy Patriarchs (*Isaac* with *Abimelech*, *Jacob* with *Laban*) may lawfully be made with Heathen Princes; being as the golden chain, that tie all the Nations of the earth in peaceable community. The second is, a league of Intercourse, or Commerce; which is likewise by the same Patriarchs, sending for Corn into *Egypt*, and *Solomon's* enter-

course with *Hiram* king of *Tyre*, together with divers other examples, allowable with Infidels. For Nature being rich in variety of commodities, doth therefore divide her works amongst the kingdoms of the earth, that there might be a mutual intercourse of exchange between the parts of the same. The third is, a league of mutual assistance; such as *Jehoshaphat* made with *Achab*: and it is hardly safe with any Prince; but no way allowable with Infidels.

Touching the Persons to be offered in a Treaty, it is to be observed from *Bibulus*, that no man, whose presence may either give offence, or whose intemperance may any way interrupt a course tending to a happy issue, is fit for any such employment.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THERE were in *Rome* certain officers called *Ædiles*, *ab Ædilibus*, as having the care of houses and buildings, both publick and private, that they might be built and maintained in such manner as was agreeable to the ordinances of that State, together with other things whereof they had the charge. *Nunc sum designans Ædilis* (saith *Cicero*) *habeo rationem quod a Populo Romano acceperim, mihi ludos sanctissimos, maxima cum ceremonia, Cere, Liberique faciendos: mihi Floram Matrem populo plobique Romano, ludorum celebritate placendam: mihi ludos antiquissimos, qui primi Romani sunt nominati, maxima cum dignitate ac religione, Jovi, Junoni, Minervæque efficiendos: mihi sacrorum Ædium procuratorem: mihi totam urbem suam esse commissam: ob eorum rerum laborem & sollicitudinem fructus illos duos, antiquiorem in senatu sententiæ dicende locum, togam prætextam, sellam curulem, præcones, ad memoriam posteritatis prodendam.* Now that I am appointed to bear the office of Ædility, I reckon with my self what charge I have received from the people of *Rome*: viz. to see to the solemnizing with highest ceremony of the most holy plaies, consecrated to *Ceres* and *Bacchus*; to the pacifying of *Flora* towards the people with celebration of plaies due to her; as likewise to the performing of those most ancient plaies, in honour of *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and *Pallas*, with the greatest splendour and religion possible: to have a care of sacred houses, and in generall of the whole City, &c. Wherein it is to be noted, that these shewes and Plaies, were always made and set forth at the charge and costs of the Ædiles: and thence it was, that the allowing or disallowing of all Play-books belonged unto them. Moreover, they

Lib. III.

Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

Nolentem
amicum ca-
pere diffi-
cile.
Xenoph. de
fidis &
did. Socrat.

they had the charge of all the publick buildings and works of the City, together with the provision of victuall and Corn. And for the missing of this office, was *Bibulus* angry with Cæsar, and would not be regained upon any condition.

CHAP. VI.

Bibulus dieth, Cæsar useth means to procure a Treaty of Peace; but prevaileth not.

Cæsar.

Bibulus being kept from landing many dayes together, and fallen into a grievous sickness, through cold and extreme labour (and having no means of help, nor yet willing to forgo his charge) could no longer withstand the violence of the disease. He being dead, there was none appointed to take the whole charge, but every man commanded his own fleet. The hurlyburly being quieted which Cæsar's suddain arrivall had moved, *Vidullus* with the assistance of *Libo*, together with *L. Luccius* and *Theophanes*, to whom Pompey was wont to communicate matters of greatest importance, resolved to deliver what Cæsar had recommended unto him: and entering into the relation thereof, was interrupted by Pompey, forbidding him to speak any farther of that matter. What use or need have I (saith he) either of my life, or of the City, when I shall be thought to enjoy it by Cæsar's favour? neither can the opinion thereof be removed, untill the warre be ended; that of my self I return back into Italy, from whence I am come.

Cæsar understood this, from those that were present when he spake it: and yet notwithstanding, he endeavoured by other means, to procure a Parle of peace. For the two Camps of Pompey and Cæsar were only separated by the River *Apfius*, that ran between them; where the souldiers had often colloquies, and by agreement amongst themselves, throw no weapon during the time of their treaty. Whereupon he sent *P. Vatinius*, a Legate, to the River bank, to utter such things as did chiefly concern a Peace; and to ask oftentimes with a loud voice, whether it were not lawfull for Citizens to send to Citizens, touching a treaty of peace; being a thing permitted to the Thieves of the *Pyrenean Mountains*: or at least, to move that Citizens should not in Arms contend with Citizens. And having spoken much very respectfully, as well concerning his own well-fares as the safety of all the rest, he was heard with silence by the Souldiers on both sides.

At length, it was answered from the other Party, that *A. Varro* did offer himself for a conference the next day; so that the Commis-

sioners on both sides might come and go in safety, and deliver freely their opinions: for which a certain time was then appointed. The next day, great multitudes of either side presented themselves at the place assigned; and great was the expectation thereof; every man seeming to incline to peace. Out of which troupe stepped forth *T. Labienus*, and spake softly touching the peace: and at last, entered into altercation with *Vatinius*. In the middle of their speech were weapons suddainly cast from all parts: which he avoided, being covered and defended with weapons. Notwithstanding many were wounded; and amongst others, *Cornelius Balbus*, *M. Plotius*, *L. Tiburtius*, Centurions, besides many other souldiers. Then said *Labienus*, Leave off therefore to speak of any composition; for unless Cæsar's head be brought, there can be no peace.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis small piece of the Story containeth divers notable passages of extremity, in the carriage of Pompey, and others of his Party. As first (to take them as they lie) that of wilfulness in *Bibulus*: whom neither sickness, nor despair of help could move to intermit the task he had undertaken; but chose rather to suffer unto death, in approving his zeal to the Cause, then to give himself a breathing time for the saving of his life: and may serve to admonish any other *Bibulus*, to value his life above that which a stiff and wilfull opinion may lead him unto, beyond the measure of honourable endeavour, or what else may any way be justly expected; least in striving to do much, he happen to do nothing. For that cannot be understood to be well done in another mans behalf, that is not well done in his own.

The second is, Pompey's resolution; being so extreme, as no composition, or other thing whatsoever, could give him satisfaction; but only a victorious end of that warre. Our proverb saith, Better a lean agreement, then a fat remedy. And the casualties of warre may move an experienced Commander, to embrace a safe and quiet peace; as knowing, that he that goeth about to vex another, shall have his turn of suffering the like misfortunes: and as war beginneth when one party listeth, so it endeth when the other side pleaseth.

—facilis descensus Averni:
Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere
ad auras.

Hoc opus, hic labor est.
—The way to hell is easy:
But to come back, and to recover life,
This is a task indeed.

And therefore let no Commander, how great soever, refuse all peace, but that which

is bought by extremity of war; least the event (whereof there can be no assurance) fall out as it happened to Pompey; but rather with the use, let him learn the end of Arms; which is, to make straight that which is crooked, and out of discord and dissension, to draw means of a happy peace.

To which may be added that other of Labienus, as far in extremity as either of the former; whom nothing would satisfy but Cæsar's head. It cannot be denied, but that he strook at the root; for his head was the head of that war. But to say it, rather then to do it, was no argument of Labienus worthiness. For as Polybius noteth, It is common to most men to magnify themselves, with words full of wind; yea and more then that, to follow their designs with impetuous violence: but to direct their undertakings to a successfull issue, and to remove by industry or providence, such hindrances as happen to traverse their hopes, is granted but to a few; and now denied to Labienus, notwithstanding this Bravado. And therefore, let such Commanders as are in good opinion and esteem with their Generals, be well wary of imberking their party in any cause, farther then may belicem the wisdom and experience of judicious Leaders; as believing in that of Metellus to king Bocchus: *Omne bellum sumi facile, ceterum acerrime desinere: non in ejusdem potestate initium ejus & finem esse: incipere civis etiam ignavo licere; deponi, cum virores velint.* Every warre is easily begun, but hardly, so soon ended: the beginning and the end of it are not in the same man's power: any poor-spirited fellow may begin a warre; but it shall end when the Conquerour pleaseth, and not before.

CHAP. VII.

Cælius Rufus moveth sedition in Italy, and is slain.

AT the same time, M. Cælius Rufus the Prætor at Rome, undertaking the businesse of debts, in the beginning of his Magistracy, placed his seat by the chair of C. Trebonius Prætor of the town; promising to be assisting to any man, that would appeal unto him, concerning valuation and payment to be performed by Arbitrators, according as Cælar had ordained. But it came to passe, as well through the equity and indifferency of the Decrees, as through the lenity of Trebonius (who was of opinion, that those times required an easy and mild execution of justice) that none were found, from whom the beginning of the Appeal

might grow: for to pretend poverty, or to complain of particular misfortunes, and of the calamity of those times, or otherwise to propound the difficulties of selling their goods by an out-rop, was every mans practise; but for any man to acknowledge himself to be in debt, and yet to keep his possessions whole and untouched, was held to be a very strange impudency: so that there was no man found that would require it.

Moreover, Cælius carried a very hard hand to such as should have received benefit thereby. And having made this entrance (so the end he might not seem to have undertook a shamefull or dishonest cause) he published a law, That there should be no Interest paid for any Monies let out upon considerations, for thirty six dayes of the time agreed on. But when he perceived that Servilius the Consul, and the rest of the Magistrates did oppose themselves against him therein, and finding it not to sort with his expectation (to the end he might incite and stirre up the humours and spirits of men) he abrogated that law, and instead thereof made two others. The one, which cut off the yearly rents that Tenants were accustomed to pay their Land-lords, for the houses they dwelt in: and the other, touching new assurances, and the abolishing of old debts. Whereupon the multitude ran violently upon C. Trebonius, and (having hurt divers that stood about him) pulled him out of his Chair.

Of these things Servilius the Consul made relation to the Senate: who thereupon decreed, that Cælius should be removed from his Prætorship. And by means of that decree, the Consul interdicted him the Senate, and also drew him from the Speaking-place, as he went about to make a speech to the people. Cælius moved with shame and despay, made as though he would go to Cælar; but sent messengers secretly to Milo, condemned to banishment for killing Clodius. And having recalled him into Italy, that by great gifts and rewards had gained to his party the remainder of the Company of Fencers, he joyned himself with him: and then sent him before to Thurin, to excite and stirre up the Shepherds to sedition; he himself going to Cassiline.

At the same instant his Ensignes and Arms being stayed at Capua, besides his family suspected at Naples, and their attempt against the town perceived; their other designs being discovered, and their Partizans shut out of Capua; fearing some danger, forasmuch as the inhabitants had took Arms, and held him as an Enemy, he let fall his former determination, and brake off his journey.

In the mean while, Milo, having sent Letters to the Municipall Towns, that what he

did, was by the authority and commandment of Pompey, according as he received it from Bibulus, he applied himself to, and solicited such as were in debt: with whom prevailing nothing, he brake up divers prisons, and began to assault Cosa in Thurin: and there he was slain by Q. Pedius the Prætor, with a stone which he cast from the wall.

Cælius going on (as he gave out) towards Cælar, he came to Thury; where when he had moved divers of the Inhabitants, and promised money to the French and Spanish Cavalry, which Cælar had put there for a Garrison, he was in the end slain by them. And so the beginning of great Matters, which put all Italy in fear and trouble, by the indirett practises of the Magistrates, and the iniquity of the times, had a speedy and easy end.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT is to be noted, for the better understanding their Passages, that of those which were chosen Prætors, the two chiefest remained at Rome. The one, to administer justice to the Citizens, which was called Prætor Urbanus; who in the absence of the Consul, had the superintendency of the affairs of the State, assembled the Senate, received Packets, made Dispatches, and gave order in all things: which place was now supplied by Trebonius. The other was called Prætor Peregrinus; whose office was, to order the causes and suits of foreigners and strangers: whereunto Cælius was chosen; and being of a turbulent and unquiet spirit, took occasion upon this rent in the State, to raise new garboils, fit for his own purposes; as having learned what Aristotele teacheth, That all things which are already stirred are more easily moved, then other natures that are yet in quiet. And thereupon, having power by his office to decide causes of Controversy, he removed his Tribunal, and placed it hard by where Trebonius sat, to the end he might oppose the Decrees he made, for the prizeing of goods to fatisie Creditours, and draw the people to appeal unto him; publishing withall certain dangerous Edicts, on the behalf of those that were in debt.

This Cælius was Cæsar's scholar for Oratory; and in the opinion of Quintilian, was thought worthy to have lived longer, if he had been of a staid and settled carriage: but now must stand for an example of a wilfull Magistrate.

Touching Rostres, which I have translated the Speaking-places, it was a part of their Fo-

rum, where the Consuls and other Magistrates spake unto the people: wherein was built a Chair or Pulpit, of the beak-heads of ships, which the Romans took from the Antians; and thereupon took the name of Rostra; memorable amongst other things, for that Antony set Tullie's head between his two hands, in the Chair, where he had often spoken most eloquently, and with as many good words, as were ever found in humane Oratory.

CHAP. VIII.

Libo takeeth an Island right over against the Haven of Brundisium; and is beaten off by a Stratagem.

LIBO departing from Oricum, with Cælar's fleet of fifty ships, came to Brundisium, and took an Island, which lyeth over against the Haven, as a place of great importance, by which our Army must necessarily come forth; thereby shutting in all the Ports, and parts of that shore: as also surprising by his sudden coming, certain ships of burthen, he set all on fire, saving one laden with Corn, which he took along with him. Whereby he put our men into a great fear; and landing certain souldiers and horsemen in the night-time, he dislodged the Cavalry that were there in Garrison: and so prevailed, through the advantage of the Place, as he writ to Pompey, that he might draw the other shipping on shore, and new trim them; for he would undertake, with his fleet alone, to hinder those forces from coming to Cælar.

Antony was then at Brundisium; who trusting to the valour of the souldiers, armed out threescore Skiffs belonging to great Ships, and fencing them with hurdles and plants, put certain choice souldiers in them, disposing them in severall places along the shore: and further commanded two Triremes (which he had caused to be made at Brundisium, for the exercise of the souldiers in rowing) to go out to the mouth of the Haven.

Libo perceiving these to come out somewhat loosely, and hoping to intercept them, sent out five Quadriremes to attack them: which were no sooner come near unto our ships, but the old souldiers that were aboard fled back into the Port.

The Enemy, carried on with a desire of taking them, pressed after somewhat rashly, and unadvisedly: when at length, upon

O o 2 a fig

Lib. 16.

Successum
forema, ex-
perientiam
laus sequi-
tur. Varr.
ex Gellio.

Salust.

Omnia
co-rano
faciles
quæquæ
se-ni-mi-
vout. De
Mechanicis.

Cælar.

a signall given, the skiffs came suddenly out from all parts, set upon them, and at the first shock took one of the Quadriremes; with all the oar-men and souldiers in her; the rest they compelled to fly away shamefully. To which losse this was further added, that they were kept from water, by the Cavalry which Antonius had disposed along the Coast: through necessity whereof (as also by reason of the ignominie received) Libo departed from Brundisium, and gave over the siege.

At any moneths were now past, and the winter came hardon, and yet neither the shipping nor the legions came from Brundisium, to Cæsar. And some opportunities seemed to be omitted, for that the wind was good oftentimes; which Cæsar thought they would have taken. And the longer they staid there, the streighter was all the Coast guarded and kept, by such as commanded the fleet, being now in great hope to hinder their passage. Which they did the rather endeavour, because they were oftentimes reproved by Letters from Pompey, for that they did not impeach Cæsar's coming at first: which he did to make them the more carefully, to hinder those supplies. And in attending so from day to day an opportunity of passage, it would wax worse and worse, the winds growing more easy and gentle.

OBSERVATIONS.

BY how much easier it is to keep the out-let of one Port, then to guard the Coast of a large Countrey: by so much was Libo more likely to prevail, in seeking to shut up the Haven of Brundisium, to hinder these supplies from coming unto Cæsar; then the other, that went about to guard all the Maritime parts of Epirus, to keepesthem from landing, after they were at Sea.

But such is the uncertainty of enterprises of war, that albeit our course be rightly shapen, yet it doth often fail of leading us to that which is desired. For, howsoever he was possessed of this Island, that lay thwart the mouth of the Haven, and had thrust out the guard of horsemen, and so became confident of blocking up the Port: yet there was means found by the adverse Party, to give him such an affront, as made him quit the place with more dishonour, then could be recompensed by any thing he got.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar's supplies passe over into Greece, and take landing.

Cæsar.



æsar troubled at these things, writ very sharply to them at Brundisium, not to omit the opportunity of the next good wind, but to put to Sea, and to shape their course so

Oricum, or to the Coast of Apollonia; because there they might run their ships on ground: and these places were freeest from Guards, by reason they could not ride far from the Ports.

They, according to their accustomed courage and valour (Marcus Antonius and Fulvius Calenus directing the business, and the Souldiers themselves being forward thereunto, as refusing no danger for Cæsar's sake) having got a South wind, weighed Anchour, and the next day passed by Apollonia and Dyrrachium: but being discovered from the Continent, Quintus Coponius, Admirall of the Rhodian Navy, lying at Dyrrachium, brought his ships out of the Haven. And as he had almost (upon a slack wind) overtaken our men, the same South wind began at length to blow stiff, by which means they escaped. Yet did not he desist from pursuing them; but was in hope, by the labour and industry of the Mariners, to overweigh the force of the tempest, and followed them, notwithstanding they were past Dyrrachium, with a large wind. Our men using the favour of Fortune, were nevertheless afraid of the Enemies Navy; if the wind should chance to slack: and having got the Port called Nymphaum, three miles beyond Lissus, they put in with their ships.

This Port lay sheltered from the South-west wind; but was not safe from a South wind; howsoever, they accounted an ill road lesse dangerous then the Enemies fleet: and yet they were no sooner put in, but the wind (which had blown southerly for two dayes together) did now most happily come about to the South-west.

And here a man may see the suddain alteration of Fortune; for they which of late stood in fear of a dangerous Road, were now by this occasion, received into a safe harbour: and those which threatened danger to them, were forced to bethink themselves of their own safety. So that the time thus changing, the tempest saved our Party, and sunk theirs. Insomuch as sixteen of the Rhodian ships were all shaken in pieces, and perished with shipwrack; and of the great number of oarmen and souldiers, part were dashed against the Rocks and slain, and part were taken up by our men: all which Cæsar sent home in safety. Two of our ships coming short, and overtaken with the night, and not knowing where the rest had taken shore, stood at Anchour right over against Lissus. Them did Otacilius Crassus, Governour of Lissus, go about to take with Skiffs, and other little ships, which he had prepared for that purpose; and withall, treated with them of yielding themselves, promising life and safety upon that condition.

One

One of the ships carried two hundred and twenty men, of the legion made of young souldiers; in the other were lesse then two hundred old Souldiers. And here a man may see, what assurance and safety consisteth in courage and valour of mind; for the new made souldiers, terrified with the multitude of ships that came against them, and spent with Sea-sickness, upon oath made not to receive any hurt, did yield themselves to Otacilius: who being brought all unto him, were contrary to his oath, most cruelly slain in his sight. But the souldiers of the old Legions (howsoever afflicted with the inconvenience of the tempest, and noisomnesse of the Pump) did not slack any thing of their ancient valour: for having drawn out the first part of the night in conditions of treaty, as though they meant to yield themselves, they compelled the Master to run his ship ashore; and having got a convenient place, they there spent the rest of the night.

As soon as it was day, Otacilius sent four hundred horse, which had the guard of that part of the coast, with others of the garrison, to assault and take them: but they valiantly defending themselves, slew divers of them; and so got to our men in safety. Whereupon, the Roman Citizens residing in Lissus, (which town Cæsar had formerly given them to be kept and guarded) received in Antonius, and assisted him with all things needfull. Otacilius, fearing himself, fled out of the town, and came to Pompey.

Antonius sent back the greatest part of the ships that had brought over his troups (which were three legions of old souldiers, one of new souldiers, and eight hundred horse) to transport the rest of the souldiers and horse, that remained at Brundisium: leaving the Pontones, which are a kind of French shippings, at Lissus; to this end, that if haply Pompey, thinking Italy to be empty and uninhabited, should carry over his Army thither, Cæsar might have means to follow him: and withall sent Messengers speedily to Cæsar, to let him know where the Army was landed, and what men he had brought over.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Ancid. 2.

Homer 9.
Iliad.

Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat, It is no matter whether the enemy does his business by Valour, or subtilty; is not so justifiable by the laws of true Vertue; as that of Achilles, who professed to hate that man more then the gates of hell, that promised one thing, and purposed another. Neither do the Jurists conclude otherwise; having for the more appa-

rency of truth, drawn it to a Question, An perfidia in perfidum uti, Jus sit, whether it be lawfull to break faith with a faith-breaker; alledging Labienus practise against Cominus of Arvax, together with that which admitteth no Answer, that their example standeth as a precedent, to deal with them as they deal with others. But to falsifie religion, as Otacilius did, and to make an oath the Broaker of unworthy ends, is abhorred by God and Man, and accordingly succeedeth.

The most remarkable instance in this kind, is that (which is to be wished were forgotten) of Lewis King of Hungaria; who having concluded the honourablest peace, that ever Christian Prince had before that time made with any of the Turkish Sultans, and confirmed the same by an oath, taken upon the holy Evangelist; did nevertheless, at the perswasion of Julian, a Cardinall (who took upon him, by power from the Pope, to disannull the league, and absolve him from the oath) break the peace, and gave battel to Amurath at Varua (where the Infidell took occasion impiously to blaspheme, in calling for vengeance on such, as in their deeds had denied the Godhead of their most sacred & blessed Lord) and was there slain, to the utter ruine of his kingdome, and the reproch of Christian Name. Neither did the Cardinall escape the vengeance, which his treachery had drawn upon that royall Army: but being there wounded unto death, was found lying in the high way, by Gregory Sanofe, ready to give up the ghost; and seemed but to stay to take with him the bitter curses of such as passed by, flying from the battel, as the due reward of his perfidious abjolution.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN case of difficulty and hazard (as Cæsar notwithstanding) there is always great help in a good courage. For, whether it be that good hap attendeth a valourous carriage, or that vertue be able to remove all opposition, or what other cause there is besides; but thus it falleth out, that such as entertain a noble resolution, are ever safest in extremity of perill; and instead of losse, get honour and renown.

Brasidas found a Mouse amongst dried figs, which bit him so that he let her go, & thereupon said to those that stood by, That there was nothing so little, that could not save it self, if it had a heart to defend it self against such as assaulted it.

And herein we may observe that to be true, which the Poet hath delivered; *Seris venit usus ab annis*, Time and Practise do much avail to perfect this courage in the minds of Men of War; as knowing beforehand the weight of such labours, and having encountered the like dangers, even to the redeeming of themselves

O o 3

selves

Hirci is lib.
8. de bello
Gallico.

Uladiſlaus.

Audaces
fortuna juvat.
Virtus omnia potest.
Virtute facciendum est.
quicquid in rebus bellis est generandum.

Plutarch;

Metamorph.

Namquam
ita quæ
quam bene
fabulatur
ratione et
viam facit
quæres,
tas, utis,
sen per ali-
quid alio-
ter novus.
Terren.
Adelp.
Mali lo-
mines, par-
ei vici-
H. red.
lib. 7.

Lib. 7. 11.
that the
Romans at
the siege of
Veene,
being out of
humane
hope, turn-
ed their
eyes to fate,
and a hope
they had in
bellying.

Observations upon Cæsars

selves from the jaws of death. Whence it is that the Comick saith, No man can possibly come so well furnished to any count of life, but that time and experience do alwaies teach him what he knew not before: whereas others that go rawly to work, are so daunted with the un-
usual looks of war, as they (forgetting the pro-
fession of Arms) do run headlong into the
danger they seek to avoid; being able to give
no other account of their service, but that they
marched many Bodies, and but a few Men.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, Appian, Suetonius, & Lucian, do all write, that **Cæsar**, impatient of the stay of his forces at **Brundisium**, embarked himself in a small Frigate of twelve oars, disguised in the habit of a slave, and put to sea to fetch his Legions; notwithstanding all the Coast swarmed with the Enemies shipping; but meeting with a contrary wind, which would not suffer him to get out of the River **Anius**, the Matter commanded the Mariners to cast about, and get to shore. Whereupon **Cæsar** discovering himself, encouraged him to go forward, for that he carried **Cæsar** and his fortunes.

The Matter forgetting all danger, made out again to get to sea; but was by force of the tempest driven to return, to **Cæsar's** great grief. And albeit there is no mention made hereof in these Commentaries, yet the authority of so many grave Authours is not to be contemned.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar hasteth to meet with **Antonius**, and pre-
venteth **Pompey**.

Cæsar.

Cæsar and **Pompey** had both intelli-
gence almost at one instant of time,
of **Antonius's** fleet: for they saw them
pass by **Apollonia** and **Dyrachium**,
and directed their journeys along the
Coast after them: but they understood not for
a while where they were lured. Howbeit
having notice thereof, either of them took a
contrary resolution. For **Cæsar** purposed to
join with **Antonius**, as soon as possibly he might:
and **Pompey** resolved to hinder their meeting,
and by ambushments (if he could) to set upon
them at unawares.

The same day, either of them drew their
Army out of their standing Camps, upon the
River **Aplis**: **Pompey** secretly, and by night;
Cæsar openly, and by day: but **Cæsar** had the

greater circuit to fetch, and a longer journey
to go up the River, to find a Foord. **Pompey**
having a ready way, and no River to passe,
made towards **Antonius** by great journeys:
and when he understood that he came near
unto him, chose a convenient place, and there
bestowed his forces; keeping every man with-
in the Camp, and forbidding fire to be made,
that his coming might be the more hidden.
Whereof **Antonius** being presently adverti-
sed by the Greeks, he dispatched Messengers
to **Cæsar**, and kept himself one day within his
Camp. The next day **Cæsar** came unto him.
Upon notice thereof, **Pompey** left that place,
least he should be intrapped between two Ar-
mies, and came with all his forces to **Aspa-
ragus** (which appertained to them of **Dyrachium**)
and there, in a convenient place, pitched
his Camp.

OBSERVATIONS.

VHere two Armies are in a Country,
and one of them hath succours coming
to reinforce them, each of those Parties are, by
the example of these glorious Commanders
(*ceteris paribus*) to make towards those suc-
cours: the ones to cut them off; and the o-
thers, to keep them standing. And to that end,
as it suited **Pompey's** condition to go secretly;
howsoever **Cæsar** noteth it, as a touch to his val-
our: so on the other side, it stood not only
well enough with **Cæsar's** party to go openly,
but also was an argument of his courage and
magnanimity, and might raise him estimation
in the opinion of the Greeks. The disadvan-
tage which **Pompey** could take thereby, was the
danger to be inclosed with Armies; which he
foreseeing, avoided.

CHAP. XI.

Scipio's preparation in **Asia**, to coincide **Greece**,
to assist **Pompey**.

ABout this time **Scipio**, having su-
stained divers losses near the
Mount **Amanus**, did nevertheless
call himself by the name of **Impe-
rator**; and thereupon commanded great summs
of money to be levied of the Cities and **Poten-
tates** of those quarters: taking from the gene-
rall Receivers of that Province, all the Monies
that were in their hands for two years past, and
commanding them to disburse (by way of loan)
the reccit for the year to come; and required
horsemen to be levied throughout all the Pro-
vince.

vince. Having gathered these together, he
left the **Parthians**, being near enemies unto
him (who a little before had slain **Mc. Crassus**,
the General, and besieged **M. Bibulus**) and
drew the legions out of **Syria**; being sent spe-
cially thither to keep and settle that Province,
much amazed through fear of the **Parthian**
warre.

At his departure, some speeches were gi-
ven out by the souldiers, that if they were led
against an Enemy, they would go; but against
a Citizen and Consul they would not bear
Armes. The Army being brought to **Pergamus**,
and there garrisoned for that Winter in divers
rich Cities, he distributed great largesses,
and gifts; and for the better assuring of the
souldier unto him, gave them certain Cities
to rife.

In the mean time, he made bitter and hea-
vy exactions of money throughout all the Pro-
vince: for he put a tribute upon slaves and
free-men by poles, set impositions upon the pil-
lars and doors of houses, as also upon grains,
oat-men, vines, Engines, and carria-
ges; and whatsoever had a name, was
thought fit to yield money by way of imposition;
and thus not only in Cities and Towns, but
almost in every Village and Castle: where-
in he that carried himself most cruelly,
was held both the worthiest man, and the best
Citizen.

The province was at that time full of Offi-
cers and Commandements, pestered with
Overseers and Exactors: who besides the mo-
ney levied by publick authority, made their
particular profit by the like exactions. For
they gave out, they were thrust out of their
houses and their Country, and in want of all
necessaries; to the end they might with such
pretences, cover their wicked and hateful
courses. To this was added the hard and hea-
vy **Usury**, which oftentimes doth accompany
warre, when all monies are drawn and exalted
to the publick; wherein the forbearance of a
day, was accounted a discharge for the
whole. Whereby it happened that in those two
yeares, the whole Province was overgrown
with debts. And yet for all that, they stuck
not to levy round summs of money, not only from
the Citizens of **Rome**, inhabiting in that
Province; but also upon every Corporation,
and particular City: which they gave out, was
by way of loan, according to a Decree of Senate;
commanding the receivers to advance the like
sum by way of loan, for the year to come.

Moreover **Scipio** gave order, that the mo-
nies which of old time had been treasured up
in the Temple of **Diana** at **Ephesus**, should be
taken out, with other Images of that Goddess.
But as he came into the temple (having cal-

led unto him many of the Senators that were
there present) he received a Dispatch from
Pompey, that **Cæsar** had passed the Sea with
his legions; and thus setting all things apart,
he should hasten to him with his Army. These
Letters being received, he dismissed such as
he had called unto him, and began to dispose
of his journey into **Macedonia**, setting for-
ward within a few dayes after: by which acci-
dent the Treasure at **Ephesus** was saved.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT is **Seneca** his conceit, that **Iron**, being of
that excellent use in things pertaining to
Mans life, and yet so much undervalued to
Gold and Silver, will admit of no peace, as of-
ten as there is question of Money; but raiseth
continually garboiles and extremities, as a re-
venge that the World doth misvalue it; and fell
out as true in those better Ages, as it doth in
these dayes, that are of baser Metall. For what run and
greater violences in the State of **Rome**, then
those concerning Tributes and Impositions? A
particular whereof may be made out of this
Chapter. For first, we find a Tribute by poles,
without respect of State or condition; which
they called **Capitatio**. And then a second, **Capitatio**;
as grievous as that, being a tax laid up-
on every dore in a house, which they called
Ostiarium; whereof **Tully** maketh mention, in the
eighth Epistle of his third Book. And lastly, an
other upon every pillar in a mans house, which
they called **Columnarium**; mentioned likewise by
Cicero, *Columnarium vide in nullum debemus*,
See that we owe no tax-money for our
pillars. **Alexander** understood this to be that
we read in **Dionysius Halicarnassensis**, That
when Treasure failed at the siege of **Modena**,
they laid an Imposition upon every tile that
was found on the Senators houses in **Rome**;
which gave the **Triumvirate** occasion, to
make the tiles as heavy to the rest of the **Roman**
Citizens: and thus, saith he, was called **Columna-
ria**.

Some Popes, out of their occasions, have gone
far in this kind, and found means to lay Im-
positions upon all things pertaining to the use of
man. Inasmuch as **Tasquill** begged leave to dry
his shirt in the Sun, before there were an Im-
position laid upon the Light. The rule is diversly
given in this behalf, That the Fisk doth not exceed
twell above his proportion. **Alexander** is com-
mended for making his Subjects the keepers of
his Treasure. And **Claudius** giveth **Honorifi-
cations** this Elogium;

Nec tui privati crescent æraria damnis.
Thy chests fill not by losse of private men.
Ephesus advieth that money thus raised, be
not

Propter
Aurum &
Argentum
nam am-
pacem facit
Ferreum. 11th
14. Epist. 23.

Ferreum
omnis artis
instrumentum
est. Au-
rum & a-
gentum
moris
municipi-
um. Epist. 23.

Officiali

Columnaria;
31 ad Acti-
cum. Epist. 11.

In the Pa-
pacy of
Sixt. Quin-
tus, 1568.
pub. liens
quod co-
crescente,
arcus reliqui
tabescunt.
Sext. Aure-
lius Victor

In Paren-
thesis
not

d. Oric.

not at any time dipped either in the teares or in the blood of the people. But Tully draweth it to a more certainty, by making Necessity the square of such commands. *Du operam* (saith he) *ut omnes intelligent, si salvi essent velint, necessitate parendum*; Do your endeavour to let all see, that they must obey necessity if they mean to be safe. And so the opening of private mens purses, is but to keep them shut and safe, from such enemies as would consume all; according as *Scipio* once answered, when the *Romans* blamed him for spending their Treasure. Howsoever, *Scipio* knew well what he did, in getting into his hand such store of Treasure; for War cannot any way be maintained, but with plenty of Money: neither can any State continue, if the revenue which supporteth the Common-weal be abated; as *Tacitus* hath well observed, *Dissolvitur imperium, si fructus quibus respub. sustinetur diminuitur*.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar sendeth forces into Thessalia, Aetolia, and Macedonia. Scipio cometh into Greece.

Cæsar.

Cæsar being joyned with Antonius, drew that legion out of Oricum, which he had formerly lodged there to keep the Sea-coast; and thought it expedient to make triall of the Provinces, and to advance further into the Country. And whereas Embassadors came unto him out of Thessalia and Aetolia, assuring him, that if he would send forces to protect them, the Cities of those Provinces would readily obey what he commanded: he sent *L. Cassius Longinus*, with the legion of young souldiers, called the seven and twentieth, and two hundred horse, into Thessalia; and *C. Calpurnius Sabinus*, with five cohorts, and a few horse, into Aetolia; exhorting them specially, to take a course for provision of Corn in those two provinces, which lay near at hand.

He sent likewise *Cn. Domitius Calvinus* with two legions, the eleventh and the twelfth, and five hundred horse into Macedonia: of which Province (for that part thereof which is called *Frank* or *Free*) *Menedemus*, a principall man of that Countrey, being sent as an Embassador, had professed exceeding great forwardnesse on their behalf. Of these, *Calpurnius* upon his coming was entertained with great affection of the Aetolians: and having cast the garrison of the enemy out of *Caledon* and *Naupactum*, became Master of all Aetolia. *Cassius* arrived with the Legion in Thessalia; and finding there two Factions, was accordingly received with contrary affections.

Que libera appellabatur.

* Lepinto.

Egeferetus, a man of ancient power and authority, favoured Pompey's party: and *Petreius*, a man of a most noble house, endeavoured by all means to deserve well of Cæsar. At the same time also came *Domitius* into Macedonia: and as Embassadors began to comethick unto him from divers States of that Province, it was told him, that *Scipio* was at hand with the legions, and came with great fame and opinion of all men: which is oftentimes a fore-runner of novelties. He, making no stay in any part of Macedonia, marched directly with great fury towards *Domitius*; and when he came within twenty miles of him, turned his course suddenly to *Cassius Longinus*, in Thessalia: which he did so speedily, that news came together of his coming, and of his arrivall. For, to the end he might march with greater expedition, he left *M. Favonius* at the River *Haliacmon* (which divideth Macedonia from Thessalia) with eight cohorts, to keep the carriages of the legions: where he commanded them to build a Fort.

At the same times, the Cavalry of *King Cottus*, which was wont to keep in the Confiner of Thessalia, came flying suddenly to *Cassius Campe*. Whereat he being astonished (understanding of *Scipio's* coming, and seeing the horsemen whom he thought to be his) made towards the hills which inclose Thessalia, and from thence marched towards *Ambracia*. And as *Scipio* made hast to follow after, Letters overtook him, sent from *Favonius*, that *Domitius* was at hand with the legions, and that he could not hold the place wherein he was left, without *Scipio's* help.

Upon the receipt of which letters, *Scipio* altered both his purpose and his journey; & leaving *Cassius*, made hast to help *Favonius*: so that continuing his journey night and day, he came unto him in very good time. For as the dust of *Domitius* Army, approaching, was seen to rise, the fore-runners of *Scipio's* Army were likewise discovered. Whereby it happened, that as *Domitius* industry did help *Cassius*, so did *Scipio's* speed save *Favonius*.

OBSERVATIONS.

Cæsar being now ready with his forces to proceed against Pompey, the first thing he did, was to make triall of the provinces of Greece, and to get their favour and assistance, for his better furtherance in contesting his Adversary. For as an Army standeth firm by two speciall means, first, in themselves, as they are able to resist any opposing force; and secondly, through the favour of the Countrey, wherein they are engaged: so on the other side, their overthrow either

In Macedo-
nia, quæ ve-
lunt sub
candida
nasci, ad Ha-
liacmonem
ducere, quæ
nigra &
fæca, ad
Axium.

Cæsar.

Scipio about two daies in his standing Camp, upon the River *Haliacmon*, which ran between him and *Domitius* Camp. The third day, as soon as it began to be light, he passed his Army over the River by a Ford, and incamped himself. The next day in the morning, he embattelled his forces before the front of his Camp. *Domitius* in like manner, made no difficulty of bringing out his legions, resolving to fight. And whereas there lay a field of six miles between both the Camps, he led his troupes embattelled under *Scipio's* Camp; who neverthelesse refused to move any jot from his standing: yet for all that, *Domitius* souldiers were hardly kept from giving battell; but specially a River lying under *Scipio's* Camp, with broken and uneven banks, did hinder them at that time.

Scipio, understanding of their alacrity and desire to fight, suspecting it might happen, that the next day he should be forced to fight against his will, or with great dishonour keep himself within his Camp, having with great expectation in the beginning gone on rashly, and unadvisedly, was now dishonoured with a reproachfull end. For in the night-time he rose, without any noise or warning for the trussing up of the baggage, and passing the River, returned the same way he came: and in an eminent place, near unto the River, he pitched his Camp.

A few daies after, he laid an ambushment of horsemen in a place, where our men had formerly accustomed to forrage. And as *Q. Varius*, General of the horse in *Domitius* Army, came out according to his ordinary use,

either proceedeth from their own weaknesse; or otherwise, when the Provinces adjoining do refuse such mutuall respects, as may relieve the wants of a consuming multitude. And therefore, laying got all the forces together which he looked for, or could any way expect, he sent out to try the affection of the Countrey, and to alter that in a moment, which *Pompey* had been settling for a year together, and then resolved to attack him nearer.

And doubtlesse, if *Scipio* had not by chance interrupted their counsels, upon his coming out of Asia to aide *Pompey*, they had as easily got all Thessalia and Macedonia, as they did Aetolia: and were neverthelesse to be ordered and disposed, as they got more honour of *Scipio*, then he could win of them.

CHAP. XIII.

The Passages between Domitius and Scipio.

they set upon him at a suddain. But our men did valiantly sustain the onset; and every man betaking himself speedily to his rank, they all together of their own accord charged the Enemy: and having slain four score, they put the rest to flight, with the losse onely of two of their men.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT appeareth here, that to shew a readines and resolution to fight, upon such grounds as are justifiable by the rules of War, is no small advantage to the prosperous carriage of the same. For albeit *Scipio* was great in his own strength, and as great in the opinion and expectation of men: yet when he found such an alacrity in the Enemy, to give and take blows, and a desire to entertain seriously all occasions of giving battell; he was so far from prosecuting what he had pretended, as he rather chose the fortune of a safe retreat, and consequently to turn the advantage which the world in opinion had given to his Army, to his own reproach and disadvantage. Whereas on the other side, to be found for the most part unwilling to hazard the triall of a Field, or indisposed to fight upon any occasion, doth invite an Enemy to attempt that, which otherwise he would not; and giveth them courage to beat him from all his purposes, as knowing the resolution of their Adversary, and the means they have, either to take or leave at their pleasure.

CHAP. XIV.

Domitius draweth Scipio to a losse, by an Ambushment, 'tween Pompey's attempt upon Oricum.

After these things, *Domitius* hoping that *Scipio* might be drawn to fight, he made as though he were in great want and scarcity of Corn: and thereupon, rising from the place wherein he was incamped, with the usual cry of removing, according to the custome of War, and having marched three miles, he lodged all his Army, with the Cavalry, in a convenient and secret place.

Scipio being ready to follow after, sent his horsemen and a great part of his light-armed souldiers, to discover what way *Domitius* took; who marching forward, as the first troupes came within the Ambushment (suspecting somewhat by the neighing of the horses) they fell back again. Those that followed after, seeing the former troupes so suddainly to retire, stood still.

P P

Our

Observations upon Cæsars

Our men finding themselves discovered, and thinking it in vain to attend the rest, having got two troupes of horse within their reach, they contented themselves with them; amongst whom was M. Opimius, the General of the horse. The rest of those two troupes they either put to the sword or took alive, and brought them to Domitius.

Cæsar, as is before shewed, having withdrawn the Garrisons from along all the Sea-coast, left onely three Cohorts at Oricum, for the defence of the Town: and to them he committed the custodie and safe keeping of the Gallies, which he had brought out of Italy; whereof Acilius the Legate had the charge, being left Governour of the town. He, for the better security of the shipping, had drawn all the fleet into a back angle, behind the town, and there fastened them to the shore: and in the mouth of the Haven had sunk a great ship, and set another by her, upon which he built a tower, to keep the entrance of the Port; and filled the same with souldiers, to defend the Haven from any sudden attempt.

Upon notice whereof, Pompey's son, being Admirall of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum, and with many hulsters and hooks weighed up the sunk ship; and assaulted the other ships set by Acilius for the defence of the Haven, with ships wherein he had made towers, which stood by counterpoize; that he might fight with advantage of height, supplying continually fresh men; and attempting also from the Land side, to take the town by scaling Ladders, as by Sea with his Navy, to the end he might distract and dismember the forces within.

In the end, with extreme labour and multitude of weapons, he overcame our Partie, and took the ship, having cast out such as had the guard, who fled all away with Skiffs and Boats. At the same time, being likewise seized of a small height on the other side of the town in the nature of a Peninsula, he conveyed over four small Gallies, with Rollers and Levers, into the inner part of the Harbor, lying behind the town; insonmuch, as setting on each side upon the Gallies tied unto the shore, empty and unfurnished, he carried four of them away, and burned the rest.

This being done, he left D. Lælius, whom he had taken from the Egyptian fleet, to keep the passage, that no victuals, or other provisions, might be brought into the town, either from Bullis or Amantia: and he himself going to

Lissus, found thirty ships of burthen, which Antonius had left within that Haven, and set them all on fire. And as he went about to take Lissus, the souldiers which Cæsar had put there for a garrison to the Town, together with the Roman Citizens, and the townsmen thereof, did so well defend the same, that after he had continued there three daies, and lost a few men in the siege, he left the place, without effecting any thing.


OBSERVATIONS.

AN Ambushment is easily at all times laid: but to do it so that it may not be suspected, and in such manner that the Enemy may fall into the danger thereof, is that which is to be aimed at therein. And therefore, to give the better colour to such delignes, the trick hath been to pretend fear (and so flight) or want of Corn, or somewhat else, to draw the Enemy to follow after with more boldnesse and resolution. And so to have it well done, there must be two deccits to assit each other; as in this of Domitius: to make shew of removing, through scarcity and want; and then to lie in wait for an advantage: According to that of the Spaniard, *A un Traydor, dos Alevosos*. For the prevention of such snares of deccit, the rule is generally given by Onofander, That the de-
Opotece
hostium
diffinitiones
semper
aspectus
habere.
 parture or falling away of an Enemy, is alwaies to be suspected.

And for the more security therein, experienced Commanders have been carefull before they stirred their Army, to make exact discovery, even to the place where they intended to lodge. For as in Physick, it is the greatest part of the cure, to know the disease: so in matter of war, the danger is almost over, when it is perceived whence it may grow.

The manner observed in discoveries, hath usually been to send the Parties out in three Companies or troupes; The first, consisting of a small number, to beat the way at ease, and to range about from place to place, as shall be found convenient: the second Company, being somewhat stronger, to second and relieve the first, if there be occasion: and the third, able to ingage a good number of the Enemy.

And after this manner Cyrus disposed of his fore-runners; as appeareth in Xenophon. But this being subject to the consideration of time and place, and other circumstances, may varie, as shall seem expedient to the wisdom of the Generall.



CHAP. XV.

Cæsar marcheth towards Pompey; offereth him battel; and cutteth him off from Dyrrachium.

After Cæsar understood that Pompey was at Alparagus he marched thitherward with his Army: and taking by the way the town of the Parthinians, wherein Pompey had put a Garrison, the th'rd day he came to Pompey in Macedonia, and lodged himself just by him. The next day he drew out his forces; and putting them in order, presented himself. But when he found that he would not accept thereof, he drew back his Army into the Camp, and bethought himself of some other course. For the next day, taking a difficult and narrow way, he set forward with all his forces towards Dyrrachium: hoping either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the town, or at least to cut him off from all Convoys and Munition, which was there stored up for the whole provision of the war; as afterwards it came to passe. For Pompey being ignorant at first of his purpose, inasmuch as he took a contrary way, thought he had been driven thence through scarcity and want of Corn. But being afterwards advertised by the discoverers what course he took, he rose the next day, in hope to meet him a nearer way. Which Cæsar suspecting, exhorted the soldiers to endure a little labour with patience. And resting a small part of the night, in the morning he came before Dyrrachium, even as the first troop of Pompey's Army was discovered afar off; and there incamped himself.

Pompey being cut off from Dyrrachium, when he could not accomplish his purposes, fell to a second resolution, and fortified his Camp in an eminent place, called Petra; from whence there was an indifferent passage to the ships; and sheltered likewise the Haven from certain winds. Thither he commanded part of the ships to be brought; together with Corn and provision of vittuall from Asia, and such other Countries as were in his obedience.

Cæsar, doubting that the war would prove long and tedious, and despairing of any succour of vittualls from the Coast of Italy, for that all the shore was (with great diligence) kept by Pompey's parties, and that the shipping which in Winter he had made in Sicilia, Gallia, and Italia, were staid and came not to him; he dispatched L. Canuleius a Legate into Epirus, to make provision of Corn.

And forasmuch as those Regions were far off, he appointed storehouses and Magazines

in certain places, and imposed carriage of Corn upon the Countrey bordering about them. In like manner, he commanded what grain soever should be found at Lissus, Parthenia, or any other place, to be brought unto him; which was very little, forasmuch as the Countrey thereabout was rough and mountainous, and afforded no Corn; but that which was brought in from other places; as also, that Pompey had taken order in that behalf, and a little before had ransacked the Parthinians, and caused his horsemen to carry away all the Grain; which was found amongst them.

OBSERVATIONS.

The first thing that Cæsar did, after their approach near one unto another; was to offer battel; as the best Arbitrator of the Cause in question, and most fitting the instance of the ancient Romans. But, forasmuch as the endeavours of such as are in action, are alwaies ordered by him that is the Sufferer; and that Pompey refused to accept thereof, knowing himself to be much stronger in forces, better accommodated, having a far greater party in the Countrey, and the Sea wholly at his command (which advantages were like to end the business, without hazard of a battel;) Cæsar bethought himself of some other project, which might take away the scorn of that refusal, by undertaking such things as much imported the State of his Adversarie. For in such cases, when an Enemy will not fight, somewhat must be done to cast dishonour, or greater inconveniences, upon him; or at least, to make overtures of new opportunities. And therefore he took a course, either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the Town wherein all his provisions of war were stored up, or otherwise to cut him off from the same. The least of which was a sufficient acquittance of any disgrace, which the neglect of this offer might seem to inferre; having thereby occasion to use that of the Poet, *Jam sumus ergo pares*; now we are even.

Adus ad-
vortum in
patentia
fane disposi-
tione. Arist.
Metaph.

CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar goeth about to besiege Pompey.

Cæsar being informed of these things, entered into a deliberation, which he first took from the very nature of the place wherein they were: for whereas Pompey's Camp was inclosed about with many high and steep Hills, he first took these Hills, and built Forts upon them; and then, as the condition of each place would bear, he made

P p 2 work

Quærit
victoria
in Thau-
linis inco-
rituram.
Lucan.

works of fortification from one Fort to another, and determined to inclose Pompey about with a Ditch and a Rampier. And especially upon these considerations; for that he was greatly straightened through want of Corn, and that Pompey being strong in horse, he might with lesse danger supply his Army from all parts with provision: as also to the end he might keep Pompey from foraging, and so make his Cavalry unserviceable in that kind; and further, that he might abate and weaken the exceeding great reputation, which Pompey had attained unto amongst foreign Nations, when it should be noised throughout the world, that he was besieged by Cæsar, and durst not fight.

Pompey would by no means be drawn to leave the commodity of the Sea, and the town of Dyrrachium, having there laid up all his provision of war, Arms, Weapons, Engines of what sort soever; besides Corn, which was brought from thence to his Army by shipping. Neither could he hinder Cæsar's fortifications, unless he would accept of batel, which for that time he was resolved not to do. Only it remained, as the last thing he could think of, to possess himself of as many Hills as he might, and to keep as much of the Country as he could with good and strong guard; and by that means, to distract, as much as possibly he might, Cæsar's forces: as accordingly it fell out. For having made twenty four Castles and Forts, he took in twenty five miles of the Country in circuit, and did forage within that space, and there caused many things to be set and planted by hand, which in the interim served as food for horses.

And as our men perceived their fortifications to be carried, and continued from one Castle to another, without intermission; they began to fear, least they had left some places to sally out, and so would come upon them behind, before they were aware.

And the reason they made their works thus perfect, throughout the whole inward circuit, was, that our men might not enter in upon them, nor circumvent them behind. But they (abounding in number of Men) exceeded in their works, having also on the inside a lesse compass to fortifie.

And as Cæsar went about to take any place, albeit Pompey was resolved not to fight, or interrupt him with all his forces: nevertheless he sent out his Archers and Slingers,

of which he had great numbers; by whom many of our men were wounded, and stood in great fear of the arrows: and almost all the souldiers made them coats, either of quilts Ex tuberculis & con- or of stiffening, or of leather, to keep them from danger.

To conclude, either Party used all force and means to take places, and make fortifications: Cæsar, to shut up and straighten Pompey what he could; and Pompey, to enlarge himself, and possess as many hills as conveniently he might; which gave occasion of many skirmishes and encounters.

OBSERVATIONS.

WE may here take notice of the strangest enterprize, that ever was undertaken by a judicious souldier. For where else may it be read or understood, that a weaker Party went about to besiege a strong adversary, and to inclose a whole Country by Castles and Towers, and perpetual fortifications from hill to hills; to the end he might shut him up, as he lay incamped in the field? But herein appear the infinite and restless endeavours of a Roman spirit, and the works they wrought to achieve their own ends: and yet not besides the limits of reason. For if that of Seneca have any affinity with truth, That a man is but a commodity, or rather contemptible thing, unless he raise himself above ordinary courses: it is more specially verified in a Souldier; whose honour, depending upon the superlative degree, must seek out projects beyond all equality: and the rather, upon such inducements as are here allowed; which shew good reason he had to be so mad.

CHAP. XVII.

A Passage that happened between both Parties, about the taking of a Place.

AMONGST these fights and encounters, Cæsar, it happened, as Cæsar's ninth Legion had taken a certain Place, and there began to fortify, Pompey had possessed himself of the Hill next adjoining therunto, and began to hinder our men from their work. And having from one side an easy access unto it, first with Archers and Slingers, & afterwards with great troops of light-armed men, and engines of Battery he began to disturb them in their business. Neither were our men able, at one and the same time, to defend themselves, and go on with their fortifications.

Cæsar,

Cæsar seeing his souldiers wounded and hurt from all parts, commanded them to fall off, and leave the Place. But so far as much as they were to make their retreat down the Hill, they did the more urge and presse upon them; and would not suffer them to fall back, for that they seemed to forsake the Place for fear. It is reported that Pompey should then, in a vain-glory, say to those that were about him, That he would be content to be taken for a General of no worth; if Cæsar's men could make any retreat from thence (where they were so rashly engaged) without great losse.

Cæsar fearing the retreat of his souldiers, caused Hurdles to be brought, and set against the Enemy, in the brim of the Hill; and behind them sunk a trench of an indifferent latitude, and incumbered the place as much as possibly he could. He lodged also Slingers in convenient places, to defend his men in their retreat.

These things being perfected, he caused the legions to be drawn back. But Pompey's party began with greater boldness and insolency to press on people: and putting by the Hurdles, which were set there as a Barricado, they passed over the ditch. Which when Cæsar perceived, fearing least they should rather seem to be beaten off, then be brought back, whereby a greater scandall might consequently ensue, having almost from the mid-way encouraged his men by Antonius, who commanded that legion he willed that the signe of charging the Enemy should be given by a Trumpet, and gave order to assault them.

The souldiers of the ninth legion, putting themselves suddenly into order, threw their Pikes: and running furiously from the lower ground, up the steep of the Hill, drove the Enemy headlong from thence; who found the Hurdles, the long poles, and the ditches, to be a great hindrance unto them in their retreat. It contented our men to leave the place without losse: so that having slain many of them, they came away very quietly, with the losse of five of their fellows. And having staid about that place a while, they took other hills, and perfected the fortifications upon them.

OBSERVATIONS.

THIS Chapter sheweth, that advantage of place, and some such indutious courtes as may be fitted to the occasion, are of great consequence in extremities of war: but above all, there is nothing more available to clear a danger, then valour. Valour is the Hercules that overcometh many Monsters: and verifieth that saying, which cannot be too often repeated, *Virute faciendum est, quicquid in re-*

bus bellicis est gerendum, What a man does in matter of war, must be done with valour. But of this I have already treated.

CHAP. XVIII.

The scarcity which either Parties endured in this siege.



HE carriage of that war was in a strange and unusual manner, as well in respect of the great number of Forts and Castles, containing such a circuit of ground within one continued fortification, as also in regard of the whole siege, and of other consequents depending thereupon. For whosoever goeth about to besiege another, doth either take occasion from the weakness of the Enemy, daunted or stricken with fear, or overcome in battail, or otherwise being moved therunto by some injurie offered; whereas now it happened that they were far the stronger, both in horse and foot. And generally, the cause of almost all sieges is, to keep an enemy from provision of Corn: but Cæsar, being then far inferior in number of souldiers, did nevertheless besiege an Army of intire and untouched forces, especially at a time when they abounded with all necessary provisions; for every day came great store of shipping from all parts, bringing plenty of all things needfull: neither could there any wind blow, which was not good from some part or other.

On the other side, Cæsar having spent all the Corn he could get, far or near, was in great want and scarcity: and yet notwithstanding, the souldiers did bear it with singular patience; for they remembered how they had suffered the like the year before in Spain, and yet with patience and labour had ended a great and dangerous war. They remembered likewise the exceeding great want they endured at Alesia, and much greater at Avaricum: and yet for all that, they went away Conquerors of many great Nations. They refused neither Barlie nor Pease, when it was given them in stead of wheat. And of Cartell (whereof they were furnished with great store out of Epius) they made great account.

There was also a kind of roots found out by them that were with Valerius, called Chara, which eaten with Milk did much relieve their want; and made with all a kind of bread, whereof they had plenty. And when Pompey's Party happened in their Colloquies, to cuss in their teeth their scarcity and misery; they would commonly throw this kind of bread at them, and scatter it in divers places, to discourage them in their hopes. And now Corn began to

Observations upon Cæsars

be ripe, and hope it self d'd relieve their want, for that they trusted to have plenty within a short time. And oftentimes the souldiers, in their watches and conferences, were heard to let fall speeches, but they would rather eat the bark of trees, then suffer Pompey to escape out of their hands.

Besides, they understood by such an away from the Enemy, that their horse of service could scarce be kept alive, and that the rest of their Castell were all dead, and that the souldiers themselves were in no good health, as well through the narrowness of the place wherein they were pent, as also by means of the ill savour and multitude of dead bodies, together with continuall labour, being unaccustomed to travel and pains, but especially, through the extreme want of water; for all the Rivers and Brooks of that quarter, Cæsar had either turned another way, or dammed up with great works. And as the places were mountainous, with some intermission and distinction of Valleys, in the form and fashion of a Cave or Den; so he stopped the same with great piles beaten into the ground, and interlaced with fagots and hurdles, and then strengthened with earth, to keep back the water, in so much as they were constrained to seek low grounds, and Marshy places, and there to sink Wells. Which labour they were glad to undertake, besides their daily works, albeit these Wells stood far distant from their Garrisons, and were quickly dried up with heat.

But Cæsar's Army was in exceeding good health, and had plenty of water, together with all kind of provisions, excepting Wheat; which the season of the year daily brought on, and gave them hope of store, Harvest being so near at hand.

In this new course of war, new policies and devices of warfare were invented and put in practice by either Partie. They, perceiving by the fires that our Cohorts in the night time kept watch at the works, came stealing out, and discharged all their Arrows upon them, and then presently retreated. Where with our men being warned, found out this remedy; that they made their fires in one place, and kept their watch in another.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FOR as much as all matter of attempt doth much import the fortune of a war, we may not omit to take notice of the reasons hear expressed by Cæsar, which are the true motives of undertaking a siege. The first is drawn either from the weakness of an Enemy, or as he is daunted

with fear, or overcome in battel. For having thereupon no confidence in his own power, he relecth himself in the strength of the Place which he holdeth and possesseth: which giveth his adversaries occasion to lay siege unto his Hold; and either to force them, or shut them up like women.

The second is, when one State hath offered injurie to another (which alwaies importeth losse) beyond that which stood with the count of respect formerly held between them. For revenge whereof, the other side laich siege to some of their Towns, to repair themselves by taking in the same.

And thirdly, the finall cause of all sieges is, to keep an Enemy from victuall, and other manner of provisions; and so to take them by the belly, when they cannot take them by the ears; which is a part so violent, in requiring that which is due to Nature, as it hath made the Father and the Son fall out for a Moule; as it happened at Athens, besieged by Demetrius.

Plur. ch.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE second thing worthy our consideration is, the patience and deportment of Cæsar's souldiers, in their so great wants and necessities. As first, in helping themselves with this root called Chara, described by Dioscorides, to Lib. 3. c. 59. be a little seed, tasting somewhat like Anise-seed, good to help digestion, and having such a root as a Carrot, which being boiled, is very good meat; and is the same which our Physicians call Caraway-seed: wherewith they served their turn with such contentment, as they seemed to have been trained up in the School of Frugality; a vertue worthy of all regard, and the onely means to make easie the difficulties of war, being as necessary for a souldier, as the use of Armes; and is that which was aimed at in the answer of Cyrus, to shew the services in a souldiers diet. For being demanded, what he would have made ready for supper; Bread, saith he; for we will sup at the Fountain.

Neither hath it been thought fit, to give way to the naturall looseness of the stomacks appetite, upon any occasion; but to use the like moderation in the time of plenty. For Zeno took the answer of them, that would excuse their liberrall expenses by their ability of means, for no better payment, then they themselves would have taken the excuse of their Cooks, for putting too much salt on their meat, because they had salt enough.

Cæsar punished his Baker, for giving him better bread then his souldiers had. And Scipio cashiered a couple of Romans at the siege of Carthage, for feasting a friend in their Tent, during

during an assault. Which austerity of life raised the Romans to that height of honour, and made them Masters of the world, from the East to the Western Ocean.

Secondly, as a consequent of this contentment, we may note their resolution to hold on their course of siege; purposing rather to eat the bark of trees, then to suffer Pompey to escape their hands. It is an excellent point in a General, to keep himself from irresolution; being a weakness of ill consequence, and not unlike the disease of the Staggers, variable, uncertain, and without bottom or bound: whereas constancy to purposes, produceth noble and worthy ends.

An instance whereof is Fabius Maximus, who notwithstanding the reproach and scandal cast upon him, continued firm in his determination, to the saving of his Country. And if it be so well becoming a Leader, it is of much more regard in the souldier: especially considering that of Xenophon; Non facile in officio potest miles contineri ab eo qui necessaria non subministrat; He cannot easily keep his souldiers in obedience, which does not provide them necessities. For, as the same Author observeth in another place, Nullus est adeo sortis aut validus, qui possit adversus famem aut frigus pugnando militare; There is no man so stout and valorous, that can fight against cold and hunger.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

AMONGST all the parts of the Roman discipline, their Watch deserveth a particular description; supplying in the Army, the office of the naturall eye in the bodie, which is to give notice of any approaching danger, for the preventing of the same. Polybius hath left it to posterity in this manner; Of each sort of the Legionary foot, as namely the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, and likewise of the horse, there was chosen one out of the tenth and last Maniple, that was made free from watch and ward. This party, as the Sun began to decline, came daily to the Tent of the Tribune, and there had given him a little Tablet, wherein the watch-word was writ; which Tablet they called Tessera: and then returning to his Company, delivered it to the Centurion of the next Maniple, and that Centurion to the next, and so in order, untill it came to the first and chiefeft Company, which was lodged next unto the Tribunes; and by the Centurion thereof was returned to the Tribune before Sun-setting.

And if all the Tablets were brought in, then did the Tribune know the word was given to all. If any wanted, they made inquire, and

by the notes of inscription finding which was missing, they punished the default as they saw cause. And this was their watch-word, by which their Party was distinguished from an Enemy; and in likelihood (for Polybius doth not affirm so much) by the Centurion given to such of his Maniple as were to watch that night.

Their night-watches were thus ordered; A Maniple, or Company, was alwaies appointed to watch at the Generalls Pavilion. The Treasurer had three watches, and every Legat two. A watch consisted of four men, according to the generall division of their night into four parts: each of those four having his turn appointed him by lot, for the first, second, third, or fourth watch, and the rest sitting by. The Velites kept watch without the Camp, and the Decurries of horse at the gates. Besides, every Maniple had private watch within it self.

Of those that were appointed to watch, a Lieutenant of each Maniple did bring to the Tribune in the evening, such as were to keep the first watch of the night: and to them were delivered lesser Tablets; then were given out at first, called Tesserae, appropriated to every particular watch; one for himself, and three other for his fellows.

The trust of going the Round was committed to the horsemen: for it belonged to the first Commander of horse in each legion, to give order to his Lieutenant, to appoint before dinner four young men of his troupe, to go the Round the next night; and in the evening, to acquaint the next Commander to appoint Rounders for the night following. These horsemen being thus appointed, did cast lots for the first, second, third, and fourth watch, and then repaired to the Tribune; of whom they had order what, and how many watches to visit, having received the watch-word before from their Commander: and then all four went to attend at the Tent of the Primipile, or chiefeft Centurion of a Legion, who had the charge of distinguishing the four watches of the night by a Trumpet.

When time served for him that was to go the Round the first watch, he went out accompanied with some of his friends, and visited those watches which were assigned unto him. And if he found the watch-man waking, and in good order, he then took that Tablet from him which he had received of the Tribune, and departed. But if he found him sleeping, or out of his place, he took witness thereof, and departed. The same did the rest of the Rounders, as their watches fell out in course. And as the day began to break, all the Rounders brought in the Tablets to the Tribunes. And if

Equalem
oportet esse
semper esse
superioris
animi
animam
tariem
pro re
variati
bus, m
instabilis
argumentum
est. Iur. A
g. p. t. s.
tous homo
nobis cun
tando resti
tue Rem.
enn.

Lib. 4. de
Cypoz.

Lat. or milit
the assidua
fuga traxit
challieristi
ne factior
tullin.
Cyrus con
breced and
water.
Xenophon.

if all were brought in, there was no more to do: but if any wanted, it was found out by the Character, what watch had failed; which being known, the Centurion was called; and commanded to bring those that were faulty. If the offence were in the watch-man, the Rounder was to prove it by witnesses; if not, it fell upon himself; and a Council of war being presently called, the Tribune gave judgement to kill him with a club. And in this manner did the Romans keep watch in the Camp.

CHAP. XIX.

A relation of divers encounters, that happened between both Parties.

IN the meantime Pub. Sylla, whom Cæsar (at his departure from the Camp) had left to command the Army, being certified thereof, came with two legions to succour the Cohort: at whose approach, Pompey's party was easily beaten off, being neither able to endure the shock nor sight of our men. For the first being put off, the rest gave back, and left the place: but as our men pursued them, Sylla called them back, and would not suffer them to follow far after. Howbeit, many men think, that if he would have pressed hard upon them, the war had ended that day. But in my opinion, he is not to be blamed; for there is one charge and power peculiar to a Lieutenant, and another to him that commandeth in Chief: the one doing nothing but by order and prescriptions, and the other disposing every thing as he shall think fit.

Sylla (in Cæsar's absence) having freed his men as content therewith, and would no further engage them in fight (which might happily prove subject to ill fortune) least he should seem to assume unto himself the place and authority of a General. There were certain things that made the retreat of Pompey's men very difficult and hazardous. For having ascended from a bottom to a Hill, they now found themselves upon the top thereof. And as they were to make their retreat down again, they stood in fear of our men, pressing on them from the higher ground; neither was it far from sun-setting (for hoping to end it speedily, they drew out the business until it was almost night) whereby Pompey was forced to take a resolution from the time, and to possess himself of a Mount, no further from the Fort than out of shot. There he made a stand, fortified the place, and kept his forces.

At the same time they fought in two other

places: for Pompey, to separate and distract our troops, assaulted divers forts together, to the end they might not be succoured from the next Garrisons. In one place, Volcanus Tullus with three Cohorts sustained the assault of a Legion, and made them forsake the place. In another part, the Germans following out of our works, slew many of the Enemies, and returned back to their fellows in safety. So that in one day there were six several fights; three at Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications: of all which an account being taken, there were found slain of Pompey's Party to the number of two thousand, and with many Centurions, and other special men called out to that war. Amongst whom was Valerius Flaccus, the son of Lucius, who being Prætor had obtained the Province of Asia: besides, there were six Enginemen taken. Our Party lost not above twenty men in all those fights; howbeit in the fort there was not one man but was hurt.

Four Centurions of one Cohort lost their eyes; and for argument of their endeavour and great danger, they made report to Cæsar, of thirty thousand arrows shot into the fort. There was also a Target of one Scæva, a Centurion, which was shewed unto him, being pierced through in two hundred and thirty places; whom Cæsar (as having well deserved of him and the Commonwealth) rewarded with six hundred pound sterling; and advanced him from the Companies of the eighth rank, to be the chiefest Centurion, or Primipile of the Legion: for it appeared, that by his means specially the fort was saved. For the Cohort, he doubled their pay, as well in Money, as in Corn and Apparell; and rewarded them nobly with ornaments of Military honour.

Pompey having wrought all that night, to fortify his Trenches, the dayes following he built towers 15 foot high; which being finished, he added manilets to that part of the Camp. And after five daies, having got a dark night (shutting all the Ports of his Camp, and ramming them up) in the beginning of the third watch, he drew out his Army in silence, and betook himself to his old fortifications.

OBSERVATIONS.

THE breach of the Historie in this place, is like a blot in a fair Table, or as a gap in a daunce of Nymphs, and doth much blemish the beauty of this Discourse. But, forasmuch as it is a losse which cannot be repaired, we must rest contented with the use of that which remaineth.

Out of which we may observe the notice they took of well-deserving; according to the institution

Solon. Plat.
S. de leg.
Liber. lib. 4.
Lib. 6.

In vita Cæsar.
sub.

In re pub.
multo præ-
stare benefi-
cium quam
ma. et cum
immemoriam
esse. et non
fignem sic
ubi neglig-
gas in malis
improbiis.
Sal. Jugur.

tution of their discipline, supported especially by Præm'um and Pæna; Reward and Punishment. The recognition whereof (according to the judgement of the gravest Law-givers) is the means to raise a State to the height of perfection. *Eo enim impendi laborem & periculum, unde enolumentum & honor speratur.* Men will then venture and take pains, when they know they shall get themselves honour and preferment by it. The Romans, saith Polybius, crowned the valour of their soldiers with eternal honours. Neither did any thing to much excite them to the achievement of noble Acts, as their Triumphs, Garlands, and other Emblems of publick renown: which Cæsar specially observed above the rest. For besides this which he did to Cassius Scæva (recorded by all the Writers of these wars) Plutarch relateth, that at his being in Britain, he could not contain from embracing a soldier, that carried himself valiantly in defence of divers Centurions. And whereas the poor man, falling down at his feet, asked nothing but pardon for leaving his Target behind him; he rewarded him with great gifts, and much honour. Howbeit, the diffidence which Salust hath made in this kind is too generally observed; that it more importeth a Commonwealth to punish an ill member, then to reward a good act: for a virtuous desire is by neglect a little abated, but an ill man becomes unalterable. And thence it is, that merit is never valued but upon necessity. It is fit that he that will have the honour of wearing a Lions skin, should first kill the beast, as Hercules did: but to kill a Lion, and not to have the skin, is not to availle as a meaner occupation. *Antony Guicciardini* another rule, observed in that government, which is the true Idea of Perfection: *En la casa de Dios jamas fue, ni es, ni sera, merito sin premio, ni culpa sin pena.* In the house of God there never was, nor is, nor shall be, desert unrewarded, or fault unpunished.

CHAP. XX.

Cæsar moveth Scipio to mediate a Peace.

Cæsar.

AETOLIA, ACARNANIA, and AMPHILOCHIS being taken by Cassius Longinus, and Calpurnius Sabinus, as is before declared, Cæsar thought it expedient to attempt and try Achaia, and to proceed farther in that course: whereupon he sent thither L. Calenus, and Q. Sabinus, and to them he added Cassius with his Cohorts. Their coming being bruited abroad, Rutilius Lupus, to whom Pompey had left the charge of Achaia, determined to fortify the Isthmus,

to keep out Fufius. Calenus in the meantime, with the favour and assent of the States, took in Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenus, besides some other places which he took by force. The rest of the Cities he laboured to draw to Cæsar's party, by Embassages sent about unto them: and therein was Fufius occupied for the present. Cæsar every day following brought out his Army into an equal and indifferent place, to see if Pompey would accept of battle; inasmuch as he led them under Pompey's Camp, the mainward being within shot of the Rampier. Pompey, to hold the same and opinion he had attained, drew out his forces, and so imbattled them before his Camp, that their reward did touch the Rampier; and the whole Army was so disposed, that every man was under the protection of such weapons as might be shot from thence.

While these things were doing in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, it was certainly known that Scipio was come into Macedonia. Cæsar not omitting his former purpose, sent Clodius unto him, a familiar friend to both of them, and one whom Scipio had formerly so commended to Cæsar, that he had taken him in the number of his nearest favourites. To him he gave Letters and Messages, to be delivered to Scipio; whereof this was the effect. That he had used all means for peace, and yet had prevailed nothing at all: which he took to be the fault of such as had the charge of the business, being fearful to treat with Pompey thereof in an unreasonable time. But Scipio had that credit and respect, that he might not only deliver freely what he thought fitting, but might also (in some sort) constrain him, and reform his error. For being Commander in chief over an Army, besides his credit, he had strength to compell him. Which if he did, every man would attribute the quiet of Italy, the peace of the Provinces, and the safety and preservation of the Empire to him only. All these things did Clodius make known to Scipio: and for the first daies was well heard; but afterwards could not be admitted to speech; Favonius reprehending Scipio, for going so far with him, as afterwards we understood upon the ending of the war: whereby he was forced to return to Cæsar, without effecting any thing.

Cæsar that he might with greater facility keep in Pompey's Cavalry at Dyrrachium, and hinder them from forrage, fortified and shut up two passages (which, as we have before

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declared, were very narrow) with great works, and there built Castles. Pompey understanding that his horsemen did no good abroad, within a few daies conveyed them within his fortification by shipping. Howbeit they were in extreme necessity for want of forrage; in so much as having beaten off all the leaves of the trees, they fed their horses with young Reeds bruised, and beaten in pieces. For they had spent the Corn which was sowed within the works, and were forced to bring food for their Cattell from Coteyra and Acarnania, by long and tedious navigation; and where it fell short, they made it up with Barley, and so kept life in their horses. But afterwards, whenas not only their Barley and other food was spent in all places, and the grasse and herbs dried up, but the fruit also wasted and consumed off the trees, their horses being so lean as they were not able to stand on their legs, Pompey thought it expedient to think of some course of breaking out.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT may seem a cunning trick of Cæsar, and perhaps it was his end, to endeavour with fair pretences to ingage Scipio so far in contriving a Peace, as being Generall of an Army, he might assume unto himself a commanding authority; and thereupon breed such a jealousy, as would keep Pompey and him asunder.

Nevertheless, it is every way worth a mans labour, to make overtures of peace howsoever: especially considering, how it changeth the relative in the condition of men, which in war is *Homo homini Lupus*, One man a Woollf to another; and in peace, *Homo homini Deus*, One man a God to another: and, proving good, will doubtlesse continue; if inconvenient, the sooner broken, and to the case is but the same it was before.

Secondly, we may note, that there is nothing so difficult, but pertinacy and restless labour, directed with diligent and intent care, will in the end overcome it. For Cæsar, that at the first seemed to undertake impossibilities, going about to besiege a great part of a Country, and to shut up a huge Army in an open place, did nevertheless (by endeavour) bring them to such extremity of want, that if, as *Demetrius* said, the body should have put the mind in fute, for reparation of losse, which her ambition and willfull obstinacy had drawn upon it, she should never be able to pay damages.

Touching the *Isthmus* which *Rutilius Rufus* went about to fortify, it is a neck of earth

joining an Island unto the Continent. For as the In-let of the Sea, between two Lands, is called *Portheum* (whereupon the town of *Portsmouth* in Hampshire hath that appellation, as sited upon the like In-let) so any small langet or neck of earth, lying between two Seas, is called *Isthmus*. Whereof this of *Achaia* is of speciall note in Greece; being the same that joined *Peloponnesus* to the Continent, and was of speciall fame for the site of *Corinth*.

These necks of earth, called *Isthmi*, are of the nature of those things, as have been often threatned, and yet continue the same. For albeit the ambition of great Princes hath sought to alter the fashion of the earth in that behalf, yet I know not how their desires have forced to no end. *Perfodere navigabili alveo his angustias tentaverit Demetrius Rex, D. et. R. Cæsar, Caius Princeps, & Domitius Nero, infansio, ut omnium paruit ex'us, incepto; King Demetrius, Cæsar the Dictator, Caius the Prince, and Domitius Nero, all of them attempted to draw through this neck of land with a navigable channell without any successe, as appears by the issue. In the time of King *Scythris*, and since, in the Empire of the *Ottomans*, they went about to bring the *Red Sea* into *Nile*; but fearing it would be a means to shrow the Land, one Sea being lower then another, they gave over the enterprize. And it may be upon like considerations, or otherwise, fearing to correct the works of Nature, they forbore to make a passage between *Nembae* and *Dios* and *Panama*, and so to join one sea to the other, as was said to be intended.*

CHAP. XXI.

An accident which fell out by two Brethren of Savoy, in Cæsar's Army.

Here were in Cæsar's Camp two Cæsar's brethren of Savoy, *Rocillus* and *Ægus*, the sons of *Aducillus*, who, for many years together, was accounted the principall and chief man of that State: these were men of singular worth, and had done Cæsar very great service in all the wars of Gallia; and in that respect, Cæsar had advanced them to great & honourable Charges in their Country, and caused them (extraordinarily) to be taken in the number of the *Senators*, and bestowed much of the Enemies lands upon them, besides great sums of ready money, and of poor had made them rich.

These men were not only well respected by Cæsar, but were in good account throughout all the Army. Howbeit, relying too much on Cæsar's favour, and puffed up with foolish and

Lib. III. Commentaries of the Civ. Warres.

barbarous arrogancy, they disdained their own men, deceiving the horsemen of their pay, and averting all pillage from publick distribution to their own particular. The horsemen provoked with these injuries, came all to Cæsar, and complained openly thereof: adding further, that their troops were not full, nor answerable to the List or Muster-rolle, by which they required payment.

Cæsar thinking it no fit time of punishment, and withall attributing much to the worth of the men, put off the whole matter, and chid them privately, for making a gain of their troups of horse; willing them to expell a supply of all their wants from his favour, according as their service had well deserved. Nevertheless, the matter brought them into great scandall and contempt with all men: which they plainly perceived, both by the speeches of other men, as also by that they might judge themselves, their own consciences accusing them. With which reproach and shame they were so moved (and thinking peradventure that they were not quit thereof, but deserved still some other time) that they resolved to leave the Army, to seek new fortunes, and make proof of other acquaintance. And having imparted the matter to a few of their followers, to whom they durst communicate so great a disloyalty, first they went about to kill *C. Volusenus*, Generall of the horse (as after the war was ended was discovered) that they might come to Pompey upon some deserved service: but after they found it hard to accomplish, they took up as much money as they could borrow, as though they meant to have paid their troups, what they formerly had defrauded them of; and having bought many horses, they went to Pompey, together with such as were acquainted with their purposes.

Pompey finding them Gentlemen of sort, liberally brought up, attended with a great retinue, and many horses, and both of them very valiant, and in good account with Cæsar, and withall, for that it was an unusuall and strange accident, he led them about the works, and shewed them all the fortifications: for before that time, no man, either souldier or horseman, had fled from Cæsar to Pompey; whereas daily they came from Pompey to Cæsar, especially such as were enrolled in *Epirus* and *Ætolia*, which countries were at Cæsar's devotion. These two Brethren exactly understand- ing all things in Cæsar's Camp (as well con-

cerning such works as were perfect, as such others wherein men skilfull in war might find defect, together with the opportunity of time, and distances of places, as also the diligence of the Guards, with the nature and endeavour of every man that had a charge) related all particularly to Pompey.

OBSERVATIONS.

WE may here observe the sincerity and direct carriage of inferior Commanders in the Roman Army by the scandall these two *Savoies* ran into for making false Murders, and defrauding the souldiers of their due: A matter so ordinary in these our times, as custome seemeth to justify the Abuse. For what more common in the course of our modern wars, then to make gain of Companies, by muttering more then they have in pay, and by turning that which is due to the souldier to their own benefit? The first whereof, if it be duly weighed, is an offence of a high nature against the State; and the second, such an injury to the souldier, as can hardly be answered.

It is merrily (as I take it) aid by *Columella*, That, in foro concessum *Lurocinium*, Robbery is lawfull in courts at Law. But for those, to whom is committed the safety of a kingdom, to betray the trust reposed in them, by raising their means with dead payes, and consequently, steading the Cause with dead service; as also, by disabling their Companions and fellow-souldiers from doing those duties which are requisite, for want of due entertainment; is a thing deserving a heavy censure, and will doubtlesse fall out unto them, as it did to these two Brethren. The sequel whereof will appear by the story, and confirme that of *Xenophon*; Lib. 5. Cy: *Dii haud impunita relinquunt impia & nefaria hominum facta*: The Gods do not suffer the impieties and wickednesses of men to escape unpunished.

CHAP. XXII.

Pompey attempting to break out, putteth Cæsar's Party to great losse.

Pompey being informed of these things, & having formerly resolved to break out, as is already declared, gave order to the souldiers to make them coverings for their Morions of Osiers, and to get some store of Bavins and Fagots, which being prepared, he shipped a great number of the light-armed souldiers and Archers, together with those fagots, in Skiffs and Gallies. And about mid-night he drew threescore Cohorts out of the greater Camp,

Observations upon Cæsars

and the places of Garrison, and sent them to that part of the fortification which was next unto the Sea, and farthest off from Cæsar's greatest Camp. Thither also he sent the ships before-mentioned, filled with light-armed men and sagois, together with as many other Gallies as were at Dyrrachium; and gave directions how every man should employ himself.

Cæsar had left Lenculus Marcellinus, the Treasurer, with the Legion newly enroll'd, to keep that fortification; who for that he was sickly, and of ill disposition of body, had substituted Fulvius Posthumus as his coadjutor.

There was in that place a trench of fifteen foot deep, and a Rampier against the Enemy of ten foot in altitude, and as much in breadth. And about six hundred foot from that place was raised another Rampier, with the front the contrary way, but somewhat lower then the former. For some few daies before, Cæsar (fearing that place, least our men should be circumvented with their ships) had caused double fortifications to be made in that place; that if (peradventure) they should be put to their shifts, they might nevertheless make good resistance. But the greatness of the works, and the continuall labour they daily endured, the fortifications being carried eighteen miles in circuit, would not suffer them to finish it. Whereby it happened, that he had not as yet made a Rampier along the Sea-shore, to joyn these two fortifications together, for the defence thereof: which was informed Pompey by these two Sivoiens, and brought great damage and losse to our people. For as the Cohorts of the ninth Legion kept watch and guard upon the Sea, suddenly, by the break of day, came Pompey's Army: which seemed very strange unto our men: and instantly thereupon, the souldiers from a ship-board assaulted with their weapons the inner Rampier, & the rest began to fill up the trench.

The legionary souldiers, appointed to keep the inner fortifications, having planted a great number of ladders to the Rampier, did amuse the Enemy with weapons, & Engines of all sorts; & a great number of Archers were thronged together on each side. But the coverings of Officers which they wore on their head-pieces, did greatly defend them from the blowes of stones, which was the only weapon our men had for that purpose. And as our men were overlaid with all these things, and did hardly make resistance,

they found out the defect of the fortification; formerly mentioned: and landing their men between the two Rampiers, they charged our people in the rere, and so driving them from both the fortifications, made them turn their backs.

This Alarme being heard, Marcellinus sent certain Cohorts to succour our men: who seeing them fly, could neither re-assure them by their coming, nor withstand the fury of the Enemy themselves: inasmuch as what relief soever was sent, was distracted by the fear and astonishment of them that fled away. Whereby the terror and the danger was made much the greater, and their retreat was hindered through the multitude of people.

In that fight, the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, and fainting for want of strength, looking towards the horsemen; This have I, said he, in my life time carefully and diligently defended for many years together, and now, dying, with the same fidelity do restore it unto Cæsar: suffer not (I pray you) such a dishonour, the like whereof never happened in Cæsar's Army, but return it unto him in safety. By which accident the Eagle was saved: all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, but the first of the Mangle of the Principes. And now the Enemy, with great slaughter of our men, approached near Marcellinus Camp.

The rest of the Cohorts being greatly astonished, M. Antonius holding the next Garrison to that place, upon notice thereof, was seen to come down from the upper ground with twelve Cohorts. Upon whose coming Pompey's Party was repressed and staied, and our men somewhat re-assured, giving them time to come again to themselves out of that astonishment. And not long after, Cæsar having knowledge thereof by smokes made out of the Forts, according to the use of former time, came thither also, bringing with him certain Cohorts out of the Garrisons.

OBSERVATIONS.

It is an old saying, that Thieves handiell is always naught. But Traitors handiell is much worse: as appeared by the falling away of these two Sivoiens: who were the first that left Cæsar in this war, and the first that brought Pompey good fortune: themselves standing culpable of as great an offence, as if they had alienated the whole Army. In the course whereof

Arma alienata grave crimen est, & causa delictorum exquiratur. Lib. 14. de re militari.

we

we may see plainly that which I have formerly noted; that it is an excellent thing to be still attempting upon an Enemy, so it be done upon good grounds and cautions: for while Pompey stood upon the defensive ward, the honour of the contention fell continually upon Cæsar. And doubtlesse, he that observeth Cæsar's proceedings in the carriage of all his warres, shall find his fortune to have specially grown from his active and attempting spirit.

Vir virtute ex natus, aliquando fortuna, semper a iusto maxime.

In this Eagle-bearer, we may see verified that which P. Scaevola affirmeth of Mithridates, That a valiant spirit is sometimes great by the favour of Fortune, but always great in a good courage.

For these titles of degrees, as *Princeps* prior, and the rest here mentioned, having formerly discoursed at large of the parts of a legion, and the Hierarchie of their discipline, I will rather refer the Reader thereunto, then bumbait out a volume with dittaine full repetitions.

CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar purpoeth to alter the course of warre; and attempteth to cut off one of Pompey's Legions.

Cæsar.

Cæsar understanding of the losse, and perceiving that Pompey was got out of the fortifications, and was incamped upon the Sea, in such sort as he might freely go out to forrage, and have no lesse access to his shipping then formerly he had, changing his course of warre, which had not succeeded to his expectation, he incamped himself fast by Pompey. The works being perfected, it was observed by Cæsar's Discoverers, that certain Cohorts to the number of a Legion, were brought behind a wood into the old Camp. The site of the Camp was after this manner. The daies before, Cæsar's ninth Legion opposing themselves against Pompey's forces, and working upon the fortifications (as is before declared) had their Camp in that place, adjoining unto a wood, and not distant from the sea above four hundred paces. Afterwards, Cæsar changing his mind for some certain causes, transferred his lodging somewhat farther off from that place. A few daies after the same Camp was possessed by Pompey. And forasmuch as he was to lodge more legions in that place, leaving the inner Rampier standing, he enlarged the fortifications so that the lesser Camp being included in the greater, served as a Castle or Cittadell to the same. Besides also, he drew a fortification from the right angle of the Camp, four hundred paces out-right, to a River, to the end the souldiers might winter freely, without dan-

ger. And he also changing his mind, for some causes not requisite to be mentioned, left the place too: so that the Camp stood empty for many daies together, and all the fortifications were as perfect as at the first.

The Discoverers brought news to Cæsar, that they had seen an Ensign of a Legion carried thither. The same was likewise confirmed, from certain Forts which stood upon the higher grounds. The place was distant from Pompey's new Camp about five hundred paces. Cæsar hoping to cut off this legion, and desirous to repair that day's losse, left two Cohorts at work, to make a show of fortifying, and he himself (by a contrary way, in as covert a manner as he could) led the rest of the Cohorts, in number thirty three (amongst whom was the ninth legion, that had lost many Centurions, and was very weak in souldiers) towards Pompey's legions, and the lesser Camp, in a double battell. Neither did his opinion deceive him: for he came thither before Pompey could perceive it.

And albeit the fortifications of the Camp were great, yet assaulting it speedily with the left Corners, wherein he himself was, he drove Pompey's souldiers from the Rampier. There stood a Turn-pike in the Gates, which gave occasion of resistance for a while: and as our men would have entered, they valiantly defended the Camp; T. Pulcio, by whose means C. Antonius Army was betrayed, as we have formerly declared, fighting there most valiantly. Yet nevertheless our men overcame them by valour; and cutting up the Turn-pike, entered first into the greater Camp, and afterwards into the Castle, and slew many that resisted, of the legion that was forced thither.

But Fortune, that can do much in all things, and specially in warre, doth in a small moment of time bring great alterations; as it then happened. For the Cohorts of Cæsar's right Corner, ignorant of the place, followed the Rampier which went along from the Camp to the River, seeking after the Gate, and taking it to be the Rampier of the Camp: but when they perceived that it joyned to the River, they presently got over it, no man resisting them; and all the cavalry followed after those Cohorts.

OBSERVATIONS.

Pompey having cleared his Army of that siege, it booteth not Cæsar to prosecute his purpose any longer: for when the end is misfitted for which any course is undertaken, it were folly to seek it by that means: We must rather

Q. q 3

chuse

Sapientem non
superare
uno gradu
sed unum via
Magna ne-
gocii mag-
nis cum pe-
riculis fulci-
tur cur.
Herodot.
Tunc in
omni ex-
pecta, om-
niferentur
accepta &
in tota ra-
tione more
salutem, si-
cuti inque
paginam fa-
cit Plin.
lib. 2. cap. 7.

chuse new wayes, that may lead us to the end of our hopes, then follow the old track, which sorted to no effect. And yet nevertheless, the sufficiency of the Generall is no way disabled: for, albeit a wise man doth not always keep one pace, yet still he holdeth one and the same way.

Secondly, that of *Xerxes* appeareth to be true, that great attempts are alwaies made with great difficulty and danger. Wherein the wisdom of the heathen world ascribed all to Fortunes, as the sole cause of all remarkable events, and that which filled up both the pages of all the Books, wherein men noted the course of things. *Clades in bello acceptas, non semper ignavies, sed aliquando Fortuna temeritatis sunt imputanda.* Losses received in war, are not alwaies to be imputed to foolish carriage, but oftentimes to the temerity of Fortunes, saith *Archieidamus*; and is that which is aimed at by *Cæsar*.

CHAP. XXIII.

The fight continueth, and *Cæsar* loseth.

Cæsar.

IN the mean while Pompey, after so long a respite of times, having notice thereof, took the first Legion from their works, and brought them to succour their fellows: and at the same time his Cavalry did approach near our horsemen, and our men that possessed the Camp, did discover an Army imbattell'd coming against them; and all things were suddenly changed. For Pompey's legions, assured with a speedy hope of succour, began to make resistance at the Decumane gate, and voluntarily charged our men.

Cæsar's Cavalry being got over the rampier into a narrow passage, seeing how they might retreat in safety, began to fly away. The right Cornet, secluded and cut off from the left, perceiving the terror of the horsemen (that they might be endangered within the fortifications) betook themselves to the other side from whence they came: and most of them (least they should be surprised in the straits) cast themselves over works of ten foot high into the ditch: and such as first got over being troden under foot by such as followed after, the rest saved themselves in passing over their bodies.

The soldiers of the left Cornet perceiving from the Rampier that Pompey was at hand, and that their own side fled away, fearing lest they would be shut up in those straits, having the Enemy both without and within them, thought it their best course to return back the same way they came. Whereby there happen-

ed nothing but tumult, fear, and flight: in so much as when *Cæsar* caught hold with his hand of the Ensignes of them that fled, and commanded them to stand; some for fear left their Ensignes behind them, others forsaking their horses kept on their course: neither was there any one of them that would stand. Notwithstanding, in this so great calamity and mishap these helps fell out to relieve us, when the whole army was in danger to be cut off; that Pompey fearing some treachery (for that, as I think, it happened beyond his expectation, who a little before saw his men flee out of his camp) durst not for a good while approach near the fortifications; and our men possessing the narrow passages and the Ports, did hinder the horsemen from following after. And so a small matter fell out to be of great moment, in the carriage of that accident, on either side. For the Rampiers, which was carried from the Camp to the River (*Pompey's* Camp being already taken) was the only hindrance of *Cæsar's* expedite and easy victory: and the same thing, hindering the speedy following of their horsemen, was the only safety and help of our men.

In those two fights, there were wanting of *Cæsar's* men nine hundred and three score; and horsemen of note, *R. Felginus*, *Tuticanus Gallus*, a Senator, *Junius C. Felginus* of *Placentia*, *Agravius* of *Puteolis*, *Sacrativius* of *Capua*, ten Tribunes of the soldiers, and thirty Centurions. But the greatest part of these perished in the Trenches, in the fortifications, and on the River banks, prest to death with the fear and flight of their fellows, without any blow or wound given them. There were lost in that time thirty two military Ensignes.

Pompey, upon that fight, was saluted by the name of Imperator; which title he then obtained, and so suffered himself to be stiled afterward: howbeit he used it not in any of his Affairs, nor yet wore any Laurell in the bundle of Rods carried before him.

Labienus having begged all the Captives, caused them (for greater ostentation) to be brought out in publick; and to give the more assurance to such as were fled thither from *Cæsar's* party, calling them by the name of fellow-soldiers, in great derision asked them whether old soldiers were wont to flee; and so caused them all to be slain.

Pompey's party took such an assurance and spirit upon these things, that they thought no farther of the course of war, but carried themselves as though they were already Victors: not respecting (as the cause of all this) the paucity of our men, nor the disadvantage of

of the place, and the streightnesse thereof, the Camp being possessed, and the doubtful terror both within and without the works; not yet the Army divided into two parts, in such sort as neither of them were able to help or succour the other. Neither yet did they add to this, that the fight was not made by any valiant encounter, or in form of battell; but that they received more hurt from the narrownesse of the place, and from their own disorders, then from the Enemy.

And to conclude, they did not remember the common chances and casualties of warre: wherein oftentimes very small causes, either of false suspicion, or of sudden fear, or out of scruple of Religion, do inferre great and heavy losses; as often as either by the negligence of the Generalls, or the fault of a Tribune, the Army is misordered. But as though they had overcome by true force of their prowess, and that no alteration of things could after happen, they magnified that dayes victory, by Letters and report throughout the whole world.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Sometimes we may think to repair a losse, and thereby hazard a greater misfortune. For albeit the saying be common, that a man must seek his coat where he lost it, as *Diceis* do; yet there is alwaies more certainty in seeking, then in finding. For the circle of humane affairs, when carried round in a course, doth not suffer happinesse to continue with one Party. And thereupon it was, That *Pit-tacus* dedicated a Ladder to the Temple of *Mitylenes*, to put men in mind of their condition; which is nothing else but going up and down. The life of a souldier is a mere *Hermaphrodite*, and taketh part of either sex of Fortune; and is made by Nature to beget Hap-pinesse of Adversity, and mischances of Good hap: as if the cause of all causes, by intermixing sweet with sorrow, would lead us to his Providence, and consequently to himself, the first Mover of all Motions.

The diversity of these events are so inched together, as one seemeth to have relation to the other. For this task admitted not of *venis, vici, vici*, I only came, and saw, and overcame; nor went on with *Alexander*, marching over the Plains of *Asia*, without rub or counterbuste: but the business was disposed, here to receive a blow, and there to gain a victory. And so this losse at *Dyrachium* made the battel at *Pharsalia* the more glorious, and beautified the course of this warre with variety of chances. The best use of these Disasters, is

that which *Croesus* made of his crosse fortunes; *Mei casus, etsi ingrati, mihi tamen exitiere* *Herodot.* discipline; My mishaps, though they be evil, are nevertheless good to me. They have still taught me something.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

AS the Mathematic's, by reason of their certainty, do admit demonstration, as well from the conclusion to the principles, as from the principles to the conclusion: so in the actions of mans life, it is not hard to align the precedents causes by the sequels; the event being oftentimes an understanding Judge of things that are past. And although it doth not where appear what was the cause of *La-bienus* leaving *Cæsar*; yet his insolent carriage towards these Captives, may make at least a probable conjecture, that his revolt proceeded from his own disposition, rather then from any cause on *Cæsar's* behalf. For where a man hath once done an injury, he will never cease heaping one wrong alter another, and all to justify his first error: whereas on the other side, a noble spirit, free from all defect, will demean himself answerable to his first innocency.

CHAP. XXV.

Cæsar speaketh to the souldiers concerning this mishap; and forsaketh the Place.

Cæsar being driven from his former Camp, purpose, resolved to change the whole course of the warre; so that at one and the same time omitting the siege, and withdrawing the Garrisons, he brought all the Army into one place, and there spike unto the souldiers: exhorting them not to think much at those things that had happened, nor to be amazed therewith; but to counterpoise this losse (which was in a mediocrity) with many happy and fortunate battels they had gained.

Let them thank Fortune, that they had taken Italy without blow or wound; that they had quieted and put in peace both the Provinces of Spain, full of warlike men, and directed by skillfull and practised Commanders; that they also had subdued the fertile bordering Provinces; and likewise, that they should remember, without facility they were all transported in safety through the midst of the Enemies fleets; not only the Havens and Ports, but all the coast being full of shipping.

If

Humanarum
rerum
cunctis
qui totus
semper
dem fo-
ratos esse
non sinit.
Herodot.
lib. 2.
Habet his
vices con-
ditio mor-
taliū, ut
adv. r. ex
secundis
secunda ex
adv. r. fa-
nat. can-
P. in. in
Paneg.

The Philo-
sophy Cra-
tor was
wrote to
say that
Tolero
of an ill
is a great
comfort in
any man
of divi-
ty. Plat in
conf. Apo.

Observations upon Cæsars.

If all things fell not out prosperously, Fortune was to be helped by their industry. The loss which was received, might be attributed to any man rather than unto him: for he had given them a secure place to fight in, had possessed himself of the Enemies Camp, driven them out, and overcome them in fight. But whether it were their fear, or any other error, or Fortune herself, that would interrupt a victory already gained, every man was now to labour to repair the damage they had sustained, with their valour: which if they did endeavour, he would turn their loss into advantage, as it formerly fell out at Gergovia, where such as before were afraid to fight, did of their own accord offer themselves to battle.

Igne miltia
militia.

Having ended his speech, he disgraced and displaced some Ensign bearers. The Army thereupon conceived such a grief of the blow that was given them, and such a desire they had to repair their dishonour, that no man needed the command either of a Tribune or Centurion: every man imposing upon himself as a punishment for his late fault, greater labours then usually, and with all inflamed with an earnest desire of fighting: insomuch as many of the higher Orders thought it requisite to continue in the place, and refer the cause to a battle. But contrariwise, Cæsar was not assured of the terrified soldiers, and thought it expedient besides, to interpose some time for the settling of their minds; fearing likewise lest he should be strengthened through scarcity of Corn, upon the leaving of his fortifications. And therefore without any further delay, giving order for such as were wounded and sick, as soon as it was night, he conveyed all the carriages secretly out of the Camp, and sent them before towards Apollonia, forbidding them to rest until they came to their lodging: and sent one legion with- all to convoy them.

That being done, he retained two Legions within the Camp: as the rest, being led out at divers ports, about the fourth watch of the night he sent the same way. And after a little pause for the observing of Military order, and to the end his speedy departure might not be discovered, he commanded them to take up the cry of trussing up their baggage; and presently setting forward, overtook the former troop, & so went speedily out of the sight of the Camp.

Pompey having notice of his purpose, made no delay to follow after: but aiming at the same things, either to take them innumbered in their

march, or astenshied with fear, brought forth his Army, and sent his horsemen before to stay the Rearward. But Cæsar went with so speedy a march, that he could not overtake them, until he came to the River Genusus; where, by reason of the high and uneasy banks, the Cavalry overtook the tail of the Army, and engaged them in fight. Amongst whom Cæsar opposed his horsemen, and intermingled with them four hundred expedite soldiers, of them that had place before the Ensigns: who so much prevailed in the encounter, that they drove them all away before them, slew many of them, and returned themselves in safety to their troops.

Cæsar having made a just daies march, according to his first determination, and brought his Army over the River Genusus, he lodged in his old Camp over against Alparagus; and kept all the soldiers within the Rampier, commanding the horse that went out to forrage, to be presently taken in by the Decuman Port.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Albeit that of Cato be true, that an Error in Right is not capable of amendment: yet out of that which happeneth amiss, may always be somewhat gathered to repair the disadvantage, and to disperse a Party to better carriage for the future. Accordingly we may note Cæsar's notable temper and demeanour, after so great a loss; recalling the courage of his soldiers, and settling their minds in a course of good resolution, with as many valuable reasons as humane wisdom was able to afford him: without which, all their other advantages, either of valour or experience and use of Arms, or their astuteness after so many victories, or what other thing forever that made them excel all other Armies, had been utterly buried in this overthrow. For his better furtherance wherein he thought it fit to use the help of times, before he brought them to the like trial. For that which is said of grief, If reason will not give an end unto it, time will, is to be understood of any other passion of the mind; which cannot possibly be so great, but time will consume it.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The second thing which cometh to be handled, is the manner of Cæsar's retreat; being as exquisite a pattern in this kind, as is extant in any story: and is the rather to be considered, forasmuch as it is one of the principall points of Military Art, and worthiest the knowledge of a General, to be able, upon all

occasions, to make a safe and sure retreat. For those that can do nothing else, can easily put themselves into a war: but to return them home again in safety, is that which concerneth the honour of a Leader.

Many are the causes that may move a Commander to dislodge himself, and to leave his Adversarie for a time: but the means to do it safely depend specially upon these two points. The one is, To advance himself onward at first, as far as possibly he can, to the end he may get the start, before the enemy be ready to follow him; and is taught by Xenophon; who, after the death of Cyrus, in the battell against King Artaxerxes, brought back a thousand men into Greece, from an Army of two hundred thousand horse, that pressed hard upon them, for five hundred leagues together. Which retreat is exactly storied by the said Author, in seven books, containing all the difficulties concerning this point: amongst which, we find this passage.

Lib. 3.

It much imported us, saith he, to go as far as first as possible we could; to the end we might have some advantage of space before the Enemy, that pressed so near behind. For, if we once got before, and could out-strip them for a daies journey or two, it was not possible for them to overtake us; forasmuch as they durst not follow us with a small troupe, and with great forces they could never reach us: besides the scarcity and want of victual they fell into by following us, that consumed all before them.

Thus far goeth Xenophon. And according to this rule, Cæsar ordered his retreat: for he got the start of Pompey so far the first day, by that eight miles he gained in the afternoon, as it followeth in the next Chapter, that he was never able to overtake him.

The second thing for the assuring of a retreat is, So to provide against the incumbrances of an Enemy, that he may not find it easie to attack him that would be gone. Of all retreats which may any way be taken from example of Beasts, that of the Wolf is most commended: who never flies, but with his head turned back upon his adversaries; and shews such teeth, as are not to be trusted.

After the Wolfs manner marched Cæsar: for howsoever the body of his Army retreated one way, yet they turned to terrible a countenance towards the Enemy, as was not to be endured. And upon these two hinges, is turned the carriage of a skilfull retreat.

Howbeit, for the better furtherance hereof, it shall not be impertinent to adde hereunto some inventions, practised by great Commanders, which may serve to amuse an Enemy, while a General doth prepare himself to observe the former points.

King Philip of Macedon, desirous to leave the Roman Army, sent a Herald to the Consul, to demand a cessation of Armes, while he buried his dead, which he purposed to perform the next day, with some care and solemnity. Which being obtained, he dislodged himself secretly that night, and was got far on his way before the Romans perceived it.

Hanniball to clear his Army from that of the Romans, which was commanded by the Consul Nero, about midnight made many fires, in that part which stood next the Roman Camp: & leaving certain Pavillions & Lodgings, with some few Numidians, to shew themselves upon the Rampier, he departed secretly towards Pirealis. As soon as it was day, the Romans (according to their custome) approaching the Counter-scarp, the Numidians shewed themselves; and then suddenly made after their fellows, as fast as their horses could carry them. The Consul, finding a great silence in the Camp, sent two Light-horsemen to discover the matter: who returning, told him of the Enemies departure.

In like manner, Varus (as is formerly related) left a Trumpeter in the Camp near Ulica, with certain Tents; and about midnight, carried with his Army secretly into the Town.

Mithridates, willing to leave Pompey, that cut him off short, the better to cover his departure, made shew of making greater provision of forrage then he was accustomed, appointed conferences the next day, made great store of fires in his Camp; and then in the night escaped away.

The Persians, in the voyage which Solyman the Turk made against them, in the year one thousand five hundred fifty four, being driven to a place where the Ottomans thought to have had a hand upon them, gathered every man a fagot; and making a great heap thereof, set them all on fire, in the passage of the Turks Army: which burned so furiously, as the Persian escaped before the Enemy could passe by the fire.

CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar goeth on in his retreat: Pompey ceaseth to follow him.

IN like manner, Pompey having that day marched a full journey, betook himself to his former lodging at Alparagus. And, for that the soldiers were not troubled with fortifying their Camp, by reason all the works were whole & intire, many of them went

out

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out far off to get wood, and to seek forrage: others, rising hastily, had left a great part of their luggage behind them; and induced by the nearness of the last night's lodging, left their Armes, and went back to fetch those things that were behind. Inſomuch as Cæſar, ſeeing them thus ſcattered (as before he had conceived how it would fall out) about high noon gave warning to depart, and ſet out his Army; and doubling that day's journey, he went from that place about eight mile: which Pompey could not do, by reaſon of the abſence of his ſouldiers.

The next day, Cæſar having in like manner ſent his carriages before, in the beginning of the night, ſet forward himſelf about the fourth watch; that if there were any ſudden neceſſity of fighting, he might (at all occaſions) be ready with the whole Army. He like he did the dayes following, by which it happened, that in his paſſage over great Rivers, and by difficult and cumbersome waies, he received no detriment or loſſe at all. For Pompey being ſtayed the firſt day, and afterwards ſtriving in vain, making great journeyes, and yet not overtaking us, the fourth day gave over following, and betook himſelf to another reſolution.

Cæſar, as well for the accommodating of his wounded men, as alſo for paying the Army, re-aſſuring his Allies and Confederates, and leaving Garriſons in the towns, was neceſſarily to go to Apollonia: but he gave no longer time for the diſpatch of theſe things, then could be ſpared by him that made haſte. For ſeeing leaſt Domitius ſhould be engaged by Pompey's arrival, he deſired to make towards him with all poſſible celerity: his whole purpoſe and reſolution ſiſting upon theſe reaſons; That if Pompey did follow after him, he ſhould by that means drive him from the Sea-side, and from ſuch provisions of war as he had ſtoved up at Dyrrachium; and ſo ſhould compell him to undertake the war upon equal conditions. If he went over into Italy, having joyned his Army with Domitius, he would go to ſuccour Italy by the way of Illyricum. But if he ſhould go about to beſiege Apollonia or Oricum, and ſo exclude him from all the Sea-coaſt, he would then beſiege Scipio, and force Pompey to relieve him. And therefore having writ and ſent to Cn. Domitius, what he would have done (leaving ſome Cohorts to keep Apollonia, one at Liſſus, and three at Oricum, and diſpoſing ſuch as were weak through their wounds in Epius and Acarnania) he ſet forward.

OBSERVATIONS.

Conſecto juſto itinere eius diei, having marched a full dayes march, or gone a juſt

dayes journey, ſaith the ſtory. Which giveth occasion to inquire, how far this juſt dayes journey extended. *Lipſius* ſaith, it was twenty four miles; alleging that of *Vegetius*; *Militari gradu* (ſaith he) *viginti millia paſſuum horis quinq; duntaxat aſtrois conſuecunt*: *pleno autem gradu qui ceteris eſt ſtoridem horis viginti quatuor*; A ſouldiers march did uſually rid 20 miles in five ſummer houres, and if they marched with ſpeed, 24 miles in the ſame time: underſtanding *juſtum iter* a juſt journey, to be to much as was meaſured *militari gradu*, by a ſouldiers march. But he that knows the marching of an Army, ſhall eaſily perceive the impoſſibility of marching ordinarily twenty four miles a day. Beſides, this place doth plainly conſute it: for, firſt, he ſaith that he made a juſt dayes journey; & then again, riſing about noon, doubled that dayes journey, and went eight miles. Which ſhews, that their *juſtum iter* was about eight miles: and ſo ſurely the ſlow conveyance of an Army, with more probability then that of *Lipſius*.

CHAP. XXVII.

Pompey haſteth to Scipio. Domitius heareth of the overthrow.

Pompey alſo conſidering at Cæſar's Cæſar. purpoſe, thought it requiſite for him to haſten to Scipio, that he might ſuccour him; if Cæſar ſhould chance to intend that way: but if it ſo fell out, that he would not depart from the Sea-side and Corcyra, as expelling the legions and Cavalry to come out of Italy, he would then attack Domitius. For theſe cauſes both of them made haſte, as well to aſſiſt their Parties, as to ſurprize their enemies, if occaſion were offered. But Cæſar had turned out of the way, to go to Apollonia; whereas Pompey had a ready way into Macedonia by Candavia. To which there happened another inconvenience: that Domitius, who for many dayes together had lodged hard by Scipio's Camps, was now departed from thence, to make proviſion of Corn, unto Heraclea Senticæ, which is ſubject to Candavia; as though Fortune would have thruſt him upon Pompey. This Cæſar was at that time ignorant of. Moreover, Pompey had writ to all the States and Provinces, of the overthrow at Dyrrachium; in far greater ſearms then the thing it ſelf was: and had noiſed it abroad, that Cæſar was beaten, had loſt all his forces, and fled away.

which reports made the waies very hard and dangerous to our men; and drew many States from Cæſar's party: whereby it happened,

opened, that many Meſſengers being ſent, both from Cæſar to Domitius, and from Domitius to Cæſar, were forced to turn back again, and could not paſſe. Howbeit, ſome of the followers of Roſcillus and Ægius (who, as is before ſhewed, had fled unto Pompey) meeting on the way with Domitius Diſcoverers (whether it were out of their old acquaintance, having lived together in the wars of Gallia, or otherwiſe out of vain-glorie) related all what had happened; not omitting Cæſar's departure, or Pompey's coming. Whereof Domitius being informed, and being but ſcarce four houres before him, d'ed (by the help of the enemy) avoid a moſt imminent danger, and met with Cæſar at Ægium, which is a town ſituate upon the frontiers of Theſſalia.

OBSERVATIONS.

Joy is an opening and dilating motion, and ſometimes openeth the body to wide, as it leecheth out the ſoul, which returneth not again. And in like manner, the cauſes of all ſuch exultations do, for the moſt part, ſpread themſelves further then is requiſite.

Pompey having victory in hope, rather then in hand, ſwallowed as though all were his: not conſidering, that the happineſſe or diſaſter of humane actions, doth not depend upon the particulars riſing in the counſe thereof, which are variable and divers, but according as the event ſhall ſentence it. Whereupon the Ruſſes have a ſaying in ſuch caſes, that he that laughs afterward, laughs then too: as Cæſar did.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Cæſar ſacketh Gomphi in Theſſalia.

Cæſar.

Cæſar having joyned both Armies together, came to Gomphi, which is the firſt town of Theſſalia by the way leading out of Epirus. Theſe people, a few dayes before, had of their own accord ſent Embaſſadors to Cæſar, offering all their means and abilities to be diſpoſed at his pleaſure; requiring alſo a Garriſon of ſouldiers from him. But now they had heard of the overthrow at Dyrrachium; which was made ſo great, and ſo prevailed with them, that Androtchenes, Prætor of Theſſalia (choſing rather to be a partaker of Pompey's victory, then a companion with Cæſar in adverſity) had drawn all the multitude of ſervants and children out of the Country into the Town; and ſhutting up the Gates, diſpatched Meſſengers

to Scipio and Pompey, for ſuccour to be ſent unto him; in that he was not able to hold out a long ſiege. Scipio underſtanding of the departure of the Armies from Dyrrachium, had brought the legions to Larilla; and Pompey did not as yet approach near unto Theſſalia.

Cæſar having fortified his Camp, commanded Mantlets, Ladders, and Hurdles to be made ready for a ſurprize. Which being fitted and prepared, he exhorted the ſouldiers, and ſhewed them what need there was (for the relieving of their wants, and ſupplying of all neceſſaries) to poſſeſſe themſelves of an opulent and full town; as alſo by their example, to terrifie the other Cities: and what they d'ed, to do ſpeedily, before it could be ſuccoured. Whereupon, by the ſingular induſtrie of the ſouldiers, the ſame day he came thither, giving the aſſault after the ninth hour (notwithſtanding the exceeding height of the walls he took the Town before ſun-ſetting, and gave it to the ſouldiers to be riſed: and preſently removing from thence, came to Metropolis, in ſuch ſort, as he outwent as well Meſſengers, as news of taking the Town.

The Metropolitans, induced with the ſame reſpects, at firſt ſhut up their gates, and filled their walls with armed men: but afterwards, underſtanding by the Captives (whom Cæſar cauſed to be brought forth) what had happened to them of Gomphi, they preſently opened their gates; and by that means were all preſerved in ſafety. Which happineſſe of theirs being compared with the deſolation of Gomphi, there was no one State of all Theſſalia (excepting them of Larilla, which were kept in with great forces by Scipio) but yielded obedience to Cæſar, and did what he commanded. Cæſar having now got a place plentiful of Corn, which was now almoſt ripe, he reſolved to attend Pompey's coming, and there to proſecute the reſidue of that war.

OBSERVATIONS.

Livie ſaith, that the ſiege of that Place which we would quickly take, muſt be proſecuted and urged hard. Which rule Cæſar obſerved: for he followed it ſo hard, that he took the Town fortified with exceeding high walls, in four houres ſpace, or thereabouts, after he began to aſſault it. Which *Plutarch* ſaith, was ſo plentifully ſtoved of all neceſſary provisions, that the ſouldiers found there a refection of all the miſeries and wants they ſuffered at Dyrrachium: inſomuch as they ſeemed to be new made, both in body and courage, by reaſon

R 2 of

Lib. 6. de
Instit. Cui.Tello lex
aquirendi
pulsillima.
Dionys. Ha-
licarn. in
expet. legat.

of the wine, victuals, and riches of that place; which were all given unto them, according to that of *Xenophon*, *Lax inter omnes homines perpetuatur, quando belligerantium urbs capta fuerit, cuncta eorum esse qui eam ceperint, & corpora eorum qui in urbe sunt & bona*; It is a general Law amongst all men, that when an Enemies town is forcibly taken, all that is found in it, as well bodies as goods, is at their disposal who have taken it.

Appian saith, the Germans were so drunk, that they made all men laugh at them: and that if *Pompey* had surprized them in these disorders, they might have paid dear for their entertainment. He addeth moreover (to shew the stiffness of the inhabitants against *Cæsar*) that there were found in a Surgeons Hall, twenty two principall Personages, stiff dead upon the ground, without appearance of any wound, having their gobbles by them: and he that gave the poison, sitting upright in a Chair, as dead as the rest. And as *Phili* having taken *Acrolis* in the Country of the *Itirians*, drew all the rest to his obedience, though the fear they conceived of their usage: to the consideration of the calamity which befall *Gomphian* and the good intreaty which the *Asteropolians* found by yielding unto *Cæsar*, brought all the other Cities under his command.

CHAP. XXIX.

Pompey cometh into *Thessalia*: his Army conceiveth assured hope of victory.

Cæsar;

Pompey a few dayes after came into *Thessalia*; and there calling all the Army together, first gave great thanks to his own men; and then exhorted *Scipio's* souldiers, that the victory being already obtained, they would be partakers of the booty and of the rewards: and taking all the legions into one Camp, he made *Scipio* partaker both of his honour and authority, commanding the Trumpets to attend his pleasure for matter of direction, and that he should use a Prætorial Pavilion.

Pompey having strengthened himself with an addition of another great Army, every man was confirmed in his former opinions, and their hope of victory was increased: so that the longer they delayed the matter, the more they seemed to prolong their return into Italy. And albeit *Pompey* proceeded slowly and deliberately in the business, yet it was but a dutes work. But some there were that said, he was well pleased with authority and commands, and to use men both of Consular dignity, and

of the Prætorian order, as his vassals and servants.

And now they began to dispute openly, concerning rewards and dignities of Priesthood; and pointed out those which from year to year were to be chosen Consuls. Others begged the houses and goods of such as were with *Cæsar*. Besides a great controversy that further grew between them in open council, whether *L. Hirrus* were not to be regarded at the next election of Prætors, being absent, and employed by *Pompey* against the Parthians. And as his friends urged *Pompey* with his promise given at his departure, requiring he might not now be deceived through his greatness and authority; the rest, running a course of as great danger and labour, saw no reason (by way of contradiction) why one man should be respected before all others. And now *Domitius*, *Scipio*, and *Spinther* *Lentulus*, began to grow to high words in their daily meetings, concerning *Cæsar's* Priesthood: *Lentulus* alleging, by way of ostentation, the honour that was due to his age and authority; *Domitius* vaunting of the credit and favours he had at Rome; and *Scipio* trusting to *Pompey's* alliance. Moreover, *Atius Rufus* accused *L. A. franius* to *Pompey*, for betraying the Army in Spain. *L. Domitius* gave out in council, That after the war was ended, all such as were of the rank of Senators, should be inquired upon by a triple Commission: and that those which were personally in the war, should be of the Commission to judge the rest; as well such as were at Rome, as those that did no service in this war. The first Commission should be, to clear such as had well deserved, from all danger. The second, Penall: and the third, Capitall. And to conclude, every man laboured, either to have a reward, or to be avenged of his Enemy. Neither did they think so much of the means how to overcome, as how to use the victory.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Tale which the Emperour *Frederick* related to the Commissioners of *Lewis* the eleventh, King of France (concerning the parting between them of the Territories of *Charles Duke of Burgundie*) Not to sell the skin before they had killed the Bear; might well have fitted these of *Pompey's* Partie, that contended for offices before they fell, and disposed of the skins ere they had took the Bears: not sparing out of their impatience to tax *Pompey* of spinning out the war, for the sweetness he found in authority and command; as *Agamemnon* did at *Troy*. Inasmuch as *Plutarch*

Cæsar.

rc-

reporteth, that one *Favonius*, imitating *Cato's* severity and freeness of speech, went about throughout all the Camp, demanding, Whether it were not great pity, that the ambitious humour of one man, should keep them that year from eating the figs and delicate fruit of *Tusculum*? And all men generally stood for affected, as *Pompey* could not withstand their inforcements. For, as *Florus* saith, *Milites otium, socii moram, principes ambitum Ducis increpabant*. The souldiers blamed the slouth, the confederates found fault with the delay, & the chief commanders with the ambition of their Generall. Onely *Cato* thought it not fit to hazard themselves upon a desperate man, that had neither hope or help, but in Fortune. But, as in most things besides, so in this he stood alone, and could not prevail against a multitude.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Placere sibi ternas tabellas dari, ad indicandum illis, qui erant ordinis Senatorii. They agreed, that all such as were of the rank of Senators, should be inquired upon by a triple Commission, saith the story. *Tabellas*, I have translated Commissions, as best fitting our English phrase: but the meaning was as followeth.

It appeareth by history, that the Roman people, as well in election of Magistrates, as in causes criminall, did give their voices openly and aloud, for six hundred years together; until one *Gabinus*, a Tribune of the People, perceiving that the Commons, for fear of the great Ones, durst not dispose of their voices freely, and as they would, published an Edict, that the people should give their voices by Balloting. Which law *Tully* commendeth; *Grata est tabella que frontes operit, hominum mentes tegit, datque cam libertatem quod velint faciant*; It is an acceptable Law, which hides the faces and meanings of men, and gives all liberty to do what they please. And in another place, he calleth it *Principium iustissime libertatis*, the foundation of most just liberty. Upon an election of Magistrates, the balls were given according to the number of the Competitors; that every man might chuse as he pleased.

In criminall Causes, every man had three: one marked with A. signifying Absolution, and another with C. for Condemnation, and another with N. L. for *Non liquet*, which they called *Ampliatio*, desirous to be further informed, which our Grand Juries do expresse by an *Ignoramus*. And in this manner would *Domitius* have had his fellow Senators either quitted or condemned. The balls which were

given upon the making of a law, were two: one marked with V. R. which signified *Uti rogas*; that it might go on: and the other with A. signifying *Antiquare*, rejecting it. For, as *Festus* noteth, *Antiquare est in modum pristinum reducere*; to Antiquate, is to make the thing be as it was before.

And in this manner they would have proceeded against *Cæsar's* Partizans, being altogether mistaken in the assurance of their happiness; the continuance whereof depended upon *Virtus*, and not upon Fortune.

Virtus si-
citatis men-
tura, non
fo tuna.
Dio. Hist.
carn. lib. 3.

CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar finding the Enemy to offer battell in an indifferent Place, prepareth to undertake him.

*R*evision of Corn being made, and the souldiers well resolved (to which end he had interposed a sufficient space of time, after the battell at *Dyrachium*) *Cæsar* thought it time now to try what purpose or will *Pompey* had to fight. And therefore, drawing the Army out of the Camp, he imbattelled his troups, first upon the place, and somewhat removed from *Pompey's* Camp: but every day following, he went further off his own trenches, and brought his Army under the hills whereon the Enemy lay incamped. This made his Army daily the more bold and assured. He kept continually his former course with his horsemen; who because they were lesse in number by many degrees then those of *Pompey's* party, he commanded certain lusty young men, chosen out of them that stood before the Ensignes, for their nimble and swift running, to fight amongst the horsemen, who by reason of their daily practise, had learned the use of that kind of fight. So that one thousand of our Cavalry, in open and champaign places, would, when need were, undergo the charge of seven thousand of theirs, and were not much terrified with the multitude of them. For at that time they made a fortunate encounter, and flew one of the two *Savoiens*, that had formerly fled to *Pompey*, with divers others.

Pompey having his Camp upon a hill, imbattelled his Army at the lower foot thereof to see if he could get *Cæsar* to thrust himself into an unequal and disadvantageous place. *Cæsar* thinking that *Pompey* would by no means be drawn to battell, thought it the fittest course for him to shift his Camp, and to be always in moving: hoping by often removing from place to place, he should be better accom-

R 2 modated

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moderated for provision of Corn: and withall, might upon a march find some occasion to fight; besides, he should weary Pompey's Army, not accustomed to travel, with daily and continuall journeys. And thereupon he gave the signe of dislodging.

But as the Tents were taken down, it was a little before observed, that Pompey's Army was advanced somewhat further from their Trenches, then ordinarily they were accustomed; so that it seemed they might fight in an equall and indifferant place. Whereupon Cæsar, when his troops were already in the gates setting out, It becometh us, saith he, to put off our removing for the present, and bethink our selves of fighting, as we have alwaies desired; for we shall not easily hereafter find the like occasion: and presently drew out his forces. Pompey also, as it was afterwards known, was resolved (at the instance of all that were about him) to give battell; for he had given out in councill some few daies before, that he would overthrow Cæsar's Army, before the troops came to joyn battell.

And as many that stood by wondered at it; I know, saith he, that I promise almost an incredible matter: but take the ground whereupon I speak it, that you may undergo the business with more assurance. I have persuaded the Cavalry, and they have promised to accomplish it, that when they come near to joyn, they shall attack Cæsar's right Corner on the open side; and so the Army being circumvented behind, shall be amused and routed before our men can cast a weapon at them: where by we shall end the war without danger of the Regions; or almost without any wound received. Which is not difficult or hard to do, for us that are so strong in horse. And withall, he gave order that they should be ready against the next day, forasmuch as the occasion was offered (according as they had often intended) not to deceive the opinion which other men had of their promise and valour.

Labienus seconding this speech, as contemning Cæsar's forces, extolled Pompey's resolution to the skies. Do not think, Pompey, saith he, that this is the Army wherewith he conquered Gallia, or Germania: I was present my self at all those battells, and do not speak rashly what I am ignorant of. There is a very small piece of that Army remaining: a great part of them are dead, as it cannot otherwise be, in so many battells. The Pestilence (the last Autumn) in Italy consumed many of them; many are gone home, and many are left in the Continent. Have ye not heard, that the Cohorts which are now at Brundisium, are made and raised of such as remained behind there to recover their healths? These forces that ye see,

were the last year gathered of the *Musters* made in the further Gallia; and most of them, of the Colonies beyond the Po: and yet all the flower and strength of them was taken away in the last two overthrowes at Dyrrachium.

When he had spoken these things, he took a solemn oath, not to return into the Camp but with victory, exhorting the rest to do the like. Pompey commending him, took the same oath: neither was there any man that refused it.

These things being thus carried in the council, they rose up and departed, with great hope and joy of all men; as having already conceived victory in their minds: and the rather, because they thought that nothing could be spoken vainly by so skilfull a Commander, in so weighty and important a Cause.

OBSERVATIONS.

Concerning the fashion of the Cavalry, in which either Party reported so much confidence, we are to note, that the Romans had two sorts of horsemen; the one compleatly armed (according to their manner) and incorporated in the body of their Legions, whose entertainment was thrice as much as the footmen. *Agua impotens postulatum fuit* (saith Livie) *ut de stipendio equitum (increbuit autem triplex ea tempestate) era demeretur*; It seemed as unreasonable a motion, that the horsemen's pay, which at that time was triple, should be lessened. And the other were as light-horsemen, which they called *Alarii*.

The first sort were thus armed, as *Josephus* Lib. 3. *Excid.* witnesseth; They wore a sword on their right side, somewhat longer then that of the footmen, and carried a long staffe or spear in their hand, a Target at their horse side, and three or more Darts in a quiver, with broad heads, and not much less then their flaves; having such head pieces and corselets as the foot-men had.

The light-armed men, had either light Darts, or Bow and Arrows. And doubtlesse, their chiefest service was with their casting weapons. And accordingly Tully putteth his son in mind, of the praise he had got in Pompey's Army (where he commanded a wing of horse) *Equitando, jaculando, omni militari labore tolerando*, in riding, casting darts, and undergoing all military duty.

And as their service consisted in breaking their Staves upon an Enemy, and in casting their Darts: so we exercise the practice of the former, in our triumphs at Tile; and the Spaniards the later, in their *loco di cane*.


Our modern horsemen are either Lanciers, Petronelliers, or Pistoliors. The Petronelliers do discharge

Prima ege-
giorum du-
cum discipli-
na victo-
riam sic
periculo
comparat.
Polyb. lib. 8.
Strateg.

Lib. 7.

Lib. 3.
Excid.

1. Olib.



discharge at distance, making their left hands, that holds the bridles their rest: which is uncertain, and to no great effect.

The Pistoller, that will do somewhat to purpose, doth come up close to the other, & discharge his Pistoll in his enemies neck, or under the corslet, about the flank or seat of a man; and commonly misseeth not.

I have seen a device to use a Musket on horse-back, which if it prove as serviceable as is by some conceived, will be of great advantage.

CHAP. XXXI.

The manner of imbatcelling their Armies.

AS Cæsar approached near unto Pompey's Camp, he observed his Army to be imbatcelled in this manner: There were in the left Corner two legions, which, in the beginning of these broils, were by order and decree of Senate taken from Cæsar; whereof one was called the first, and the other the third: and with them stood Pompey. Scipio had the middle Squadron, with the legions he brought out of Syria.

The Legion of Cilicia, joyned with the Spanish Cohorts, which Afranius brought with him, made the right Corner. These Pompey held to be very strong. The rest of the troops were interlaced between the middle Squadron and the Corners. All made one hundred and ten Cohorts, which amounted to fifty five thousand men: besides two thousand old soldiers, and men of note, whom he had called out to that war, and dispersed them over all the Army. The rest of the Cohorts, which were seven, he had left in the Camp, or disposed about the forts near adjoyning. The right Corner was flanked with a River, that had high and cumbersome banks: and thereupon he put all his Cavalry, together with the Archers & Slingers, in the left Corner.

Cæsar, observing his former custome, placed the tenth legion in the right Corner, and the ninth in the left; albeit they were very much weakened in the fights at Dyrrachium: but to this he so turned the eighth, that he seemed almost to make one of two, and commanded them to succour each other. He had in all about eighty cohorts, which made twenty two thousand men: two cohorts he left to keep the Camp. He gave the left Corner to Antonius, the right to Pub. Sylla, and the middle Squadron to Cn. Domitius, and put himself opposite to Pompey. And with all having well observed these things (according as I have formerly declared) fearing least the right Corner should be inclosed

about with the multitude of the Cavalry, he speedily drew six cohorts out of the third battell, and of them he made a fourth to encounter the horsemen, and shewed them what he would have done; admonishing with all that the victory of that day consisted in the valour of these cohorts: commanding the third battell, and likewise the whole Army, not to joyn battell without order from him; which when he thought fit, he would give them notice of by an Ensigne.

And going about to encourage them to fight, according to the use of war, he put them in mind of his favours, and his carriage towards them from time to time; and specially, that they themselves were witnesses, with what labour and means he had sought for peace, as well by treaty with Varinus, as also by employing A. Clodius to Scipio: and likewise how he had endeavoured at Oricum with Libo, that Embassadors might be sent to treat of these things. Neither was he willing at any time to mispend the souldiers blood, or to deprive the Common-wealth of either of these Armies.

This speech being delivered, the souldiers both requiring and longing with an ardent desire to fight, he commanded the signe of battell to be given by a Trumpet.

OBSERVATIONS.

CONCERNING the order used in disposing these Armies, for the trial of this Cause, it appeareth by the storie, that Pompey set two Legions in his left Corner, which are here named the first and the third. Howbeit Lucan saith, that those Legions were the first and the fourth.

———— Cornus tibi cura sinistri,
Lentule, cum primis, quæ sum fuit optima bello,

Et quartæ legione d'itur. ———

———— The left Corners care,
Which the first legion, (best in all that warre)

And fourth made up, O Lentulus, was thine.

The middle Squadron was led by Scipio, with the legions he brought out of Syria, which were also two; *Exspectabam cum Scipione ex Syria legiones duas*, he expected Scipio out of Syria with two legions, as it is in the second chapter of this book.

In the right Corner was the Cilician legion, with the Cohorts that Afranius brought out of Spain: which amounting to the number of a Legion, made that Corner equall to the rest. And to of these six Legions, which were the strength and sinews of his Army, he fashioned his battell into a middle Squadron, and two Corners.

In manibus
velis
quoniam sic
Emilia
dotis.
Lucan. lib. 7.

Cornets. His other forces, being young souldiers, he disposed in the distances, between the Cornets and that middle Squadron.

Lib. 3. cap. 3. Frontinus speaking of this point, saith; *Legiones secundum virtutem, firmissimas in medio, & in cornu locavit; spacia his interposita tyrionibus supplevit*: He disposed his legions according to their goodnes & worth: the stoutest he placed in the middle Squadron and the Cornets; filling up the spaces betwixt these with his young souldiers. His number of men, by our text, was fifty five thousand; but *Plutarch* maketh them not above forty five thousand.

Cæsar had not half so many men, and yet made a triple battell; but not so thick or deep with Legions: for in the right Corner he put the tenth Legion, and in the left the ninth and the eighth; being both weak and far spent, by the former overthrow. Of the other Legions he maketh no mention: but it seemeth they filled up the distances between the Cornets and the body of the Army; and were as flesh to those sinews and bones, which out of the prerogative of their valour, took the place of the Cornets, and the middle bulk of the battell. And fearing least his right Corner should be circumvented by the multitude of their Cavalry, he drew six Cohorts out of his third or last battell, to make a fourth battell to oppose the Cavalry: which got him the victory. For howsoever the Text saith, *Singulas cohortes detraxit*: yet *Plutarch* saith plainly, that those Cohorts he thus took were six, and amounted to three thousand men; which riseth to the number of 10 many Cohorts. And *Appian* agreeing herunto, saith, that his fourth battell consisted of three thousand men. *Frontinus* likewise affirmeth, he took out six Cohorts, & tenuit in subsidio, sed dextro laere conversus in obliquum; and kept them as a reserve, placing them off obliquely from the right corner. Wherunto that of *Lucan* agreeth;

----- Tenet obliquas post signa cohortes.

He plac'd these troupes oblique behind the battell.

Which is thus to be understood; that they turned their faces towards the left Corner of Pompey's Army, that they might be the readier to receive the Cavalry coming on to inclose Cæsar's right wing; as being sure of the other side, which was fenced with a River and a Marish.

Touching Cæsar's Speech to the souldiers, it seemed like that of *Themistocles* at the battell of *Salamina*: where *Xerxes* made a long Oration to encourage the *Perians*, and lost the day; *Themistocles* spake but a few words to the *Greeks*, and got the victory. Howsoever, one thing is not to be omitted, that *Plutarch*, and such others as have dipped their pens either in the sweat or in the blood of this battell, do all

agree, that Cæsar had not above twenty two thousand men.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Battell beginneth; and Cæsar overcometh.



Here was one *Crassinus* in Cæsar's Army, called out to this war, who the year before had led the first company of the tenth Legion, a man of singular valour; who upon the signe of battell given, Follow me, saith he, as many of you as were of my company; and do that endeavour to your Emperour, which you have alwaies been willing to perform. This is the onely battell remaining unfought: which being ended, he shall be restored to his dignity, and we to our liberty. And withall, looking towards Cæsar, I will, saith he, O Emperour, so carry my self this day, that thou shalt give me thanks, either alive or dead. And when he had thus spoken, he was the first that ran out of the right Corner: and about one hundred and twenty elected souldiers of the same Centurie followed voluntarily after him.

There was so much space left between both the battells, as might serve either Army to meet upon the charge. But Pompey had commanded his men to receive Cæsar's assault, and to undergo the shock of his Army without moving from the place wherein they stood (and that by the advice of *C. Triarius*) to the end that the first running out and violence of the souldiers being broken, and the battell disordered, they that stood perfect in their Orders, might set upon them that were scattered and dispersed: hoping the piles would not fall so forcibly upon the Army standing still, as when they advanced forward to meet them; and that it would fall out withall, that Cæsar's souldiers, having twice as far to run, would by that means be out of breath, and spent with wearinesse.

Which, in my opinion, was against all reason: for there is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Nor was it in vain of ancient time ordained, that the Trumpets should every where sound, and every man take up a shout; but that they thought these things did both terrifie the Enemy, and incite their own Party.

But our souldiers, upon the signe of Battell, running out with their Piles ready to be thrown,

thrown, and perceiving that Pompey's souldiers did not make out to meet them (as men taught with long uses, and exercised in former fights) stopp their course of their own accord, and almost in the mid-way stood still; that they might not come to blows upon the spending of their strength: and after a little respite of times running on again, drew their piles, and presently drew their swords, as Cæsar had commanded them. Neither were Pompey's souldiers waiting in this business; for they received the piles which were cast at them, took the shock of the Legions, kept their ranks, cast their piles, and betook them to their swords.

At the same time, the Cavalry, according as was commanded them, issued out from Pompey's left Corner, and the whole multitude of Archers thrust themselves out. Whose assault our horsemen were not able to endure, but fell back a little from the place wherein they stood: whereby Pompey's horsemen began to presse them with more eagerness, and to put themselves in squadrons to inclose the Army about. Which Cæsar perceiving, gave the signe of advancing forward to the fourth Battell, which he had made up of six Cohorts; who came with such a fling upon Pompey's horsemen, that none of them were able to stand before them, but turning their backs, did not onely give place, but fled all as fast as they could to the highest Hills: whereby the Archers and Slingers being left naked without succour, were all put to the sword. And with the same violence those Cohorts encompassed about the left Corner, notwithstanding any resistance that could be made by Pompey's party, and charged them behind upon their backs.

At the same time Cæsar commanded the third Battell, which as yet stood still, and were not removed, to advance forward: by means of which fresh and sound men, relieving such as were faint and weary, as also that others did charge them behind upon their backs, Pompey's party were able no longer to endure it, but all turned their backs and fled.

Neither was Cæsar deceived in his opinion, that the beginning of the victory would grow from those Cohorts which he placed in the fourth Battell, against the horsemen; according as he himself had openly spoken, in his encouragement to the souldiers. For by them first the Cavalry was beaten, by them the Archers and Slingers were slain, by them Pompey's Battell was circumvented on the left Corner, and by their means they began to flee.

As soon as Pompey saw his Cavalry beaten, and perceived the part wherein he most

trusted, to be amused and affrighted, and distrusting the rest, he forthwith left the Battell, and conveyed himself on horseback into the Camp. And speaking to the Centurions that had the watch at the Prætorian gate with a loud voice; as all the souldiers might hear, he said, Keep the Camp, defend it diligently, to prevent any hard casualty that may happen. In the mean while, I will go about to the other Ports, to settle the Guards of the Camp. And having thus said, he went into the Prætorium, distrusting the main point, and yet expecting the event.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Pompey so carried himself in the course of this war, as he rather seemed a sufferer than a doer: never disposing his Army for any attempt or on-set, but onely when he brake out of the place wherein he was besieged at *Dyrachium*. And accordingly he gave order, that in the main action & point of trail, his souldiers should suffer and sustain the assault, rather than otherwise. But whether he did well or no, hath since been in question. Cæsar utterly disliked it, as a thing contrary to reason. *Esi quædam* (saith he) *animi incitatio atque alacritas, naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ studo pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere Imperatores debent*. There is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Agreeable wherunto is that of *Cato* the Great; that in cases of battell, an Enemy is to be charged with all violence. And to that purpose it is requisite, to put the souldiers (at some reasonable distance) into a posture of vaunting and defiance, with menaces and cries of terrour; and then to spring forward in such manner, as may make them fall upon their enemies with greater force: As Champions or Wrestlers, before they buckle, stretch out their limbs, and make their showishes as may best serve to allure themselves, and discourage their adversaries; according as we read of *Heracles* and *Antæus*.

Ille Cleonæi projecit terga Leonis, Antæus Libyci: persudit membra liquore Hostes, Olympiace (servato more) Palæstræ. Ille parum sileus pedibus contingere matrem, Auxilium membris calidus insudit æneas.

The one throws by's Cleonæan Lion's skins. The other's Libyan; and ere they begin, The

Observations upon Cæsars

The one anoints himself from top to toe,
As the *Olympian* Gamblers use to do.
Not sure his toe would let his feet touch ground,
Himself with sand *Anteus* sprinkles round.

Howbeit, forasmuch as all men are not of one temper, but require severall fashions to tune their minds to the true note of a battel, we shall find severall Nations to have severall usances in this point. The *Romans* (as appeareth by this of *Cæsar*) were of ancient time accustomed to found *Trumpets* and *Hoboes*, in all parts of the Army, and to take up a great clamour and shout, whereby the souldiers (in their understanding) were encouraged, and the Enemy affrighted. Whereas, contrariwise, the *Greeks* went always with a close and silent mouth, as having more to do then to say to their Enemies. And *Thucydides*, writing of the *Lacedæmonians*, the flower of *Greece* for matter of Arms, saith, that instead of *Trumpets* and *Cornets* to incite them, they used the sweet harmony of *Flutes*, to moderate and qualify their passions, least they should be transported with unbridled impetuosity.

It is reported, that *Marshall Biron* the Father, seemed to dislike of our *English* march (hearing it beaten by the *Drums*) as too slow, and of no encouragement: and yet it to fitteth our Nation (as *Sir Roger Williams* then answered) as we have divers times over-run all *France* with it. Howsoever, the event of this battel is sufficient to disprove *Pompey's* error herein, and to make good what *Cæsar* commanded.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

These six Cohorts, which made the fourth battel, did so encounter *Pompey's* Cavalry, that they were not able to withstand them. It is said, that *Cæsar* gave them order not to sling their Piles, as commonly they did, but to hold them in their hands like a Pike or a Javelin, and make only at the faces of those Gallants, and men at Arms on horseback. For the holding of them in their hands, I do not understand it, and cannot conceive how they could reach more then the next ranks unto them in that manner. But for making at the faces of the Cavalry, *Florus* saith that *Cæsar*, as he galloped up and down the ranks, was heard to let fall bloody and bitter words, but very pathetically, and effectually for a victory: as thus, Souldier, cast right at the face: whereas *Pompey* called to his men, to spare their fellow-Citizens.

Eutropius, in his Epitome of *Suetonius*, affirmeth the same thing, both of the one and of the other: and *Lucan* seemeth to averre the same, concerning that of *Cæsar*;

Adversosque inbet ferro conindere vultus. Lib. 7.
He bids them strike just at the Enemies face.
Frontinus hath it thus; *C. Cæsar, cum in partibus Pompeianis magna equitum Romanorum esset manus, eaque armorum scientia milites conficeret, oculosque eorum gladiis peti iussit, & sic adversam faciem cedere coegit: Pompey* having in his army a great company of *Roman* Knights, who being well-skilled at their weapons made an end of their enemies; *Cæsar* commanded his men to make at their faces and eyes: and thereby compelled them to turn away their faces.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Amongst these memorialls *Crassinus* may not be forgotten, being the first man that began the battel; whom *Plutarch* calleth *C. Crassinus*, and saith, that *Cæsar* seeing him in the morning as he came out of his Tent, asked him what he thought of the successe of the battel. *Crassinus*, stretching out his right hand unto him, cried out aloud, O *Cæsar*, thine is the victory; and this day shalt thou commend me either alive or dead. And accordingly, he brake afterwards out of the ranks; and running amongst the midst of his Enemies, with many that followed him, made a great slaughter. At last one ran him into the mouth, that the sword's point came out at his neck, and so slew him.


By him, and others of like courage and worth, was *Cæsar* raised from the extremity of his wants, and the disgrace of his former losses, to the chiefest height of earthly glory; and herein might well assume unto himself, that which was formerly said of the people, *Magna populi Romani fortuna, sed semper in malis major resurrexit*; Great is the fortune of the people of *Rome*; but it still grows greater & increaseth by troubles: together with that of *Plutarch*, *Res invicta Romanorum arma*, The *Roman* Arms are things invincible. *Lucan* speaking of *Scæva* formerly mentioned, saith, He shewed a great deal of valour to get *Rome* a Lord. But upon *Crassinus* he laeth a heavy doom.

Dii tibi non mortem, que cunctis poena paratur,
Sed sensum post fata tue dent, Crastine, morti,
Causa toria manu commisit lancea bellum,
Primaque Thessaliam Romano sanguine tinxit.

Maist thou not only dy, which all men do;
But dy, and have thy senses after too.
A lance thrown by thy hand the fight began.
When with brave *Roman* blood *Thessalia* ran.

CHAP.

SABINVS AND COTTA



CHAP. XXXIII.

Cæsar presseth hard after the Enemy, and taketh the Camp.

Cæsar.

Pompey's souldiers being thus forced to fly into their Camp, Cæsar thinking it expedient to give them no time of respite, exhorted the Army to use the benefit of Fortune, and to assault the Camp: who, notwithstanding the extreme heat (for the businesse was drawn out untill it was high noon) were willing to undergo any labour, and to yield obedience to his commandments. The Camp was industriously defended by the Cohorts that had the guard thereof; but much more stoutly by the Thracians, and other succours of Barbarous people. For such souldiers as were fled thither out of the battel, were so terrified in mind and spent with wearinesse, that most of them (having laid aside their Arms and Military Ensigns) did rather think how they might best escape, then to defend the Camp. Neither could they which stood upon the Rampier any longer endure the multitude of weapons; but fawning with wounds, forsook the place, and presently fled into the high Mountains adjoining unto the Camp, being led thither by the Centurions and Tribunes of the souldiers.

In the Camp were found tables ready laid and prepared with linen, together with cupboards of plate furnished and set out, and their Tents strewed with fresh herbs and rushes; and that of Lentulus and divers others with Irie, and many other superfluities, discovering their extreme luxury and assurance of victory. Whereby it was easily to be conceived, that they nothing feared the event of that day, being so carefull of such unnecessary delights. And yet for all this, they upbraided Cæsar's patient and miserable Army, with riot and excess: to whom there were alwaies wanting such requisites as were expedient for their necessary uses.

Pompey, whenas our men were come within the Camp, having got a horse, and cast away all Ensigns of Imperiall authority got out at the Decumane gate, and made towards Latilla as fast as his horse could carry him. Neither did he stay there; but with the same speed (having got a few followers that escaped

by flight) posting night and day, came at length to the Sea side with a troupe of thirty horse, and there went aboard a ship of burthen: complaining that his opinion only deceived him; being as it were betrayed by such as began first to fly, from whom he hoped chiefly to have had the victory.

OBSERVATIONS.

VHereas it is said, That a dilatory course is very profitable and safe; we are to understand it as a chief and main point in the duty of an Embassadour, to temperize in things which are pressed hard upon him: as being accountable for words and time; but no way charged with expeditions of war; wherein Protraction is oftentimes the interrupter of absolute victory, and the only supplanter of that which is desired. *Vincere se's Hannibals, sed videtur mi nescis*, Thou knowest well enough how to get the victory, Hannibal, but thou knowest not how to use it; was a common byword, and happened then well for the State of Rome. But now it fell out otherwise; having met with one that knew how to conquer, and how to follow victory to purpose.

For notwithstanding the battel he had fought, and the advantage he had thereby got, might have seemed sufficient for one daies labour; yet he would not let occasion passe, without taking the benefit that was then offered: and never ceased untill he had forced the Camp, and overtaken those that escaped the battel: and so made victory sure unto him, by driving the nail home to the head. In regard whereof, he did not unfitly use for his word or Motto, (as they call it) *Μηδὲν ἄρα Cæsar*. **BY DEFERRING NOTHING.**

CHAP. XXXIV.

Cæsar besiegeth those that were escaped into the Hills.

Cæsar having got the Camp, instantly required the souldiers not to look after pillage and booty, and let slip the means of ending the rest of their businesse. Which after he had obtained, he began to inclose the Hill about with works of fortification. They of Pompey's party, distrustful the place, for that the Hill had no water, left it at an instant. And all

ut illis & c.
ta res dilas
co. nomy
militar.
lib. 8.

Non com.
mitantur
egit is cri
re re s, auc
loca, auc le
giones, auc
arces; sed
verba &
tempo a.
Demost. de
falsa legati
one.

1. Labor in
n gatio,
2. fortitudo
in periculo
3. indu tria
in agend.
4. celeritas
in conficiend.
do, were
Cæsar's pro
perties.

those that were partakers of that fortune, made towards Larilla. Which Cæsar observing, divided his forces, and commanded part of the Legions to remain in Pompey's Camp, and part he sent back into his own; and leading four Legions along with him, he took a nearer way to meet with them; and having gone six miles he embattled his forces. Which they perceiving, betook themselves unto a high Hill, under which ran a River.

Cæsar persuaded the soldiers, albeit they were spent with continual labour all that day, and that night was now at hand; yet they would not think it much to cut off the River from the Hill by a fortification, to keep them from watering in the night. Which work being perfected, they began by Commissioners to treat of conditions of yielding themselves. Some few of the Senators escaped in the night-time away by flight.

Cæsar as soon as it was day, caused them all to come down from the Hill into the Plain, and there to cast away their Arms: which they performed without refusal; and casting themselves upon the earth, their hands spread abroad, with shedding of many tears, desired mercy. Cæsar comforting them, commanded they should stand up: and having spoken somewhat touching his clemency, a little to ease them of their fears, he gave them all their lives with safety; commanding the soldiers not to hurt any of them, nor that they should want any thing that was theirs.

These things being thus achieved with diligence, he caused other Legions to meet him from the Camp, sending those he had with him to rest themselves; and the same day came to Larilla. In that battell he lost not above two hundred soldiers; but of Comurions, valiant men, he lost thirty. And Crastinus fighting valiantly was slain (of whom we formerly made mention) with a sword thrust into the face. Neither was that false which he said as he went to the battell: for Cæsar was persuaded, that Crastinus behaved himself admirably in that fight, and did deserve as well of him as a man possibly could.

There were slain of Pompey's Army about fifteen thousand: but he there were of them that yielded themselves above twenty four thousand. For such Cohorts as were in the Forts, did likewise yield themselves to Sylla; and many fled into the next Towns and Cities. Of military Engines there were brought out of the battell to Cæsar one hundred and four score, with nine Eagles. L. Domitius flying out of the Camp into the Mount, fainting for want of strength, was slain by the horsemen.

OBSERVATIONS.

AND thus we see the issue of that battell, and the victory which Cæsar obtained at as cheap a rate as could be imagined: for there were slain twenty three thousand of the enemy; and as many taken, by rendering themselves, with the losse of two hundred souldiers, and thirty Centurions; amongst whom was Crastinus: whose death obliged Cæsar to make this honourable mention of his valour. But as it is observed by D. Onysius Halicarnassensis, *Non Deus quipiam se ducibus, pro salute omnium qui certamen ineunt, sponsores sistit: nec ea condicione imperium accepimus, ut omnes homines devincamus, nullo ex nostris amisso.* No God can promise a Generall the safety of all his men: neither do we take commands upon that condition, to conquer all our enemies without the losse of a man.

Lib. 8.


CHAP. XXXV.

Lælius attempteth to block in the Haven at Brundisium: and Cassius forceth Cæsar's ships at Messina.

ABOUT the same time D. Lælius came with his Navy to Brundisium; and according as Lælius formerly did, took the Island in the mouth of the Port. And in like manner Vatinius, Governour of Brundisium, having furnished and sent out certain Skiffs, inticed out Lælius ships, and of them took a Gallie, with two lesser ships, that were further shot out into the straits of the Port: and also had disposed his Cavalry along the shore, to keep the Mariners from fetching water. But Lælius having the time of the year more favourable, and fitter for sayling, supplied his Army with water from Corfu and Dyrrachium: neither could he be beaten off his designe, nor be driven out of the Port, or from the Island, either with the dishonour of the ships he lost, or with scarcity and want of all necessaries, untill he heard of the battell in Thessalia.

About the same time also Cassius came into Sicilia, with the Navy of Syria, Phœnicia and Cilicia. And whereas Cæsar's ships were divided into two parts; Pub. Sulpicius, Prator, being Admirall of the one halfe, and lying at Visone in the Straights, and M. Pomponius Admirall of the other halfe at Mellana; Cassius came first to Mellana, and was arrived before Pomponius heard of his coming: by which means he surprised him, distracted, and much amazed, without any order or guards. And finding a strong

Incoronatus
improbes con-
pice iter
manetur. A
n inoribus.
lib. 8.



strong and favourable wind, filled the ships of burthen with Rosin, Pitch and Tallow, and the matter of firing; and sending them out to Pompeius Navy, he burned all the ships, being in number thirty five, amongst which there were twenty that had decks. By means whereof they conceived such a terror, that albeit there was a legion in Garrison at Messina, yet the Town was hardly kept. And but that certain Messengers coming post, brought news at the same instant of Cæsar's victory, most men thought the Town would have been lost: but the news coming so opportunely, the town was kept.

Callius departed from thence, and went to Sulpicius fleet at Vibo; where our ships being brought to shore for fear of the like danger, he there did as he did before: for finding the wind good, he sent in forty ships of burthen furnished with matter to burn the Navy. The fire having taken hold of both Corners of the fleet, five of them were burned down to the water. And as the flame began to be further carried with the wind, the soldiers of the old legions which were left for the defense of the shipping, and were of the number of them that were sick, did not endure the dishonour: but getting aboard of their own accord, put the ships from the shore, and setting upon Callius fleet took two Gallies, in one of the which was Callius himself: but he being taken out with a Skiff, fled away. And furthermore, they took two Triremes. Not long after certain news came of the battell in Thessalia, so that Pompey's party believed it: for before that time, it was thought to be but a thing given out by Cæsar's Legates, and other of his friends. Whereupon Callius departed with his Navy, and left those places.

OBSERVATIONS.

THe branches of a Tree do receive life from the stock, and the stock is maintained by the root, which being once cut asunder, there remaineth no life for stock or bough, leaf or branch. Accordingly it happened with this large-spread Party; the root whereof was then in Thessalia: and being broken asunder by the violence of Cæsar's forces, it booteth not what Lælius did at Brundisium, or Callius either at Messina, or Vibo. For all the parts were overthrown with the body: and the fortune of the battell over-ruled other petty losses whatsoever; being so powerfull in the opinion of the world, *Ut quo se fortuna, eodem etiam favor hominum inclinât*; that what way soever fortune goes, the same way goes the favour of the people: Or, as *Lucan* saith,

*Rapimus quo cuncta feruntur,
We're snatch'd that way that things are
carried.*

CHAP. XXXVI.

Cæsar pursueth Pompey: who is slain in Egypt.

Cæsar setting all other things apart, thought it expedient for him to pursue Pompey into what parts soever he should betake himself; least he should raise new forces, and renew the war again: and thereupon made forward every day, as far as his Cavalry was able to go; commanding one Legion to follow after by lesser journeys. There was a publication made in Pompey's name at Amphipolis, that all the youth of that Province, as well Greeks as Citizens of Rome, should come to be enrolled for the war. But it is not possible to discover, whether Pompey did it to take away all cause of suspicion; that he might the longer hide his purpose of flying away; or whether he went about by new levies to keep Macedonia, if no man pressed hard after him.

Howsoever he himself lay at Anchor there one night. And calling unto him his ancient Hosts and Friends, he took so much money of them as would defray his necessary charges: and understanding of Cæsar's coming, within a few daies he hoised sail and departed thence, arriving at Mitylene, where he was kept two daies with foul weather; and there reinforcing his fleet with some Gallies he took to him, he went into Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. There he understood, that by the generall consent of the Antiochians, and such Citizens of Rome as were there residing, the Citadell was already taken to keep him out: and that Messengers were sent about, to those that were fled from his Party into the bordering Cities, forbidding them to come to Antioch; for if they did, they should hazard it with the danger of their heads. The like happened to L. Lentulus, who the year before was Consul, and to Pub. Lentulus, of Consular dignity, and to some other at Rhodes. For as many as fled thither after Pompey, and came unto the Islands, were neither received into the Town nor into the Haven; but were commanded by Messengers sent unto them, to depart from thence, and forced to weigh anchor against their will. And now the fame of Cæsar's coming was spread abroad throughout all the Cities.

Whereupon Pompey, leaving off his purpose of going into Syria, having taken what money he found in Bank, besides what he could borrow of his private friends, and putting aboard great store of Brasse for the use of war; with two thousand Armed men (which he had raised partly out of the towns, and partly had forced

forced up amongst the Merchants, and such others of his followers whom he thought fit for this business, he came to Pelusium. I here by chance was king Ptolemy's child within years, with great forces making war against his sister Cleopatra; whom a few Months before, by means of his Allies and Friends he had thrust out of his kingdom: And Cleopatra's Camp was not far distant from his.

Pompey sent unto him, that in regard of ancient hospitality, and the amity he had with his Father, he might be received into Alexandria; and that he would aid and support him with his wealth and means, being now fallen into misery and calamity. But they that were sent, having done their message, began to speak liberally to the Kings souldiers, and to exhort them, that they would stand to Pompey, not despising the low ebbe of fortune he was brought to. Amongst them were many that had been Pompey's souldiers, which Gabinius had received out of his army in Syria, and had brought them to Alexandria; and upon the ending of the war, had left them with Ptolemy, the father of this child. These things being known, such as had the procurator of the kingdom in the minority of the Boy, whether they were induced through fear of gaining the Army, (as afterwards they confessed) whereby Pompey might easily seize upon Alexandria and Egypt; or whether despising his fortune (as for the most parts, in time of misery a mans friends do become his enemies); did give a good answer publicly to such as were sent, and willed him to come unto the King: but secretly plotting amongst themselves, sent Achilles, a chief Commander, and a man of singular audacity, together with L. Septimius, Tribune of the souldiers, to kill Pompey. They giving him good words, and he himself also knowing Septimius to have led a company under him in the war against the Parus, went aboard a little Bark with a few of his souldiers: and there was slain by Achilles and Septimius. In like manner L. Lentulus was apprehended by commandment from the King, and killed in prison.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

If it be now demanded, Where was Cæsar's desire of Peace? and, Why pursued he not a treaty of Composition, at this time, whenas his tale would have been heard with gladnesse, and any conditions of atonement very acceptable to the vanquished? the answer is already made in the beginning of this Commentary; That there was but one time of making peace: & that was when both Parties were equall; which was now past, and Cæsar too far gone, to look

back upon any thing that might weake reconciliation. The one was exult to high, and the other cast down to low, that they seemed not compatible in any Medium, although it were to the saving of the Empire. However, it is not denied but that Pompey gave great occasion of these wars. For Seneca saith; He had brought the Commonwealth to that passe, that it could not longer stand, but by the benefit of servitude. And he that will look into the reasons of this confusion, shall find all those Causes corrupting, or ruining causes, which are noted by Aristotle to threaten the welfare of a State, in the excess of Pompey's exorbitancy. For, having nothing in a Mean, he held all his fortunes by the tenure of *Nimium*; and was overgrown, first, with too much honour, secondly, with too much wealth, thirdly, with too much power; whereby he exceeded the proportion of his fellow-Citizens, and blemished the beauty of that State, whose chiefest graces were in a fitting equality. And adding to these the convulsions of fear, he made no difficulty to engage Rome in a bloody war; as having no other hope, but in the confusion of Arms.

It is said that at his arrivall at *Mitylene*, he had much conference with *Craippus*, whom *Tully* mentioneth in his Offices; wherein, amongst other remonstrances, the Philosopher made it plain, that his counle of government had brought a necessity of changing that State from the liberty of a Commonwealth, to the condition of a just Monarchy. And such it tell to Cæsar's fortune, if there were any error committed in the seizure, he may take the benefit of the generall pardon, exemplified by *Trebellius Pollio*, That no Nation can shew a Man that is altogether blameless.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Concerning the State of Egypt, we are to note, that Alexander the Great being cut off by death, his Captains laid hold upon such Provinces and kingdoms as were under their commands: amongst whom one *Ptolemus* the son of *Lagus*, a Macedonian, seized upon Egypt, where he reigned 40 years; and of him were all his successours called by the name of *Ptolemy*. This first *Ptolemy* posselt himself of Egypt about the year of the world 3640: which was 275 years before Pompey's overthrow. His son that succeeded by the name of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, caused the Bible to be translated out of Hebrew into Greek by 70 Interpreters, which are called the *Septuagint*; and made the famous Library which was burned in these wars.

The

The Father of this young *Ptolemy*, was the ninth in succession from the first, and at his death, made the people of Rome Tutors to his children. His eldest son and *Cleopatra* his daughter reigned together six years; but in the end fell to strife and wars, and were deeply engaged therein when Pompey arrived. But shortly after Cæsar did ordered the differences, that he set the Crown upon *Cleopatra*'s head; who held it peaceably, untill she came to play that tragick part with *Antony*: which being ended, the kingdom was then reduced to a Province, under the obedience of the Roman Empire.

Concerning this miserable end of Pompey, it is truly said of Seneca, that Death is alike to all: for although the ways are divers by which it happens, yet they all meet in the same end. And forasmuch as *Ptolemy* hath described particularly the manner of this Catastrophe, it shall not be impertinent to insert his relation thereof.

When Pompey heard news that king *Ptolemy* was in the City of *Pelusium* with his Army, making war against his sisters, he went thither, and sent a Messenger before unto the king, to advertise him of his arrivall, and to intreat him to receive him. King *Ptolemy* was then but a young man, inasmuch that one *Photinus* governed all the whole Realm under him. He assembled a Councell of the chiefest and wisest men of the Court, who had such credit and authority as it pleased him to give them. They being assembled, he commanded every man in the Kings name to say his minds touching the receiving of Pompey, whether the king should receive him or not. It was a miserable thing to see *Photinus*, an Eunuch of the Kings, and *Theodorus* of *Chios*, an hired Schoolmaster to teach the young king Rhetorick, and *Achillis* an Egyptian, to consult among themselves what they should do with Pompey the Great. These were the chiefest Councillors of all his Eunuchs, and of those that had brought him up.

Now did Pompey ride at anchor upon the shore side, expecting the resolution of this Councell: in the which the opinions were divers; for some would not have him received, others contented that he should be received. But the Rhetorician *Theodorus*, to shew his eloquence, perswaded them that neither the one nor the other was to be accepted. For, quoth he, if we receive him, we shall have Cæsar our enemy, and Pompey our Lord; and if we do deny him on the other side, Pompey will blame us for refusing him, and Cæsar for not keeping of him: therefore this would be the best resolution, he told them, to send to kill him, for thereby they should win the good will of the one, and not fear the displeasure of the other. And some say moreover that he added this mock

withall, A dead man bites not. They being determined of this among themselves, gave *Achillis* commission to do it. He taking with him *Septimius* (who had charge aforetime under Pompey) and *Salvius*, another Centurion also, with three or four souldiers besides, they made towards Pompey's Gallies, about whom were at that time the chiefest of his train, to see what would become of this matter. But when they saw the likelihood of their entertainments, and that it was not in Princely shew nor manners, nor nothing answerable to the hope which *Theophanes* had put them in, seeing to few men come to them in a fisher-boat; they began then to mistrust the small account that was made of them, and counselled Pompey to return back, and to launch again into the sea, being out of the danger of the hurling of a Dart.

In the mean time the fisher-boat drew near, and *Septimius* rose, and saluted Pompey in the Roman tongue, by the name of *Imperator*, as much as sovereign Captain: and *Achillis* also spake to him in the Greek tongue, and bade him come into his boat; because that by the shore side there was a great deal of mud and sand banks, so that his Galley should have no water to bring him in. At the very same time they saw afar off divers of the Kings Gallies, which were arming with all speed possible, and all the shore besides full of souldiers. Thus, though Pompey and his company would have altered their minds, they could not have told how to have escaped: and furthermore, shewing that they had mistrusted them, then they had given the murderer occasion to have executed his cruelty. So taking his leave of his wife *Cornelia*, who lamented his death before his end, he commanded two Centurions to go down before him into the Egyptians boat, and *Philopone* of his slaves enfranchised, with another slave, called *Seynes*. When *Achillis* reached out his hand to receive him into his boat, he turned him to his wife and son, and said these verses of *Sophocles* unto them;

*The man that into Court comes free,
Must there in state of bondage be.*

These were the last words he spake unto his people, when he left his own Galley, and went into the Egyptians boat, the land being a great way off from his Galley. When he saw never a man in the boat speak friendly unto him, beholding *Septimius*, he said unto him; Me thinks, my friend, I should know thee, for that thou hast served with me heretofore. The other nodded with his head; that it was true, but gave him no answer, nor shewed him any courtesy.

Pompey seeing that no man spake to him, took a little book he had in his hand, in which he had written an Oration that he meant to make unto King *Ptolemy*, and began to read it.

ic. When they came near to the shore, *Cornelia* with her servants and friends about her, stood up in her ship in great fear, to see what should become of *Pompey*. So she hoped well, when she saw many of the Kings people on the shore, coming towards *Pompey* at his landing, as it were to receive and honour him. But even as *Pompey* took *Philip* his hand to arise more easily, *Septimius* came first behind him, and thrust him through with his sword: next unto him also *Salvius* and *Achillas* drew out their swords in like manner. *Pompey* then did no more but took up his gown with his hands, and hid his face, & mainly abode the wounds they gave him, onely fighting a little. Thus, being 59 years old, he ended his life the next day after the day of his birth.

They that rode at anchor in their ships, when they saw him murdered, gave such a tearfull cry, that it was heard to the shore: then weighing up their anchors with speed, they hoisted sail and departed their way, having wind at will that blew a lusty gale. As soon as they had gotten the main Sea, the *Ægyptians* which prepared to row after them, when they saw they were past their reach, and impossible to be overtaken, they let them go. Then having tricken off *Pompey's* head, they threw his body over-board, for a miserable spectacle to all those that were desirous to see him.

Philippus enfranchised bond-man, remained ever by it, until such time as the *Ægyptians* had seen it their bellies full. Then having washed his body with salt water, & wrapped it up in an old shirt of his, because he had no other shift to lay it in, he fought upon the sands, & found at length a piece of an old fishers boat, enough to serve to burn his naked body with, but not all fully out. As he was busie gathering the broken pieces of this boat together, thither came unto him an old *Roman*, who in his youth had served under *Pompey*, and said unto him; O friend, what art thou that preparest the funeral of *Pompey* the Great? *Philip* answered that he was a bond-man of his, enfranchised. Well, said he, thou shalt not have all this honour alone; I pray thee yet let me accompany thee in to devout a deed, that I may not altogether repent me to have dwelt so long in a strange Country, where I have abidden such misery and trouble; but that to recompence me withall, I may have this good hap, with mine own hands to touch *Pompey's* body, and to help to burye the onely and most famous Captain of the *Romans*.

The next day after, *Lucius Lentulus* (not knowing what had passed) coming out of *Cyprus*, sailed by the shore side, and perceived a fire made for funeral, & *Philip* standing by it; whom he knew not at the first. So he asked him, What is he that is dead, and buried there? But

straight fetching a great sigh, *Alas*, said he, perhaps it is *Pompey* the Great. Then he landed a little, and was straight taken, and slain. This was the end of *Pompey* the Great. Not long after *Cæsar* also came into *Ægypt*, that was in great wars; where *Pompey's* head was presented unto him: but he turned his head aside and would not see it, and abhorred him that brought it as a detestable murderer. Then taking his Ring wherewith he sealed his Letters, whereupon was graven a *Lyon* holding a sword, he built out a weeping. *Achillas* and *Photinus* he put to death. King *Ptolemy* himself also being overthrown in battell by the River of *Nilus*, vanished away, and was never heard of after. *Theodotus* the Rhetorician escaped *Cæsar's* hands, and wandered up and down *Ægypt* in great misery, despised of every man. Afterwards *Marcus Brutus* (who slew *Cæsar*) conquering *Asia*, met with him by chance, and putting him to all the torments he could possibly devise, at the length slew him. The ashes of *Pompey's* body were afterwards brought unto his wife *Cornelia*; who buried them in a town of hers, by the City of *Alba*.

And having in this manner paid the tribute which the law of Nature doth exact, the law of the Twelve Tables did free his Sepulchre from any further disturbance; *Ubi corpus demortui hominis condas, sacer esto*, Let that place be sacred, where the body of a dead man is buried. Onely this may be added; That as *Fabius* was called *Maximus*, *Scipio Magnus*, and *Pompey Magnus*, which titles they carried as marks of speciall Nobleness, to raise them above the common worth of men; so their ends made them even with the lowest of the State. According to that of *Seneca*; *Intervallis distinguimur; exitu aquamur*: Here we are distinguished by distances, but death makes us all equal.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Prodigious Accidents happening upon the Battell in Phœlalia, *Cæsar* cometh into *Ægypt*.

Cæsar coming into *Asia*, found *T. Ampius* going about to take the money out of the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*; and for that cause to have called together all the Senators that were in the Province, that he might use them as witnesses in the matter. But being interrupted by *Cæsar's* arrivall, he fled away. So that two severall times, the money was saved at *Ephesus* by *Cæsar's* means. It was further found very certain, that in the Temple of *Minerva* at *Elis* (a just calculation of the time being taken) the same day that *Cæsar* over-

Mors Nature lex est. Mors tribus tum obli- ciumque mortalium. Seneca, natura, quæ, & Fabius dixit Maximus, Scipio Magnus, Pompeyus, lib. 8. h. 11. 100.

threw *Pompey*, the Image of Victory, which stood before *Minerva*, and looked towards her portraiture, did turn it self towards the Portall and the Temple-gate. And the same day likewise there was such a noise of an Army twice heard at *Antioch* in *Syria*, and such sounding of Trumpets, that the City ran in Armes to keep the walls. The like happened at *Ptolemais*. And likewise at *Pergamus*, in the remote and hidden places of the Temple, which are called *Adyta*, into which it is not lawfull for any man to enter but the Priests, were bells heard to ring. Besides at *Triallessin* the Temple of Victory (where they had set up a Statue to *Cæsar*) there was shewed a Palm-tree, which in those daies was grown from between the joints of the stones out of the pavement.

Cæsar staying a few daies in *Asia*, hearing that *Pompey* was seen at *Cyprus*, and conjecturing he went into *Ægypt*, for the amitie and correspondency he had with that King, domes besides other opportunities of the place; he came to *Alexandria* with two legions, one that he commanded to follow him out of *Thessaly*, and another which he had called out of *Achaia*, from *Publius* a Legate together with eight hundred horse, ten Gallies of *Rhodes*, and a few ships of *Asia*. In these Legions were not above three thousand two hundred men; the rest were either wounded in the fights, or spent with travel, and the length of the journey. But *Cæsar* trusting to the time of his great exploits, did not doubt to go with these weak forces, thinking every place would entertain him with safety.

At *Alexandria* he understood of *Pompey's* death: and as he was going out of the ship, he heard a clamour of the souldiers, which the King had left to keep the town, and saw a course of people gathered about him, because the bundle of Rods was carried before him; all the multitude crying out, that the Kings authority was diminished. This tumult being appeased, there were often uproares and commotions of the people for every day after; and many souldiers were slain in divers parts of the City. Whereupon *Cæsar* gave order for other Legions to be brought him out of *Asia*, which he raised, and enrolled of *Pompey's* souldiers. He himself was staied by the winds called *Ætææ*, which are against them that sail from *Alexandria*.

In the mean time, forasmuch as he conceived that if the controversy between the King and his sister did appertain to the people of *Rome*, then consequently to him, as Consul, and so much the rather it concerned his offices for that in his former Consulship, there was a League made by the decree of Senate with *Ptolemy* the Father: in regard hereof he signified

that his pleasure was, that both the king and his sister *Cleopatra* should dismisse their Armes, and rather plead their Cause before him, then to decide it by Armes.

There was at that time one *Thotinus* an Eunuch, that had the administration of the kingdom during the minority of the Child. He first began to complain among his friends, & to take it in scorn, that the King should be called out to plead his Cause: and afterwards having gotten some assistance of the Kings friends, he drew the Army secretly from *Pelutium* to *Alexandria*, and made *Achillas* (formerly mentioned) Generall of all the forces; inciting him forward as well by his own promises, as from the Kings, and instructing him by Letters and Messengers what he would have done.

Ptolemy the Father, by his last Will and Testament, had left for heirs the eldest of two sons, and likewise the eldest of two daughters: and for the confirmation thereof, had in the same Will charged and required the people of *Rome* by all the gods, & by the league he made at *Rome*, to see this accomplished. For which purpose he sent a copy of his Will to *Rome*, to be kept in the Treasury; which by reason of the publick occasions, that admitted no such business for the present, were left with *Pompey*: and the Original, signed and sealed up, was brought to *Alexandria*.

While *Cæsar* was handling these things, being very desirous to end these controversies by arbitrement, it was told him on a sudden, that the Kings Army and all the Cavalry were come to *Alexandria*. *Cæsar's* forces were not such that he durst trust upon them, to hazard battell without the town; onely it remained, that he kept himself in such places as were most fit and convenient for him within the town, and to learn what *Achillas* intended. Howsoever, he commanded all the souldiers to arme; and exhorted the King, that of those which were nearest unto him, and of greatest authority, he would send some to *Achillas*, to know his meaning.

Dioscorides & *Scrapion* being deputed thereunto, having been both Embassadors at *Rome*, and in great place about *Ptolemy* the Father, they came to *Achillas*: whom as soon as they were come into his presence, and before he would hear or understand what they would have, he commanded to be taken away and slain. Of whom, one having received a wound, was carried away by his own people for dead: the other was slain out-right. Whereupon *Cæsar* wrought to get the King into his own hands; thinking that his Name and Title would prevail much amongst his people, as also to make it appear, that this war was rather moved by the private practice of some seditious

The Priests of *Ægypt* said, that whenever the Axe and the bundle of Rods came into *Alexandria*, the power of their Kings should presently cease, according as it was written in the *Canons* of gold, at Memphis.

This also floweth from another title.

tious thieves, then by order and commandment from the King.

OBSERVATIONS.

Lib. 3. Ep. 8.

THe multiplicity of occasions and troubles which happen to such as have the ordering of any business of import, doth make that of *Plinius* often remembered; *Pateribus negotiis non vacare scimus, nec tamen prius peraguntur, tot malis, tot quasi catenis, manibus occupatum agmen extenditur*. New businesses come in the neck of old, and yet the first are not dispatched with so many ties and chains as it were, is the troupe of businesses every day made longer and longer. For *albeit Pompey* had now spent his malice, and was no more to appear in *Armes* against *Cæsar*; yet his hap was by flying, to draw him (as it were by way of revenge) into a place, where he was necessarily to be intangled in a dangerous war.

Lib. 5. cap. 18.

To these prodigies here mentioned, may be added that of *Annius Gellius*, that The same day the battell happened, there fell out a strange wonder at *Panama*: where a certain Priest called *Ceryllus*, of Noble race and Holy life, suddenly fell into an extasy, and said, he saw a great battell arise off, Darts and Piles lie thick in the air, some flying and some pursuing, great slaughters accompanied with many lamentable groans and cries: and in the end cried out, that *Cæsar* had got the victory. For which he was mocked for the present, but afterwards held in great admiration.

Plinius maketh the small increase of *Nilus* to be a fore-teller of *Pompey's* death; *Minimusque Pharus, et cetera*: *veluti necem Magni prodigium quodam flumine aversante*. The least increase of *Nilus* was at the time of the *Pharusian* battell: the very river prodigiously shewing (as it were) a detestation of the murder of the Great *Pompey*.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Cæsar landeth his forces, taketh *Pharus*, and causeth *Photinus* to be slain.



He forces that were with *Achillas* were a number for their number, or fashion of men, or use and experience in war, to be commended. For he had twenty two thousand men in *Armes*. These troops consisted of the *Galatian* soldiers; which were now grown into a custome of life and liberty of the *Egyptians*; and having forgot the name and discipline of the people of *Rome*, had there married wives, and most of them had children. To these

were added such as were gathered from the thieves and robbers of *Syria*, the Province of *Cilicia*, and other sinitimate Regions: besides many banished men, and others condemned to die, that fled thither. And for all our fugitives, there was ever a sure and certain receipt at *Alexandria*, and a certain condition of life: for upon giving up of his names he was presently enrolled a souldier. And if one chanced to be taken and apprehended by his Master, he was presently released by the concurrence of souldiers; who being all in the same condition, did strive for him as for themselves. These required the Kings friends to be slain; these were accustomed to rob rich men of their goods, to better their pay, to besiege the Kings house, to expell him out of the kingdom, and to send for others home, according to an old custome and privilege of the *Alexandrian* Army.

There were besides two thousand horse, that had been of ancient continuance in many of the wars held at *Alexandria*, and had brought back *Ptolemy* the father, and restored him to his kingdom; had slain *Bibulus* two sons, and had made war with the *Egyptians*; and this use and knowledge they had of war. *Achillas* trusting to these forces, and concerning the small number of *Cæsar's* troops, did take and possess *Alexandria*, and further, assaulting that part of the town which *Cæsar* held with his men, did first of all endeavour to break into his house. But *Cæsar* having disposed the cohorts in the streets and wares, did bear out the assault. At the same time they fought likewise at the Port, and it came to light to a very forcible encounter: for having drawn out their troops, the fight began to be bet in divers streets and lanes; and the Enemy (in great troops) went about to possess themselves of the Gallies, of which there were 50 found there, that were sent to serve *Pompey*, and returned home again after the battell in *Thestalia*. These were all *Triremes* and *Quinquereemes* rigged, and ready to go to sea.

Besides these, there were twenty two, which were always accustomed to be the best for the defence of *Alexandria*, and were all furnished with darts: which if they had taken, together with *Cæsar's* shipping, they would have had the Haven and the Sea at their command; and by that means, hindered *Cæsar* from succours and provision of victuall. In regard whereof they fought hard on both sides; *Achillas* expecting victory, and our men for their safety. But *Cæsar* obtained his purpose: and because he was not able to keep so many severall things with so small forces, he set them all on fire together with those that were in the Roads, and presently landed some souldiers at *Pharus*; which is a tower in an Island of a great height, built with

with strange workmanship, taking that name from the Island. This Island lieth over against *Alexandria*, and so maketh it a Haven. But former Kings had enlarged it nine hundred paces in length, by raising great mounts in the Sea: and by that means had brought it so near to the town, that they joyned them both together with a bridge.

In this Island dwelt divers *Egyptians*, and made a Village of the bignesse of a Town: and what ships soever had fallen off their course, either by tempest or error, were there robbed by these *Egyptians*. For by reason of the narrow entrance, no ships can come into the Haven but by the favour and leave of them that hold *Pharus*. *Cæsar* being afraid of this, while the Enemy was busy in fight, landed his souldiers, took the place, and there put a garrison. Whereby he brought it to pass, that both corn and succours might safely come by sea to supply him: for he had sent to all the confining Regions for aide. In other places of the town they so fought, that they gave over at length upon equal conditions: (which happened by reason of the narrowness of the passages) and a few of each side being slain, *Cæsar* took in such places as were most convenient for him, and fortified them in the night. In this quarter of the Town was contained a little part of the Kings house (wherein he himself, at his first arrivall, was appointed to lodge) and a beaver joyned to the house, which was instead of a Castle, and had a passage to the Port, and to other parts of Road. The daies following he increased these fortifications, to the end he might have them as a wall against the enemy, and thereby need not fight against his will.

In the mean time, the younger daughter of King *Ptolemy* hoping to obtain the Crown now in question, found means to convey herself out of the Kings house to *Achillas*; and both jointly together undertook the managing of

that war. But presently there grew a controversy between them, who should command in Chief; which was the cause of great larges and rewards to the souldiers, either of them being at great charges and expences to gain their good wills.

While the Enemy was busy in these things, *Photinus*, the Governour of the young King, & Superintendent of the kingdom on *Cæsar's* party, sent Messengers to *Achillas*, exhorting him not to desist in the business, or to be discouraged. Upon the discovering and apprehension of which Messengers, *Cæsar* caused him to be slain. And these were the beginnings of the *Alexandrian* war.

OBSERVATIONS.

Pharus is a little Island in the Sea over against *Alexandria*; in the midst whereof *Ptolemy Philadelph* built a tower of an exceeding height, all of white Marble. It contained many Stages, and had in the top many great Lanterns, to keep light in the night, for a mark to such as were at Sea. The Architector imprinted thereupon this inscription; *Sofrates Gnidius, the son of Dexiphanes, to the Gods Conservators, for the safety of Navigators*.

It was reckoned for one of the seven Wonders of the world. The first whereof was the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*. The second was the Sepulchre which *Artemisia*, Queen of *Caria*, made for her Husband *Mausolus*, whose ashes she drank. The third was the *Colossus* of the Sunne at *Rhodes*. The fourth was the Walls of *Babylon*. The fifth was the *Pyramides* of *Egypt*. The sixth was the Image of *Jupiter Olympus* at *Elis*, which was made by *Phidias*, and contained threecore cubites in height; and was all of Ivory, and pure Gold. And the seventh was this *Pharus*.

F I N I S.

A CONTINUATION
of the
VVARRRES
in
GALLIA,

Beginning where *Cæsar* left, and deducing the History
to the time of the *CIVILE WARRES*.

Written by A. HIRTIUS PANSÆ.

VVith some short Observations thereupon.

Together with
The MANNER of our MODERN
TRAINING, or TACTICK
PRACTISE.

LONDON,

Printed by ROGER DANIEL: 1655.

Of the nature of the superfluous and incoherent.

THE EIGHTH COMMENTARY OF THE VVARRES IN GALLIA,

Written by *AULUS HIRTIUS*.

CHAP. I.

The *Galles* raise new troubles in divers places. *Cæsar* scattereth and wasteth the *Bituriges*, and after that the *Canutes*.

After that all *Gallia* was subdued, forasmuch as *Cæsar* had rested no part of the former Summer from warre, he was desirous to refresh his Souldiers after so great pains taken, the rest of the winter season; when news was brought him that many States at the self-same time, did lay their heads together again about warre, and make conspiracies. Whereof there was reported a very likely cause; in that it was known to all the *Galles*, that there could not any power so great be assembled into one place, as should be able to withstand the *Romans*: neither if many States at once made war in divers places at one instant, could the army of the people of *Rome* have sufficient, either of aid, or of time, or of men of warre to pursue all at once: and there ought not any State to refuse the lot of their misfortune, if by the respite thereof, the rest might set themselves at liberty.

The which opinion to the intent it should not settle in the minds of the *Galles*, *Cæsar* leaving *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with charge of his winter garrisons, went with a strong company of horsemen the last day of *December* from *Bibracte* to his twelfth Legion, which he had placed not farre from the borders of the *Hedui*, in the country of the *Bituriges*, and taketh thereunto the eleventh Legion which was next unto it. Leaving two Cohorts to defend his stuff and carriages, he led the rest of his army into the most plentiful fields of the *Bituriges*: the which being a large country and full

of towns, could not be kept in awe with the garrisoning of one Legion amongst them, but that they prepared for warre and made conspiracies.

By the sudden coming of *Cæsar*, it came to passe (which must needs happen to such as are unprovided and scattered abroad) that such as were tilling the ground without fear, were surprised in the fields by our horsemen, before they could get them into the Towns. For at that time, the common token of invasion which is wont to be perceived by burning of houses, was by *Cæsar*'s commandment forbore, lest they should either want forrage and corn if they were minded to make any further rode into the country, or else, that their enemies for fear of the fires, should convey themselves out of the way.

After that many thousands of men had been taken, the *Bituriges* being sore afraid, such of them as could escape out of the *Romans* hands at their first coming, upon confidence either of the old acquaintance and familiarity that had been privately between them, by reason of resorting as guests one to another, or of their mutuall agreement and partaking in the same devities, fled into the next cities: but all was in vain. For *Cæsar* by great journeys came so suddenly upon all places, that he gave not any city leisure, to think of the safeguard of other folks rather than of themselves. Through the which speed, he both kept his friends faithfull unto him, and put the wavering sort in such fear, that he compelled them to be glad to receive peace.

The matter standing in this case, when the *Bituriges* saw that through *Cæsar*'s gentleness there was yet a way for them to return into his favour again, and that the next States had delivered him hostages, and were thereupon received to mercy, without further punishment: they themselves did in like wise. *Cæsar*, because his men had patiently endured so great travell in the winter

winter dayes, through most cumbersome wayes, in intolerable cold weather, and continued most resolutely in the same to the uttermost, promised to give to his souldiers two hundred sesterces apiece, and to the Captains 2000 apiece, in the name of a prey: & so sending his Legions again into their wintering places, he himself returned to *Bibracte* the twentieth day after his setting forth. There as he was ministering of Justice, the *Bituriges* sent messengers unto him, desiring help against the *Carnutes*, whom they complained to make waire upon them.

Upon the receipt of this news, when he had not lain in garrison past eighteen dayes, he draweth the fourteenth and sixteenth Legions out of garrison from the river *Arar*, where he had placed them for the speedy purveyance of corn and victuals, as was shewed you in the last book: and with those two Legions went to prosecute the *Carnutes*.

When our enemies heard of the coming of our army, the *Carnutes* moved with the calamity of others, left their towns and villages that they dwelt in, which they had made upon the sudden with little cottages for necessities sake to keep off the winter; (for since they were conquered of late, they had lost many of their walled towns;) and fled scattering abroad. *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he would not put his souldiers to the abiding of the unreasonable sharp storms which chiefly at that time fell, encamped himself within *Genabum*, a town of the *Carnutes*, and housed his souldiers partly in the buildings of the *Gallies*, and partly in such buildings as being unfinished they thatched in haste with the straw that was brought in to cover their tents and cabins. Nevertheless he sendeth abroad his horsemen and auxiliary footmen into all parts whither he heard his enemies resorted: and that was not in vain; for commonly our men returned ever with a great booty.

The *Carnutes* being put to it with the hardness of the winter, and the terror of the danger, being driven out of house and home, and not daring to stay any where any long time, the woods being not able to defend them from the bitterness of the storms, were scattered abroad, and with the losse of a great part of them, dispersed into the next cities.

CHAP. II.

The *Bellovaci* and other States under the leading of *Corbicus* and *Comius* invade the *Suessiones*: *Cæsar* marcheth against them.

Cæsar at that hard time of the year, thinking it enough to disperse the powers that were assembling, to the intent no beginning of warre might spring up, and weighing how

much it concerned him, to prevent any open warre from breaking out the beginning of the next summer; he placed *C. Trebonius* in garrison at *Genabum* with those two Legions that he had there about him: and forasmuch as he was by often messages certified from the men of *Rhemes*, that the *Bellovaci* (who excelled all *Gallies* and the *Belgæ* also in military fame) and the *States* adjoining unto them, under the conduct of *Corbicus* of *Beauvais* and *Comius* of *Arras*, levied men of warre, and assembled them into one place, to the intent with their whole power to invade the borders of the *Suessiones*, which were appertaining to the men of *Rhemes*; thinking it stood not only upon his honour, but also tended to his own security for the future, to save his allies, which had deserved well of the Commonweal, from displeasure and damages, he called the eleventh legion again out of garrison. Moreover he wrote to *C. Fabius* to bring the two legions that he had, into the confines of the *Suessiones*; and sent for one of those two legions that were with *T. Labienus*. So according as his garrisons lay for the purpose, and as the state of the warre required, to his own continuall trouble, he put sometimes one of his legions and sometimes another, to march from their quarters.

With this power that he had assembled he went against the *Bellovaci*: and encamping himself in their country, sent abroad his horsemen into all quarters to glean up some of them, by whose means he might learn what his enemies purposed to do. His horsemen doing their duty, brought word how few were found in the houses, and those not such as had stayed behind to till the ground, (for they were purposely removed out of all places) but such as had been sent back again to sipe. Of whom *Cæsar* enquiring in what place the forces of the *Bellovaci* were, and what was their intent; found that all the *Bellovaci* were gathered together into one place: and that the *Ambiani*, *Aulerci*, *Caleres*, *Velocasses* and *Atrebates* had chosen a very high ground to encamp in, enclosed with a troublesome marsh, and had conveyed all their stuff into woods that were farther off. Of the which warre there were many Noblemen that were ringleaders; but the multitude obeyed *Corbicus* chiefly, because they understood that he hated most the name of the people of *Rome*: And that *Comius* of *Arras* was a few dayes before gone to fetch aid of the *Germans*, who were their next neighbours, and swarmed in multitude of people. He learned moreover at their hands, that the *Bellovaci* by the consent of all the Noblemen, at the earnest instance of the Commons, were determined, if *Cæsar* came (as it was said he would) but with three legions, to offer him battell, left afterward to more

disadvantage and hinderance they should be compelled to encounter with his whole host: And if he brought a greater power with him, then to keep themselves still in the same ground that they had chosen, and by ambushes to keep the *Romans* from forrage (which by reason of the time of the year was scarce, and also lay scattering) and from corn, and other victuals and things necessary for their army.

The which things when *Cæsar* understood by the contriving report of many, considering how full of wisdom this project was, and how farre from the rashnesse that the barbarous people are wont to use, he determined to make the best advantage of all things, to the intent his enemies disdaining his small company, should make the more haste to come into the field. For he had three old practised legions, the seventh, eighth, and ninth, of singular valour and prowesse; and the eleventh, which was of chosen young men of great hope and towardnesse, which having at that time received eight yeares wages, was notwithstanding look'd upon as not comparable to the other three either for standing, or for valour and courage.

Wherefore summoning an assembly, and there declaring all things that had been reported unto him, he confirmed the hearts of the common souldiers, if peradventure with the number of three legions he might draw out his enemies to fight with him in the field. He set his battell in this order: the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions went before the carriages, and the eleventh cloied in the reere thereof; the which notwithstanding was but finally, as it is wont to be in such expeditions: and this he did, lest the enemies should find a greater number then they expected. By this means, in a square battell almost, he brought his host in fight of his enemies sooner then they looked for him.

When the *Gallies* beheld these legions, so suddenly set in order, marching toward them apace, as it had been in a pitched field (whereas it was reported to *Cæsar* that they intended to carry on their businesse with confident boldnesse,) whether it were for the perill of the encounter, or the suddennesse of our coming, or that they looked to see what we intended to do, they set themselves in order of battell before their camp, and would not descend from the higher ground. Albeit that *Cæsar* was desirous to have fought with them, yet wondering at the great number of his enemies, he pitched his camp directly over against theirs, on the other side of a valley, which was more in deepnesse downward, then in widenesse any way at the bottom. This camp he commanded to be fortified with a rampier of twelve foot, and an open gallery to be builded upon it according to the measure of the same height, and a double ditch to be made of

fifteen foot apiece, with sides plumme down, and many turrets to be reared of three stories high, and to be joynted together with draw-Bridges to let down at pleasure, the fronts whereof were fenced with grates of wicker; to the intent the enemy might be repulsed with double rows of defendants: of which the one from the Bridges, the more out of danger they were by reason of the height, so much the boldier and the farther off might they send their darts; the other the nearer they were placed to their enemy upon the Rampier, so much the better should they be covered from the artillery that might fall down upon them: and over the gates he made high towers. This kind of fortification was to two good purposes: for by the greatnesse of his works and his pretence of fear, he hoped to put the barbarous *Gallies* into a great confidence; and whensoever he should have occasion to send out farre for forrage or victuals, he saw that the camp might be defended with a small power, the strength of the fortifications was so great. In the mean while, parties on both sides would severall times go out and skirmish in the marsh that was between our two camps: the which oftentimes either the *Gallies* and *Germans* that were of our host would passe, and eagerly pursue their enemies; or else in like manner our enemies passing over it, did send our men farther off.

It happened in our daily forraging (as there was no other shift, forasmuch as we were faine to fetch forrage at houses that stood scattering farre asunder) that our forrages being scattered in disadvantageous places, were entrapped. The which thing as it was some losse to us of our beasts of carriage, and slaves, so it heightened the foolish courages of the barbarous *Gallies*: and that so much the more, because *Comius* of *Arras* (who we said before was gone to fetch aid of the *Germans*) was returned with some horse; of whom although there was not above the number of five hundred, yet the *Gallies* were puffed up at the coming of the *Germans*.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar strengthens himself with more forces. The men of *Rhemes* warred by the Enemy, and they again by the *Germans* on *Cæsar's* party.

When *Cæsar* perceived how his enemies kept themselves many dayes together within their camp, which was fortified both with a marsh and also with advantage of the ground, and that he could neither assault them without manifest perill, nor inclose the place where they were with any fortifications, without a greater army, he directed his letters to *Tre-*

V v bonius,

boniss, that he should with all haste possible send for the thirteenth legion which wintered amongst the *Rhiniges*, under *T. Sextius* the Legate, and to with three legions make long marches to come to him. In the mean season he sent out by turns the horsemen of *Rhemes* and of the *Lyngones* and other States, of whom he had called forth a great number, to safe-conduct the forragers, and to withstand the sudden assaults of the enemy.

This being done day by day, and our men taking now less heed, because it was an ordinary matter with them, (which thing for the most part cometh to passe by daily custome) the *Bellovaci* with a band of chosen footmen, knowing the places where our horsemen daily kept their standings, laid ambushes in woody places: and the next day they sent thither their horsemen, first to draw out our men into the danger of their ambushments, and then to assail them as they were enclosed. The lot of this ill luck lighted upon the men of *Rhemes*, whose turn it was to perform the duty that day. For they, when they had espied the horsemen of their enemies upon the suddain, despising them because they were less in number, followed them over-greedily, and were enclosed by the footmen. Whereby being disordered, they retired more hastily then horsemen are accustomed to do in battell, with the losse of *Vetisco* the Prince of their State, and Captain of their horsemen. Who being scarce able to sit upon a horse by reason of his age, would notwithstanding (according to the custome of the *Galles*) neither seek to disburden himself of the Captainship by excuse of his age, nor suffer the encounter to be fought without him. With this lucky battell, wherein they slew the Prince and Captain of the men of *Rhemes*, the courages of our enemies were heightened and raised: and our men were taught by their own harm, to search the places better where they should keep their standings, and to follow their enemy more advisedly when he fled. In the mean while ceased not the daily skirmishes in the sight of both our Camps, which were made at the fords and passages of the marsh.

In this kind of exercise, whenas the *Germani* (whom *Cæsar* had for the same purpose fetcht over the *Rhene*, that they should fight intermingled with his horsemen in the battell) had all boldly passed the marsh, and slaying a few that made resistance, followed eagerly upon the rest of the multitude; not only they that were overthrown at hand or wounded aloof, but also they that were wont to succour as farre off, were to stricken with fear, that they ran away shamefully; and never left flying from higher ground to higher, which they oftentimes lost, before they either recovered into their Camp, or (as some

did for very shame) fled farther off. With whose danger the rest of the host was troubled, that it can scarcely be judged, whether good successe (were it never so small) would make them more arrogant, or a misfortune (were it never so mean) would make them more cowed and fearfull.

CHAP. III.

The *Galles* discamp, and are pursued by *Cæsar*.
The routing of part of them, and the death of *Corbeus*.

After they had lurked many dayes in the same Camp, when the Captains of the *Bellovaci* understood that *C. Trebonius*, one of *Cæsar's* Legates, was at hand with no Legions, fearing the like siege as was at *Alexia*, they sent away in the night all such as by reason of yeares or otherwise wanted strength, and all such as wanted armour among them, and with them they sent away also their carriages. While they were setting forth this troubled and confused company, (for the *Galles* even when they go lightest, are wont to have a great multitude of Carts following them) day-light came upon them; and therefore they set their men in battell-array in their camp, lest the *Romans* should pursue, before the company of their carriages could get any thing forward. But *Cæsar* thought it not good to assail them that were ready to defend themselves, having to high a hill to climb up unto them; and yet he thought to come so near them with his host, as that they might not depart out of the place where they were without danger, our men being hard at hand ready to fall upon them. Therefore whereas he perceived that the troublesome marsh parted Camp from Camp, (the difficult passage whereof might hinder the speedy pursuit of our enemies) and that the same ridge of the hill which went from the farther side of the marsh almost to the camp of the enemies, was parted from their said camp with a small valley: he made bridges over the marsh, and passing over his army, got quickly into the plain of the said ridge, the which on two sides was fortified with a steep descent. There embattelling his men, he came to the farthest end of the ridge: and ordered his battels in such a place, from whence with an engine artillery might be shot amongst the thickest of the enemies.

The *Galles* trusting to the advantage of the place, when they would neither have refused the encounter, if perchance the *Romans* should have adventured up the hill against them, nor yet durst by little and little diminish their battell by severing themselves, lest when they had been out of array, they might hap to have been set upon,

on, kept themselves in order of battell. Whose wilfulnesse *Cæsar* perceiving, kept twenty Cohorts in a readinesse, and pitching his tents in the same place, commanded his camp should be fortified. As soon as the works were finished, he set his Legions in array before the Rampier, and appointed the horsemen to their standings with their horses ready bridled.

When the *Bellovaci* saw the *Romans* in a readinesse to pursue them, and that themselves could not without perill either lodge that night, or continue any longer in the same place where they were, they devised this shift to recover themselves. In the place where they were let together, (for it is declared in *Cæsar's* former Commentaries, how the *Galles* are wont to sit down in the battell) they received from hand to hand one of another bundles of straw and fagots, whereof there was great store in their camp, and cast it all on a heap before their battell, and in the later end of the day, at a watch-word that was given, they set it on fire all at one instant: by means whereof the continuall flame suddenly took away the sight of all their army from the *Romans*: and therewithall the savage *Galles* fled away as fast as their legs could bear them.

Albeit that *Cæsar* could not perceive the departing of his enemies, by reason of the flame that was betwixt them; yet notwithstanding, forasmuch as he suspected it to be a deceit practised by them, that they might the safer fly away; he marched his footmen forward, and sent his horsemen to pursue them. Howbeit for fear of treachery in the businesse, least perhaps his enemies should abide still in the same place, and onely draw us forth into a ground of disadvantage, he went the slower pace. His horsemen fearing to venture into the smoke and thick flame (and if any were so resolute as to enter it, they could scarce see the fore-parts of their own horses) lest they should be intrapped, gave the *Bellovaci* free liberty to recover themselves whither they would. Thus our enemies by their flight, which was mixt with fear and subtilty, escaping without any losse, went but ten miles off, and encamped themselves in a very advantageous ground. From whence by laying ambushes both of horse and foot in divers places, they did the *Romans* great displeasure as they went a foraging.

After this had happened many and sundry times, *Cæsar* learned of a captive, that *Corbeus*, Captain of the *Bellovaci*, had chosen out of his whole host, six thousand of the valiantest footmen, and a thousand horsemen; which he had laid in ambush in the same place whether (for the plenty of provision and corn that was there) he judged the *Romans* would send to forage.

This being known, *Cæsar* bringeth forth more legions then usual, and sendeth his horsemen before as he was wont to do, to safe-conduct his forragers. Among them he mingled for their assistance many light-armed footmen, and himself with his legions followeth as near as possibly he might. The enemies that were laid in ambush, having chosen a field for their purpose, not above a mile over every way, environed round about, either with cumbersome woods, or else a very deep river, beset it with their ambushments, as it had been with a toil.

Our men, forasmuch as they were privy to the design of their enemies beforehand, being ready both with heart and hand to fight, seeing their legions followed hard after them, would refuse no encounters but went rank by rank down into the said places. At whole coming, *Corbeus* thinking an occasion of doing some good to be fallen into his hands, first discovereth himself with a small number, and giveth charge upon the next troops. Our men stoutly withstand the brunt, & flock not many into one place at once; which in skirmishes of horse is wont commonly to happen through fear, and their clustering together turneth to their own losse. They being thus engaged in small parties, and having a care still that their fellows should not be circumvented, the rest brake out of the woods, while *Corbeus* was fighting. Then was the encounter hot and doubtfull. After it had continued indifferent a good space, by little and little came their footmen in array out of the woods, which compelled our horsemen to give back. But they were quickly relieved again by the light-armed footmen, which as was said were sent before our legions, who being intermixed among the horsemen fought stoutly.

The encounter continued a good while doubtfull. But as the course of warre requires, they that had withstood the first brunt of them that lay in ambush for them, had thus much the advantage, that they received not unawares any foil at their hands. In the mean while our legions drew nearer, and divers messengers brought word both to our men and to our enemies at once and the same time, that the Generall was at hand with his army in battell array. Which thing being known, our horsemen trusting to the help of the Cohorts, lay about them very eagerly, lest if they should have delayed the matter, they might have given the footmen part of the honour of the victory. Upon this our enemies hearts began to fail; and they sought to fly by severall wayes, but all was in vain. For by the disadvantage of the same places in which they would have inclosed the *Romans*, were they themselves taken tardy and could not get out. Notwithstanding, being vanquished and altogether out of heart, when they had lost the greater part of

V v 2 their

their company, like men amazed they betook themselves to flight; and some made toward the woods, others toward the river, where being overtaken by our men that followed eagerly after them, they were all slain. In the mean time *Corbennus*, whose heart could by no misfortune be daunted or overcome, never departed out of the battle, nor made toward the woods, neither could by the entreaty of our men be persuaded to yield himself: but fighting most valiantly, and hurting many of our men, he so farre exasperated the victours, that they could not forbear to throw their darts at him, and dispatch him.

CHAP. V.

The remainder of the *Gallies* submit themselves to *Cæsar*. *Comius* in danger to be slain by treachery.

The matter being brought to this passe, *Cæsar* pursuing his newly-got victory, forasmuch as he thought that his enemies being discouraged with so great a misfortune, would immediately upon the news thereof, forsake the place where they were encamped, which was said to be not above eight miles from the place where the slaughter was made; although he saw it would be some trouble to him to passe the river, yet passed he his army, and marched toward them. But the *Bellovaci* and the other States, upon the return of a few of their men, and those wounded, out of the chase, which had escaped the milchance by means of the woods, understanding by them their own great misfortune and misery by the death of *Corbennus*, the losse of their horkemen, and the slaughter of their stoutest footmen, and mistrusting that the *Romans* would out of hand come upon them; immediately called an assembly by the sound of a trumpet, and cried all with one voice, to send ambassadours and hostages to *Cæsar*.

When *Comius* of *Arras* perceived that this motion would be entertained, he fled to those *Germanis* of whom he had borrowed assistance to the warre. The rest sent ambassadours presently unto *Cæsar*, desiring him to content himself with that punishment of his enemies, which if he might have laid upon them without battle in their chief prosperity, they were well assured that of his clemency and courtesy he would not have done it. The *Bellovaci* said that their power was weakened by the losse of their horkemen; many thousands of their choicest footmen were cut off, scarce any escaping to bring tidings of the slaughter: yet notwithstanding their great misfortune, they had by that battle received this happinesse, that *Corbennus*, the author of the

warre and raiser of the multitude, was slain. For as long as he was alive, the Senate could never bear so great sway in the city, as the rude and unskillfull commonalty.

As the ambassadours were speaking these things, *Cæsar* put them in mind, that about the same time the last year, the *Bellovaci* and other States of *Gallia* raised warre, and that they above all others stood most stiffly in their opinion, and would not be reduced to obedience by the submission of the rest. He told them, he knew and understood it was an easie matter to lay the fault of their offence upon him that was dead. But he was sure that there was no man of so great powers, that against the noblemens wills, the Senate resisting him, and all good men withstanding him, could with a weak handfull of the commonalty, raise a warre, and go through with it. Nevertheless he was satisfied with the punishment which they had brought upon themselves.

The night following, the ambassadours returned this answer to those that sent them, and forthwith they gave hostages. Then also the ambassadours of other States, which waited to see what successe the *Bellovaci* would have, came to *Cæsar*, giving hostages, and performing his commands; only *Comius* stood off, who durst not for fear trust his life into any mans hands. For the year before *Titus Labienus* perceiving how while *Cæsar* was committing justice in the higher *Gallia*, *Comius* stirred up the States and made confederacies against *Cæsar*, thought he might without being accounted a faith-breaker revenge his treacherous carriage. And thereupon, because he thought he would not at his sending for come into the camp, lest he should by such a message make him more cautious, he sent *C. Volusenus Quadratus* to murther him, under pretence of communing with him: and for the performance of the matter, he sent with him certain selected Centurions for the purpose. When they came to conference, and that *Volusenus* (as it was agreed upon) had caught *Comius* by the right hand, one of the Centurions, as if he had been moved at the strangenesse of the matter, gave *Comius* a shrewd blow on the head with his sword; howbeit he could not dispatch him, because his friends stept in and saved him. By and by was drawing of swords on both sides, and yet none of both parties were minded to fight, but to fly away: our men, because they believed that *Comius* had had his death wound; the *Gallies*, because perceiving the treachery, they feared there had been more behind then they saw. Upon which businesse it is reported, that *Comius* vowed he would never come in the fight of any *Roman*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar dispoſeth his forces into severall parts of *Gallia*, and himself waſteth the countrey of *Ambiorix*.

When *Cæsar* had subdued the Nations that were most warlike, perceiving there was now no City that prepared warre, to stand against him, but that many to chew the present yoke of the *Roman* Empire, left their towns and fled out of the fields, he determined to send his army abroad into divers quarters. *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with the eleventh legion he took to himself. *C. Fabius* the Legate with twenty five cohorts he sendeth into the farthest part of all *Gallia*, because he heard say that certain States were there in Arms, and that he thought *C. Caninius Rebilus* the Legate had not a sufficient strength of those two legions that were with him already. *T. Labienus* he called unto him from the place where he was; and the twelfth legion which wintered under him, he sent into *Gallia Togata*, to defend the towns that the *Romans* had there peopled with their own Citizens, lest any such harm should happen to them by invasion of the barbarous people, as had happened the summer before to the *Tergetini*, who were surprisled and spoiled of their goods by their suddain invasions.

He himself set forward to waste and spoil the borders of *Ambiorix*; who lying before him for fear from place to place, when he saw there was no hope to get him into his hands, he thought it was most for his honour, so to despoil his countrey of people, buildings and cattle, that his countrymen might loathe him (if fortune reserved any countrymen for him) that for the calamities he had brought upon his countrey, he might never have access thereto again.

After he had sent abroad his host into all parts of *Ambiorix* his countrey, and wasted all places with slaughter, burning and rapine; having slain and taken prisoner a great number of men, he sent *Labienus* with two legions among the *Troveri*: whose countrey, by reason of the nearnesse thereof unto *Germanis*, being daily inured to the warres, is not much unlike to the *Germanis* in rudenesse and savagenesse of life; neither did they obey the commandments of *Cæsar* at any time longer then we had an army in that countrey to compell them.

CHAP. VII.

A new war raised in the territories of the *Pictones*. *C. Fabius* pursueth to fight the forces of *Dumnacus*: subdueth the *Gatunus* and *Aremorici*.

In the mean season *C. Caninius* the Legate, understanding by the intelligence and letters of *Duracius*, (who had continued alwayes firm to the friendship of the people of *Rome*) that a great number of enemies were assembled in the borders of the *Pictones*; forasmuch as a part of that City had renounced their obedience, went to the town of *Lemovicum*. When he came near the town, and understood by his prisoners, how that *Dumnacus* Captain of the *Audes*, with many thousands of men had enclosed *Duracius* and that *Lemovicum* was besieged; he durst not with his weak legions adventure upon his enemies, but pitched his Camp in an advantageous ground. *Dumnacus* hearing of the approach of *Caninius*, turned all his power against the *Roman* legions, determining to set upon them in their Camp. After he had spent many dayes in the assault, and had lost many of his men, and yet could not break down any part of their fortifications, he returned again to besiege *Lemovicum*.

At the same time, *C. Fabius* receiveth many Cities by composition, and assureth them with hostages; and is advertised by *Caninius* letters, of those things that were done among the *Pictones*. Upon the knowledge whereof, he set forth to rescue *Duracius*.

But *Dumnacus* understanding of *Fabius* coming, forasmuch as he thought he should hazard the losing all; if at once he should be compelled both to abide the *Romans*, his enemies without, and also to have an eye to and stand in fear of the towns retired suddenly with all his forces from the place; and could not think himself to be sufficiently in safety, before he had passed his army over the river *Loire*, which by reason of the greatnesse thereof, was to be passed by a bridge and not other wise.

Although *Fabius* was not yet come within sight of his enemies, not had joyined with *Caninius*, yet forasmuch as he was thoroughly informed by such as knew the coast of the countrey, he suspected that his enemies would take that way which they did. Therefore he marcheth with his army to the said bridge where his enemies had passed, and commanded his horkemen to go no farther before the footmen, then that they might upon occasion retire into the same Camp without firing their horses. Our horkes, as was commanded them, overtook the host of

Dumnacus and set upon them; and assailing them flying and amazed, as they marched with their luggage at their backs, slew a great number and took a great prey: and so with good successe retired into their camp.

The night following *Fabius* sent his horsemen before, so provided, that they might encounter the enemy, and stay all the whole army untill he should overtake them. *Q. Aulus Varus* the commander of the horse, a man of singular courage and wisdom, having encouraged his men and overtaken the body of his enemies, disposed certain of his troupes in places convenient, and with the rest of his horsemen gave charge upon his enemies. The cavalry of the enemy fought so much the more boldly, because their foot were ready to assist them, who being mingled through the whole army, as often as occasion was, did succour them against our men. The encounter was very sharp. For our men despising them whom they had vanquished the day before, and remembering that the legions followed at their heels, ashamed to give ground, and desirous to get the day before their coming, fought very valiantly against the footmen. On the other side, our enemies believing that no greater forces of ours were behind, according as they had seen the day before, thought a fair opportunity offered them to destroy our cavalry utterly.

When they had fought a good while very eagerly, *Dumnacus* made a battell to relieve his Cavalry, when occasion should be. But on the suddain our enemies espied our legions coming up close together: at the sight of whom their horse were stricken into such a fear, and the foot so amazed, that breaking through their carriages, with great clamour and confusion they betook themselves every where to flight. Then our Cavalry, who a little before had their hands full, being heartened with joy of the victory, raised a great shout on all sides, and casting themselves amongst them as they fled, made slaughter of them as farre as their horses breaths would serve to pursue them, and their arms were able to strike them. Insomuch that having slain above twelve thousand men, armed, and such as for fear had cast away their arms, they took all their carriages, none escaping.

Out of the which chafe forasmuch as it was certainly known, that *Drapes* the *Senon* was escaped (who when *Gallia* first began to rebel, gathering to him men of desperate fortunes out of all places, setting bondmen at liberty, entertaining outlaws of all countries, and receiving high-way thieves, had cut off the carriages and victuals of the *Romans*) was going toward the *Province* with five thousand men at the most, which he had rallied after the chase; and that *Luterius* of *Cahors* joyned himself with him,

who in the former Commentary is said to have attempted an invasion of the *Province* at the first insurrection of *Gallia*; *Caninius* the Legate with two legions pursued after them, left some great dishonour might be received by those loole fellows terrifying and harrasing the *Province*.

C. Fabius with the rest of the army went against the *Carnutes* and the other States, whose power he knew to be crushed in the battell that was fought against *Dumnacus*. For he doubted not, but he should find them more tractable to deal with, by reason of the late overthrow: whereas if he should give them time of respite, by the instigation of the said *Dumnacus*, they might be raised again. *Fabius* with marvellous good luck and speed brought those States to submission. For the *Carnutes*, who had been oftentimes before ill-handled by us, yet would never listen to peace, now gave hostages, and came into subjection. And the rest of the States situate in the farthest parts of *Gallia*, bordering upon the sea, which are called *Armorica*, following the example of the *Carnutes*, at the coming of *Fabius* with his legions amongst them, performed his commandments without delay.

Dumnacus thus driven out of his own countrey, wandering and lurking in corners alone, was compelled to betake himself to the uttermost countreys of all *Gallia*.

CHAP. VIII.

Drapes and *Luterius* seize upon *Uxellodunum*. *Caninius* pursueth them, overthroweth their forces, taketh *Drapes* prisoner, and with *Fabius* besiegeth *Uxellodunum*.

BUt *Drapes* and *Luterius*, when they understood that *Caninius* approached with his army, perceiving they could not without manifest perill enter the bounds of the *Province*, considering how the army pursued them, nor yet range abroad on thieving at their pleasure, stayed together in the countrey of the *Cadurci*. There *Luterius* (who in times past while he was in prosperity, was able to sway greatly with his countreymen, and had gotten great estimation among the rude people; as one that was ever a beginner of new designs) took with his own and *Drapes* his forces, a town called *Uxellodunum*, which had been formerly in his tuition, a place excellently well fortified by the naturall situation thereof, and caused the townsmen to joyn with him.

To this town *Caninius* forthwith came; and perceiving that all parts of the same were fortified

with craggy cliffes, inso much that though no man were there to defend it, yet were it a hard matter for men in their armour to get up; knowing also that the moveables of the townsmen were great, which if they should go about to carry privily away, they could not escape either our horsemen or footmen: he divided his Cohorts into three parts, and made three Camps upon a very high ground; from which by degrees, as his army was able, he determined to draw a Rampier and trench round about the town.

The townsmen perceiving that, and remembering the miserable condition of *Alexia*, feared the like siege. *Luterius* especially, who had tasted the smart of that misfortune, advised them to lay for corn beforehand: whereupon they determined by generall consent, that leaving a part of the army for the defence of the town, *Luterius* and *Drapes* with the best provided, should go forth to fetch in corn. This counsell being approved of, the next night *Drapes* and *Luterius*, leaving two thousand armed men behind them, drew the rest out of the town. After a few dayes being abroad, they brought in a great quantity of grain out of the countrey of the *Cadurci*, who partly were willing to help them therewith, and partly durst not withstand their taking it, as not being able to make their part good against them. Oftentimes also they would fly out in the night, and assault the castles of our camp. Upon which consideration *C. Caninius* stayed the making of fortifications round about the town, lest he should not be able to defend the circumvallation when it was finished, or else should be forced to set but weak watches in so many places at once.

When they had gotten together a great quantity of grain, *Drapes* and *Luterius* took up their standings not above ten miles from the town, the better at times to convey it in; and they parted the charge between them. *Drapes* tarried behind with part of the army to keep the Camp: *Luterius* drave the beasts with their carriages toward the town: and setting guards there for his defence, about ten of the clock in the night purposed by narrow wayes through the woods, to convey the corn into the town. The watchmen of our Camp hearing the noise of their feet, and the scouts which were sent out reporting what was a doing, *Caninius* caused his Cohorts to arm themselves quickly, and about break of day made attempt out of the next castles upon the forragers. Who being frighted with the suddennesse of the mischief, fled to their guards. Which as soon as our men perceived, they flew more fiercely upon them, and suffered none to be taken alive. *Luterius* fled from thence with a few, but returned not to his Camp.

After this good successe, *Caninius* understood by his prisoners, that part of the army was behind in the Camp with *Drapes*, not above twelve miles off. Which when he had learned by many to be truth, believing that one of the Generals already put to flight, the remnant of the army being terrified, might easily be overthrown; he thought it a great piece of happiness, that none escaped from the slaughter into the Camp, to carry tidings of the mishap to *Drapes*. And forasmuch as he saw there was no danger in putting the matter to triall, he sent all his horsemen and the *German* footmen, swift and nimble fellows, besides to the Camp of his enemies. One of his legions he left in his Camp, and the other eased of all carriages, he took with him.

When he came near his enemies, his scouts that he had sent before, brought word that (as the custome of the barbarous nations commonly is) they had abandoned the higher ground, & encamped themselves by the River side; & that our horse and the *Germans* had flown upon them suddenly ere they were aware, and charged them. Upon the receipt of this news, he halted forward with his legion well armed and well appointed: and to the sign being given suddenly on all sides, the higher places were taken by our men. At the doing whereof, the *Germans* and our Cavalry seeing the Ensigns of our Legions, fought very stoutly: and by and by all our Cohorts charged upon them round; so that in the conclusion, they were all either slain, or prisoners, and a great booty taken. *Drapes* himself was also taken in the same conflict.

Caninius having done his work successfully, without almost any hurt at all to his souldiers, returned to besiege the town: and having now destroyed his enemy without, for fear of whom he could not before divide his garrisons, nor environ the town with fortifications; he commandeth the works to be carried on round about the town. The next day came thither *C. Fabius* with his forces, and took another part of the town to besiege.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar having punished *Guturatus* for the revolt of the *Carnutes*, joyneth with *Caninius* and *Fabius* before *Uxellodunum*. Upon his depriving them of water the town yieldeth. *Cæsar* cutteth off their right hands.

IN the mean time, *Cæsar* left *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with fifteen Cohorts among the *Bellovacis*, to prevent any new confederacies amongst them for the future: and he himself visited the other States, charging them

with mo hostages, and with comfortable words raising the fearful hearts of them all.

When he came amongst the *Carnutes*, in whose country (as *Cæsar* hath declared in his former Commentary) the warre first of all began, inasmuch as he perceived them to be chiefly afraid, as being conscious to themselves of their fault, to the intent he might the more speedily deliver the rest of the State from fear, he demanded *Guentrius*, the ring-leader of that mischief, and raiser of the rebellion, to be delivered unto him to be punished: who albeit he trusted not himself with his own countrymen, yet all men made to diligent search for him, that he was soon found out and brought to the Camp. *Cæsar*, contrary to his own nature, was compelled to punish him whether he would or no, by the importunity of his souldiers, who imputed all the dangers and losses that they had sustained by this warre, unto *Guentrius*: inasmuch that his body after it was in a manner whipped to death, was beheaded.

While *Cæsar* tarried here, he was advertised by severall letters from *Caninius*, what was done to *Drapes* and *Luterius*, and how the townsmen perceived in their resolution: the small number of whom although he despised, yet he deemed their wilfulness worthy of severe punishment; lest they might give occasion to all *Gallia*, to think that they wanted not strength, but constancy and resolution to withstand the *Romans*; or let by their example, other cities of *Gallia* trusting to the advantage and strength of places, should attempt to recover their liberty: especially seeing he was sure that all the *Galles* knew his commission lasted but one summer longer, which if they could hold out, they should need to fear no danger after. And therefore leaving *Q. Calenus* the Legate behind with two legions to follow leisurely after him by easy marches, he himself with all his Cavalry made haste to *Caninius*.

When *Cæsar*, contrary to all mens expectations, was come to *Uxelodunum*, and saw the town environed with fortifications, perceiving that it was not for him to break up his siege on any conditions, and learning moreover by run-aways that the town had great abundance of victuals: he assayed to cut off the water from his enemies.

There was a river that ran through the bottom of the valley, which environed well-near all the hill whereon the town stood, from whence the descent was rough and steep on all sides. The nature of the place would not suffer this stream to be turned any other way. For it ran in such sort at the very foot of the hill, that there could be no ditch cut low enough to drain it. The townsmen had hard and very steep coming down to it, inasmuch that if our men withstood

them, they could not without wounds or danger of their lives, either come down to the river, or get up the steep hill again. Which distresse of theirs *Cæsar* well knowing, placed archers and slingers, and other artillery also, against such places where the easiest coming down was, to keep the townsmen from the water of the river: who afterward came for water all to one place. For under the very walles of the town there gushed out a great spring of water, on that side where there was a space almost of three hundred foot not encompassed with the river.

Now whilst all the rest wished, and only *Cæsar* perceived, that this spring might be taken from the town, though not without great damage; he began to raise Vines directly against it toward the hill, and to make mounts with great labour and continuall fighting. For the townsmen came running down from the higher ground, and fought with our men at a distance without danger, wounding many of them that pressed up too forwardly. Notwithstanding our men were nothing deterred from bringing forward their Vines, endeavouring to overcome the crabbedness of the place, with their labour and works. At the same time they drew privy mines to the head of the springs, which kind of work they might do without any danger or mistrust of their enemies. A mount was cast up six foot high, and thereupon was raised a tower of ten stories; not such a one as might equall the height of the walles, (for that was not possible to be done any way) but such a one as might exceed the top of the spring. From which conveying darts with engines to the brim of the springs, so that the townsmen could not fetch water without danger, not only all sorts of cattell, but also a great number of men died for thirst.

The townsmen greatly astonished hereat, filled barrels with greafe, pitch, and shingles, and setting them on fire rolled them down upon our works, and at the same time also fought very desperately, with the perill of fighting to keep the *Romans* from quenching the fire. Suddenly there was a great flame in our works. For whatsoever was thrown down from that steep place, the same flaying against the Vines and rampier, took hold upon the things that flayed them. On the other side, our souldiers, albeit they were hindered both with the dangerousnesse of the encounter, and with the disadvantage of the place, yet they bare out all things with a stout courage. For the thing was done both in an eminent place, and also in the sight of our army: and a great cry was raised on both sides. So that every man as farre as he could, especially the most daring, (to the intent his valour might the better be known and testified) ventured himself upon the fire, & the weapons of his enemies.

Cæsar

Cæsar when he saw many of his men wounded, commanded his Cohorts to clumbe up the hill on all sides of the town, and to raise a shout as if they purposed to scale the walles. Where-with the townsmen being frighted, forasmuch as they knew not what was doing in other places, called back their men from assaulting our works, and placed them upon the walls. So our men having respite from fighting, did quickly either quench the works that were on fire, or else cut them off from the rest.

The townsmen stubbornly standing out, though they had lost a great part of their men by thirst, and continuing still unanimously resolved, at length the veins of the spring were cut off within the ground by mines, and turned another way: by means whereof the fountain of running water was presently dried up. Which to daunted the hearts of the defendants, who believed it could not be done by the wit of man, but came to passe by the will of the gods; that when they saw there was no other remedy, they yielded themselves.

Cæsar being assured that his clemency was sufficiently known to all people, and therefore he needed not to fear that it would be imputed to the cruelty of his nature, if he dealt something harshly with them; and besides that, considering with himself, that it might well be thought he little regarded the good successe of his counsells and undertakings, if by suffering such things unpunished, others should be encouraged to rebel in divers places: he thought it requisite to hold the rest in awe by the punishment of these. And therefore he cut off the hands of as many of them as were able to bear arms, and let them live still, that the punishment of such wicked men might be more manifest to the world.

CHAP. X.

Drapes dieth, *Luterius* brought to *Cæsar*, *Labienus* good successe against the *Treviri*. *Cæsar* after his expedition into *Aquitania*, putteth his army into winter-quarters.

DRapes, whom I declared to have been taken by *Caninius*, whether it were for vexation and grief that he was in bands, or for fear of more heavy punishment, fasted a few dayes from meat, and so starved.

At the same time *Luterius*, that escaped by flight from the battel (as I shewed before) fell into the hands of *Epasnatius* the *Arvernian*. For in often shifting from place to place, he was faine to venture himself upon the courtesy and civility of many, because he thought he could never continue any long time in one place without danger, his heart misgiving him how much he had deserved to have *Cæsar* his enemy. *Epasnatius* the *Arvernian* being a faithfull friend to the

people of *Rome*, as soon as he had gotten him into his hands, brought him without further delay bound unto *Cæsar*.

In the mean time *Labienus* warreth prosperously against the *Treviri*: and having slain many both of the *Treviri* and also of the *Germanis*, who were ready to assist any man against the *Romans*, got the chief of them alive into his hands; among whom was *Surns* the *Heduan*, a man of great valour and noble birth, who alone of the *Heduanis* had unto that day continued in arms against the people of *Rome*.

Cæsar knowing thereof, and forasmuch as he saw his affairs went well forward in all parts of *Gallia*, weighing with himself how all *Celtica* and *Belgica* were the former Summers conquered and subdued, and that he had never all this while visited *Aquitania*, only he had made a kind of entrance into it by certain victories gotten by *P. Crassus*: he marched thither with two legions, with intent to bestow the later part of the summer there. Which thing (as he had done all others before) he dispatched quickly and luckily. For all the States of *Aquitania* sent ambassadours unto him, and gave him hostages.

After the accomplishment of these things, he went to *Narbone* with his guard of horsemen, and sent his foot into their wintering-places by his Legates. Four legions he placed in *Belgium* under *M. Antonius*, *C. Trebonius*, *P. Vatinus*, and *Q. Tullius*, Legates. Two he quartered amongst the *Heduanis*, whom he knew to be of greatest authority in all *Gallia*. Two more he placed amongst the *Treviri* in the borders of the *Carnutes*, to be a stay to all the country that lay upon the sea-coast. The other two he placed in the borders of the *Lemovici*; not farre from the *Arverni*: that so there might not be any part of *Gallia* without an army.

After he had tarried a few dayes in the *Province*, and there speedily taken cognizance of all their courts, sitting upon publick controversies, and rewarded such as had deserved well, (for he had a great desire to understand how every man had carried himself towards the commonweal during the generall rebellion of all *Gallia*, which he had born out through the faithfulness & assistance of the said *Province*) as soon as he had dispatched these things, he returned to his legions into *Belgium*, and wintered at *Nemetocenna*.

CHAP. XI.

Comius of *Arras* overthrown in a battel of horse by *C. Volusenus*, submitted to *M. Antonius*, and receiveth pardon.

WHile he was there, he understood that *Comius* of *Arras* had encountered with his Cavalry. For *Antonius* being come into his winter-quarters, and the city of *Arras* con-

X x continu-

continuing firmly loyall, *Comius*, who after his wound that we spake of before, was wont still to be ready at hand to his countrymen at every stirre, to the intent that if they would begin any new rising, they should not want a head and a captain for the war; as long as the city continued obedient to the *Romans*, he with his horsemen maintained himself and his followers by thieving, for laying the wayes, he cut off many conveyes that were going with provision to the *Roman* garrisons. *C. Volusenus Quadratus*, the generall of the horse, was appointed to winter in the same place with *Antonius*; him did *Antonius* lend to pursue the horse of his enemies. *Volusenus*, beside the singular valour that was in him, did also beare a great hatred toward *Comius*, and for that cause was the more willing to execute the thing that was commanded him. Wherefore placing divers ambushes, he oftentimes set upon *Comius* horsemen, and put them to the worke.

At last, when the contention grew more vehement, and that *Volusenus*, desirous to cut off *Comius* himself, followed him somewhat more eagerly with a small party, and *Comius* on the other side fled the faster away, thereby to draw him farther from his company; at length espying his advantage, *Comius* suddenly cried out to all his men, that as they were true unto him they should stand to him, and not suffer the wound that was given him basely under colour of friendship, to be unrevenged; and therewithall turning his horse, he runneth from the rest of his company upon *Volusenus*. All his horse followed, and because there were but a few of our men, they made them retreat, and pursued them. *Comius* putting spurres to his horse, encountered the horse of *Quadratus*, & with his spear thrust *Volusenus* by great violence through the thigh.

When our horse saw that their Captain was wounded, they bestirred themselves, and turning again upon the enemy, put them back. Many of the enemies by the violent charge of our men were beaten off and wounded: of whom some were overthrowen in the chase, and some were taken prisoners. As *Comius* escaped any farther mishap by the swiftnesse of his horse: so our Generall being by him in this battell fore wounded, was carried into the Camp in such a case, that it was not likely he should have lived. And *Comius*, whether it were that he thought himself sufficiently revenged, or because he had lost a great part of his men, sent messengers to *Antonius*, giving hostages, and assuring him that he would continue where it should please him to appoint, and do whatsoever he should command him. Only one request he made, wherein he besought him to beare with his fearfulness, that he might not be forced to come in the sight of any *Roman*. Which request *Antonius* judging to

proceed out of a real fear, and not without good cause, he pardoned him according to his desire, and received his hostages.

CHAP. XII.

While *Cesar* is busie in quieting and ordering things in *Gallia*, and visiting some municipall towns in *Italy*, his enemies conspire against him at *Rome*.

DURING the time that *Cesar* wintered in *Belgium*, his chief purpose was, to keep the States in amity, and to take away all hope and occasion of warre: for he intended nothing lesse, then the carriage of his businesse so, as he should be constrained to have warre at the time of his departure: lest when he should withdraw his army, he should leave any troubles behind, which all *Gallia* could willingly engage in, so that it might be without present danger. And therefore by entreating the cities honourably, by rewarding the noblemen highly, by burdening the country with no new impositions, he easily kept all *Gallia*, which now was tired out with so many unfortunate battels, in quiet and obedience.

Winter being over, *Cesar*, contrary to his custome, hasteth into *Italy* with as much expedition as might be, to treat with the municipall towns and colonies, and to commend unto them the suit of his Quæstor *M. Antonius* for the Priesthood. For he made all the friends for him he could, both because the same *Antonius* was his very dear friend, whom he had sent before to sue for that promotion, as also to oppose the factions and unreasonable proceedings of a few men, who by putting *Antonius* beside his purpose, sought to disparage *Cesar* now going out of his command.

Albeit he had tidings by the way before he came near *Italy*, that *Antony* was made Augur, yet he thought he had as good reason as before, to visit the municipall towns and colonies, both to give them thanks for appearing in the businesse, and for their civility shewed in the behalf of *Antony*; as also to commend unto them his own case, touching the honour which he purposed to sue for the next year: and that the rather, because his adversaries proudly made their brag, that *L. Lentulus* and *C. Marcellus* were created Consuls, to deprive *Cesar* of all honour and authority; and that the Consulship was wrested from *Sergius Galba*, though he had more voices on his side, because he was a familiar friend of *Cæsars*, and had been engaged unto him as his Legate.

Cesar at his coming among the municipall towns, was entertained with extraordinary affection and respect: that being his first coming from the warres in *Gallia*. Nothing was omitted

ted that could be devised for the decking and adorning of their gates, wayes, and places where *Cesar* should passe. All the people came forth with their children to meet him by the way; sacrifices were every where offered; the temples and market-places were hanged with clothes of tapestrie: so that a man would have thought by the expressions of joy, there had been some great triumph expected and provided for. So great costliness was among the richer sort, and such hearty expression among the meaner sort.

When *Cesar* had lightly passed through all the countreys of *Gallia Togata*, he returned with all speed to his army at *Nemetocenna*, and calling all his legions out of their winter-quarters into the country of the *Treviri*, he went thither, and there mustered them. *T. Labienus* he made governour of *Gallia Togata*, thereby to get himself the more favour and furtherance in his suit for the Consulship. He himself removed from one place to another, according as he found it necessary for health. And albeit he heard oftentimes that *Labienus* was solicited strongly by his enemies, and was also advertised how it was carried on by a small faction at *Rome*, to take away part of his army from him by a decree of the Senate: yet notwithstanding he neither gave credit to any thing that was reported of *Labienus*, nor would be drawn to do any thing contrary to the authority of the Senate. For he believed that if the Senators might give their voices freely, he should easily obtain his purpose.

For *C. Curio* Tribune of the people, who had taken upon him the defence of *Cesar's* cause and dignity, had oftentimes propounded to the Senate, that if the fear of *Cesar's* army prejudiced any man, and seeing that the authority and power of *Pompey* did not a little keep the Courts in awe; that both of them might lay down their arms and dismisse their armies: and so should the City be at liberty to use her own right as she pleased. This he not only propounded, but began to divide the Senate about it: which the Consuls and the friends of *Pompey* commanded should not be done: and so ruling the matter as they listed, they departed. This was a great testimony of the whole Senate, and agreeable to their former act.

For *Marcellus* the year before, opposing *Cæ-*

sar's dignity, contrary to the law of *Pompey* and *Crassus*, and having put up a bill to the Senate for the discharge of *Cesar* before the time of his commission was expired; when they had given their voices, *Marcellus*, who sought all his honour by working spite against *Cesar*, departed aside, and the Senate fell all of them quite upon other matters.

This did not at all daunt the spirits of *Cesar's* enemies, but rather stirred them up to strengthen their party, and thereby to, compell the Senate to approve of that which they had determined. Hereupon a decree was made, that *Cneius Pompeius* should lend one legion, and *Cesar* another, to the warre against the *Parthians*. But it was easily discerned that both these legions were taken from *Cesar*. For the first legion, which *Cneius Pompeius* had sent unto *Cesar* levied in the *Provinces*, he gave unto *Cesar* as one of his own number. Nevertheless, albeit that no man need doubt but that *Cesar* was spoiled at the pleasure of his enemies, yet he sent *Pompey*, his legion again: and of his own forces, he ordered the fifteenth legion which he had in the hither *Gallia*, to be delivered to him according to the decree of the Senate. In the room whereof he sent the thirteenth legion into *Italy*, to ly in garrison in the same place from whence the fifteenth was drawn.

Then he distributed his army into winter-quarters. *C. Trebonius* with four legions he placed in *Belgium*: *C. Fabius* with as many amongst the *Hedui*. For this he thought would be the best way to keep *Gallia* in most safety and quiet, if the *Belgae*, who were the most valourous, and the *Hedui*, who were of most authority, had forces quartered among them to keep them in obedience. This done, he took his journey into *Italy*.

When he came thither, he understood that the two legions which he had dismissed, which by the decree of the Senate should have been employed in the *Parthian* warre, were by *C. Marcellus* the Consul delivered to *Pompey*, and kept still in *Italy*. Although by this dealing it was evident to all the world, what was intended against *Cesar*, yet *Cesar* determined to take all things patiently, as long as he had any hope left to decide the controversy rather by the law then by the sword.

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE EIGHTH COMMENTARY OF THE WARRES IN GALLIA.

Some attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gallies to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be lorded over by strangers: and others, to the too great clemency of Cæsar. I grant that clemency apt to pardon emboldens to revolt; for that we easily forget all benefits which do not intirely establish our liberty: but if cruelty causeth them lesse frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous; for that when despair driveth men thereunto, and that the hope of safety resteth onely in victory, the revolted become all valiant, obstinate, constant, and faithfull to the end; which never falleth out where there is hope of the enemies clemency. We have here plentifull examples thereof. Cæsar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gallies hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his clemency; which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts: and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by fowl and unworthy aits; as when the Veneti under publick faith imprisoned the Roman officers, which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army. But I cannot excuse that of Uxellodunum. On the contrary, the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alva, drove poor fishermen so into despair, that they have shaken off his insupportable yoke; and with an admirable constancy have maintained and enriched themselves, and are grown so potent, as that they are able to resist him by

land, and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies.

Cæsar sheweth us also by his care and industry to get intelligence of the enemies proceedings, (whether by taking prisoners in the field, or by having good spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successfull designs having been founded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he which assaileth hath more courage then he which is assailed, and alwayes believeth the assailant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well-exercised and well-disciplined army is able to do in such a case, is to defend it self; but where are new-levised souldiers, fall out great disorders: which was the reason he took so much care to fortify his camp very strongly, to the end he might defend it and all his baggage with a few men, and might without danger execute many brave designs, being alwayes assured of his retreat. Let us farther take view of the siege of Uxellodunum: which Cæsar judging to be impregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of corn, undertaketh by a great & dangerous labour to keep them from water, which was from a fountain without the town, from whence they were only supplied: which the besieged perceiving, having set fire on Cæsar's works, by a sally they hindered him from quenching it. Cæsar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place, resolveth to make an assault upon the town; which apprehension caused them to retreat.

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THE MANNER OF OUR MODERN TRAINING. Or TACTICK PRACTISE.

By CLEMENT EDMONDS, Remembrancer of the
City of LONDON.



Orasmuch as my purpose was to make this task of Observations as a parallel to our modern Discipline, I did not think it fit to mingle the Tactick Practise of these times with the use of foregoing ages, but rather to shut up these Discourses therewith, as the second line of this warlike parallel, which is thus drawn in the best fashion of modern Art.

In the knowledge of marshalling an Army, there is nothing more especially to be regarded, then that from a confused company of men, having chosen the fittest for the wars, we should so place and digest a convenient number of them, that in marches, in incamping, in battels we may be able with a few well ordered to encounter a farre greater army in confusion, and to overthrow them. From hence *Aeneas* did define the Art of war, to be the knowledge of warlike motions.

Before this unexpert army shall be able to be moved in such fashion, it shall not be amiss to acquaint it with the most usuall terms, wherewith they shall be often commanded into diverse postures, as occasion shall be offered. For as in the art of Fencing, no man shall be able to turn and wind his body for his best advantage to offend his enemy, or defend himself, unlesse first his master shall instruct him in the severall parts and postures thereof: so every souldier, or the whole troupe as one body, or one souldier, shall never be readily instructed to transform or turn it self by divers motions into different forms, unlesse they

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first understand what is meant by Fronts and Flanks, by Files and Ranks, what by Leaders and Followers, by Middlemen and Bringers up. By this means each souldier understanding what the terme doth signifie, shall readily both apprehend and execute such commandments as the Captain or Officer shall direct him.

A File is a certain number of men following singly one Leader unto the depth of 8 or 10, as they shall be commanded. The ancients have called this File *Seriem*, *ordinationem*, or *decuriam*. It consisteth of Leaders and Followers, placed according to their worth and valour: and especially there ought to be regarded, the Leader or *Decurio*, the fifth, sixth, or Middlemen, and the tenth and last called the Bringer-up or *Tergiductor*.

The Leader, First therefore, every souldier being aptly fitted unto his severall armes according to his worth, age and stature, they are to be disposed into severall files, wherein every one is especially to acknowledge his leader or foremost man to be the authour of all his motions: & therefore duely attending what directions shall be commanded, each follower shall according to the motions of his leader or foremost man, order his own; and is to be excused, if he attend the motions of his leader before he move himself.

Battallion. A Rank or Front. Sidemen. When many files are thus disposed together, all the leaders making one and the same front, and their followers observing likewise one and the same proportion of distance before, and after, and on each side, these Files thus joynd make one Battallion, the front whereof is called a Rank, and so likewise the second and third in depth, according to the number of men in each file. The first, second and third, and so forward in each file, are called Sidemen, in respect of the same numbers in the next file. Neither must every souldier onely regard the motions of his Leader, but he must also diligently respect his sidemen, and such as shall be placed on his right and left hand, called his ranks: so that both in files and ranks he may alwaies be found in the same distance wherein he is commanded.

The number of souldiers in a Battallion. It should be impertinent to the purpose to prescribe a certain number of souldiers unto these Battallions, onely thus much for the proportion: that it ought never to exceed so much, but that it may easily upon any occasion be changed into such a form or fashion to fight, as may be thought fittest for the present.

The length. The length of this Battallion is diversly termed amongst the Latines, as *Frons*, *Facies*, *Adstructio*, *Jugum*, &c. but in our modern practise, most familiarly the Front or Rank.

Breadth or depth. The breadth of the Battallion, which is from the leader to the bringer-up, with the distance between all the followers, is said to be the length or depth of one file or flank.

Dignities in places to be observed. In the disposing of souldiers into files and ranks, besides their observing a right line in their places and standing, we must likewise especially respect the different worth and quality of the souldiers; that every one according to his worth may be fited unto his proper place, and accordingly receive advancement, as the death of his Leaders, and true value of his desert by his Commander shall give occasion.

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MODERN TRAINING.

First therefore there must be especiall choice made of the leaders of each file, or first front or ranks of the Battallion, of the most expert, ablest, and best-armed men: because that as from them the rest are to receive directions of their after-motions; so in them the greatest hope of the day doth consist.

Next unto the first it must be provided, that the bringers up or last rank, called *Tergiductores*, be little inferiour, well experienced, wise and valiant; that they may both know when to reprehend their former Ranks, and urge them forward, if they see them declining or yielding upon false occasions; as also to be able upon any sudden alarm given in the reere, to turn faces about and make themselves a Front for the best resistance.

Neither must it be neglected concerning the second and ninth ranks, that they also may be furnished with the next most sufficient men; both because of their nearness unto danger, as also that if their leaders or bringers up shall either be slain, or disabled by wounds, they may presently succeed in their places and make them good.

There is also a good decorum to be observed in the middlemen, or fifth and sixth ranks, both for the men themselves and their armes: that in our marches, when the middlemen or sixth ranks shall be called up to front with their leaders, they may in some sort and proportion answer their places; as also when we double our front, by calling up middlemen to fight in a greater breadth, they may not be unsurable: but especially in marches, that they may be able to make the best resistance, when they shall become the flanks of the Battallions.

As these respects ought to be observed in ranks, so the files also are not without their different degrees of dignity. As the leader of the right-hand file is accounted to have the first place of honour in the Battallion: for he doth not onely lead the rest in his own file, but he is the author and beginner of the motions of the whole Battallion.

The leader of the left-hand file hath the next place, because that he with the leader of the right-hand file do alwaies in their marching and imbattelling rectifie or rank the whole front of the battallion: and so consequently all the next of their files as they stand in order, even untill the middle, who are accounted the last in dignity.

The Battallion being thus disposed into files and ranks, and each file and rank according to his worth and experience rightly advanced: it followeth that there should be a just distance proportioned between either, that at all times upon all occasions, they might be found ready, and in comeliest fashion, either to offend their enemy, or defend themselves. These distances which every follower must observe in respect of his leader, and every leader and follower in respect of the sidemen, may be reduced unto three severall Orders, as followeth.

The first is called open Order; the distance whereof is twelve foot between every follower and his leader, or between every file; and six foot between them and the sidemen, or between every rank. This order is commonly used upon marches when the enemy is known to be farre off,

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as also in private exercising of souldiers for their severall managing of their armes. It differeth somewhat from the *Ordinatus Miles* amongst the *Romans*, who alwayes observed but four cubits in files and ranks.

Order.

The second distance is called Order, when we contract the battallion both in length and breadth, and gather the souldiers within a nearer scantling both in files and ranks, that is, by observing six feet in their files between the follower and leader, and three feet between the ranks or sidemen. This distance is used when we march toward an enemy near at hand, or in marches by reason of the opportunity of the place suspiciously dangerous. This is also near unto *Denfatus ordo*, but onely that that was but two cubits in both files and ranks.

Close order, pouldron to pouldron.

The third and last order, is when either we attend the enemy his present assault, or that we intend to charge him upon our securest and best distance; when every follower standeth three feet, or his rapier length behind his leader, and a foot and a half from the sidemen or files; or when every souldier occupieth but one foot and a half for his own station, joyning pouldron to pouldron, or target to target. This differeth from *Constipatus ordo*, because that alloweth but one cubit for files and ranks, and this close order alloweth one cubit in the file, but two in the ranks.

The manner of charging with five ranks.

This distance doth agree also best with the length of our pikes of 15 or 16 feet long. For it is thought fit oftentimes that the battallion consisting of ten ranks, there should not charge more at one time then the 5 formost, so that the pikes of the fifth rank might be three foot over the formost shoulder; and the other five ranks should in this close order, or nearer if it be possible, follow the other charging, with their pikes advanced, untill some occasion should require their charge. In the mean time they should perform their dutie, in keeping the five formost ranks from retiring, and besides adde strength unto the charge or shock.

The manner of exercising of composed Battallions, with their different motions.

THe files and ranks being thus understood, disposed and ordered, and all parts and members of the battallion being joyned in their just proportion and distance, able and fit to be altered upon any sodain occasion (as if it were but one entire body) unto severall and divers postures, and to make resistance unto what forces soever shall oppugne the same: it might be thought needlesse to have made the disposition of the members so exact, unlesse by continuall practise and exercise they might be made nimble and ready, not onely to defend themselves and their whole body on all sides, but also to be able to offend whensoever they shall espie the least occasion of advantage.

The terms of direction or command, which are commonly used in this modern discipline of martiall exercise, as they are not many, onely answering to

to the different postures which are required in the Battallion; so they are and must be short and perspicuously plain, that by this means being sodainly uttered, easily apprehended and understood, they may as speedily be put in execution by those which shall be commanded.

First therefore, that the Battallion may be commanded into some one fashion or posture, from whence it shall be fit to convert it self into all other, the Captain or Officer shall bid them stand in front. When every particular souldier composing himself after his foremost leader, standeth comely in file and rank, fronting unto some certain place, or to the Captain, as shall be thought best for the present.

Stand in front. In arcob stature.

In this and all other directions whatsoever, it shall be especially observed, that every follower attending what is commanded, mark his next leader, and accordingly move himself, as he shall see him move first.

The Battallion therefore thus fronting, if the enemy should suddenly either assault the right or left flank, it shall be commanded to turn faces to the right or left hand; when every souldier observing his leader shall turn his face, and make his flank his front according to the direction.

Faces to the right or left hand. Declinate in hastam vel in scutum.

There is also a doubled motion or declination to the right or left hand, when every souldier observing his leader shall turn their bodies twice to the right or left hand, and by that means become turned with their faces where their backs were, as if they expected an enemy in the rere, or being to perform some other motion that may be offered: beginning this alteration from the right or left hand as shall be commanded.

Faces about to the right or left hand. Duplicem declinatio or mutatio.

As every particular souldier in the troupe is thus commanded at sometimes to turn his face to the right or left hand, or about, the Battallion standing in order, that is, according to the distance before named; so the whole Battallion being reduced into their close order, is commanded to turn as one body to the right or left hand. It is performed thus: Imagine the Battallion stand first in order, it shall be commanded that they close their files to the right hand, when the right file standing still, the rest turning their faces to the right hand, march into their close order and return as they were: next that they close their ranks from behind, when every follower marcheth forward to his leader unto his rapiers point as is said before. This done, (the leader of the right file standing immoveable) all the rest (as the body of a ship or a great gate) turn about that leader, as about the hinge or center, every one keeping the same distance and order wherein they were first placed, as if they were but one entire body.

Wheel to the right or left hand. Conversio in hastam vel in scutum.

When the same Battallion is to be restored into the same station wherein it was first, it is commanded; Faces about to the left hand, and march into your order from whence you were closed. Then let your leaders or first ranks stand still, and the rest turning faces about, march ranks in order as before: then turn as you were, and you are restored.

As you were. Revolutio. Reversio.

When the whole Battallion being in their close order should turn about and make the Rere the Front, it is done by a double turning or declination, and commanded to wheel about, which is answerable to the former faces about or mutation,

Wheel about. Inflexio militum.

Reverſe.

There is alſo another wheeling in this ſort, when the front changeth the aſpect thrice, for as wheeling about maketh the Front the Rere, ſo this wheel-eth from the right hand to the left, or contrariwiſe: which faſhion is ſo ſeldom uſed, that we ſcarce afford it a name.

In all ſuch motions and alterations, it is moſt fit that all men perform their directions with their pikes advanced, being in that ſort moſt eaſie to be commanded, as alſo leſſe troubleſome to their followers and leaders.

Countermarching Files and Ranks.

There is alſo another means to prevent the enemy his aſſaulting us in the rere or flank, leſt he ſhould find our worſt men leaſt able to make reſiſtance; and this is performed by countermarching both files and ranks three divers wayes apiece.

Files.
From the
rere
through
Evolutio
Macedonica

The firſt was uſed by the *Macedonians*, after this faſhion: Firſt the leader turneth his face about towards the right or left hand, and ſo the next follower marching behind his leader turneth alſo, and ſo the third and fourth, untill the bringer up have carried himſelf out into a new place in the rere further from the enemy, as he was before next unto him. But this neither was nor is accounted ſafe or ſecure, becauſe it doth ſomewhat reſemble a flying or running away from the enemy, which might give him no ſmall encouragement, and therefore it is not much in uſe.

Only at ſome times, the bringers up marching throughout beyond the leaders, untill they poſſeſſe the ſame ſpace before them which they did behind them, all turning their faces about, make their leaders to affront the enemy, who were before fartheſt from them.

From the
front
through
Laconica
evolutio.

The *Lacedamonians* uſed the contrary, as it were purſuing the enemy: the bringer up firſt being turned face about, and ſo the next marching before him, and ſo the third, untill the leader himſelf became alſo turned, and in the foremoſt front unto the enemy. Which with us is ſomewhat otherwiſe, but yet both affronting, and as it were purſuing the enemy: becauſe our leaders firſt begin this motion, and ſo countermarching through on the right or left hand, become in the front in a new ſpace of ground, who were before in the rere.

From the
front and
flank.

The third and laſt was invented by the *Persians*, whom when the place or near approach of the enemy would not ſuffer to change their ground, they were wont to countermarch the front to the right or left hand: and being come unto the depth of the bringers up, to ſtand ſtill untill the other half file had likewiſe marched forth, and fallen upon their leaders in every file. In all theſe it is eſpecially commanded, to march ſtill in the ſame diſtance, and by whole ranks, to prevent confuſion, which (eſpecially the enemy at hand) muſt needs be moſt dangerous, and therefore carefully to be avoided.

Chorica
evolutio.Counter-
marching of
ranks.

In like ſort the ranks may countermarch, when either the right wing would be ſtrengthened by the left, or the left by the right, alwayes marching by whole files towards the right or left hand, according as they ſhall have the direction, either

either changing the ground, or upon the ſame ground, as in the former counter-marches.

There is uſed alſo another kind of ſtrengthening both the front and flank when occaſion ſhall be offered, viz: by doubling either files or ranks. And this, either by doubling the number of ſouldiers in the ſame files or ranks, keeping ſtill the ſame breadth and depth of ground; or elſe by doubling the ground, keeping the ſame number of ſouldiers. The files are doubled, when the ſecond file ſhall inſert it ſelf into the firſt, the leader thereof putting himſelf a follower unto the leader of the firſt, and the next follower follower to the next in the firſt file, and ſo forwards. And likewiſe the fourth file inſerting it ſelf into the third, and the ſixth into the fifth. And this is to be performed when the Battallion ſtandeth in his order.

The dou-
bling of
files to the
right or left
hand.
By men.

To double the place or depth, is when the ſame number of men ſhall put themſelves out of their order into their open order, either by advancing forward, or by falling backwards, as they ſhall be commanded.

Duplicate
altitudinem.
By ground.

The ranks are doubled two manner of wayes: either by inſerting the ſecond into the firſt to the right or left hand, as before in the files; or elſe (the enemy being at hand) by joyning whole troupes together to the right or left wing, according as occaſion ſhall be offered: and this is held to be the ſafeſt when the enemy is near, to avoid confuſion. It is performed either in the ſame ground, or by doubling the ground, when either we deſire to exceed the front of our enemy his battallion, or to prevent leſt we our ſelves be included. The terms to both are; Double your files or ranks to the right or left hand: and when you would have them return again into their proper places, it is commanded; As you were.

Doubling
of ranks by
inſerting, or
adding new
troupes.Duplicate
longitudi-
nem.

The ordinary directions which are eſpecially given in theſe martial exerciſes are, firſt that no man in the time of exerciſing or marſhalling ſhall be lowder then his Officer: but every one attending to his place, when he is commanded, ſhall diligently hearken to ſuch directions as ſhall be given. The Captain in the front ſhall ſpeak, and the Sergeants in each flank ſhall give the word unto the Lieutenant or Enſigne in the rere: who as in his proper place, ſeech all things executed accordingly as the Captain ſhall command. It ſhall be unpoſſible to performe any thing herein, unleſſe firſt every one do exactly obſerve his leader and his ſideman: and to this purpoſe it is often commanded, Keep your files, Keep your ranks.

Silence to
be kept.

Of Marches.

In champains there needs no great labour to marſhall particular troupes for their after-marches: becauſe they may march either by whole diviſions, obſerving onely their courſe of indifferency, that every diviſion may every third day have the vanguard; or elſe in ſuch form and faſhion as the Generall hath propoſed for a day of battell, according as the danger of an expected enemy ſhall give occaſion. But becauſe all countries will not afford a champain for

In a champ-
paine.

THE MANNER OF OUR

the marching of an army, and therefore not possible to march far with many troupes in front, nor many files of any one troupe or division, by reason of often straights, and passages betwixt hills, woods, or waters; It is provided, though by long induction, the whole army shall be extended into a thin length and few files, yet the souldiers well disposed shall be as readily able to defend themselves and offend the enemy on their flanks (from whence only in such straights the danger is imminent) as if they were to affront an enemy with an entire battallion in a champaign country.

In streights
or narrow
passages.

How to
march in a
division for
such a
march.

To reduce
them in
into their
first front.

The manner
of charging
pikes with
pikes.
Five ranks
only.

By the
whole
depth.

To charge
with mus-
ketiers.

First therefore a division or Battallion being ordered and drawn before the Quarter, into one even front of just files, ten in depth; the musketiers equally divided on the right and left flanks of the pikes, all standing in their order, that is to say, six feet distant in files and ranks; the Captain carefully provideth, that the first, fifth, sixth and tenth ranks be alwayes well filled and furnished with his most able and best-armed souldiers. Which done, he commandeth first the middlemen or half files to come a front with their leaders; so that the division becometh but five in depth. Next he commandeth to turn faces to the right or left hand, as direction shall be to march from that quarter: and so the whole division resteth ready in his fashion to march five in front, the one half of the musketiers in the vanguard and the other in the rere, the pikes in the battell, and both flanks well furnished with the ablest & best men to offend or defend, as there shall be occasion: that is to say, the right flanks with the first and fifth ranks, and the left with the sixth and tenth ranks. If occasion afterwards shall be given of a halt in a champaign or before the quartering, the Captain commandeth first unto all, (they being first closed into their order) Faces as you were; next unto the half files; Faces about, and march out, and fall again upon your files. By which means the division becometh again reduced into the same front and fashion from whence it was first transformed, ready to encounter an enemy, or to be drawn into the Quarter.

When pikes are to charge pikes in a champaign, it useth to be performed two severall wayes. First the whole division being commanded into their close order, the five first ranks charging their pikes, every follower over his leaders shoulder directeth his pike as equally as he can, & the first rank shall have three feet of his pike over the formost shoulder. The other five ranks with their pikes advanced follow close up in the rere, either ready to second the formost, or to be employed in the rere as occasion shall be offered. Otherwise and most usuall, when the whole depth of the files throughout the division shall charge together, all fast locked and united together, and therefore most able to make the strongest shock offensive or defensive: provided alwaies that none mingle their pikes in others files, but the whole file one in anothers shoulder.

In charging with musketiers, it is observed no way convenient that there should be too many in a rank, or that the ranks should be too long. For the first rank is commanded to advance ten paces before the second, and then to discharge, and wheeling either to the right or left hand, falleth into the rere; and so the second advancing to the same distance, dischargeth and wheeleth as before; and likewise the third, and so forward as long as the Officer shall be

com-

MODERN TRAINING.

commanded. Which shall not so well be performed the ranks being extraordinary long, because it will require so long a time to wheel from the front, that the second may succeed, unless by direction the rank may divide it self, the one half to the right hand and the other to the left in wheeling to the rere.

There must
not be too
many in a
rank.

In the retreat the whole ranks having turned their faces about, are to march three or four paces forward: their chief officer coming in the rere, first commandeth the last rank to make ready, and then to turn faces about & discharge, and wheel about to the head or front of the division: and being clearly passed, the next rank to perform as much: and so the rest in order.

In the
retreat.

Where the passages are narrow, and the division cannot come to charge in front, as between two waters or woods, the manner of charging is different: for there being five or ten files led in the induction, that file which flanketh the enemy dischargeth first onely, and the rest marching continually forwards, it standeth firm untill the last rank be passed, and then sleeveeth it self on the left flank and makes ready; and so the second file and the third, so long as the enemy shall continue, there being a continuall discharging by files as before by ranks. Unless it be in the pases of Ireland, meeting with an irregular enemy, where they use to intermingle their files of shot with pikes, that the one may be a defence for the other, when the enemy shall come up to the sword, as they use there very often.

The manner
of charging
by files in
narrow
passages.

In the pases
of Ireland.

How directions are delivered in the warres.

All directions in the wars have ever been delivered either by signes subject to the eye, by word of mouth, or the sound of a drumme, or some such warlike instrument. Concerning those visible signes displayed unto the souldiers, the falling of mists, the raising of dust, showers of rain & snow, the beams of the Sun, hilly, uneven and crooked passages, by long experience have found them to be most doubtfull and uncertain; as also because, as it was a matter of great difficulty to invent different signes upon all sodain occasions; so it is almost an impossibility, that the common souldier (who oftentimes is found scarce capable of the understanding of plain words distinctly pronounced) should both apprehend and understand sodainly, and execute directly the true sense and meaning of his Commanders signes.

By signes.

The Drum and Trumpet are yet used. But because many different sounds are not easily distinguished in souldiers understanding, without some danger of confusion, we onely command by the inarticulate sounds, to arm, to march, to troupe, to charge, and to retreat: with all which severall notes the souldier is so familiarly to be acquainted, that so soon as he hears them beaten, he may be ready sodainly to put them in execution, as if he heard his Captain pronouncing as much.

By drum or
trumpet.

The directions by word of mouth are infinite, according to the different occasions which shall be offered, yet alwayes with this caveat, that they be short, yet perspicuous, without all ambiguity, and plainly pronounced, first by the Captain,

By word of
mouth.

The most usual directing terms in exercising a Battalion or division.

Captain, then derived by the Sergeants through the division or Battallion. Though infinite, yet the most usuall are these: To your armes: Keep your files, keep your ranks: Follow your leader: Leaders look to your files: Keep your distance: Faces to your right hand: Faces to your left hand: Close your files: Close your ranks: Stand as you are: As you were: Faces about to the right hand: Wheel about to the right or left hand: Double your ranks: Double your files: Leaders countermarch through to the right or left hand: Leaders counter-march to the right or left hand and stand: Middlemen come forth and fall upon your leaders. Besides many fit terms commanded in managing particular armes, as pikes and muskets, which are omitted.

And thus much touching the Tactick practise of our modern wars: which I have the rather added, in regard that diverse souldiers, as unacquainted both with the manner and the value thereof, do think a heap of people unmartialled, to be as available for a great designe, as any other number distinguished in files and parts, and disposed for facile and easie motions, according to the powerfull circumstances of time and place. Wherein, howsoever the practise of the *Turk* and the *Hungarian* may seem to give warrant to that opinion, yet the use of Armes amongst the *Gracians* and the *Romans*, whose conquering armies are pregnant witnesses of the excellency of their militarie discipline, shall speak sufficiently for order and Tactick motion, as most necessary parts in a well-ordered war.

F I N I S.

